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Introduction 
 
This thesis is a comparative study of the Labour movements in Cork, a poorly industrialised 
city, and Derry, a semi-industrialised one, during the syndicalist years of the Irish Labour 
movement: 1917-23.1 Specifically, it is an investigation of how, and to what extent, 
syndicalism impacted the third and fourth cities of Ireland. It establishes the internal and 
external influences on Labour in two urban areas with disparate internal and external dynamics.  
The introduction provides a broad synopsis of the history of Irish Labour from 1850 
until 1923. By putting it in its socio-economic and political contexts, it explains the nature and 
ideological influences of the movement, as well as its relationship to British Labour. It thereby 
demonstrates how the themes of modernisation and decolonisation suffused Irish Labour from 
the late nineteenth century until the early 1920s, an era in which the contemporary movement 
was born. Syndicalism is the central concept of scrutiny. The introduction provides a detailed 
description of the ideology, how it manifested internationally and how Irish syndicalism 
differed from its international counterparts. It also describes the extant relevant literature and 
explains how this thesis compliments that body of work.     
Section I details the intense class conflict of the era in Cork and Derry individually 
before conducting a comparative analysis in its last chapter. In so doing, it examines why 
syndicalism held far greater sway in Cork and whether its workers did better under its influence 
than in Derry. Section I places class conflict in both places in the broader context of the social 
upheaval occurring both domestically and internationally. Furthermore, it contextualises class 
conflict by demonstrating the impact that the political turmoil consuming the island had upon 
it. The differences in the structure of the Labour movement in Cork and Derry is examined. 
Accordingly, there will be a strong focus on the Irish Transport and General Workers’ Union 
(ITGWU) and its conflict with British unions. It also analyses women’s experience of trade 
unionism and how men perceived the unionisation of women.   
Section II examines the relationship between Labour and the Irish revolution. Its 
structure is like the previous section. First, it outlines and compares how and why Labour 
participated in the revolution in two nationalist-majority cities. Then, it investigates how 
Labour was viewed and treated by the Irish revolutionaries and the Ulster Unionist 
counterrevolutionaries. This is achieved by investigating how employees fared within public 
authorities that changed hands from constitutional nationalist to republican in Cork, and from 
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Unionist to nationalist and back again in Derry. Section II’s final chapter compares the 
experiences of workers in both cities amid political revolution and reaction: where they 
converged, where they diverged and, ultimately, where Labour fared better and why. This 
social analysis reveals the class nature of republican revolution and Unionist reaction, and how 
Labour could expect to fare under the partition settlement. Most importantly, however, it 
illuminates the social dynamics of the Irish revolution. 
 
Overview and Background: Ireland and Irish Labour, 1850-1923 
Ireland’s economic performance between 1850 and 1914 was unusual by international 
standards. Huge levels of emigration caused a massive 25 per cent population decline between 
1851 and 1911. Traditional historiography claims that the country experienced economic 
decline in this period because emigration deprived it of some of its most able people – but 
recent scholarship has shown that this is inconsistent with the evidence.2 Even though they 
were among the first in Europe to experience deindustrialisation, the living standards of the 
Irish working class rose impressively and wages converged with Britain and the US.3 The 
driving force behind this growth is the subject of debate among historians. Some highlight 
emigration’s role in pushing Irish wages upwards by reducing under- and unemployment, 
sapping labour supply and integrating Ireland into global labour market conditions.4 Others 
focus on more foundational measures like economic structural change, capital accumulation 
and labour productivity.5 Cormac Ó Gráda estimates that national income per capita grew faster 
in Ireland than in Britain (it nearly trebled) between 1850 and 1914, rising from 40 to 57 per 
cent of British levels.6 By 1914, Irish tradesmen’s wages were nearly as high as their British 
peers, though the gap for labourers was still about 25 per cent.7 Between 1850 and 1920 Irish 
retail prices were largely determined in Britain because the export prices of agricultural 
produce, of which Britain was the chief market, became the ruling wholesale prices in Ireland. 
From 1874 to 1898, Irish wages grew in tandem with a decline in the cost of living, significantly 
improving workers’ living standards.8        
But these improvements did little to ameliorate long-standing gap between trade and 
spade; by the 1880s, British ‘new model unions’ had obtained wages for Irish tradesmen that 
were typically double that of their labourers. Established throughout the 1850s and 1860s, new 
model unions were, unlike their predecessor craft unions, centralised national organisations 
with full-time general secretaries. They levied high rates of contributions that enabled them to 
pay generous strike, sick and funeral benefits. They reflected the conservatism of the ‘labour 
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aristocracy’ (the mid-nineteenth century craftsman) and were reluctant to strike. They prided 
themselves on their ‘respectability’ and manoeuvred tactically by maintaining demand for 
labour through strict control of apprenticeships and the enforcement of restrictive practices. 
Prominent new model unions included the Amalgamated Society of Engineers (ASE), founded 
in 1851, and the Amalgamated Society of Carpenters and Joiners (ASCJ), founded in 1860, 
which shortly thereafter began organising in Ireland.9 Although new model unionism had a 
very limited appeal in both Cork and Derry, it re-orientated the values and outlook of Irish 
Labour towards Britain. This was British Labour’s contribution to the Anglicisation of Ireland. 
From the 1850s, Irish Labour applied the industrial methodology of British trade unionism, 
methods that were inapplicable in a poorly industrialised economy with high unemployment, a 
sparse number of tradesmen and a preponderance of unskilled labour. The foundation of the 
ITGWU in January 1909 was the beginning of the decolonisation of Irish Labour.10 Larkinism 
(1907-14) was the second of the three waves of unrest that revolutionised Irish Labour. The 
first was ‘new unionism’ (1889-92) and the third was syndicalism (1917-23).   
As the American and European economies emerged from recession in 1887, there was 
a resurgence of trade unionism and violent class conflict. The ‘new unions’ were distinguished 
by their militancy and organisation of the neglected unskilled labourer; some even recruited on 
a general basis. New unions charged low subscription rates and prioritised winning 
improvements in wages and conditions rather than just providing friendly benefits. New unions 
improved and defended their members’ living standards through strike, or at least the threat of 
it, and eschewed conciliation and arbitration. Strike tactics often included violence and 
blacking. New unionism anathematised the hitherto acceptable principle of voluntary 
participation in trade unionism and insisted on having a closed-shop.11 They recruited by 
appealing to class consciousness and solidarity. This was a central goal of the movement: the 
unification of the working class into a politically independent, assertive force. They believed 
proletarian interests went beyond industrial relations and advocated Labour representation in 
parliament. The demand for an eight-hour day became an international new unionist rallying 
cry. Accordingly, many new unionists flirted, however mildly, with socialism.  
New unionism had greater support from tradesmen in Ireland than in Britain as unions 
were much weaker in the former. Mental colonisation manifested itself in Irish Labour’s 
assumption that copying British Labour was the path to progress. Irish new unionism was 
essentially a reproduction of its British equivalent. It accelerated a process that had been 
ongoing since the 1830s: the assimilation of Irish Labour into the British movement. The 
‘amalgamateds’, as they were known, had been progressively subsuming local unions but 
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greatly increased this drive from 1889. Irish new unionism strongly depended on two factors 
beyond its control: British support and the health of the economy, which was gripped by 
another deep recession from 1891-94. The poor economy helped employers to crush the 
movement. New unionism was the first serious attempt to modernise Irish Labour. After its 
demise, old unionism regained its ascendency until 1907 with the advent of what Irish 
employers disparagingly called Larkinism. However, new unionism never truly died and there 
were ripples of recovery from 1894-5, 1897-8 and 1900-03. A more enduring new unionist idea 
materialised in 1894 with the creation of the Irish Trade Union Congress (ITUC), even though 
it embodied old unionist inertia until 1911.12  
In January 1907, the fortunes of Irish Labour began to change utterly when Big Jim 
Larkin arrived in Ireland to organise Belfast dockers for the moribund National Union of Dock 
Labourers (NUDL).13 Larkin brought with him not only a revitalised union but a philosophy of 
industrial and class relations. Momentum towards a second wave of new unionism had been 
gathering across Ireland since 1903. Real wages across the UK had been stagnant since 1896 
and rising food prices meant that workers’ living standards were diminishing in real terms. 
Rising unemployment also dragged labour to the left.14 Irish employers by now accepted craft 
unions, responsible and respectable as they were deemed to be, but opposed any unionisation 
of the unskilled. To them, the labourer could not be trusted to behave sensibly with a powerful 
weapon like trade unionism. Chaos would inevitably ensue from the wild demands that labour 
unions would make in a poorly industrialised economy that simply could not afford it. Larkin 
understood that Irish employers would have to be taken on directly via mass sympathetic 
action. If the NUDL would not commit the necessary resources to this fight then no British 
union would, in which case an Irish union was needed. In late 1908, the opportunity to 
breakaway arose when Larkin’s union executive expelled him for his militancy. Most of the 
Irish NUDL went with him and the ITGWU was born. The new union was the driving force of 
Larkinite agitation.15 But Larkin’s presence was not the only reason for the rebirth of militancy. 
When the Liberal Party government passed the 1906 Trade Dispute Act to reverse the Taff 
Vale judgement, it represented a shift from the laissez-faire economic liberalism the party had 
championed throughout the nineteenth century.16  
Ideologically, Larkinism had much in common with contemporary European 
syndicalism; while both were products of the same forces, notable differences existed between 
the two. Unlike syndicalism, Larkinism resulted from the absence of radical alternatives, not 
from disenchantment with them. However, like syndicalism, Larkinism exalted the ‘irrational’ 
aspect of the human condition. In other words, it infused new moral, rather than material, values 
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into Irish trade unionism. As an agitator, Larkin projected the workers as moral heroes and 
presented himself as the embodiment of their spiritual resurrection. Larkinism instilled new 
ethical values of class solidarity into the paradigm of class relations by ennobling methods 
which made possible the unionisation of the unskilled as part of a morality of struggle. Its 
ultimate manifestation was the sympathetic strike – its most efficacious weapon in the class 
war. Its three central characterises were a glorification of the working class, sympathetic action 
and class solidarity. It was part of the rebirth of militancy taking place across Europe and North 
America and was Ireland’s contribution to the international syndicalist insurgency.17 
Larkinism stimulated a growth in class consciousness, which galvanised women to 
organise. Until the early twentieth century, union leaders, the vast bulk of whom were men, 
were heavily influenced by prevailing societal views of gender roles. ‘The thought of 
organising women workers, of whom thousands and thousands worked in slave conditions . . . 
never crossed their minds.’18 Nevertheless, between 1870 and 1914 women in Ulster’s clothing 
industries struck several times, sometimes with remarkable success, despite not being 
organised. The strikes were not spontaneous or predicated on unionisation: the militancy was 
deeply rooted in the informal networks that existed among working-class women.19 But the 
benefits of trade union membership were obvious given women’s terrible economic status. 
Although some unions began accepting female members in the 1890s, most found it difficult 
to accept the presence of women in the labour market. By 1914, only a tiny percentage of 
women were organised.20 Labour leaders often insultingly attributed this to female apathy. 
While apathy may have contributed, it is a simplistic explanation to a complex phenomenon. 
Some historians have suggested that wages were so low that women could not afford to join a 
union; others have highlighted long working-hours which, combined with demanding domestic 
duties, gave women no time to organise.21 While it is sometimes wrong to view poor 
unionisation as evidence of an absence of class consciousness or a weak position in the labour 
market, the lack of labour market leverage was the central reason for pitiable levels of 
organisation among industrial workers of all kinds, including women.22  
Skill, gender, employer hostility and working-class family structure were also factors. 
Few of the era’s union leaders rejected the view that the man, as the breadwinner, should be 
able to earn a ‘family wage’ – enough to keep his wife and children in frugal comfort. Women 
could then remain in their rightful place, the home, catering for the family. The patriarchal 
notion of the family wage was all-pervasive in the ITUC. Congress was happy to accept the 
status quo that men should always be better paid than women in every job. The only reference 
to equal pay during all these years was a rhetorical flourish from James McCarron, a Derryman. 
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Even unions representing women did not raise the differential rates of pay between men and 
women. When the ITUC considered issues of material concern to women, it was often because 
it wanted to defend the men whose wages were being undercut by unorganised women. In this 
regard, the ITUC did not differ from its British counterpart, which in 1913 called for a 
minimum wage for men fifty per cent higher than that for women. Thus, gendered roles in 
labour movements and markets were common internationally, and Irish Labour must be 
understood in this context.23 
Irish union leaders also believed that low male wages forced many women to work to 
raise working-class family income to a ‘decent’ level. This view was informed by a certain 
perception of women’s unpaid work in the home: that it had no economic value and therefore 
did not deserve the same respect or consideration of men’s work. Many trade unionists assumed 
that women who worked were forced to it, rather than doing so out of desire. Some did indeed 
see work as simply an obligatory interregnum between school and marriage. Given the 
sectarian nature of Ulster life, the situation of Catholics in the province may have differed from 
Protestants. While Catholic women typically married casual labourers, it was more usual for 
Protestants to marry craftsmen who could support the family. Therefore, it was more likely that 
Catholic women would continue to work in the factories after marriage. But by the turn of the 
century – though the number of working females was declining – many women were choosing 
to work; at the very least, they were content to be at work. The main reasons for this were social 
– for the freedom and friendships that it brought: work gave women economic independence 
from men. However, this freedom may have weakened the impulse for unionisation.24  
The outbreak of the First World War in July 1914 brought adversities to the working 
class that were novel in nature and unprecedented in scale. Chief among them was the mass 
inflation caused by Germany’s devastating U-boat campaign against British merchant ships in 
the Atlantic.25 Profiteering by unscrupulous employers, shopkeepers and farmers was a major 
grievance from the start. In a foretaste of things to come, the average retail price of food went 
up 10 per cent at the war’s beginning.26 But inflation was just one reason the war necessitated 
a move toward a planned economy. Inevitably, the UK economy was geared towards the 
production of munitions and food, so Irish workers involved in these industries had a relatively 
‘good’ war. The war was very consequential for UK Labour in how it altered the nature of 
industrial relations and the role played by the state in class conflict. Despite ideological qualms, 
by early 1915 the British Government had developed an industrial wartime policy built around 
tackling four key issues: controlling the cost of living, maintaining essential war supplies, 
addressing labour shortages (arising from recruitment) and maintaining industrial peace. A 
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content working class was central to this strategy. Therefore, the state adopted Labour-friendly 
policies. The Committee on Production – on which employers, but not trade unionists, sat – 
was instituted in February 1915 to regulate wages, output and labour supply in the shipbuilding 
and engineering industries.27 The Munitions of War Act 1915 extended its terms to include all 
war industries. Strikes and lockouts were prohibited in these industries and compulsory, 
binding arbitration introduced. As it allowed this ban to be spread to other industries, the Act’s 
impact was far wider and more consequential than intended. Compulsory arbitration began to 
apply to industrial disputes across the economy and was not limited to munitions works. 
Workers benefited as employers were forced to the negotiating table. Previously, employers 
could grind out a victory by issuing a pre-emptive lockout and wait for strike pay to dry up. 
Now, they had no choice but to bargain with unions. Workers could issue strike notice and an 
improvement in pay was practically guaranteed. Conversely, binding arbitration encouraged 
trade union membership – which facilitated Irish Labour’s recovery after the 1913 Dublin 
lockout – and employers therefore bitterly resented it.28 However, the government was slower 
to control price increases. A Food Controller was appointed in December 1916 and began to 
phase in price controls on a selective basis.  
From 1907-14, Irish Labour had been both inactive and ineffective when compared to 
its British equivalent. By 1914, Irish unions had been completely exhausted with few tangible 
improvements to show for two decades of struggle.29 Labour was poorly placed to deal with 
the hardships caused by the war. For the Irish working class, it was a war of two halves as food 
shortages and inflation accentuated latent class tensions from 1914-16. By late 1916, food 
prices were, on average, 84 per cent above their pre-war level while the best paid workers were 
getting only 20 per cent above their pre-war wages.30 Southern cities had fewer industries 
relevant to the war effort than Ulster and their workforces contained much unskilled labour. 
Workers in the south were therefore less affected by the new atmosphere of class co-operation 
than Britain and Belfast from 1915 and missed out on the benefits that accrued. They 
increasingly locked horns with employers who profited from the war but were reluctant to share 
these profits in the form of wage advances. Employers grudgingly gave ‘war bonuses’ – a name 
given to highlight the temporary nature of the payment – to placate workers, but it was not 
enough. Moreover, Ireland’s low levels of military recruitment removed a further hindrance to 
industrial action.31 For these reasons, from 1917 Irish Labour was engulfed by its final, and 
most intense, wave of agitation: syndicalism.       




The essence of syndicalism 
More so than any other ideology or movement, syndicalism incorporated a vision of the 
working class rooted in a belief in its right to self-management and in its capacity to govern its 
own affairs.  
 
To syndicalists, the working class constituted the force for change, the economic terrain its 
natural battlefield, direction action its natural weapon, and self-directed labour associations the 
natural agencies for uniting, marshalling and applying the collective and ultimately 
revolutionary power of the workers.32 
 
Though it had radical and moderate wings, it is possible to broadly define syndicalism as 
‘revolutionary trade unionism’. Not only were unions the agents to overthrow capitalism but 
they contained the embryo of a new order. A truly democratic and egalitarian society could be 
governed by unions, not political parties or the state; so could a collectivised, worker-managed 
economy. Although it was an international phenomenon, syndicalism was far from 
homogeneous and varied considerably from country to country. While it grew out of socio-
economic and political conditions created by international capitalism, it manifested itself in 
direction relation to each country’s distinct material conditions and traditions.33 However, 
syndicalism everywhere had core theoretical and practical goals: revolutionary class warfare 
and direct action; rejection of political parties, parliamentary democracy and the capitalist state; 
trade unions as the vehicle of revolution; the general strike; workers’ control; and anti-
militarism and internationalism. Ideologically, it was a synthesis of Marxism, anarchism and 
revolutionary trade unionism. The national context determined which of these elements exerted 
the most influence.34  
Originating in France in the early 1890s (syndicat is the French word for trade union), 
syndicalism was born out of the perceived failure of the various forms of existing socialist 
politics and reformist trade unionism. Syndicalists maintained that political parties create an 
unaccountable elite that will inevitably betray the membership. Parties grouped their members 
according to their beliefs and not their class: professionals, intellectuals even landlords and 
capitalists could be members of a socialist party. Trade unions grouped workers according to 
their class interests irrespective of belief. If the political party was an association of choice, the 
trade union was an association of necessity.35 Besides, political power simply reflected 
economic power. Syndicalists sought to use trade unions – which they regarded as the most 
authentic manifestation of working-class struggle – to replace expressions of industrial 
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grievances with revolutionary class consciousness. The organisation of all workers into One 
Big Union was the logical conclusion of this process. The working class could then utilise its 
most effective weapon, the general strike, to smash capitalism and seize power at the point of 
production.36  
General strikes took place in Belgium in 1893 and 1902, in Sweden in 1902 and 1909, 
in the Netherlands in 1903, in Italy in 1904 and during the 1905 Russian revolution. It was not 
until the 1890s, simultaneous to the emergence of syndicalism, that the general strike became 
a practical possibility. There are two reasons for this. First, the working class had become so 
numerous that any prolonged strike could seriously destabilise the economy. Second, workers 
had achieved enough organisation and class consciousness, at least in the essential economic 
sectors, to make a widespread work stoppage viable. This occurred in most developed capitalist 
countries between 1870 and 1900.37 The unprecedented urbanisation of the late nineteenth 
century also aided syndicalism’s birth: workers began to live in segregated, homogenous 
neighbourhoods which often heightened class consciousness and fostered solidarity. It is not a 
coincidence that syndicalism coincided with the onset of the ‘second industrial revolution’. 
Technological innovation, especially the introduction of new sources of power like electricity 
and the internal combustion engine, altered the nature of the economy and, consequently, 
working conditions.38       
Syndicalists believed that industrial harmony was illusionary because the interests of 
employers and workers were irreconcilable; therefore, class conflict was unavoidable under 
capitalism. In the long-term, intense class warfare via direct action should be waged against 
the bourgeoisie and the capitalist state that buttressed them. With capitalism overthrown, the 
proletariat, not politicians or bureaucrats, would control society. Not only was syndicalism an 
ideological doctrine but, more importantly, a mode of action: a practical social movement. 
Indeed, it began as a philosophy of action that emphasised revolutionary spontaneous struggle 
rather than preconceived notions of how society should be structured. Despite syndicalism’s 
theoretical thinness, many leading exponents, including James Connolly and Larkin, were self-
educated ‘worker intellectuals’ who became widely respected for their oratorical abilities and 
knowledge of economics and working-class history.39 Larkin had been a docker and foreman, 
and Connolly a navvy, builders’ labourer and shipyardman; syndicalism in France, Italy, the 
US and Britain was led by tradesmen and white-collar workers.40  
Syndicalism strove to create a proletarian counterculture to replace the perceived 
decadence of bourgeois society; economic revolution would herald a moral transformation. 
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Syndicalists were critical of Marxism’s presentation of itself as a ‘value-free’, rational science 
and instead tried to fuse moral and material goals to mass mobilise. Like Larkinism, it did this 
by appealing to the ‘irrational’ traits of the human psyche. Myth was central to both ideology 
and action. It was through myth that socialism could unlock mobilising forces like faith, will, 
intuition and morality. An almost mythological exaltation of the workers as a virtuous, risen 
people on the cusp of moral grandeur existed in the syndicalist current. Having captivated both 
Larkin and Connolly, syndicalism was the most popular form of revolutionary socialism until 
it lost that honour to communism in 1917 after the Bolshevik Revolution.41   
 
Irish and international syndicalism 
In early twentieth century France, industrialisation lagged Germany, Britain and America, and 
so the country contained a large artisanal workforce employed in small-scale workshops. When 
mechanisation, deskilling and absorption into the factory system threatened the control over 
work, craftsmen turned en mass to the syndicalist CGT (General Confederation of Labour) and 
the decentralised ‘trade socialism’ it propounded. Railwaymen and miners were also 
prominent. The French revolutionary tradition and the legacy of the Paris Commune also 
spurred on the development of French syndicalism. At its height in 1920, the CGT had 2½ 
million members.42  
Backwardness also provided the basis for syndicalism in Spain and Italy, where (like 
France to a lesser extent) the anarchist influence was most pronounced (Spain in particular). 
‘Normal’, non-revolutionary trade unionism was impossible in semi-feudal, absolutist Spain 
with its powerful aristocracy, weak bourgeoisie and fiercely intransigent employers. Thus, 
landless labourers and Catalonian industrial workers were all receptive to the CNT’s 
(Confederación Nacional del Trabajo) brand of anarcho-syndicalism: it had 790,948 members 
in December 1919. The USI (Unione Sindacale Italiana) was a product of the profound wealth 
disparity between the country’s industrialised north and penurious south. For a brief period, it 
successfully united farm labourers, building tradesmen and some industrial workers. It peaked 
in late 1919 with a membership of 305,000.43  
In Britain and America, syndicalism was a consequence of the increasing industrial 
concentration in the hands of a small group of capitalists. In the former (like France), failure to 
halt managerial control over work also aided syndicalist fervour among metal craftsmen, 
workers hitherto conservative. But it also found support among miners and construction and 
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transport workers. British syndicalism was embodied by the Industrial Syndicalist Education 
League, founded in 1911, and the wartime shop stewards’ movement among engineers. 
American employers were even more aggressive, and many resisted any unionisation of 
workers. Fierce class warfare was the result. From this milieu emerged the IWW (Industrial 
Workers of the World or ‘Wobblies’) in 1905. It was eagerly supported by unorganised 
migratory labourers, miners, seafarers and industrial workers, and incurred ferocious hostility 
and violence from the local, state and federal governments.44  
Like Spain and Italy and Ireland, syndicalism in the US and Canada reflected the 
countries’ regional economic divides and contradictions. In the American and Canadian west, 
harsh material conditions radicalised workers and drove a wedge between them and the 
reformist craft unions of the east. In the west, exploitation was more acute, employers more 
obdurate and the alliance of capital and government more obvious than on the eastern 
seaboards. Revolutionary unionism in both countries was most popular in the industrial, 
logging and mining communities of the west, both heavily populated by immigrants.45 
‘Industrial concentration, the growth of mass production industries, technological changes, and 
corporate control all developed in largely virgin territory, preceding, superseding, or breaking 
whatever labour-union traditions had previously existed.’46 Canada’s One Big Union was 
established in 1919 and had 40-50,000 members by late 1919/early 1920 before contracting to 
5,000 by early 1921. By 1922, it was all but dead outside Winnipeg.47  
 The emergence of vast industrial monopolies in late nineteenth century North America 
underscored the weakness of a divided working class and made the One Big Union an 
organisation necessity. Like other countries that industrialised after 1870, the same forces 
shaped syndicalism in Germany, where revolutionary trade unionism was embodied in dual 
unionism. Here, the socialist movement was founded before the labour unions, who were 
strongly associated with social democratic politics from their beginning. After the Great War 
and the 1918-19 revolution, many dockers and sailors at the North Sea ports, building workers, 
chemical and shipbuilding workers, and miners and metalworkers in the Ruhr and middle 
Germany embraced the anarcho-syndicalist FAUD (Freie Arbeiter-Union Deutschlands), 
whose membership reached 111,675 in late 1919. In contrast to Britain and France, semiskilled 
workers led German anarcho-syndicalism after 1918.48  
Dutch revolutionary trade unionism was led by the NAS (Nationaal Arbeids-
Secretariaat). Founded in 1893, it turned to syndicalism during the war when workers raced to 
join it. Its membership peaked at 51,000 in 1920, with construction workers, transport workers 
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(especially dockers) and municipal employees particularly prominent. By 1924, however, this 
figure had shrunk to 13,000. In Sweden, the SAC (Sveriges Arbetares Centralorganisation) was 
born out in 1910 of economic depression, social democrat revisionism and employer 
aggression. Until 1917, it was a militant anarcho-syndicalist organisation. But by 1922, it had 
accepted an evolutionary path to socialism via increasing workers’ control. In the mid-1920s it 
had over 37,000 workers in its ranks, mainly building and forest workers. In neighbouring 
Norway and Denmark, syndicalists formed opposition groups in their countries’ Labour 
movements that were powerful from 1917-20. In 1920, the Norwegian opposition took control, 
but by then syndicalism played a secondary role to Bolshevism. In Portugal (like Spain and 
Italy), socio-political and economic backwardness ensured that anarcho-syndicalism remained 
the foremost brand of revolutionary socialism. When the CGT (Confederação Geral do 
Trabalho) was founded in 1919, capitalism in Portugal was still highly underdeveloped and 
republican liberal democracy only nine years old. Parliament’s inability to delivery for workers 
drove the union’s expansion: it grew to 150,000 members in 1921 (when there were only 
170,000 industrial workers in the country) with construction workers playing a leading role.49      
 Syndicalism was not solely a Western phenomenon. From the 1880s to the 1930s, 
anarcho-syndicalism dominated Labour movements in Argentina, Brazil, Mexico, Peru and 
Cuba. Syndicalism was also a significant force in Paraguay, Uruguay, Bolivia and Ecuador, 
and visible in Costa Rica, Venezuela, Puerto Rico and Panama.50 Beginning in the late 
nineteenth century, radical South European immigrants helped to spread anarcho-syndicalism 
to these countries. This globalisation owes much to the IWW and its organisation of sailors. 
True to its name, it brought syndicalism to Australia, New Zealand, South Africa and Japan to 
name but a few.51 In Chile, it became a powerful union until its suppression by the country’s 
dictatorship in 1927. The Mexican Wobblies had 80,000 members in 1928-29.52 
The explicitly anarchist FORA (Federación Obrera Regional Argentina) was founded 
in 1901 and attracted mass support from disenfranchised immigrants. It spread rapidly and led 
several general strikes, some of which involved hundreds of thousands of workers. In 1915 it 
split into anarchist and non-anarchist unions. The former’s membership peaked at 10,000 while 
the latter’s reached 100-120,000 by 1919. Both were central to Argentina’s ‘Tragic Week’ in 
January 1919 when a strike at a Buenos Aires ironworks led to riots and violent clashes with 
police and far-right terror squads that left over 700 dead and over 2,000 wounded.53 From 1917-
19, Brazil was convulsed by general strikes in its major cities when workers took militant action 
against grinding poverty, long working hours, low wages and inflation. The unrest climaxed in 
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November 1918 when the anarchists attempted an uprising. At its 1919 height, the syndicalist 
Brazilian Workers’ Confederation had 100-125,000 members in Rio de Janeiro alone. State 
repression and a swing to reformism helped to kill the revolutionary fervour. Simultaneously, 
via the Casa del Obrero Mundial, Mexican workers built by far the largest anarcho-syndicalist 
movement the Americas has ever seen. Founded in 1914 during the Mexican Revolution, the 
Casa’s propagation of governance based on workers’ syndicates spearheaded a rapid growth 
among artisans and labourers alike. By 1916 its ranks had swelled to nearly 150,000 members 
before an alliance of state and capital crushed it.54   
Irish syndicalism was more a mentality than a movement. It was a native expression of 
the international unrest – a reprise of Larkinite militancy in response to unbridled wartime 
inflation and revolution at home and abroad. Connolly’s contribution to syndicalism was his 
emphasis on class unity, to be realised in industrial unions and, ideally, the OBU (which he 
learned from the Wobblies). Irish syndicalism was also the product of structural factors. 
Syndicalism tended to be strongest in backward parts of advanced countries where labourers 
were neglected by the established unions. As an area heavily reliant on primary production 
where industrial tactics had to be militant, southern Ireland was a typical centre of 
syndicalism.55  
Republican revolution and Ulster Unionist counterrevolution at home also radicalised 
Irish Labour. The war had destabilised conservative politics, creating the space for radicalism 
to flourish. The Easter Rising was a consequence of this destabilisation and it began a political 
re-alignment in the south from constitutional nationalism to Sinn Féin. Ulster Unionism 
responded by tightening inter-class bonds, quashing radical impetuses in the process. For this 
reason, among others, syndicalism was largely, though not entirely, a southern phenomenon. 
From 1919-21, the age of the bourgeois, capitalist state appeared to be over and the fabled 
‘workers’ republic’ became something other than a radical pipe dream. The re-emergence of 
products unavailable in wartime had triggered a boom from 1919-20 that fuelled this 
possibility. Overproduction led to a capitalist crisis from 1921-24, when political and employer 







Methodology and evaluation of primary sources 
Until recent times, the concept of class had been the central methodological focus of Labour 
history. This was a direct result of Marxism’s status as the primary method of analysis for 
Labour historians, with Weberianism also prominent. But this dominance has been recently 
challenged by scholars who argue that Labour history should be studied in the context of 
society’s gender, ethnic, racial, cultural and religious divisions.57 These historians are critical 
of mono-casual explanations based on class and the chief supposition of traditional Labour 
historiography: that the working class acts in accordance with its long-term class interests. 
More so than anything else, gender has established itself as the main methodological rival to 
class within Labour history. Moreover, some of those who do accept class analysis reject 
orthodox Marxist theory and view alternative methods as complimenting, and not in conflict 
with, the centrality of class.58 The traditional objects of class analysis have also changed. 
Labour history has traditionally focussed on occupations and industries as the objects of 
analysis, most of which has manifested as studies of trade unions, individuals, time periods, 
workplaces and groups of workers.59 Labour and social historians have largely operated on the 
basis that the working class and its organisations are national entities. Thus, the nation state 
has been considered the logical unit of analysis. This methodological nationalism began to 
change from the 1960s when historians became aware of the benefits of international, 
comparative studies of the working class. Within this comparative history the nation state 
remained the centre of focus as historians have compared Labour movements or aspects thereof 
in two or more countries. This method is extremely valuable as an illuminator of national 
similarities and differences, thereby linking micro- and macro-history. But it is important that 
the researcher not treat separate units as overly casually independent, the assumption of which 
is implicit in the comparative methodology.60 Although, there has been a major growth of 
interest in the local and spatial dimensions of Labour history, national borders remain the 
principal parameters of study.61   
 This thesis combines elements of both the ‘old’ and the ‘new’ methodologies. Like 
traditional Marxist historiography, its central focus is class. Accordingly, strikes and lockouts 
are vigorously examined to analyse the nature of class and the strength of class consciousness 
(a concept that will also be examined). However, it also employs methodologies of gender, 
religion and ethnicity when discussing, ethnoreligious and gender-based proletarian divisions. 
It is an empirical ‘history from below’ that narrates the experience of rank-and-file workers in 
a turbulent era; employers and political actors are secondary. Most obviously and significantly, 
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it is a comparative history.62 Utilising national parameters, it demonstrates how the Irish 
working class was divided by non-material factors; simultaneously, it shows how the spread of 
syndicalism in the south had a material basis. There are several reasons why Cork and Derry 
were chosen. There are deep structural, economic political, ethnic, religious and gender 
differences between the two cities that make a comparative study illuminating. This dissertation 
facilitates the testing of hypotheses about Irish Labour history (mental colonisation) to explain 
historical outcomes (conservative revolution, partition). This comparison also reveals the 
different impact that major external developments (syndicalism, the Bolshevik Revolution) had 
on Labour in Cork and Derry.  
 Primary sources reflect the focus on workers rather than unions or officials. 
Unfortunately, the years covered made this more difficult than a study of a more contemporary 
period because receiving oral testimony was not possible. In lieu of interviews, local 
newspapers were the major primary source to chronicle the workers’ experience, especially 
during strikes and lockouts. The upsurge in class conflict was accompanied by a more extensive 
Labour press and greater coverage of unions in the mainstream media. The Cork Examiner and 
the Derry Journal are ubiquitous throughout. There is a simple explanation for this: as 
nationalist papers, both were more sympathetic to Labour than their Unionist rivals – the Cork 
Constitution, Londonderry Sentinel and the Derry Standard – and therefore gave it far more 
column. However, neither were Labour papers and many strikes and lockouts received only 
fleeting references or no coverage at all. The political tumult inevitably took precedence. This 
is especially apparent in the Derry papers which mirrored the city’s politico-sectarian divisions. 
Newspapers also gave fuller accounts of the meetings of public bodies covered in this study 
than their minutes did. This was more valuable for Derry where public institutions usually met 
monthly rather than weekly, as was the case in Cork. As no records exist for the Cork or Derry 
trades councils for 1917-25, newspaper reports had to suffice.   
 Where newspapers failed, British state files filled the gap. Appendices concerning 
strikes, government arbitration and long-term wage and cost-of-living fluctuations could not 
have been constructed without the Ministry of Labour’s records. Its monthly publication, the 
Labour Gazette, was therefore vital. However, small strikes and lockouts or changes in wages 
and hours in Ireland often went unnoticed by the recording clerks. Trade-union and 
employer/business records also aided in the creation of this data. The minute books of trade 
union executives were quite uninformative. They reflect a disconnect that often existed 
between headquarters and individual branches, something painfully apparent within British 
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unions that considered Ireland to be of secondary importance. As they were written for a 
general audience, union journals and newspapers shine a stronger light on how British trade 
unionists perceived events in Ireland.    
 A major difficulty in conducting any comparison of Cork and Derry was the unevenness 
of archival material: Cork has far more records available than Derry. No trade union records 
from Derry branch survive from the era. Moreover, as Derry was not a centre of the Irish 
revolution, few personal papers of locals who participated in it survive. Furthermore, unlike 
Cork, no Derry paper was a daily; only weekly and tri-papers were produced.  
 
Existing literature and historiography 
The shortness of this review reflects the dearth of literature on the topics covered in this thesis. 
Although the Irish revolution has a voluminous historiography, there remains a dearth of 
research into Labour during these years. Irish syndicalism remains deeply under-researched, 
even though 1917-23 is among Irish Labour history’s most studied periods. Syndicalism 
outside of Ireland has received more attention but it too remains under-researched.63 Only 
Marcel van der Linden and Wayne Thorpe have tried to explain why it was such an 
international phenomenon. They pinpoint five things that had to happen in a country before 
syndicalism took hold: growth of radicalism among workers, changes labour processes, 
rejection of the dominant labour strategy, embrace of the general strike, and spatial and 
geographical influences.64 Whilst their input is invaluable, there are limitations. There is no 
scrutiny of the interdependency of variables or assessment of the extent to which they 
influenced each other. Both rightly speak of the characteristics of global syndicalism but speak 
little of syndicalism’s different national manifestations. Moreover, there is insufficient 
international comparison. Factors crucial to syndicalism’s birth, like the role of the state, 
ideological influences (like anarchism) and employer and state repression, are ignored.65 
 Ralph Darlington’s Radical Unionism (2008) partially fills these lacunae. It is a highly 
informative book that demonstrates how syndicalism adapted to unique socio-cultural, political 
and socio-economic contexts. It does this by a comparative study of six countries: the US, 
Britain, France, Spain, Italy and Ireland. It explains syndicalism’s growth by analysing 
industrial and economic backcloth; political context; trade union framework; anarchism and 
other ideological influences; level of workers’ struggle and political radicalisation; conscious 
and organised syndicalist intervention; and international cross-fertilisation of syndicalist 
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movements.66 The strength of Darlington’s work lies in its comparative nature and enunciation 
of the complex relationship between syndicalism and communism, and how the latter’s growth 
in popularity aided the former’s demise. However, beyond that comparative context nothing 
new is revealed about Irish syndicalism as the sections dealing with Ireland lack detail.  
 Despite recent advances, Irish Labour historiography remains sparse. This was 
commented upon three decades ago by Emmet O’Connor and it remains the case. A prime 
example of the neglect is Conor Kostick’s Revolution in Ireland (1996). Though its subject is 
proletarian militancy during the revolutionary years, it does not discuss syndicalism to any 
significant degree and therefore contributes little new to working-class history. Furthermore, 
Kostick’s argument of a militant rank-and-file ‘betrayed’ by a conservative leadership is 
simplistic and overly influenced by his Trotskyite politics. A better account is provided by 
O’Connor, whose Syndicalism in Ireland (1988) remains the most authoritative study of Irish 
syndicalism. Essential for any social analysis of the revolutionary years, it is an excellent 
dissection of the ideological origins and nature of Irish syndicalism, and its impact on Labour. 
Equally impressive is its discussion of Labour’s participation in the national struggle and how 
the rulings classes perceived the syndicalist insurgency. However, the book’s language is 
unnecessarily dense, making it difficult to understand in parts and unsuitable for a general 
audience. O’Connor’s A Labour History of Ireland (1992) is a foundational text for any study 
of Irish Labour history. However, some of its arguments are dated and others are unclear due 
to poor quality of writing. An example of the former is its claim that the Irish economy declined 
from 1850; an example of the latter is its assertion that Irish Labour’s growing dependence on 
Britain is indicative of economic decline.67  
 The historiography’s limited nature is especially apparent for Labour in Cork and 
Derry; the movement in Dublin and Belfast has been more thoroughly researched.68 A notable 
exception Andrew Finlay’s PhD thesis on trade unionism and sectarianism in Derry’s shirt 
industry – an excellent work of historical anthropology. It conducts a multifaceted examination 
that explores the influence of unionisation, politics, sectarianism, craft and gender on the 
working life of the shirt worker. This is one by the collection of oral testimony from the shirt 
workers themselves. Finlay’s interviews with participants in the 1920 shirt cutters’ strike, like 
Peadar O’Donnell, was especially beneficial to this thesis. His dissertation’s greatest strength 
is its explanation of the role that gender played in influencing the (overwhelmingly male) 
cutters’ behaviour towards their (female) co-workers on the factory floor. Finlay succeeds in 
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achieving his main goal: debunking what he sees as Connolly’s incorrect analysis of northern 
Labour that exercised an undue influence over subsequent Marxist historiography.69  
Some of his claims (like the extent to which gender dynamics impacted trade unionism 
in the shirt industry) are disputed by O’Connor, who also helped to fill the lacuna of Derry 
Labour history. His two short books on the subject are extensively used and helped to establish 
a narrative. They skilfully apply his theories of mental colonisation and modernisation of Irish 
Labour to the Derry context. The first, which covered the years 1889-1906, adeptly reveals the 
radical and inclusive nature of new unionism in Derry, something Shane McAteer also did.70 
O’Connor’s second book, which covers 1907-23, shows how sectarianism was a major reason 
for the power of British unions in this nationalist-majority city. The British, he argues, were 
able to avoid sectarian splits by eschewing the Ulster question thereby keeping nationalists and 
Unionists in the same unions. Moreover, it shows how northern Connollyites of the era 
understood the Ulster Protestant working class in a way that revisionist Marxism has not fully 
appreciated. This thesis supports O’Connor’s propositions. However, both books are very short 
and do not detail the multifaceted dynamics of the revolutionary era and how they impacted 
Derry Labour. Whilst working-class history is only a minor concern for Robert Gavin, William 
Kelly and Dolores O'Reilly, they cover the topic at various points in Atlantic Gateway (2009). 
Their history covers all aspects of Derry’s port, including a social history of those who worked 
there. It is thorough and impressively researched, which helped to provide much-needed socio-
economic context. However, its slant is conservative, and the authors take an unsympathetic 
view towards Labour that O’Connor attacks as ‘pro-establishment’.71  
      Historians have been similarly neglectful of Cork Labour during the Irish Revolution, 
though this is not true for the nineteenth century. Maura Cronin has added several masterful 
studies that chronicle several aspects of working-class life in the nineteenth century: trade 
unionism, Fenianism, leisure, and political and economic context. Especially advantageous was 
how she exhibited the enormous importance the craftsman applied to his trade and how this 
inhibited working-class unity in Cork. Her work is complimented by Edward Lahiff’s MA 
thesis.72 As one of the only studies of the Cork economy and Labour movement in the twentieth 
century, Lahiff’s work was an important source. It is well-researched and utilises an impressive 
array of sources, thus allowing a more holistic study of Cork industry and Labour. However, 
there is no discussion or analysis of syndicalism and there is insufficient detail on the 1917-21 
period, years that merit the most attention from Labour historians. Moreover, avoidable factual 
errors undermine its quality (see Endnote 66).73 Stephen McQuay Reddick’s masters thesis 
19 
 
suffers from the opposite problem. Although its analysis is more accurate and conclusions 
nearer to the mark, it is too dependent on local primary sources and provides and inadequate 
national and international context.74 The broader picture was provided by John Borgonovo, 
whose strength as a historian is proven by his dexterous ability to put the revolutionary political 
and military upheavals the city endured in their socio-economic and political contexts. The 
Dynamics of War and Revolution (2013) is a thorough account of Cork life during the early 
revolutionary period that achieves just that. It was most useful when examining the rise of the 
amiable relationship between the Labour and republican movements and the crossover that 
existed between them. Unfortunately, it too contains errors about Cork’s Labour movement 
that negatively affect its quality (see Endnote 68).75     
   The extent to which class antagonisms influenced the nature and outcome of the Irish 
revolution has received attention from the earliest histories of the revolution. Many historians 
have detected some class basis to the Treaty split. Pro-Treatyite P.S. O’Hegarty implicitly 
highlights the ‘respectable’, middle-class nature of the Treatyites’ conservative nationalism. 
On the other side, Dorthy Macardle’s insinuates a natural affinity between republicanism and 
workers, farm labourers and small farmers. Macardle’s view was repeated in the 1960s when 
the modern historiography of the civil war was born. Republicanism was typically presented 
as a phenomenon of the land-hungry rural proletariat eager for the redistribution of wealth and 
power. The Free State’s primary backers were the employers, merchants, large farmers, 
remnants of the Anglo-Irish Ascendency, the press and the Catholic Church.76 Generalisations 
like these are problematic. Labour was officially ‘neutral’ on the Treaty and trade unionists 
were on both sides of the civil war.77  
 The Irish revolution contains a small but influential Marxist historiography.78 Here, the 
case for class as a determinant of the revolution is made most strongly. Previous generations 
of Marxists saw British rule as the root cause of Ireland’s problems, including partition and 
northern sectarianism. They agreed that Ireland’s status as a colonised country meant that Sinn 
Féin’s ‘bourgeois nationalism’ could aid the proletarian struggle and have a complimentary 
relationship to socialism. In his influential biography of Liam Mellows, Charles Desmond 
Greaves, who embodied this school of thought more than anyone, used dialectical materialism 
to explain the complex social and class dynamics of the 1916-23 period.79 He argued that the 
petit bourgeoisie, the most numerous bourgeois class, turned to Sinn Féin after the collapse of 
the Irish Parliamentary Party, Labour having abstained to preserve the unity of the trade union 
movement. This betrayal of the working class was crucial to the formation of the Irish state. It 
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left the petit bourgeoisie without allies during the Treaty split, allowing conservative propertied 
interests to rally to the Free State which thus emerged victorious. Although the Irish’s 
proletariat class consciousness came to the fore during the revolution – as evidenced by the 
litany of strikes, soviets, land seizures, cattle drives and other forms of unrest – the petit-
bourgeoisie’s domination of republicanism produced a ‘counterrevolutionary’ Treaty 
settlement.80   
 Justifiably, this argument has been heavily revised or dismissed completely by 
subsequent Marxists. These ‘revisionists’ offer a class analysis that exposes the strength of the 
rural bourgeoisie that led Sinn Féin and argue that social revolution was never a possibility. 
Sinn Féin’s revolution was an inherently conservative one because its republicanism was a 
manifestation of reactionary, bourgeois Catholic nationalism.81 Ulster Unionism is not simply 
a pernicious product of British misrule held together by imperial manipulation and deceit, but 
a movement as complex and internally divided as republicanism. As the British state is much 
more heavily influenced by a much stronger Labour movement than its Irish equivalent, the 
British presence in the north is not inherently harmful to working-class interests. Highlighting 
Unionism’s proletarian support and the Ulster Protestant’s potential for radicalism are central 
goals of this agenda.82 Austen Morgan, Henry Patterson, Paul Bew and Peter Gibbon are major 
proponents of this school of thought which is sometimes difficult to distinguish from non-
Marxist, Unionist historiography.83 Their work has been attacked by some as academic 
whitewashing of partition and the history of British rule in Ireland.84 Greaves and co. are more 
positively received by contemporary (northern) Marxists who agree with his ‘nationalist’ view 
that British rule and its underwriting of reactionary Ulster Unionism is the source of partition 
and the persistence of conflict.85 They argue that working-class Unionism is due to a deceptive 
policy of ‘labour aristocracy’: the deliberate creation of a well-paid, skilled Protestant stratum 
at the expense of Catholics, most of whom were labourers. The complexities of and intra-class 
tensions within loyalism render this view too simplistic to be taken seriously.86  
 This dissertation enhances the historiography of the Irish revolution in five ways. 
Firstly, it describes Labour in Cork and Derry during some of the most eventful years in Irish 
history more thoroughly than any existing study. Secondly, it is the first historical study that 
compares Labour in two structurally distinct Irish cities, disparate in terms of their religious, 
gender, political and demographic compositions. Thirdly, it helps to move Labour 
historiography away from Dublin and Belfast and raise appreciation of the working-class 
history of other cities. Fourthly, by comparing a city in the six counties to one in the twenty-
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six counties, it improves our understanding of Labour’s role in partition. Lastly, it aids our 
understanding of a period whose historiography is dominated by military studies. By providing 
local studies of Labour, north and south, this thesis informs the historiography of Labour and 
the Irish revolution on a national level.  
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Industry and Labour in Cork and Derry, 1850-1917 
 
From 1850 to 1917, working-class life in Cork and Derry changed significantly, albeit in 
diverse ways. Derry achieved impressive levels of industrialisation. Shipyards and a tramway 
had sprung up, it acquired the biggest coachworks in the north of Ireland and Watt’s distilleries 
had become world-renowned. Most impressive was the growth of its shirt industry, which had 
become the biggest in the UK. A 1908 government report could realistically call Derry a 
‘prosperous town’.1 In the same report, Cork was described as a ‘town which depends chiefly 
upon its natural situation for its means of sustenance’.2 In contrast to Derry, it had significantly 
deindustrialised over the period, leaving it with an even larger pool of unskilled labour. 
Dockers, railwaymen and general labourers dominated its male employment structure. The 
cities’ distinct histories were mirrored in their Labour movements. In the nineteenth century, 
little differentiated the two. However, from the early twentieth century, ethno-sectarian, 
political and industrial differences put them on separate paths. Irish Labour’s syndicalist era 
crystalized these differences.    
 
Table 1. 1: Populations of Cork and Derry, 1851-1911 
Cork Derry  
Year Population Change Population Change  
1851 87,758 - 20,135 - 
1861 80,121 -8.7% 20,875 +3.68% 
1871 78,642 -1.8% 25,242 +20.92% 
1881 80,124 +1.9% 29,162 +15.53% 
1891 75,345 -6.0% 33,200 +13.85% 
1901 76,122 +1.0% 39,892 +20.16% 
1911 76,673 +0.7% 40,780 +2.2% 
Source: Cost of Living of the Working Classes, 1908, Cd. 3864, CVII, UKPP, pp. 573, 583; Cost of Living of the 








Economy and Poverty, 1850-1917 
Working life and Labour in Cork had been transformed over the course of the nineteenth 
century. The advent of factory-based machinery in the latter half of the century did much to 
undermine the power of the city’s traditional crafts. This was compounded by the disintegration 
of the manufacturing sector caused by the integration of the Irish and British economies, as 
mandated by the Act of Union. The removal of tariffs devastated many local industries as they 
were unable to compete with British products that were often cheaper and/or of superior 
quality. Many trades and industries went into terminal decline.3 Like every other city outside 
of Ulster, by 1914 Cork had reached an industrial nadir: its industrial base was thinner than 
what it had been in 1800.4 
 The First World War saw a temporary reversal of fortunes in some industries. 
Employment at Rushbrooke and Passage dockyard doubled to 800.5 Industrial growth also took 
place at the Cork Spinning and Weaving Company, where 700 women produced aeroplane 
cloth. The opening of an artillery shell factory in 1916 gave Cork its sole share in the vast 
growth of the UK’s munitions industry.6 However, most workers had a less positive 
experience.7 The government diverted raw materials for war production which made them 
scarce and costly, damaging many industries. The destruction of mercantile shipping created 
shortages of coal, timber and cement, making raw materials even more expensive. The building 
trade was hit particularly badly, with its labourers experiencing ‘distress’ by the summer of 
1917.8 Government-imposed limitations on the use of barley caused Murphy’s brewery to sack 
half of its coopers in February 1915 and a further one-third of its staff in May 1917. By 1917, 
short-time hours and enforced holidays without pay were common in the printing trade because 
of paper shortages.9 However, in 1917 Cork’s economy received a major boost when Henry 
Ford opened a manufacturing plant at the Marina. A highly mechanised Fordson tractor factory 
opened on 1 July 1919 and provided much male employment.10 Employment structures in Cork 
were typical for an Irish city: male-dominated and sexually segregated. Women typically 
worked in the textile, linen, upholstery and tailoring trades (see Table 1. 8).11   





Table 1. 2: Employment in Cork, 1919 
Industry Numbers Employed 
Coachbuilding 150 
Jam & preserves 180 
Boot & shoemaking 400 
Bacon curing 250 
Shirtmaking 250 
Engineering 350 
Boot & shoemaking 400 
Flourmilling 400 
Dock work 500 
Brewing & distilling 600 
Spinning & weaving 1,000 
Sawmilling & munitions 1,500 
Wool 1,800 
Source: D.J. Coakley (ed.), Cork: Its Trade and Commerce – Official Handbook of the Cork Incorporated 
Chamber of Commerce (Cork: Guy and Co. Ltd, 1919), p. 62. 
 
Deindustrialisation had contributed to abject levels of poverty, which afflicted a quarter 
of Corkonians in 1914.12 In 1915, Fr A.M. MacSweeney reported that 35 per cent of residents 
lived ‘in a chronic state of want’. A further 14 per cent lived a ‘hand-to-mouth’ existence.13 In 
1917, out of a population of 80,000, Cork had 719 tenements with about twelve people 
inhabiting each.14 Public health problems were widespread. In 1915, infant mortality was 132 
per 1,000 births while tuberculosis deaths totalled 2.88 per 1,000, producing 283 deaths.15 In 
1913, Cork Corporation estimated that 8,765, almost one-ninth of the population, resided in 
tenements.16 Four years later, over 16,000 people inhabited houses considered unfit or barely 
fit for habitation.17 Table 1. 3 shows the tragic results of this poverty in a comparative context.  
 
Table 1. 3: Annual Death Rate per 1,000 of the Population, 1922-24 
City 1922 1923 1924 
Dublin 17.6 15.0 16.7 
Cork 18.0 14.0 19.3 
Limerick 19.3 17.2 14.5 
Waterford 15.3 15.2 16.4 
Source: Aodh Quinlivan, Dissolved: The remarkable story of how Cork lost its Corporation in 1924 (Cork: Cork 








Deindustrialisation ensured that class conflict intensified as the nineteenth progressed. The 
defence of the craftsmen’s livelihood fell to the trade unions, but the wide availability of scab 
labour severely hampered their ability to make gains.18 In 1870, the tailors’ rage boiled over, 
triggering a strike against low wages, mechanisation and non-union and sweated labour. The 
employers eventually crushed it and spent the next decade eroding Labour’s limited gains.19 
The organisation of labourers into trade unions, which first began in the late 1860s, posed a 
major challenge to the craftsmen’s traditional dominance of the Labour movement. Three 
labourers’ unions emerged in Cork in 1868-9. Two of them, the Cork Working Men’s 
Association – a Fenian front group – and the Labourers’ Society were effectively general 
unions. Republican politics provided a means in which ‘trade and spade’ could meet as equals. 
Cork was a stronghold of the Fenians in the 1860s with up to 4,000 local members. Craftsmen 
constituted 32 per cent of the Fenian leadership, and clerks and shop assistants 14 and 7 per 
cent respectively.20 
 The late 1870s and much of the 1880s had been a time of severe economic depression 
in Ireland. Mass unemployment and emigration militated against the organisation of the 
working class into a powerful force. Nevertheless, there was a brief upsurge of agitation in 
1881 when city labourers answered the call of farm labourers on strike to down tools for a wage 
rise. But strikes were rare in the 1880s and, when they did occur, were seldom successful. 
Workers resorted to cruder means of expressing grievances like hunger marches and breaking 
into grocery stores and bakeries. Twenty-two strikes took place that decade, an increase of 
seven from the decade prior. The main causes were wage claims and objections to working 
with non-union labour.21 Some lasting gains were made that decade. The Cork United Trades’ 
Association was formed in February 1881 by eleven trades to advance the craftsmen’s interests, 
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New Unionism, 1889-92 
By the late 1880s, the economy was reviving. Full employment meant that mass unionisation 
of unskilled workers was once again possible.23 Between mid-1889 and early 1891, fourteen 
strikes took place in different sectors of unskilled or semiskilled labour. New unionism 
announced its Leeside arrival in 1889 with strikes at the flax mills and at Lunham’s pork 
butchers.24 There were fifty-four recorded strikes in Cork from 1890-1898: twenty-seven by 
labourers and twenty-seven by tradesmen. In the 1890s, disputes over wages accounted for the 
greatest number of strikes – twenty. Of this number, fifteen were by labourers, while the trades 
struck as often over the employment of non-union labour and demarcation as over wages or 
hours. Twelve strikes affecting more than one firm in a trade occurred in the 1890s – seven by 
the skilled and five by the unskilled – a sharp rise from the 1880s.25 
 New unionism in Cork was led in the main by newly formed British-based unions.26 
However, local societies also surfaced. Indeed, the most militant union to come from this era 
was the South of Ireland Labour Union. In 1890, it led a strike of labourers at the Hive 
Ironworks and Furlong’s mills for a wage rise. For this, it incurred the wrath of the tradesmen, 
in stark contrast to their support for a concurrent strike of pork curers at Lunham’s. This 
hostility did as much to doom the union’s fate as the employers’ strikebreaking. Craft unionism 
was exclusive, insular and conservative.27 The tradesman might pay lip-service to proletarian 
solidarity, but he was ultimately motivated by a suspicion of the labourer that was rooted in 
craft rather than class identity. This made sense because the tradesmen’s livelihoods depended 
upon the utmost limitation of the available labour force.28 
 
The trades’ opposition to the South of Ireland Union was due to the fact that the new union 
included in its ranks the detested ‘handymen’, and it feared that the unionization of such men 
would increase their capacity to undercut and displace skilled labour.29    
 
A distinguishing feature of new unionism was the level of co-ordination between 
diverse groups of workers. The willingness of workers to strike in support of sacked colleagues 
or in solidarity with others was novel. New unionism fundamentally changed the dynamic of 
class relations during its visit to Cork. In 1890, there were no marches of workers through the 
city centre, no appeals to the powerful for clemency or random attacks on their property. 
Violence was not directed against the institutions of political power but against scabs and other 
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non-co-operative components to maximise the impact of a strike.30 New unionism’s last major 
occasion of labourer militancy in Cork took place in late 1890 when dockers and seamen ceased 
work to force the City of Cork Steam Packet Company to replace non-unionists with union 
members in need of work. The strike failed and led to the collapse of the NUDL.31 The vast 
pool of scab labour and the hostility of the craftsmen – who dominated the trades council – 
seriously hampered the labourers. In 1890, only one labourers’ strike, that of the bacon curers, 
was successful.32 The boom in trade which helped to fuel new unionism came to an end in late 
1890. Although there had been an equal number of strikes as the previous six years combined, 
in 1891 there were only four strikes.33 Employers gained the upper hand in the class war: two-
thirds of Irish strikes ended in victory for them in 1891.34 Although stoppages remained 
common in Cork (five were recorded in 1892), by 1893 the defeat of new unionism was 
complete and Labour drifted back to its conservative, craft union ways.35  
However, Cork Labour achieved much since 1850 and 1900. Irish wages were catching 
up with Britain and the US, and in Cork the convergence was stronger than in most cities. 
Between 1850 and 1890, wages expanded by one-half or more for local printers, plumbers and 
bakers, and less than one-fifth for cabinetmakers and ironfounders. From 1850 to 1900, 
engineering workers’ wages rose by 25 to 42 per cent and shipbuilding wages by 28 to 50 per 
cent.36 In 1852, the real wages of builders’ labourers in Dublin and Cork were 51 per cent of 
British wages; they were 71 per cent in 1870, 93 per cent in 1904 and 82 per cent in 1913.37 In 
1892, the living standards of Cork labourers were better than other in most other Irish centres.38 
Local trends thus conform with the broader movement of Irish wages. An examination of the 
Cork building trade between 1870 and 1930, as demonstrated in Appendix 10, is enlightening 
here. Periods of growth were often followed by lengthy periods of stagnation, which allowed 
inflation to erode living standards in the early twentieth century. For example, carpenters’ pay 
grew incrementally between 1870 and 1917 but exploded thereafter. It was similar for the 
coopers. In 1914, they experienced their raise since 1872. From 1916, however, their wages 
grew exponentially, as Table 1. 4 demonstrates. 







Table 1. 4: Coopers’ Wages in Cork, 1872-1936 
1872-Mar. 1914 36s. 
Apr. 1914 39s. 
Aug. 1916 42s 
Sept. 1917 45s. 
Nov. 1917 47s. 
Mar. 1918 52s. 
July 1918 60s. 
Apr. 1919 68s. 
Sept. 1919 81s. 4d. 
May 1920 97s. 
Jan. 1924 91s. 
Feb. 1924-1936 85s. 3d. 
Source: Cork Coopers’ Society minutes, 1913-25, U218/A/8, CCCA; Workmen’s Register, 1912-36, 
BL/BC/MB/334-335, Murphy’s brewery collection, UCCA. 
 
Old Unionism, 1893-1907 
The return to old unionism signalled a retreat for workers. Unions in the newly organised 
sectors crumbled in the face of lockouts, strike-breaking, federated employers and the 
dismantling of legal protections. Strikes that took place were on a smaller scale and mainly 
occurred in the trades.39 But flickers of new unionism persisted. In 1898, labourers on the Cork, 
Bandon and South Coast Railway struck from January to May for recognition of the 
Amalgamated Society of Railway Servants (ASRS), ending a protracted period of Labour 
quiescence. The strike failed and the men were victimised.40 Poor levels of organisation of 
labourers was a chronic problem once more for Labour. By 1900, only 30 per cent of them 
were unionised whereas 70 per cent of tradesmen were.41 Few strikes occurred during the 
opening years of the twentieth century and those that did were largely unsuccessful. The defeat 
of new unionism, the Taff Vale case and the absence of collective bargaining structures meant 
that the class war had firmly swung in the employers’ favour.42 For example, there were 
unsuccessful strikes at the Cork Spinning and Weaving Company in 1900, and at Lunham’s 
and Crosse and Blackwell’s in 1902.43 
  Politically, Labour and the Left remained on the margins. A tiny branch of Connolly’s 
Irish Socialist Republican Party existed from 1897 to 1902 but fell victim to public indifference 
and hostility from the Catholic clergy.44 The trades council sponsored a local Labour Party that 
ran candidates in the 1898 municipal elections, elected Lord Mayors in 1899 and 1900, and 
secured five Corporation seats in 1905 and six in 1908. In 1911, only one trade unionist won a 
Corporation seat on a Labour platform, an all-time low for its political representation.45 
32 
 
Larkinism by the Lee, 1908-14 
In August 1908, James Sexton, general secretary of the NUDL, instructed Larkin to re-organise 
Cork’s defunct NUDL branch. Larkin dispatched Newry-born James Fearon to do so.46 Fearon 
was tremendously successful and the branch scored two major victories for its members, whom 
it called ‘the most neglected body of workers in the city’.47 The first was a negotiated 
improvement of conditions for labourers at the Clyde Shipping Company. The second was won 
through strike action when the NUDL approached the City of Cork Steam Packet Company 
and asked for a pay raise. The dockers had not received an increase for nearly twenty years and 
the plea was the first of its kind for seventeen years.48 The union was ignored. On 9 November, 
150 labourers struck. They were soon joined by the company’s stockmen and hundreds of 
carters from other firms. In total 600-700 were affected.49 It was Cork’s first major labour 
trouble since 1901. After three days, the claims were submitted to arbitration, which yielded 
substantial concessions in December.50 The strike brought Larkin into further conflict with 
Sexton, who could no longer tolerate his militancy. Accordingly, Larkin was suspended in 
December 1908. In January 1909, much of the NUDL’s Irish section, including Cork, seceded 
and formed the ITGWU.51 The ITGWU made little immediate impact in Cork and its creation 
was not universally welcomed. In April, Fearon and several Transport Union men fought 
violently with a crowd of anti-ITGWU dockers and their supporters along Patrick’s Quay.52  
Cork’s beleaguered labourers were asserting themselves for the first time in twenty 
years. In April, the tramwaymen struck for a pay rise; the next month, 300 builders’ labourers 
followed suit. Both disputes ended in compromise.53 In mid-May, the Cork United Trades and 
Labour Council (UTLC) organised the first Labour Day rally in many years. The regrowth of 
class consciousness was reflected in the trades council. Between 1903 and 1907 membership 
quadrupled to 8,000: thirty-five affiliates.54 However, Larkinism was not breaking down Cork 
Labour’s internal divisions; moreover, new ones were emerging. Tensions between British and 
Irish unions and between craft general unionism remained strong. From April 1909, Labour 
became a conduit for nationalist infighting when Cork City MP William O’Brien broke away 
from the Irish Parliamentary Party (IPP) and formed his own party, the All-for-Ireland League 
(AFIL).55 A trades council decision to back Maurice Healy, an independent nationalist, in the 
1 May by-election caused much acrimony among several craft unions.56 Disaster ensued when 
the Workers’ Union of Britain and Ireland launched a Cork branch of his union to compete 
with the ITGWU.57 
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On 10 June 1909, porters and storemen at Sutton’s coal company – members of the 
ITGWU and the Carmen and Storemen’s Union – struck to protest the employment of members 
of the Workers’ Union, which they regarded as a scab union. Over the coming days, quay 
labourers, carters, carmen, loaders, dockers and railway porters struck in sympathy. The 
dockers also struck against the proposed mechanisation of the quays which they feared would 
displace them. It was Ireland’s first example of Larkinism without Larkin. The episode 
embodied the violence of early twentieth century strikes: scabs were imported and the police 
issued numerous baton charges. However, the employers had a new weapon – combination. In 
May, they had formed the Cork Employers’ Federation (CEF), the first of its kind in Ireland, 
under the chairmanship of the acerbic Sir Alfred Dobbin. The CEF immediately locked out 
anyone who refused to pass pickets or handle ‘tainted goods.’ Within a week, 6,000 workers 
were directly or indirectly affected. Despite numerous attempts by Labour, the employers 
refused to negotiate. After a month, a return to work had begun; after seven weeks, the strike 
had collapsed.58 It was, in the RIC’s words, a ‘complete victory for the masters.’59 Cork’s 
ITGWU branch collapsed and was not revived for four years. Additionally, Dublin Castle 
prosecuted Larkin, Fearon and two other Cork officials under dubious charges of fraud.60 More 
significant was the rupture that took place in the trades council. In August 1909, fourteen craft 
unions sick of Larkinism broke away and formed the Cork District Trades Council (DCTC).61 
Political divisions were as destructive for Labour as the strike had been. The new council 
aligned with Redmond while the UTLC backed the O’Brienites. For the CEF, the 1909 strike 
confirmed the malignant character of Larkinism. Strike breaking once again replaced 
mediation.62  
The destruction of the ITGWU and two antagonistic trades councils produced another 
period of Labour passivity. This ended in July 1911 when workers at Anderson’s Quay struck 
for recognition of their union, the National Sailors’ and Firemen’s Union (NSFU).63 On 18 
August 1911, a national and cross-channel rail stoppage was called by the ASRS for better 
wages and conditions. In the ITGWU’s absence, the ASRS now carried the torch for militant 
trade unionism in Cork. For three days, Irish railwaymen struck in sympathy with their 
comrades in Britain. The strike ended in a negotiated truce and obtained recognition for the 
ASRS.64 However, events in Ireland took a distinctive turn when Dublin timber merchants 
locked out their workers because of the disrupted rail service. The men refused to resume work 
and instead demanded a wage increase, which the merchants refused. In mid-September, ASRS 
goods porters on the GSWR refused to handle timber from implicated merchants and a week 
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later the union called an Irish national railway strike. But on 16 September, Cork GSWR goods 
workers beat their executive to it and went on sympathy strike. They took the opportunity to 
file their own claims for advances in wages and conditions.65 The company utilised scabs who 
received military and police protection. On 4 October, a national agreement was reached. The 
workers had lost and were heavily victimised. The strikes brought to prominence local ASRS 
official John Good who would subsequently become a stalwart in the Labour and republican 
movements.66  
 Cork Labour was not organised or strong enough to combat employers, leading to a 
deterioration of working-class living standards. Between 1905 and 1912, rents and retail prices 
increased by 13 per cent while building artisans’ and engineering workers’ wages were 
unchanged. Builders’ labourers’ and compositors’ pay was upped only 6 per cent in that time.67 
Attempts to re-establish the ITGWU had succeeded by June 1913. By July, it had 900 members, 
including printers, engineers and masons. The following month, it took over the militant 
Carmen and Storemen’s Union.68 Within weeks of renewing itself in Cork, the ITGWU was 
thrown into the forefront of a titanic struggle: the 1913 Dublin lockout. The union in Cork was 
active in fund raising and rallying public support for the Dublin workers, as was the UTLC.69 
The CDTC, on the other hand, opposed the ITGWU during the lockout.70 Though the 
employers emerged victorious, in Cork the ITGWU had done much to raise its own profile. By 
early 1914, it was the city’s largest union. The lockout triggered a sizeable growth in class 
consciousness. Irish nationalist leaders, both Redmondites and O’Brienite, were increasingly 
seen as either indifferent or hostile to Labour.71 Industrial Labour’s increasing success inspired 
political Labour to approach the 1914 municipal elections with unprecedented buoyancy. 
However, all but one of the Labour candidates were defeated while three trade unionists were 










Cork Labour and the Great War, 1914-17 
From July 1914, the escalating cost of living was the primary catalyst for Irish Labour’s 
renaissance after the 1913 lockout. Across Cork, workers were demanding wage increases to 
deal with inflation. Calls for advances produced Cork’s first major strike in three years when 
builders’ labourers downed tools for six weeks from October 1914.73 February 1915 brought a 
strike of 200 labourers at Victoria Quay. The following month, the farriers struck for an 
increase, as did GSWR labourers in November.74 These disputes ended when employers 
partially conceded the men’s demands. This pattern of class conflict intensified in 1916. In 
April, labourers on the Cork, Blackrock and Passage Railway struck; that summer, coal porters, 
fillers and carters did the same.75 In all cases the men cited the growing cost of living as the 
source of discontent and accepted modified increases. 
In mid-1916, the coopers reported that inflation meant that ‘we find it at present very 
difficult to keep our homes together’.76 Throughout 1916, the National Union of Railwaymen 
(NUR), the dominant union on the Irish railways, demanded government intervention to 
combat inflation. Irish railwaymen struggled to make ends meet on a war bonus of, in optimal 
situations, 1s. 6d. British railwaymen, on the other hand, were getting a 10s. bonus. On 16 
November, Irish railwaymen resolved to call a national strike if their demands were not met. 
The strike, which was set for 18 December, was called off when the government announced it 
would take control of the railways and partially meet the railwaymen’s claim.77 However, 
developments specific to Cork strengthened the hand of local workers. Foremost was the 
reunification of the two trades councils in November 1916 as the Cork and District Trade and 
Labour Council [hereafter called the Cork Trades Council (CTC)], which even the employers 
welcomed.78 
 
Table 1. 5: War Bonuses Granted by the City of Cork Steam Packet Co., 1916-19 
Date Granted Bonus 
Nov. 1916 5s. 
July 1917 10s. 
Mar. 1918 15s. 
July 1918 20s. 
Feb. 1919 22s. 6d. 







Economy and Poverty, 1850-1924 
By 1847, Derry’s linen industry – its biggest employer until the 1830s – had been made extinct 
by free trade and British competition.79 However, linen had laid the foundations for a shirt 
industry that would become the principal seat of the trade in the UK. It grew from humble 
origins in the 1850s to make Derry one of the world’s foremost producers of shirts by 1900. 
As it developed, a system of ‘outwork’ was established where thousands of seamstresses in 
Derry’s rural environs assembled shirts at outstations or their homes.80 In the late nineteenth 
century, a spinoff underclothing industry also developed via a combination of factory and 
outwork labour.81 Outworkers were among Ireland’s most vulnerable group of workers because 
it was extremely difficult, perhaps impossible, to unionise them and enforce state regulation of 
their working conditions. Consequently, they endured long hours and low wages (9s. a week 
in 1912) because unscrupulous employers regularly exploited their cheap labour. Trade 
unionists appears to have made little or no effort to organise outworkers and there is no record 
of anyone speaking publicly on their behalf.82 
 But as technology improved work became increasingly centralised in factories and 
outwork began to decline. In 1871, there were 22,812 outworkers across Derry, Donegal and 
Tyrone; by 1920, however, there were very few left. The shirt industry continued to grow until 
the first years of the twentieth century when a depression took hold in the trade.83 By 1902, it 
employed about 18,000 – more than Derry’s other industries combined.84 The shirt industry’s 
growth was the driving force behind the city’s population explosion, as migrants flooded in 
from neighbouring counties in search of work.85 Over 90 per cent of shirt workers were female, 
giving the city an employment pattern highly distinctive for an Irish city: 55 per cent of the 
population was female. Men in factories were primarily cutters, clerks, mechanics and 
managers.86 Their numbers had been growing since 1871 due to increased mechanisation with 
its need for maintenance of machinery and motive power.87  
 Distilling began to become an industrial force in Derry from 1825 when Andrew 
Alexander Watt built a distillery to adjoin his Bogside brewery. By 1900, Watt’s Tyreconnell 
was one of the world’s most consumed whiskeys.88 The First World War was difficult for UK 
distilleries as large increases in excise duty and the 1915 Immature Spirits Act made 
circumstances far more tumultuous. Another hefty increase in excise duty in 1919 – by which 
time there were four distilleries in Derry – culled demand even further. This contributed to the 
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closure of Watt’s in October 1921, a crushing blow to Derry’s economy. Approximately 200 
men lost their jobs, as did many dockers, carters, railwaymen, shop workers and others 
employed in the service sector.89  
 Four shipyards existed between 1830 and 1924. In 1839, Kinsale-born William Coppin, 
bought the city’s shipyard from Pitt Skipton – who had opened it in 1830 for the ship repairs – 
to launch a shipbuilding enterprise. But Coppin soon ran into financial difficulties and in 1870 
the yard closed.90 The next attempt came in 1882 when W.F. Bigger opened the Foyle shipyard. 
In 1892, his yard shut down when the Liverpool firm of Henry Iredale & Co., who owned many 
ships build by Bigger, folded.91 When the yard re-commenced operations in 1899, it did so 
under Glasgow-born William de Russett, manager of the Londonderry Shipbuilding and 
Engineering Company. His initiative was the shortest yet, collapsing in 1904.92 The final, and 
most fruitful, attempt came in 1912 when Trevisa Clarke, J. Weir-Johnston and John Esplin 
launched the North of Ireland Shipbuilding Company, which they hoped would eventually 
employ 1,000 men. By 1913, 450 were employed there. It experienced solid growth until the 
First World War, when it expanded exponentially after obtaining contracts from the Royal 
Navy. The yard was open twenty-four-hours a day during the war.93 By 1918, it employed 
approximately 2,000 men, making Derry Ireland’s second shipbuilding centre after Belfast. 
The brief post-war boom was the driving force behind its continued growth until the early 
1920s when the workforce peaked at 2,600. By 1922, Derry’s shipyard had the third largest 
output in Ireland, and it was expected that it would eventually employ about 4,000 men. But 
the industry entered a state of depression that year as the Royal Navy’s reversion to a peacetime 
programme caused a dramatic contraction in demand that made many UK shipyards, including 
Derry’s, unviable. After a period of severe decline, the North of Ireland shipyard closed in 
1924. The shipyards and distilleries made a major contribution to the local economy. Their 
workforces were entirely male and helped to rebalance the local employment structure. 
Moreover, their need for craft work, especially in shipbuilding, helped to reduce Derry’s 
dependency on cheap labour.94 
 In 1912, working-class housing conditions in Derry’s were favourable for an Irish city, 
with a low residential density of eighteen people per acre. Rents were also among Ireland’s 
lowest. The lack of overcrowding contributed to improved working-class health: Derry’s 1905 
death rate of 18.1 per 1,000 was lower than either Dublin or Belfast. By the 1920s, however, 




New Unionism, 1889-92 
Establishing unions in the early nineteenth century was a monumentally difficult task. In 1834, 
George Kerr, a Belfast cabinetmaker, helped local cabinetmakers form a union to combat a 
wage cut. They were arrested on false charges of administering illegal oaths.96 By 1840, trade 
unionism in Derry had been annihilated.97 The emasculation of trade unionism was a factor in 
the social peace that largely prevailed in Derry until 1888.98 Few strikes took place in this 
period. From 1868, however, there was a renewal in working-class militancy, especially in the 
shirt industry. Sectarianism invariably coloured Derry Labour, as it did with all aspects of 
Ulster life. In November 1883, 100 machinists at Tillie’s, the vast majority of whom were 
Catholic and nationalist, struck for three days for the sack of the factory doctor because he had 
voted against holding a nationalist rally on the property of Derry Corporation.99  
The revival of militancy announced its arrival in the Maiden City in January 1888 when 
craftsmen at the Foyle Shipyard struck. That October, carpenters and joiners at Ballintine’s and 
Colhoun Brothers struck for a six-hour cut in their sixty-hour week, the hours worked by 
shipyard carpenters. It the first major strike of the new unionist era in Derry. Strikes in the 
building trade were easier to sustain as craftsmen were mobile and could obtain temporary 
work elsewhere. The strike dragged on until June 1889 when a 56½-hour week from 1 January 
1890 was agreed.100 Little distinguished new unionism in Derry from other Irish cities. The 
National Amalgamated Sailors’ and Firemen’s Union was one of the first new unions 
established in Derry. In February 1889, a strike of its members on Clydeside for higher pay 
reached the Maiden City. It was the era’s first strike of Irish infrastructural workers. Another 
influential new union to set up in Derry was the ASRS. In early 1890, it prepared to strike on 
the Great Northern Railway (GNR) which employed many Derrymen. Strike was averted in 
March 1890 when an agreement was reached.101 
In 1890, trade unionism finally secured a foot in the door of the shirt industry when the 
Londonderry Shirt, Collar and Underclothing Cutters’ Union was started.102 The most exotic 
of new unionism’s importation arrived in August 1889 when the secretive Knights of Labour 
set up a Derry branch. Alpha Assembly 1601 flourished and became Ireland’s most durable 
branch.103 By March 1891, its membership had grown to 800 from an inaugural figure of just 
fourteen. However, membership had declined to 667 by that August and continued to 
haemorrhage thereafter. By late 1896, the branch had faded into oblivion.104 The tailors were 
at the heart of the most serious strike of 1890. The Amalgamated Society of Tailors set up a 
Derry branch as part of its campaign against ‘sweated’ labour. In April 1890, it put forward a 
demand for an increase as local tailors earned less than their colleagues in Belfast, Dublin, 
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Glasgow or Manchester. Some firms refused to recognise the union and, in response, were 
struck. A lengthy battle ensued that was marred by the violence typical of nineteenth century 
strikes. Scabs, who worked under heavy police protection, were assaulted and several strikers 
convicted before the courts.105 Branch secretary James McCarron and two others were found 
guilty of riot and unlawful assembly.106 The strike ended inconclusively some months later.107 
McCarron had been instrumental in establishing the Derry Trades Council in 1887. He was 
Derry’s most prominent and formidable trade unionist. As president of the trades council, he 
was proud that it included both Catholics and Protestants. He was also involved in the 
formation of the ITUC. A vocal Home Ruler, he insisted that one could be stridently nationalist 
– or Unionist – and remain strictly apolitical in advancing the cause of Labour. He was a 
staunch defender of the presence of the ‘amalgamateds’ in Ireland and opposed calls for 
separate, Irish trade unions.108 
  In January 1891, the National Union of Gas and General Labourers opened its first 
Derry branch. By June, it had four branches. It was the archetypal new union and quickly 
became the principal body for the unskilled, organising heretofore neglected workers like 
builders’ labourers.109 That November, it became the first union to organise shirt operatives 
when it opened its fifth branch. The union organised an event for which new unionism in Derry 
is perhaps best remembered: the visit of Eleanor Marx-Aveling, daughter of Karl Marx, to the 
city in November 1891.110 Her call to the ‘factory girls’, as they were colloquially known, to 
join the Gasworkers’ Union was heeded. But success was transient, and membership was 
dwindling by March 1892.111  
Trade unionism never took off in the shirt industry and no strikes by its female 
operatives occurred during new unionism. Employer hostility to trade unionism and the decent 
pay at the Derry factories may explain the women’s lack of spirit for unionisation.112 But 
Patterson has suggested other possibilities: 
 
. . . the great majority of the workforce had tasks which were easily learnt. With a large labour 
supply, individual workers were thus easily replaceable. It was simple for employers to 
dispense with workers who were awkward or active in trade unions. Secondly, there was a 
traditional assumption among men, as well as many women, that women ought to earn less than 
men. Many saw the women’s wages as a supplement to the male breadwinners’ and so it is 
possible that young women had a conception of being factory workers as a temporary part of 
life before they got married and therefore they did not find it worth the effort to unionise and 
to contribute economically in a long-term activity. . . there was a high degree of localism in the 
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workforce, with daughters following their mothers and older sisters into the same employment. 
Such a tradition served to perpetuate restricted horizons. . . A . . . cultural factor is the different 
status among the women workers . . . a form of aristocracy. In other words they did not feel any 
sense of solidarity with other groups of workers. . . An important factor is employer power. . . 
the use of paternalism as a strategy to discipline the workers. But far more important is the 
repression of workers who dared to join unions. The final factor is the sectarian division inside 
the Ulster working class.113 
   
From early 1891 the economy turned sour and recession took hold, giving impetus to 
employers to launch a counteroffensive against Labour’s gains over the past two years. A 
turning point came in August 1891 with Derry’s first dockers’ strike. Like many other port 
cities, dockers in Derry were the one group of labourers whose unionisation predates 1889. The 
Saint Columb’s Quay Labourers Society operated like a craft union, giving them some control 
over work which was sporadic and hazardous. Although they earned more in a day than local 
tradesmen, the irregularity of employment meant that dockers averaged only 11s. a week. In 
1889, the Society put forward claims for a 25 per cent increase and a promise that colliers 
would be discharged by hand rather than the more cost-effective steam-winches.114 In 1891, a 
crisis was prompted by the installation of two mobile steam-cranes by the Derry Port and 
Harbour Commissioners, who recruited non-union men to operate them. The men opposed 
mechanisation for two reasons. Firstly, cranes would cause unemployment. Secondly, and 
more importantly, the ‘nons’ would be paid less than the agreed rate and destroy the Society’s 
closed shop.115 On 27 August 1891, the strike began when Society men refused to work with 
‘nons’.116 It is likely that the Board deliberately provoked the strike to smash the Quay 
Labourers’ Society. If the Society was strong, it could, like a craft union, control the supply of 
labour and impose restrictive practices to maintain jobs.117 On 26 September, the strike ended 
in a humiliating defeat for the men, who were forced to accept mechanisation, the retention of 
scabs and a wage cut.118 However, the Quay Labourers’ Society had survived and bucked the 
trend of waterfront union collapse.119 In November 1891, it became the NUDL’s no. 16 branch 
when that union was disintegrating in many Irish ports.120 The employers accepted the NUDL 
and its virtual closed shop. In return, the merchants got a large pool of placid and competent 
labour that far exceeded demand, directed by a union that was anxious to avoid another 
strike.121 
  In 1888, Catholic and Protestant craftsmen coalesced to form the Derry United Trades 
Council, the first of its kind in Derry and a prerequisite to Labour becoming a mass 
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movement.122 By late 1890, it had renamed itself the Derry Trades and Labour Council, 
symbolic of its newly found inclusivity. One of its greatest achievements in its nascent years 
was the convening of Derry’s first ever Labour Day rally in 1890. Whereas in the past Catholics 
and Protestants had paraded in mutually hostile marching groups, now both came together 
under a common banner of Labour. The next two Labour Day processions were even bigger 
and more lavish: the apogee of new unionism in Derry. The procession went into deep decline 
in 1892 and 1894 was the last celebration for many years.123 Relative to their numbers, 
Protestants were over-represented in the craft and clerical sectors, and therefore the trades 
council. They predominated at all levels at the shipyard, especially among the trades, although 
the engineering trade was evenly divided along sectarian lines. However, Catholics comprised 
seventy per cent of skilled foundrymen. Catholic dominance also extended to casual carmen 
and skilled railwaymen, though Protestants had a majority among the other railway sectors.124  
The financial strength of the amalgamateds enticed local societies to sacrifice 
independence for security by merging with their bigger British counterparts.125 Building trade 
unions put up the strongest resistance to the British invasion, with some bricklayers and masons 
doing so successfully. In 1890, their local body joined the Dublin-based Ancient Guild of 
Incorporated Brick and Stonelayers. As a result, there were two masons’ unions in Derry, one 
Irish and one British. The bakers were the only workers who successfully resisted and provided 
a rare example of new unionism prompting an Irish amalgamation. The Irish National Federal 
Union of Bakers, formed in 1889, soon absorbed the local bakers’ society. The strength of 
British unions, which had now established a strong local foothold, and the weakness of Irish 
ones diminished the possibility of workers splitting along political or sectarian lines.126 
Avoiding these splits remained a constant theme for Derry Labour. 
 
Table 1. 6: Social Class in Derry by Religion, 1901 
Social Class Total Number Catholic (%) Protestant (%) 
Professional 33 70.3 29.7 
Commerce 88 38.4 61.4 
Skilled: Non-Manual 179 65 35 
Skilled: Manual 567 57.3  42.7 
Semi-skilled 278 64.7 35.3 
Non-skilled 232 69.4 30.6 
Total 1,377 56.3 43.7 





Back to old unionism, 1893-1906 
New unionism was delivered a decisive blow by the dockers’ defeat. As the UK economy sank 
deeper into recession, the employers’ counterattack was increasingly successful. Derry was 
cushioned from the worst of the slump by the continued expansion of its shirt industry. By 
1894, new unionism was over. The Gasworkers’ Union, the NAFSU and the Londonderry 
Shirt, Collar and Underclothing Cutters’ Union had all collapsed.127 Derry’s NUDL branch was 
one of only two in Ireland to survive, though it remained largely inactive until Jim Larkin 
visited the city in 1907.128 The withering of working-class militancy was reflected in the decline 
of strikes. Only two were recorded in 1892 and none were recorded between 1893 and 1895. 
This tranquillity ended in 1896 when coal porters unsuccessfully struck against working 
conditions, a wage cut and the employment of nons. That year, the NUDL committed itself to 
pursuing a policy of non-militancy by obeying agreements and lobbying for the enforcement 
of fair wage contracts and health and safety legislation.129 
 By 1897, the National Union of Amalgamated Labour (NAUL) had established itself 
as a major force on the local Labour scene. The NAUL was founded in Newcastle in 1888. It 
soon spread to Ireland, primarily to Ulster, where it organised semiskilled shipyardmen in 
Belfast.130 In June 1898, it led its first strike in Derry when labourers at Ballintine’s refused to 
work with four non-unionists. Work was resumed on the employers’ terms.131 Of the seventeen 
strikes that were recorded in Derry between 1896 and 1906, eight of them were in the building 
trade with all but one involving craftsmen. Four were successful, four were unsuccessful and 
the rest ended in compromise. Only two of the seven stoppages recorded between 1897 and 
1899 did not involve building craftsmen: a tailors’ strike in 1898 and a demarcation dispute 
among shipwrights in 1900.132 
 The biggest strike of these years was also Labour’s most crushing defeat. The ASRS 
was one of the only unions in Derry to retain a fighting spirit and pushed for an improvement 
on the Londonderry & Lough Swilly Railway (LLRS). A typical working day for a driver was 
fourteen hours; up to twenty-one hours was not uncommon.133 Its chairman was the abrasive 
John McFarland, Derry’s leading capitalist. When McFarland refused to negotiate with the 
ASRS, strike on the LLSR was called in November 1903. The company’s first major labour 
dispute, it lasted until 20 February 1904 when the men accepted defeat and begged for their 
jobs back. Most were rejected.134 McFarland’s victory motivated other employers to follow his 
example. When trade in the shirt industry began to deteriorate from 1903, pay cuts were 
introduced. The closure of the shipyard in 1904 and a halt in the construction industry due to 
oversupply deepened the local recession.135 Disputes occurred in the shirt factories in February 
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1904, December 1905, and March, September and November 1906, some of which led to 
strikes.136 The 1904 strike was the industry’s first since 1883. Why there was such placidity 
among Derry’s shirt workers is an open question. Emmet O’Connor has rejected sectarianism 
as the only answer:  
 
An intriguing possibility is that Derry was ‘too’ integrated, and the shirt factories too religiously 
balanced for spontaneous solidarity to combust easily. Sectarianism was not an obstacle to a 
narrow unity on wages and conditions, if the notional lines and unwritten rules were understood, 
or if one denomination homogenized the force, as with the overwhelmingly Catholic and 
nationalist dockers.137  
  
However, political tensions undoubtedly inhibited unity in the shirt factories. Although 
factories were predominately nationalist or Unionist depending on geography, several had 
sizeable minorities of both. Though segregated by grade and department, tensions occasionally 
flared among the girls.138 Sectarian clashes broke out in August of 1877, 1880, 1899, 1900 and 
1913 when the Apprentice Boys commemorated the Relief of Derry and the Ancient Order of 
Hibernians celebrated the Feast of the Assumption.139 A lack of unionisation was also an acute 
problem that prohibited a strike of any significant duration. In August 1906, a local branch of 
the Textile Operatives' Society of Ireland was launched by its organiser, Mary Galway.140 Only 
about one-seventh of the workers joined it and by 1910 it had fizzled out.141 In 1913, the 
Amalgamated Society of Tailors’ and Tailoresses (ASTT) opened its books to operatives. In 
1914, the ‘City of Derry Textile Workers’ Trade Union’ merged with the ASTT.142 But few 
women joined and by mid-1917 most were still unorganised. Poor pay was the inevitable result. 
Real wages had been declining since 1890 and by 1906 they were among the lowest in the UK 
shirt industry. Cutters earned 25-30s. while women earned 9s. 6d.143 This deterioration 
contrasts with the broader movement of wages in the city and indeed across Ireland. Table 10. 
D depicts this trend for building tradesmen between 1890 and 1930. Though stagnation was 









By 1907, Irish Labour had hit its nadir and the employers were firmly on top in the class war. 
Derry was a microcosm of the afflictions: poor levels of unionisation of the unskilled was 
crippling the movement. But workers were about to rise again when Larkin visited Derry for 
the first time. However, the lynchpins of Larkinism in other Irish cities, the dockers, would 
remain loyal to Sexton and his non-militancy. Although it became a bastion of anti-Larkinism, 
Derry was not immune from Larkin’s influence.144  
The new wave of agitation began on the quays in May 1907 when forty dockers left 
work over a reduction in tonnage rates. They were dismissed and easily crushed. It was Derry’s 
only dock strike in the Larkinite era.145 Larkin’s influence in Derry was undeniable. His 5 July 
address to the NUDL at Saint Columb’s Hall led to talk of the branch coming out in sympathy 
with their beleaguered comrades in Belfast.146 That September, recently unionised newsvendor 
boys struck for better conditions. The strike involved the throwing of stones at policemen and 
vans, for which some of the boys were convicted before the courts. Efforts to arrest them 
provoked a riot.147 Militancy continued to grow in the shirt industry. In October 1907, the 
National Federation of Women Workers brought out machine operators at Tillie’s for a month 
against a reduction which they bargained down by half.148 Buttonhole-makers at Leinster 
Brothers’ and Staveacre’s struck for a week in December.149 In 1908, Labour failed to spread 
the fire of proletarian insurrection, partially because Larkin moved his focus to the south. The 
shirt industry was the scene the year’s biggest dispute when over 1,000 workers were locked 
out in September to enforce a pay cut. The lockout was precipitated by a strike in one 
department, signifying that, despite the absence of a union, some level of proletarian class 
consciousness existed.150 British unions had launched a fresh invasion of Derry from 1906. 
That March, the Railway Clerks’ Association (RCA) started its second Irish branch in Derry 
with W.P. O’Doherty as chairman, a position he would retain for many years. O’Doherty would 
later serve on the RCA’s Irish Council. In May 1906, the Municipal Employees’ Association 
(MEA) established an outlet to organise Corporation labourers.151  
 Labour militancy was reignited in 1909. Outside of Ulster, Larkin promoted the 
ITGWU as an Irish departure from British trade unionism; in the north, he deliberately played 
down its nationalist rationale. However, Derry’s labourers saw no reason to join the ITGWU. 
On 13 January 1909, the NUDL met to hear Sexton plead with them to stick with ‘the old 
union’. William J. McNulty, the veteran organiser of Derry’s dockers and carters, presented 
the choice as one between NUDL moderation and the chaos of ITGWU militancy. He told the 
men that ‘he deprecated strikes’ and that he ‘never yet knew of a strike which benefited the 
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worker’. The meeting unanimously resolved to ‘declare our adhesion to the union, and strongly 
condemn the action of the late organiser and other branch officials in Belfast in their attempts 
to create a division in the ranks of the union by the formation of an opposite organisation’.152 
It is not clear to what extent Sexton influenced the men’s decision but their loyalty to McNulty 
was crucial. Derry’s labourers demonstrated that the establishment an ITGWU branch was not 
a prerequisite for militancy. In April, carters struck for union recognition and a wage 
increase.153 Two months later, arbitration under the Board of Trade awarded the men a 16s. 
wage for a fifty-six-hour week but not the freedom to wear trade union badges.154 
 Although class conflict dissipated in 1910, it flared again in 1911. That summer, 
Derry’s seamen took part in the NSFU successful national strike to win better wages and 
conditions as well as union recognition. In a similar vein, Derry’s railwaymen featured in the 
ASRS’s UK-wide action from 18-20 August when GNR passenger porters and goods depot 
workers struck for better pay and hours. However, Derry, like most of Ulster, was not a part of 
the next Irish railway strike that took place from 15-30 September.155 The defeat of the 
railwaymen severely checked proletarian militancy for the next two years. Only the docks saw 
labour disturbances in 1912.156 The following year, however, was one of proletarian action. 
February brought 1913’s biggest local industrial dispute: the strike of 1,200 workers at Tillie’s 
against a wage reduction. Like 1908, a strike in one department was met with a general 
lockout.157 The building trade produced the year’s most protracted dispute. Beginning in 
August, the strike dragged on until October because the men were able to find work in Glasgow. 
Modified increases were given.158 
Derry Labour’s solidarity with the ITGWU during the 1913 Dublin lockout was 
tepid.159 The NUDL demonstrated the lengths to which it would go to undermine Larkin by 
colluding with the employers when a cargo of Guinness blacked by the Transport Union in 
Sligo was diverted to Derry for unloading.160 On 25 November 1913, Larkinism was roundly 
attacked at an NUDL branch meeting by its Irish organiser, James O’Connor-Kessack, for 
which he received hearty rounds of applause. O’Connor-Kessack urged Derrymen to ‘rid 
themselves of the baneful influence of Larkinism, his methods and his folly’. Larkin, ‘was not 
only a fool but a knave . . . The greatest obstacle to the uplifting of the working classes . . . was 
Larkin and men like him’. He concluded by proclaiming that ‘workers . . . should never let 
themselves be cut adrift from their fellow-workers across the Channel’.161 That such a speech 
and such applause could come from the NUDL, a union known for its militancy in Britain, is 
indicative of Derry Labour’s inertia.  
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The NUDL was at the heart of the most vicious strike Derry witnessed in the Larkinite 
era: a five-day strike of carters in February 1914 for a 22s. wage and a fifty-five-hour week. 
The men secured 20s. rate for a 56½-hour week.162 Rumours that Larkin was on his way to 
Derry were met with a hostile response from the carters.163 The other major dispute of 1914 
took place at the shipyard. From 25 April to 15 May, labourers, stagers and platers’ helpers 
struck from 25 April to 15 May when their demand for wage parity with Belfast was turned 
down.164 The men accepted a lesser advance.165 The labourers had been represented by the 
NAUL, which had re-established itself in Derry in 1912. It would fast become the city’s biggest 
union. In 1918, it received a major scalp when William Logue – Derry’s most prominent trade 
unionist – joined as a fulltime organiser from the Typographical Association. Logue was a 
compositor with the Journal, a member of the Ancient Order of Hibernians and a nationalist 
councillor.  
By mid-1914, Derry Labour did not have much to show for seven years of renewed 
struggle. Nevertheless, the future looked bright. The creation of an Irish shirtmaking trade 
board promised to consolidate trade unionism’s tenuous presence in the staple industry.166 
Emboldened, in 1913 employers founded the Londonderry Shirt and Collar Manufacturers’ 
Association, which became a branch of the Shirt Manufacturers Federation (SMF). In June 
1914, the Irish shirtmaking trade board fixed an hourly minimum of 3½d, the same as existed 
in Britain, for a fifty-hour week.167 Irish employers appealed the decision and pleaded for a 
wage reduction, arguing that they needed to offset the cost of transporting garments to the 
British market. They succeeded. Women’s hourly pay was cut by ¼d. in June 1915 and by 
another ¼d. thereafter. Male pay was cut by 1d. per hour. These differentials with British rates 
became chronic grievances for the next five years.168  
 
Derry Labour and the Great War 
World War One was a mixed blessing for Derry. The shirt factories were in a fine position to 
benefit by contributing flannel and army uniform shirts to the war effort. In August 1914, shirt 
operatives’ hours were lengthened to cope with the demand of War Office contracts. However, 
the war damaged other economic sectors. By April 1915, general employment had dropped 
over the last twelve months and twenty-three per cent of workers were on short time.169 For the 
unskilled labourer, enlisting was largely due to economic necessity, not political allegiance. 
Army pay was exceptionally good, far more than what most workers earned, especially for a 
man with a wife and children who could avail of extra allowances and benefits. Employers 
often encouraged men to enrol in the army and promised recruits their jobs back on 
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demobilisation. In June 1919, Archibald Ball, a tonnage docker who had who left for the 
Western Front in 1916, sued his former employers for £50 when they declined to take him 
back. The proceedings reveal the snobbery experienced by working-class people from the 
corridors of power: 
 
- Ball: If the defendants had no boat, he could take up employment elsewhere. The Dockers’ 
Union specified that a certain squad could be employed at a boat. 
- His Honour: Do you call that free labour, because I don’t. 
- Counsel for Morrison: That is one of the difficulties the masters have to contend with. 
- His Honour: Yes, and it is destroying the country, and the labourers are the first that will 
suffer. 
- Counsel for Ball: if men like this had not gone to war what would have happened to the 
country? 
- His Honour: Probably there would have been better men to go. There is very little credit in 
that. 
- Counsel for Ball: Very little credit for a labourer who went to the war? 
- His Honour: Yes.170 
 
The case was dismissed.171          
Demands for wage increases were always because of rocketing inflation. In February 
1915, both the NUR and the Unionist-controlled Derry Corporation called on the government 
to regulate the cost of living.172 War bonuses were generally half, and often less than half, of 
the men’s original claims. But these modest concessions were insufficient to dampen the 
Labour resurgence. In August 1915, shirt workers mobilised as they were still not in receipt of 
any bonus. Hence, cutters at Tillie’s went out for a month in November for a 3s. bonus. Cutters 
earned between 10s. and 24s., with 26s. paid in a small number of instances. They were vividly 
aware of their status as their industry’s male elites and were, like other craft unions, highly 
protective of their trade. For example, In March 1916 another cutters’ strike occurred at 
McIntyre, Hogg, Marsh and Co. when female labour was brought into the cutting department 
which, the cutters feared, the employers would use to dilute skill and undermine pay.173 Their 
independent union had merged with the Shirt and Collar Cutters’ Union of Ireland in 1915.174 
In September and October 1915, LLSR workers and local dockers at the Belfast Steam Packet 
Company withdrew their labour for increases.175 As the cost of living continued its escalation 
in 1916, so too did the class conflict that accompanied it. That May, Derry’s dockers won an 
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increase after a strike. On 15 September, 300 carters struck after their plea for a 6s. increase on 
their 24s. wage was refused.176  
While inflation affected all workers, the conflict created additional gripes for some. In 
May 1915, workers in the distillery, the city’s third largest industry, gathered to protest the 
proposed doubling of the excise duty on liquor by David Lloyd George, the Chancellor of the 
Exchequer. It was feared that this would cause job losses and wage cuts. On 24 July 1916, an 
illegal eleven-day strike of apprentice platers and an apprentice angle-smith in an industry 
covered by the Munitions of War Act took place. The men were tried, convicted and fined 
before a munitions’ tribunal in January 1917.177 The NAUL, which had organised the distillery 
and shipyardmen since 1913, was continuing its ascent to becoming Derry’s premier union. If 
loyalty to the NUDL distinguished Derry from the south before 1914, then the NAUL’s 
popularity was symbolic of the subsequent divergence. Across Ulster, but in the north-west 
especially, the Tyneside union recruited sectors that in the south were the sole preserve of the 
ITGWU, like agricultural labourers.178 
July 1916 brought the eruption of a prolonged dispute on the LLSR when gangers, 
milesmen and surfacemen on the Derry to Carndonagh section, who earned only 14s. and 17s. 
respectively, ceased work for a 3s. advance. The strike lasted nearly twelve weeks. The 
railways were notorious for their low pay. Paltry though the LLSR’s wages were, they were 
the highest rates for any similar narrow-gauge line in Ireland.179 Derry’s NUR branch was part 
of the union’s national movement in late 1916 for state control of the Irish railways. It 
supported the national executive’s plan to strike and regarded the outcome of the affair as a 
tremendous victory.180 Railwaymen across Ireland agreed. The NUR’s Irish membership sky-
rocketed from 3,676 in December 1916 to over 17,000 in July 1917 – a 400 per cent increase 
– inclusive of 275 Derrymen. The NUR also instituted an Irish Council in 1917 to manage Irish 
affairs, the first of its kind for a British union in Ireland.181 When the RCA, the ASLEF and 
craft unions in the workshops are included, 80 per cent of Irish railway workers were unionised 
by late 1917. The proportion in Derry was probably even higher than that. Inter-union 
sectionalism and discrepancies in grade were grievances, as a local ditty pointed out:   
 
Oh, a foreman’s life in Derry,  
Is more than usually merry,  
With its chances of an extra special trip, 
But the prospects of a Fireman, 
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Are enough to raise one’s ire, man, 
Or, as the vulgar say, give anyone the pip, 
He may sit for his exam, 
But no one gives a damn, 
As to whether for a driver he is fit, 
But if the firemen got together, 
They would quickly find out whether, 
The righting of their wrongs passed human wit.182     
 
Firemen and drivers wanted the Board of Trade to issue certificates of competency to protect 
them during investigations of accidents. The lower grades looked coldly upon the idea of 
implementing specific legislation for the elite footplate men. A motion supporting certificates 
was put forward at the ITUC’s 1919 annual conference by the Irish Stationary Engine Drivers, 
Cranemen, Firemen and Motormen’s Trade Union and met strong opposition from the NUR; 
Congress overwhelming rejected it.183        
 
Table 1. 7: War Bonuses Given in Derry, 1915-17 
Workers Date Given Bonus 
Carters184 Mar. 1915 2s. 
Corporation employees July 1915 2s. 
Engineers Mar. 1916 4s. 
Bakers Sept. 1916 3s. 
Typographers Oct. 1916 3s. 
Iron moulders Jan. 1917 3s. 
Source: LG, 1915-18; DJ, 1915-18.185 
 
Cork and Derry: the structural differences 
By 1917, both Cork and Derry Labour were on the precipice of unprecedented power and 
success – but this is where the similarities ended. Having been equally affected by new 
unionism, Cork’s embrace of Larkinism and the ITGWU put it on a different trajectory to 
Derry, which remained loyal to the amalgamateds. As explained in Chapter 6, the structural 
differences between Cork and Derry were major reasons for this divergence. Tables 1. 8-12 
reveal the fundamental socio-economic disparities between the two cities. Firstly, there were 
notable gender-based differences. Though the nature of female employment was similar in both 
(domestic service, clothing manufacture and general labour), Derry had a much higher 
percentage of women in its workforce. In both, the overwhelming majority of those whom the 
1911 census considered ‘non-productive’ were women. There were also strong ethnoreligious 
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differences and inequalities in the pattern of employment. Cork was 88 per cent Catholic in 
1911 whereas Derry was 56 per cent. The former had little of the latter’s sectarian division of 
labour as Catholics dominated nearly every sector. Only in the printing and engine and machine 
making trades did Protestants make up 25 per cent or more of the workforce. In Derry, sectarian 
divisions were far more common and consequential. While Catholics had large majorities in 
some better-paid building trades, they were overrepresented in low-paid commercial labour; 
Protestants, on the other hand, were overrepresented in the best-paid craft work (like 
engineering and printing) and as clerks. Many occupations were more mixed (see Table 1. 10). 
It was worse for Derry’s women, who had to contend with a gender-based, as well as religious, 
division of labour. Catholics dominated factory work while three-quarters of clerks were 
Protestant. In Cork, Protestant women were significant minorities in the white-collar world of 
teaching and clerical work.  
As in the rest of Ireland, Labour’s remobilisation in Cork and Derry put workers in a 
better position to contend with the upheavals of the First World War. But Labour could never 
have predicted how enormous these upheavals would be. From 1917, the growing divergence 
of northern and southern Labour was reflected by the proliferation of syndicalism in Cork and 
its absence in Derry. Nevertheless, both movements experienced unparalleled success over the 



















Table 1. 8: Principal Female Occupations in Cork and Derry by Religion, 1911 
Occupation Cork Catholic 
(%) 
Derry Catholic (%) 
Teachers 264 63.5 184 40 
Domestic servant 3,018 96.5 987 68 
Charwoman 171 97.5 69 88 
Washing & Bathing Service 512 96 803 65 
Commercial Clerk 274 74 200 24 
Bookbinder 52 84.5 4 0 
Linen (including employers & 
dealers) 
178 89 83 36 
Flax worker 415 99.8 5 80 
Milliner, Dressmaker, 
Staymaker 
1,025 96 412 49 
Shirtmaker, Seamstress 390 99 2,722 67 
Tailoress 159 99 22 50 
Factory Labourer (undefined) 208 99.5 632 80 
Machinist, Machine Worker 
(undefined) 
43 93 276 70 
Indefinite/non-productive 30,304 89 15,045 54 















Table 1. 9: Principal Occupations in Cork and Derry (including employers), 1905 
Cork (Men) Cork (Women) Derry (Men) Derry (Women) 
Occupation No. Occupation No. Occupation No. Occupation No. 





































660 Flax linen 
(undefined) 
































House building 1,770 Shirtmaking, 
seamstresses 













105 Total 5,812 
Coachbuilders 179   Ships & boats 
(construction) 




116   Tailors 309   




415   Blacksmiths 84   
Coopers 275   General 
labourers 
1,914   
Blacksmiths 147   Total 5,352   
General 
labourers 
3,553       
Total 9,652       
Source: Cost of Living of the Working Classes, 1908, Cd. 3864, cvii, UKPP, p. 572; O’Connor, 1: New unionism 




Table 1. 10: Principal Male Occupations in Derry & Cork by Religion, 1911 




General Labourer 1,890 71 4,107 98.5 
Carpenter & Joiner 317 42 521 97 
Bricklayer 84 75 42 100 
Stonemason 112 69 156 99 
Slater/Tiler 19 95 27 100 
Plasterer 49 73 134 99 
Plumber 34 29 157 88 
Painter 148 57 352 92 
Building tradesmen 845 56 1,389 96 
Cabinetmaker 69 41 97 92 
Coachbuilder 45 49 176 93 
Baker 205 47 229 96.5 
Tailor 249 70 463 81.5 
Shirtcutter 324 31 8 87.5 
Butcher 143 75 255 95 
Shoemaker (including employers) 185 56 393 92 
Grocery (including employers) 282 35 245 86 
Drapery (including employers) 142 32 309 92.5 
Sawyer 17 41 43 100 
Cooper 43 32.5 179 96 
Printer 148 36 216 75 
Bookbinder 11 9 31 68 
Lithographic Printer 5 40 33 48.5 
Shipwright 13 46 30 100 
Engine Driver, Stoker, Fireman 74 53 116 95 
Factory labourer (undefined) 82 40 204 99.5 
Blacksmith 62 60 145 97 
Ironmonger (including employers) 71 34 54 83 
54 
 
Boilermaker 13 46 52 90 
Engine & Machine Maker 73 40 111 74 
Fitters & Turner 53 32 176 81 
Messenger, Porter, Watchman (neither 
Railway nor government) 
441 76 763 98 
Harbour, Dock, Wharf, Lighthouse Service 324 90 732 98 
Cannon, Carrier, Carter, Drayman 404 69 657 98 
On Railways 283 53 593 92.5 
Commercial Clerk 477 31 1,220 82.5 
Teachers 93 45 138 85 
Indefinite/Non-Productive 7,201 56.5 13,931 96 
Source: 1911 Census. 
 
Table 1. 11: Occupational Classes by Gender in Cork and Derry, 1911 
Cork Derry 
Class Men Women Total Female 
(%) 
Men Women Total Female 
(%) 
Professional 3,470 1,065 4,544 23 1,632 429 2,061 21 
Domestic 437 3,942 4,379 90 242 1,923 2,165 89 
Commercial  5,756 363 6,119 6 2,576 247 2,823 9 
Agricultural 679 12 691 2 381 8 389 <1 
Industrial 12,069 4,636 16,705 28 6,493 4,603 11,096 41 
Non-
Productive 
13,931 30,304 44,235 68.5 7,210 15,045 22,255 67 
Total 36,342 40,322 76,664 52.5 18,534 22,255 40,789 54.5 













Table 1. 12: Industrial Occupations by Gender in Cork & Derry, 1911 
 Cork  Derry  
Occupation Men Women Total Female 
(%) 
Men Women Total Female 
(%) 
Commercial 2,208 336 2,544 13 843 222 1,065 21 
Conveyance of 
Men, Goods & 
Messages 
3,548 27 3,575 <1 1,733 25 1,758 <1 
Books, Prints & 
Maps 
308 77 385 20 183 13 196 7 
Machines & 
Implements 
511 3 514 <1 219 0 219 0 
Houses, Furniture 
& Decoration 
1,745 27 1,772 2 967 4 971 <1 
Carriages & 
Harnesses 
305 1 306 <1 96 0 96 0 
Ships & Boats 45 0 45 0 24 0 24 0 
Chemicals & 
Compounds 
93 4 97 <1 48 0 48 0 
Tobacco & Pipes 31 45 76 59 31 3 34 1 
Food & Lodgings 1,456 509 2,055 25 1,067 123 1,190 1 
Textiles & 
Fabrics 
420 838 1,258 7 165 135 300 45 
Dress 950 1,668 2,618 64 843 3,184 4,027 79 
Animal 
Substances 
118 31 149 21 8 0 8 0 
Vegetable 
Substances 
365 48 413 12 130 84 214 39 
Mineral 
Substances 
805 22 827 3 386 21 407 5 
General or 
Unspecified  
4,902 1,271 6,173 21 2,318 1,035 3,353 31 
Refuse Matters 15 2 17 12 8 1 9 11 
Total 17,834 4,909 22,824 22 9,069 4,850 13,919 35 
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The Birth of the Workers’ Republic: Class Conflict in Cork, 
1917-21 
 
Throughout 1915 and 1916, most employers had successfully resisted demands for increases. 
Instead, they gave war bonuses that rarely exceeded 2s. a week. From 1917, however, union 
militancy compelled them to give higher bonuses and permanent increases, as well as a shorter 
week. This would culminate in Labour’s two anni mirabiles – 1919 and 1920, when class 
conflict swung decidedly in favour of the workers. Inflation continued during the post-war 
boom, but it was surpassed by wage increases. Syndicalism provided the basis for success 
because it encouraged working-class solidarity and Labour’s spread to new sectors like non-
manual workers and women. The ITGWU led the charge, making its drive to become Ireland’s 
One Big Union seem like an attainable goal. Its growth in Cork was replicated everywhere 
outside of Ulster. By late 1920, it had 120,000-130,000 members nationally.1 By mid-1920, 
Irish Labour was more powerful than ever. Since 1916, numbers affiliated to Congress grew 
from 70,000 to a peak of 229,000. A further 20,000 trade unionists, mainly in the northern 
shipbuilding and engineering industries, were unaffiliated for political reasons.2 Employers and 
the authorities took note. 
 Inflation and the exigencies of war compelled greater government intervention and the 
state tried to mitigate class conflict with arbitration. The Board of Trade’s Labour Department 
had grown exponentially since the war began and in 1916 it was made into a separate Ministry 
of Labour. In July 1919, it set up an Irish Department in Dublin. One of its primary functions 
was to arbitrate disputes, a process that generated rewards for workers. The Catholic Church 
took a similar approach to class conflict, allowing a Kilkenny-born Capuchin to become the 
most beloved figure in working-class circles in Cork. It seemed that life was finally getting 





The birth of Irish syndicalism 
Wartime profiteering accentuated a pre-war malady that afflicted the working class: a 
successful accumulation of capital that far exceeded Labour’s gains. Across Europe, 
Australasia and the Americas inflation transformed pre-1914 discontent into a revolutionary or 
semi-revolutionary sentiment that syndicalists were happy to exploit. Between 1910 and 1920, 
semi-insurrectional strike waves comparable only to the seismic international working-class 
upheavals of 1869-1875 and 1968-1974 engulfed France, Germany, Britain, the US, Italy and 
Spain. Elsewhere, similar levels of workers’ unrest took place in Scandinavia (1909 to mid-
1920s), Mexico (1915-16), Russia (1917) and Argentina (1919).3 Exogenous influences on 
syndicalist movements were as powerful as endogenous ones. Radical migrants and activists 
helped to spread the movement internationally, as did sailors. Irish syndicalism was part of this 
diffusive network and it borrowed much from the international movement, most notably the 
idea of the One Big Union which was embodied most perfectly in the ITGWU.4 
  From late 1916, the Transport Union swiftly expanded in Cork under Denis Houston, its 
new regional organiser, and was fast becoming the chief medium through which working-class 
anger was being channelled. Labourers, urban and rural, were at the heart of its renaissance. In 
this way, Irish syndicalism more closely resembled American, Italian and Spanish syndicalism 
than its French or British variants.5 In January 1917, the ITGWU took over the local Builders’ 
Labourers’ Society, and sought a 32s. wage and a reduction of hours from sixty to fifty-one for 
carters and storemen. The CEF refused to negotiate due to ‘past experience with this union’.6 
Having issued strike notices, it successfully agitated on behalf of the tramwaymen in March, 
June and July.7 
 From April 1917, an unprecedented wave of labour agitation swept through Cork. A 
building trade strike heralded the new dawn. It all workers except painters – 900 in total. The 
masons and bricklayers sought 1s. 6d. more a day and the plasterers an extra 1s. The carpenters 
went further and demanded 6s. 3d. a week, a 3s. bonus and a fifty-hour week. The Master 
Builders’ Association’s offer of lesser increases was turned down. Having agitated for seven 
months, the men ceased work on 31 March. After seven days, all but the carpenters returned to 
work. A conference of arbitration presided over by the lord mayor fixed improved wages and 
a fifty-one-hour week. As they could find work elsewhere, the carpenters remained out for 
another two weeks until arbitration gave them most of their demands: 10d. per hour and a fifty-
hour week.8 (See Tables A & B, Appendix 10).  
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 Construction workers contributed disproportionate support to syndicalist movements in 
several countries, most notably France, but also Britain, Germany, the Netherlands, Sweden 
and Portugal. Though building tradesmen had been traditionally hostile to radicalism, 
economic change forced a change in outlook. The ‘second industrial revolution’ of the early 
twentieth century brought a litany of technological and organisational innovations that altered 
working conditions in the industry by reducing numbers and endangering painstakingly 
acquired skills. Carpenters were threatened by mechanical saws and prefabricated wood; 
masons by mechanised devices for working stone spread and by iron and concrete.9 
 
. . . labour relations in the industry were being altered in the new century, particularly by 
increasing commercialization or speculative construction which was accompanied by the 
proliferation of competitive general contractors and subcontractors. A typical feature of the new 
situation was that . . . construction workers were contracted for each new building site and were 
therefore increasingly reduced to conditions akin to casual workers. Job control was further 
threatened by the willingness of contractors to shift from skilled to unskilled workers when 
possible, or to employ non-union workers. Strikes against non-union labour were common in 
the construction trades.10 
 
Moreover, the nature of construction work lent itself to radicalism: 
 
The industry . . . clearly exhibited a characteristic frequently associated with the appeal of 
syndicalism: work in small. . . seemingly self-sufficient groups . . . those that syndicalism saw 
as the local productive and administrative groups of the future. That these small but changing 
work groups worked on limited-term projects, for changing employers at changing sites, no 
doubt also placed a high premium on direct industrial action. Grievances . . . had to be settled 
quickly, for length processes might well outlive the construction project and the grievance. . . 
moreover . . .there was a tendency . . . towards larger construction firms and better-organised 
employer groups . . . better able to resist workers’ demands. . . widespread and increasingly 
competitive subcontracting . . . gave subcontractors a strong incentive to drive hard bargains 




Thus, Irish building craftsmen were prompted to ally with labourers to secure their bargaining 
power; a growth in syndicalist sympathy among both was the outcome. However, unlike most 
countries where syndicalism emerged, Irish tradesmen stuck with their non-syndicalist craft 
unions. 
 Rocketing inflation was another factor that produced syndicalist sentiment. The RIC 
testified that, ‘the abnormal prices of food stuffs make it difficult for workers and their families 
to maintain themselves on their wages.’12 It noted discontent among artisans and labourers in 
March, railwaymen in April, and mill and tramway workers in May.13 Accordingly, the NUR 
pressed for 8s. more on their bonus to bring it into line with British railwaymen. It acquired 5s. 
(making the bonus 12s.) but, much to its ire, the differential with Britain remained.14 In July, a 
dockers’ strike was averted when, after three weeks of negotiations, government intervention 
produced a settlement that gave permanent men an extra 3s. Fr. Thomas Dowling, a Capuchin 
priest who had recently arrived in Cork, was central to the talks.15 He would soon become one 
of the era’s most significant individuals for Cork’s working class. Employers were being 
inundated with demands for wage increases, but they remained intransigent despite the 
inflationary environment, making union pugnaciousness necessary. Consequently, industrial 
mediation was becoming more extensive, with Dowling taking the lead. In October, the carters 
put forward to the Carriers’ Federation their claim of a 30s. wage for a fifty-one-hour week and 
eight consecutive paid holidays per annum. The threatened strike was resolved when Dowling 
secured the wage.16 He also settled a dispute at D.J. Lucy & Co. wool manufacturers.17 When 
John Wallis & Sons withheld the 30s. wage from their carters, the British government stepped 
in and awarded it to them for a sixty-hour week thus averting a strike there.18  
Across Ireland, assistant workers were establishing themselves as some of the most 
militant workers. The IDAA was growing rapidly to become one of the foremost Irish unions. 
Its British rival, The National Amalgamated Union of Shop Assistants, Warehousemen and 
Clerks, had undergone a major expansion of its Irish operations since late 1916 and trebled its 







Militancy among women 
Under the leadership of the Irish Women Workers’ Union (IWWU), an offshoot of the ITGWU, 
from late 1917 there was an upsurge in militancy among women. Workers at the Munster 
Laundry presented a united front and won two increases and a week’s holidays with full pay at 
Christmas, the first non-craft workers in Cork to do so. At the same time, 120 women at four 
printing and paper bag-making works struck for a minimum wage of 17s. 6d., as recommended 
by the Cardboard Box Trade Board (Ireland). Most of these women earned less than 10s. and 
some as little as 4s. After a week, they obtained their full demands. Male clerks, packers and 
messengers, who also secured increases, picketed alongside them.20 In the same period, the 
British-based National Federation of Women Workers spread from the artillery shell factory to 
the Douglas Woollen Mills. In 1919, it transferred its Irish members over to the IWWU.21 But 
militancy could only gain so much. In September 1919, laundry workers were on only 21s. for 
their forty-eight-hour week.22 
 By the end of 1917, the IWWU’s brother union boasted more than 5,000 members and 
six branches in Cork, and had won pay raises at the gristmills, in the coal trade and at two 
shipping lines.23 The period’s bitterest strike in Cork ensued from its organisation of the 
teenage staff at Alfred Dobbin’s jam factory, Ogilvie & Moore. Dobbin paid girls 6s. a week 
on average and men 22s. 6d. In late 1917, the employees asked for a wage of 18s. for women 
and 30s. for men and rejected Dobbin’s offers of smaller increases. Dobbin then sacked 
workers who refused to perform their duties. On 28 January 1918, the women struck. The 
stoppage continued for eighteen months and followed an antiquated pattern of class conflict: 
state prosecution of picketers, attacks on scabs and police escorts of company lorries.24 
 Syndicalism’s record on women’s rights is unimpressive. In Britain, France, the US, 
Spain and Italy syndicalists a sexist indifference to women’s issues typical of the time. The 
suffragette movement was viewed by many as toxic and bourgeois because it sought to destroy 
the solidarity of working-class men and women and replace it with a fallacious cross-class one 
based on sex. Syndicalist preoccupation with workplace struggle led to a ‘workerist’, rather 
than feminist, commitment to women’s rights. It was a commitment based solely on class and 
it ignored how women’s oppression transcended home and work. Some syndicalists even 
believed that a woman’s place was in the home and made no attempt to organise women. 
However, most wanted to end women’s degradation which could only be achieved through 
class-based action: getting women into the workforce and unionising them. The ITGWU’s 
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record on women is similar. It sponsored the foundation of the IWWU in 1911 by Delia Larkin 
(sister of Jim) and both unions developed a close working relationship. It supported suffrage 
and considered itself a champion of women’s rights. Nevertheless, the ITGWU’s language was 
often explicitly masculine (appeals to manhood, calling on men to be men, etc.) and manliness 
was a strong part of the union’s ethos.25 Syndicalist movements everywhere were, to varying 
degrees, influenced by the prevailing culture. Despite clear national differences, a conception 
of masculinity in which independence and ‘homosocial alliances’ were central to global 
syndicalism. Francis Shor has argued that the syndicalist tactic of industrial sabotage (see p. 
125) was also a ritualistic means of asserting one’s manhood. Regarding syndicalist 
susceptibility to racism, Pieter van Duin has argued that the South African IWW made no 
attempt to organise non-white workers despite explicit anti-racist claims, but this is disputed 
by Lucien van der Walt.26 
 
The wages movement in 1918: growing momentum 
Proletarian militancy continued to flourish across Cork in 1918 and unskilled workers were at 
the vanguard. January 1918 was a portent of what was to come as militancy continued its spread 
to disparate sectors. Teenage labourers at Ryan’s soap, candle and glycerine factory; 
tramwaymen; and weighmen and storemen at Green & Co. grain mill were among those who 
secured increases through strike or the threat of it.27 Irish syndicalism’s strong appeal to 
labourers is noteworthy given that the same movement was more alluring to tradesmen in 
Britain and France. The war had rapidly accelerated the long-term trend of craft dilution, a by-
product of the second industrial revolution. Employers used technological change as a weapon 
with which they could take control over production away from workers: 
 
For example, new management techniques were introduced, which resulted in the replacement 
of systems of internal contract and indirect employment whereby skilled workers hired, paid 
and supervised their own assistants, or team leaders contracted with the overarching employer 
but assembled, monitored and paid their own teams, by direct employment and bureaucratic 
control. . . In addition to increasing direct supervision, employers experimented with various 
means, such as piecework, premium bonuses, internal promotion and job ladders, to elicit 
greater worker effort, docility and loyalty . . . a common feature of the new managerial 
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procedures was the consolidation of control over the work process, which involved transferring 
production expertise from workers to the employers, and which inevitably drew resistance.28 
 
Inflation and workplace change were the bases for craft militancy. From early 1918, the 
tradesmen, who heretofore experienced great difficulty in preserving their standard of living, 
found the tide turning in their favour. Even their apprentices were taking matters into their own 
hands and making gains. In January 1918, apprentice painters struck for 6s. extra on their 3s. 
to 18s. wage scale. Two months later, they attained modified increases. In early February, 
apprentice plumbers struck for a final year wage of 34s. 6d. and against being compelled to 
perform the duties of a labourer. They did not return to work until 13 April.29 Apprentices were 
bound by an indenture that tightly controlled their wages and their behaviour both on and off 
the job. Most trades only paid ‘encouragement money’ of a few shillings in an apprentice’s 
first year, gradually increasing to about 50 per cent of a journeyman’s rate by the final year.30 
In March, after agitating for 15s. extra, the coopers secured 5s. the following month.31 Perhaps 
to placate them, in July the brewers voluntarily gave the coopers another 8s, catching them by 
surprise and giving them a 60s. wage. Piece-rates, where they still operated, were raised to a 
standardised 50 per cent above the pre-war levels.32  
In April, Dowling and Patrick Lynch averted a stoppage in the building trade by 
obtaining increases and standardising hours at fifty.33 Militancy was so pervasive that it even 
reached the picturesque, campus of University College Cork. In March, ITGWU boys 
employed to weed its gardens for 5s. a week withdrew their labour for an increase. The college 
authorities replaced them with non-unionised girls who would work for 4s.34 Despite greater 
craft militancy, the ITGWU remained Cork’s most successful union. In April, it won 
concessions for breadvan drivers (who had earned 33-35s.), tramwaymen (aided by Lynch and 
Dowling) and Corporation workers. These increases totalled an additional £10,000 worth of 








Table 2. 1: Wages in the Cork Printing Trade, 191836 
Job May 1918 Sept. 1918 
Casemen (day) 52s. 54s. 
Machine operators (day) 58s. 6d. 60s. 9d. 
Casemen (night) 55s. 57s. 
Machine operators (night) 63s. 6d. & 60s.37 65s. 
Jobbing hands - 54s. 
 
Wages upsurge continues 
In late May, the Shop Assistants initiated a major strike at Guy’s printing works, where most 
employees still earned less than 20s. The union kept them out for seven weeks for a 25 per cent 
wage increase, paid sick leave and other advances. Non-government arbitration produced a 
disappointing award: a 2½ per cent advance and other small concessions. Although dejected, 
the workers accepted the result.38 Meanwhile, the Shop Assistants’ chief rival, the IDAA, 
continued to establish a reputation as one of Ireland’s most militant and successful unions. 
Strikes were becoming part of the fabric working-life in Cork. The soaring inflation remained 
the chief cause of unrest. Disputes at Kiloh’s and John Daly’s, in the boot and shoe trade, and 
at the Spinning and Weaving Co. (which involved over 700 women) were settled by Dowling, 
whose role as an industrial mediator continued to grow.39  
 Unskilled workers remained at the heart of the syndicalist upsurge, with dockers and 
agricultural labourers particularly prominent. This is explained by the nature of their work, 
characterised as it was by episodic employment, frequent changes of employer and changes in 
worksite and geographic locale. When there was no work available on the docks, men typically 
had to find jobs elsewhere to maintain an income. Interchange was common between the 
building trade and dock work, and periodic trans-occupational migration inevitably stimulated 
attempts to establish unions across industries, like the ITGWU. Since dockers were not bound 
to a single, long-term employer, they did not have to endure the restraints characteristic of a 
client-patron relationship. The constant change in their places of employment made them less 
afraid of dismissal than those with a (semi-) permanent employer and thus more likely to 
withdraw their labour. Finally, when grievances arose on such jobs, where time was of the 
essence, workers had to act immediately. There was no opportunity to plan strategy, build up 
a strike fund or engaging in the time-consuming process of mediation. Accordingly, the appeal 
of the syndicalist notion of direct action to casual, seasonal or project workers is clear.40 
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  It is therefore unsurprising that Cork’s most protracted strike of 1918 took place on the 
docks. When the Committee on Production turned down the National Transport Workers’ 
Federation’s demands, 250 dockers struck for a pay rise and a reduction of hours. Cork’s 
dockers were earning 40s. for a sixty-hour week – the worst conditions at any Irish port – and 
they demanded an extra 5s. and a fifty-four-hour week. The strike lasted for six weeks before 
Dowling negotiated another compromise.41 In November, coalporters, drapers’ and grocers’ 
assistants, and tailors pushed for improvements.42 They were largely successful, with the 
grocers’ assistants obtaining 20s. over pre-war levels.43 In tandem with their national 
executives, the Cork branch of the Irish Asylum Workers’ Union (IAWU) – whose members 
were among Ireland’s worst-paid attendants – and the Irish National Teachers’ Organisation 
(INTO) agitated for increases. The former demanded 20s. above pre-war levels and a reduction 
of hours to fifty-six; the latter demanded a war bonus on par with that given to other civil 
servants. Both groups threatened strike if their claims were ignored. The asylum workers 
accepted increases of 17s. for men and 12s. for women. A teachers’ strike was set for 4 
November but was called off. The British Government awarded increases that brought 
teachers’ yearly war bonus to £32. 10s. for men and £26 for women.44 
 
Government Arbitration 
The British government’s war effort was predicated on industrial peace and a content 
proletariat. The scale of class conflict from 1917 necessitated a huge expansion of the state’s 
role as an industrial arbitrator, forcing employers to make concessions. On 23 March 1918, via 
the Ministry of Labour, the NUDL won a 35s. wage for carters and storemen and improvements 
for tonnage workers from the CEF’s coal section. In February 1919, the same workers secured 
better hours, conditions and overtime rates from state arbitration.45 On 5 September 1918, the 
Committee on Production ruled that all Irish tradesmen and their labourers were entitled to the 
12½ per cent bonus on earnings that existed in Britain. This bonus became a symbol of Labour 
achievement that employers loathed paying. The following month, government arbitration gave 
flourmill labourers a wage 21s. higher than what prevailed in 1914 (see Appendix 4).46 Table 





Table 2. 2: Arbitration Award at the Cork Gas Company, May 1918 
Occupation Increase  
Machine men 3s. 6d. 
Firemen 3s. 6d. 
Stop pipe men 3s. 6d. 
Assistant firemen 3s. 6d. 
Yardmen and outside labourers 2s. 6d. 
Gas fitters 4s. 
Main and service layers 2s. 6d. 
Lamp repairers 2s. 6d. 
Meter fixers 2s. 6d. 
Slot collectors 3s. 
Carmen 3s. 
Boys 2s. 
Source: Arbitration Award between the Cork Gas Consumers’ Company and the National Union of General 
Labourers, 20 May 1918, LAB 2/85/IC2776/2/1918, Min. of Labour records, UKNA. 
 
Cork Labour in 1919 
By the end of 1918, most Cork workers had received wage increases ranging from 25 to 100 
per cent since 1914 (see Table 2. 4). Wages began to rise more swiftly from late 1918 in concert 
with the spread of syndicalism. Most impressive of all were the improvements obtained by 
women at Ogilvie and Moore which were well above the norm, albeit from a very low base. In 
August 1914, the average wage was 5s. 1d. before reaching 8s. 4d. by August 1916. and 15s. 
by December 1918. The working week had been cut from fifty-five to forty hours over the 
same period.47 Avenging their June disappointment, the Shop Assistants won large increases 
in December 1918 (see Table 2. 3) The union received another boost when the Cork branch of 
the Irish Chemists’ Assistants Association became a section of it.48 However, despite Labour’s 
victories, most workers were still earning at best 50 per cent above their pre-war wages while 
food prices were significantly more than 100 per cent dearer.49 
 
Table 2. 3: Shop Assistants’ Wages in Cork, 1918 
Occupation Feb. 1918 Dec. 1918. 
Assistant (male) 12s. 6d. 27s. 6d. 
Assistant (female) 12s. 6d. 22s. 6d. 
Clerk 7s. 6d. 17s. 
Charge hands 25s. 40s. 




Table 2. 4: Wages in Cork in late 1918 
Workers Wage 
Undertakers’ drivers 30s. (up from 21s. in 1917) 
Butter workers 33s. 
Drapers’ assistants 32s. (up from 27s. 6d. in 1917) 
Egg packers 37s. 6d. for men & 17s. 6d. for women 
General labourers 40s. 
Typographers 60s. & 67s. 6d. 
Source: Lahiff, ‘Industry and Labour in Cork’, p. 204. 
 
Class conflict and the Cork Conciliation Board 
As 1919 began, strikes continued to proliferate. The stoppage at Dobbin’s jam factory was still 
unsettled and threatened to spread. Extra police had been drafted into Cork to protect scabs. 
The CTC’s attempts at conciliation were met with a frosty response from the CEF who refused 
to co-operate, echoing employers in the days of Larkinism. Dobbin demanded that the trades 
council disown the ITGWU before any settlement could be reached. It refused.50 The ITGWU 
and the council toyed with the idea of calling a general strike against Dobbin, but this never 
happened.51 Advocacy of the general strike was something that united syndicalists everywhere. 
The general strike, it was believed, would circumvent a violent crackdown from the state 
because the overwhelming numbers involved meant there would be no precise target for 
repression. The revolution would be widespread and diffuse, everywhere and nowhere, and 
would thus paralyse the bourgeois social order. Localised general strikes became a notable 
feature of Irish syndicalism: Youghal in 1917 and Dungarvan in 1919 are prime examples. But 
it was also a trait of other syndicalist movements: the 1919 Winnipeg general strike organised 
by the OBU in Canada, for example.52  
 Although a local general strike never occurred in Cork, a more significant CTC 
initiative did materialise. On 15 February 1919, a proposal to establish the Cork Conciliation 
Board to arbitrate industrial disputes was revived at a conference between the CTC and the 
CEF under Dowling’s auspices. Cork became the first city in the English-speaking world to 
establish such an institution. Dowling had championed a conciliation board as a long-term 
solution to class conflict since late 1917.53 The Cork Conciliation Board was formally 
constituted at its first meeting held on 1 March 1919.54     




The spread of militancy 
Despite the Board of Trade granting Irish railwaymen eight-hour day from 1 February, there 
was continued unrest on Cork’s railways. On 4 February, the RCA conducted a day-long strike 
across the UK to win recognition from the Railway Executive Committee, which now operated 
the railways. The Committee recognised the ASLEF and the NUR but not the RCA. In a 
provisional agreement, the government largely ceded this demand; however, the chief, personal 
and staff clerks working for the individual general managers and superintendents were not 
covered. The RCA accepted this. But the Committee interpreted the agreement so broadly that 
the exemption was applied to most clerks. Negotiations recommenced but ruptured in early 
March. Another strike was set for 11 March unless the agreement was applied fairly but was 
postponed for further negotiations. On 24 March, a settlement was announced that gave the 
clerks the eight-hour day and better pay and conditions.55 Their action was the only direct 
connection between Cork and the strike endemic engulfing Britain.56  
 But this was not enough to persuade the British government, which was alarmed by the 
spread of class conflict in Ireland and failed to comprehend it as a phenomenon. That August, 
Lloyd George told his cabinet that:  
 
The Irish question, in his opinion, had more to do with the existing industrial unrest than the 
great majority of people imagined. The policemen on strike, the many agitators who were, 
actively engaged in various parts of the country in stirring up trouble and fomenting unrest, 
were generally of Irish extraction, and they were creating a vicious atmosphere. He had been 
told by the Commissioner of the Metropolitan Police that none of his Irish officers were really 
to be trusted. A satisfactory settlement of the Irish question was most important from the point 
of view, not only of the position as regards the Industrial world, but also of our relations with 
the Dominions and the United States.57       
  
Having dismissed Irish Labour as a republican front, the British tried to explain Irish unrest 
with absurd conspiracy theories based on gross exaggerations and lumping various forces of 
discontent together.58 Agitation was always seen as a part of an insidious, global ‘Bolshevist’ 
plot. In 1918, the threat was the ‘Bolshevik, Syndicalist, and the German Spy’; after the war, 




With such a poor understanding of Irish syndicalism, it is unsurprising that the 
government could not halt its spread. Across Ireland, assistants were now heeding the call of 
militancy. On 17 January 1919, Cork bar assistants served demands for wages of 65s. for 
charge hands, 55s. for second hands and 40s. for junior hands. The Licenced Vintners’ 
Association rejected these claims, prompting the Irish National Union of Vintners’, Grocers’ 
and Allied Trades Assistants to issue strike notice. A stoppage was avoided when union 
recognition and wages of 60s., 50s. and 35s. respectively were granted.  
Unlike their British counterparts, most Irish workers continued to confront and 
negotiate with employers on a purely localised level, reflecting the differences in capitalist 
development between the two countries. Irish employers were organised on sectional lines and 
in bodies designed for trade promotion, not industrial conflict. They made little effort to set 
wage levels for an industry, especially in the south. One exception to this was the collective 
bargaining agreement reached between the Irish Master Printers’ Association and the 
Typographical Association in March, an extension of a system already operational in Britain. 
In Cork, collective bargaining granted a forty-eight-hour week for day workers, a forty-five-
hour week for night workers and a week’s paid holidays, demands previously refused by local 
employers acting individually.60 Later that month, employers from across Ireland met in Dublin 
and launched the Irish Association of Employers. Benjamin Buckworth of the CEF seconded 
the resolution to establish it and was elected to its executive council. As its founders made 
clear, it was a direct response to union militancy. Its stated goals were government recognition, 
countering Labour and combatting socialism and nationalisation.61 
In subsequent years, collective bargaining spread across the Irish economy. Although 
the short-term benefits were clear, in the long-term it brought more harm than good to some 
workers, especially during recessions. Between 1910 and 1940 collective bargaining was 
introduced in many countries to diffuse class antagonism. Syndicalists in several countries 
initially rejected it as collaboration with the bourgeoisie that would bureaucratise unions, 
undermine revolutionary spirit and restrict freedom of action. This position was subsequently 
abandoned in the Netherlands, Sweden, Argentina and Canada. Collective bargaining aided the 
demise of international syndicalism by institutionalising unions into the state apparatus. It made 
union leaders responsible for disciplining workers during contract periods and turned them into 
a buffer between capitalists and workers which made them more conservative. Moreover, under 
collective bargaining wages were fixed for a set period (sometimes several years) even if the 
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workers had urgent demands, which sapped radical impulses among the working class.62 In 
Ireland, however, other reasons determined syndicalism’s collapse (see Conclusion).   
In the meantime, Labour radicalism was thriving in Cork. In spring 1919, the coopers 
secured another 8s. after threatening strike (which would have their first since 1894), giving 
them 68s.63 The building trade remained a constant source of discontent. On 7 April, the 
Conciliation Board halted a planned stoppage by awarding tradesmen (except plumbers, 
carpenters and joiners) higher wages.64 But it failed to prevent plumbers and the carpenters and 
joiners from downing tools for hourly rates of 1s. 6d. and 1s. 9d. respectively. Despite 
Conciliation Board mediation, the carpenters’ strike dragged on until 23 September when a 
conference fixed hourly rates at 1s. 8d. for a forty-seven-hour week.65 The following month, 
the Board averted another strike in the trade by awarding these rates and hours to all craftsmen 
bar plumbers from 1 January 1920. Though they were given the 1s. 8d. rate, plumbers’ hours 
remained fifty.66 Throughout this period, furnishing workers’ wages tracked those in the 
building trade and they too had the 1s. 8d. rate by late 1919, although their week was still fifty 
hours.67             
 
May Day 1919 
The peak of post-war proletarian exuberance in Ireland was reached on May Day 1919. The 
ITUC called a national general strike for 1 May and the CTC was happy to participate. Over 
8,000 Corkmen – 6,000 from the city and 2,000 from the county – abstained from work. They 
partook in a procession which featured the red flag, orderly marches, militant speeches, 
republican music and vocal praise for the Bolsheviks, whose revolution Labourites regarded as 
a blow to imperialism. It was enough to worry the police. ‘There is nothing to show a marked 
tendency towards Bolshevism, but the fact that red flags were carried . . . would indicate a 
slight tendency in that respect’. By now, the CTC had grown to include unions from every 
sector of the economy.68 The procession’s biggest bloc was formed by the ITGWU and its 
4,000 members who were, according to the RIC, ‘all members of the Sinn Féin organisation’. 
It had six sections and even organised some craftsmen like stonecutters, having taken over the 
Cork-based Operative Stonecutters of Ireland Trade Union in 1918.69 The ITGWU was now a 
real force to be reckoned with in Cork, as it was in many Irish cities. In Limerick, for example, 
its growth from 1917 was similarly impressive and it had 3,000 members by mid-1919.70 
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 The rally also featured a contingent of girls from the Irish Citizen Army: a scouts’ unit 
that often led ITGWU processions. A local ICA women’s branch, ‘Ireland’s Own, had also 
existed since 1917. It operated like Cumann na mBan though it was poorly supported by that 
body. Nora and Sheila Wallace, who owned a newsagent that regularly housed republicans on 
the run, led the branch. The Wallace sisters were early Cumann na mBan members who later 
drifted towards the Citizen Army and the IRA. They were both Connollyites who viewed the 
Labour and republican struggles as inseparable. Ireland’s Own existed until the truce. It hosted 
socials and raised funds for the republicans. It was Cork’s only ICA branch: the men’s unit had 
been subsumed into the IRA.71 In April 1920, the Citizen Army discussed re-establishing a 
men’s section in Cork but dropped the proposal two months later.72 A Citizen Army boy scouts’ 
division was started in late 1918 or early 1919 and peaked with a membership of about forty 
before petering out the following year. During its brief existence, it made inroads within Fianna 
Éireann, the republican boy scouts organisation. The Citizen Army made a negligible impact 
in Cork and there are few records of its activities beyond appearances at republican/ITGWU 
processions and marches, and at funerals of IRA trade unionists in the latter part of the War of 
Independence.73      
 
Deepening class conflict 
Class conflict deepened in Cork during the summer of 1919. The biggest stoppages resulted 
from lockouts rather than strikes. This hardening of employer class consciousness illustrates 
the limitations of Dowling’s mediation endeavours as the bosses sought to reassert their 
hegemony in revolutionary Cork. The Conciliation Board was impelled into action for all but 
the shortest of these battles. It persuaded the tramwaymen, farriers and tobacconists’ assistants 
not to withdraw their labour by mediating their grievances.74 But Dowling was unable to stop 
every dispute from developing into a strike. On 12 May, the ITGWU brought out the egg-
packers for higher pay and fewer hours. Male packers earned 37s. 6d. for a forty-eight-hour 
week. Under Dowling’s counsel, the employers made concessions. But trouble was not 
abating.75  
 In early May, a wage claim in the bakeries led to Conciliation Board intervention. 
Dowling put forward proposals that were acceptable to the workers but not the master bakers 
because the Ministry of Food refused to increase the price of bread or reduce the price of flour. 
After a stoppage from 15-26 May and ten days without bread, the price of a loaf was increased 
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by ½d. and bakers’ wages by 24s., giving them 66s. a week. Confectioners were given 20s. 
(giving them a 70s. rate) and breadvan drivers 7s.76 The Board was also unable to stop a strike 
at Lyons that began on 28 May when the company locked out the IDAA after it demanded an 
upward revision of wages.77 Likewise, on 23 June the tailors withdrew their labour for a 70s. 
minimum. Dowling ended both stoppages by awarding modified improvements.78 Although 
workers rarely secured their full demands through the Capuchin, he had earned the reputation 
of being a friend of the working class. After the tailors’ strike, firms paid 140-150 per cent 
above pre-war levels. The master tailors were impressed with Labour’s unity and unhappy with 
their own lack of it. They vowed to change this.79 Low wages and employer obstinance meant 
that the tailoring trade had been in a state of conflict since February. The ASTT had put forward 
claims of 9d. an hour (from 6½d.), a shorter week and improved conditions, but were forced to 
accept the employers’ offer of 7d. and a forty-eight-hour week.80 The union would not relent 
until it received an award given to British workers. On 22 May, the Ministry of Labour 
deliberated in Dublin on whether the award applied to Ireland but withheld the findings. The 
situation remained unresolved when the Cork branch met in August and demanded a trade 
board for Irish dressmakers and milliners.81 
Not only were wages on the up, hours were coming down. Coachbuilders’ pay jumped 
by a sizable 16s. 7d. and their hours were cut from fifty-four to forty-seven.82 Industrial trouble 
was spreading to unlikely places. In June, the barmaids declared their intention to strike if 
wages of 45s. for second hands and 40s. for junior hands were not given. The women were 
granted annual salaries of £30 and £40 respectively.83 The ASE sought an 84s. wage for a forty-
seven-hour week. It attained an 80s. flat rate, making Cork’s engineers the best paid in 
Ireland.84 By July, what remained of the strike at Ogilvie & Moore’s had fizzled out. Dobbin, 
who had replaced the sacked workers, emerged triumphant. But his victory was a pyrrhic one. 
It came at considerable financial cost and, in John Borgonovo’s opinion, contributed to a deep 
unpopularity that had near-fatal consequences. A staunch Unionist, a republican gunman tried 
to assassinate him in 1920 and a year later the IRA burned his mansion as a counter-reprisal.85 
Labourers remained at the forefront of trade union militancy as another spate of disputes broke 
out that autumn. The ITGWU pursued an advance for corn porters (who earned 20-30s. a day) 
and brought out gristmill and Cork Tanning Company labourers, who earned 45s. for a fifty-
four-hour week.86 Tradesmen agitation continued to yield impressive results. The coopers 
negotiated an increase to give them Cork’s first uniform rate (81s. 4d.), even though it was less 
than the 87s. 9d. they had wanted.87 Electricians received an advance that that made them 
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among Cork’s best paid workers and had their hours cut from fifty to forty-seven. (See Table 
M, Appendix 7).88 The strike wave was so endemic that the threat of labour withdrawal was 
enough to force employers to make concessions, as seen in Table 2. 5. 
 
Table 2. 5: Threatened strike in Cork, 1917-20. 
Workers/union Demand Outcome Threat issued 
CCSPC sailors & 
firemen 
60s. wage Successful Mar. 1917 
CCSPC labourers 40s. wage Modified increase Nov. 1917 
IDAA 25 per cent increase Modified increase Oct. 1917 
Assistant teachers Increased salary Modified increase Mar. 1918 
Tramwaymen Wage increase Modified increase Apr. 1918 
Coalporters Wage increase Modified increase Nov. 1918 
Part-time teachers Extra remuneration Postponed until 
academic year after 
Dowling intervenes 
Jan., Mar. 1919 
Gasworkers 10s. increase Modified increase Feb. 1919 
ASLEF Fireman not be sacked Notice withdrawn Jan. 1919 
ASTT 15s. increase and an 
eight-hour day 
5s. increase May 1919 
Corn porters 20 per cent increase Referred to Wheat 
Commission 
Aug. 1919 
Journeymen butchers Wage increase 12s. increase and 
improved piece rates 
Sept. 1919 
Gristmill labourers Wage increase Modified increase May 1920 
Printing trade 
labourers 
Wage increase Modified increase May 1920 
Oil, colour, wine and 
spirit workers 
Wage increase 10s. increase Aug. 1920 
Source: CE, 1917-20; Watchword of Labour, 1919-20; CCSPC minutes, 1917-18, 370/A/10, CCCA. 
 
White-collar militancy 
White-collar workers continued to assert themselves as never before. That summer, the 
Southern Law Clerks’ Association, agitated for improvements.89 A perfect expression of the 
zeitgeist occurred on 1 September when the Part-Time Teachers Association brought out the 
professors at the Cork School of Music for a 50 per cent advance over pre-1914 rates. A 
settlement could not be found, and the professors resigned in protest.90 The IDAA led the white-
collar charge. In July, it had sought a new wage scale and improved working conditions for 
drapers’ assistants, which the employers could not accept. The dispute rumbled on until strike 
was set for 18 October. Dowling persuaded the union to postpone off its action, which would 
involve over 600 assistants. In November, he negotiated a better deal and the stoppage was 
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avoided.91 The following month, another planned strike at two draperies was called off when 
the staff received increases of 75 per cent at one firm and 20s. at the other.92 Table 2. 6 shows 
the IDAA’s successes. Simultaneously, after months of negotiations, Dowling obtained higher 
wages and a forty-seven-hour week for the grocers’ assistants (including clerks), as outlined in 
table 2. 7.93 
 
Table 2. 6: Advances Secured by the IDAA, 1919-20 
Firm Advance Date 
Kiloh & Co. £550 worth of increases and 
£200 worth of bonuses 
Aug. 1919 
Hardware stores 60s. minimum with 33½ per 
cent increases on wages below 
60s. and 25 per cent on wages 
above 60s.94 
Aug. 1919 
T.J. O’Connell’s95 £30 annually Oct. 1919 
Baker & Wright’s 7-16s. a week for office & 
warehouse staff 
Dec. 1919 
Kerin’s and Egan’s 7-15s. a week Dec. 1919 
Power Bros. and John Hill & 
Sons 
20s. a week Dec. 1919 
Moynihan’s, Fitzgerald’s, 
Cahill’s and the Gas Company 
Wage increases Jan. 1920 
Dwyer & Co. Reduction of hours Jan. 1920 
Drapers’ assistants Scale of £104 to £186 (after ten 
years) for men and of £78 to 
£144 for women 
Feb. 1920 
Source: Drapers’ Assistant, vol. 17, Sept., Nov. 1919, Jan. 1920; IDAA executive committee minutes, 18, 25 
June, 19 Nov. 1919; Mandate Trade Union archives, O’Lehane House; LG, Mar. 1920. 
 
Table 2. 7: Grocers’ Assistants’ Wages in Cork from 6 October 1919 
Position in Trade Wage 
3-4 Years 35s. 
19 Years Old 37s. 6d. 
4-5 Years 40s. 
5-6 Years 50s. 
6-7 Years 53s. 
Over 7 Years 67s. 6d. 
Charge Hands 87s. 6d. 





Despite their gains, some clerks encountered intense employer hostility to trade 
unionism, akin to what tradesmen and labourers had experienced in previous generations. In 
mid-1919, Sutton’s clerical staff had their request for an improved bonus denied because of 
their membership of the Irish Clerical Workers’ Union (ICWU). Strike was called but it soon 
collapsed, and the clerks were forced to sign a document renouncing their union. Employers 
had good reason to fear the ICWU. Since the Cork branch’s formation in January it had won a 
fortnight’s annual holidays and weekly increases of 10-40s. (20s. on average).96 Syndicalism 
was also emboldening white-collar women to unionise. In November 1919, the Cork Nurses’ 
Association was founded. It spent much time campaigning for the eight-hour day.97 
Most extraordinary of all was the novel sight of bank clerks organising and issuing 
strike notice for better salary and recognition of their union. The Irish Bank Officials 
Association (IBOA) was formed on 17 March 1918. By 1919, its assertiveness had grown after 
repeatedly encountering the bankers’ obduracy. By that autumn, it had unionised over eighty 
per cent of the Irish bank clerks. It wanted a minimum annual salary of £80 for the first year 
that would rise incrementally to £500 after twenty years’ service. Despite promises of 
victimisation, strike was set for 31 December. However, the bankers soon backtracked. They 
agreed to recognise the IBOA and to submit its claims to arbitration. In March 1920, a tribunal 
issued a major victory for the clerks. The award fixed an initial salary of £100 for male clerks 
rising by annual increments before peaking at £450. For permanent female employees, the new 
salary scale would commence at £100 and rise to £190. Salaries were to be free of income tax 
and a 20 per cent cost of living bonus was instituted. Tellers and cashiers were given a £20 
responsibility allowance while accountants and sub-managers were given a £40 allowance. 
From now on, all permanent male officials would be entitled to a retirement pension after 
fifteen years’ service, with the amount growing to two-thirds of the salary after forty-five years’ 
service. The resolve of the IBOA’s executive had found strong support among Cork’s bank 
clerks.98 
White-collar militancy also manifested itself in a strike of chemists’ assistants in several 
Irish cities, including Cork. On 2 December, after pleas for an improvement on their 37s. 6d. 
wage were not met, strike was called. The assistants had originally planned to cease work on 
23 November but postponed it after accepting Ministry of Labour arbitration. In Cork, the strike 
lasted until 19 December when an agreement was reached.99 Shortly before the strike, tragedy 
struck the Shop Assistants when Edward Owens, its Irish organiser, died from pneumonia. O. 
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W. Humphrey of the Cork branch described him as ‘the greatest figure that ever carried the 
banner of shop life reform through Ireland’.100    
    
The height of the class war, 1919-20 
Irish syndicalism climaxed from late 1919 to mid-1920 when it coloured all aspects of the 
Labour movement. Like France, Spain and Italy, and unlike Britain and the US, syndicalism’s 
influence in Ireland is attested by its impact on the traditional centres of craft unionism: pre-
modern workshops, worksites and small and medium industries.101 By late 1919, the wages of 
Cork’s boot and shoe operatives ranged from 50-60s. However, inflation meant that they had 
experienced no tangible benefits during the war. The NUBSO was thus compelled to present 
their employers with claims for a wage 100 per cent above pre-war levels, a forty-eight-hour 
week and a 35s. wage for women. They refused, sparking a seven-week strike from late October 
that was ended by Dowling. The Cork Master Shoe Repairers’ Association agreed to give an 
average advance of 50 per cent on piece-rates, as arranged by the Boot and Shoe Repairing 
Trade Board (Ireland). Hours were also reduced by one to forty-eight.102 In 1920, the NUBSO 
negotiated UK-wide wages of 65s. and 68s. for men and 40s. for women, their peak rates.103  
 By the end of 1919, labour had much to be proud of. Across all sectors, workers’ living 
standards had improved. The ITGWU, the finest crystallisation of Irish syndicalism, had the 
most to be proud about. An example of its success was its organisation of workers at Gouldings. 
There, it had obtained 57s. 6d. for carmen (from 14s. in 1914) and 55s. for labourers (5s. above 
the standardised minimum) after a 5s. increase in December. It also secured a 56s. wage for 
yardmen at Kenny’s and labourers at Sutton’s, and rates at Lunham’s ranged from 50s. to 70s. 
All had the forty-seven-hour week. On average, the unions had enhanced workers’ pay by about 
25 per cent.104  
 Industrially, February of 1920 was the era’s most disturbed month in Cork. Fittingly, it 
began with a work stoppage. Via Dowling, the ITGWU secured improvements for carters and 
labourers at Jennings & Co. water factory after a 7-day strike.105 But the Transport Union did 
not represent Cork’s most exploited workers, the Lunatic Asylum’s attendants. The IAWU had 
a torrid time in pressing for a reduction of their working week – about seventy hours – to fifty-
six hours and for better pay. The asylum’s management reluctantly conceded the demands after 
a national conference held on 25 February between the asylums’ management committees and 
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the IAWU standardised wages and hours across Ireland. Monthly minimum wages were now 
100s. for men and 70s. for women, with 10s. monthly increments given after a year’s service. 
Men’s annual pay would be £92 and women’s £72. Hours were cut to fifty-six.106  
       
The brewery workers’ and printers’ strikes 
On 11 February 1920, the year’s first major strike materialised when 300 brewery labourers 
went out for a 70s. wage, a forty-seven-hour week and seven days annual paid holiday. The 
trades council and its affiliates gave the strikers generous financial support. Throughout 1919, 
the Cork Brewery Workmen’s Association had pushed for wage increases and a shorter week. 
It attained a 50s. wage but failed to reduce hours below fifty despite struggling for the forty-
four-hour week.107 After five weeks on strike, the men were granted a 62s. 6d. wage and a 47½-
hour week. Though previously hostile to labourers, the coopers contributed generously to the 
CTC’s appeals and refused to scab, making the strike far more effective.108 This support is 
significant because cooperage was traditionally a trade in which the gulf between craftsman 
and labourer was particularly pronounced.109 The maltsters and draymen were also given 
increases to maintain their differentials over the labourers.110 The strike’s ultimate legacy was 
the enduring foothold it gave Guinness in Cork, allowing to it to become a major competitor to 
the local breweries. The unions tried to nip this in the bud. At the behest of the coopers, they 
conducted a public campaign against the local consumption of Guinness from August to 
October 1923. With their employers’ support, trade unionists picketed the Guinness offices 
interfered with deliveries. Though initially successful, it failed to halt Guinness’s growth in 
Cork.111   
 
Table 2. 8: Wages at Murphy’s Brewery, 1914-20 
Year Watchmen Enginemen Lorry Drivers 
1914 26s. 30s. - 
1915 27s. 31s. - 
1916 30s. 34s. - 
1917 36s 40s. - 
1918 41s. 50s. - 
1919 53s. - 72s. 6d. 
1920 - - 90s. 
Source: Borgonovo, War and Revolution, p. 160; Workmen’s Register, BL/BC/MB/334, Murphy’s brewery 
collection, UCC Archives (UCCA). 
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Printers encountered similar employer obstinance as the brewery labourers. In July 
1919, in accordance with a national agreement, the master printers instituted wages of 67s. 6d. 
for Cork jobbing compositors and 65s. for bookbinders and machine rulers, with another 2s. 
6d. increase operative from September.112 At the year’s end, the Cork Examiner’s staff tendered 
notices. Employers then granted increases of 12s. 6d. to compositors, machinemen and linotype 
and monotype operators in the morning newspapers, and 10s. for those in the evening 
newspapers. Lithographic printers secured 7s. 6d. and bookbinders and machine rulers 5s. (see 
Table 2. 9).113 But the workers needed more to deal with inflation. In February 1920, a year 
after the introduction of collective bargaining to the printing trade, Cork employers pulled out 
of national negotiations when the local Typographical Association’s applied for a 15s. advance. 
The Association’s executive intervened and advised a return to work as a strike in Cork could 
jeopardise talks across the UK. On 21 February, the printers at the jobbing houses ceased work. 
They held out until 19 March when an agreement giving them 10s. more was signed. Jobbing 
compositors now had 80s. National collective bargaining was resumed once again. By April, 
machine operators in the jobbing houses were earning an impressive 85s.114 
 
Table 2. 9: Wages in the Cork Printing Trade, January 1920 
Job Wage 
Compositors 87s. 6d. (night) & 80s. (morning) 
Lithographic printers 83s. 
Bookbinders & Machine rulers 72s. 6d. 
Stereotypers 60s. 
First cutters 54s. 
Second cutters 40s. 
Monotype casters 48s. 
Store polishers 47s. 6d. 
Shop assistants 50s. 
Charge hands 30s. 
Women 12-27s. (depending on age) 
Source: LG, Jan., Feb. 1920; Watchword of Labour, 13 Dec. 1919, 14 Feb. 1920; Typographical Association Cork 







The advent of proletarian power 
On 16 April, Irish dockers launched an initiative that demonstrated Labour’s capacity to 
advance workers’ interests outside the sphere of industrial relations. By order of the ITUC, the 
ITGWU and the NUDL launched a national embargo on the exportation of bacon, butter and 
live pigs following the British Government’s promise to decontrol food prices. Congress 
warned merchants that if they did not fix prices at a reasonable level then the workers would 
seize control of industry and do so themselves.115 The stoppage was ‘strictly observed’ in 
Cork.116 Syndicalism’s influence on the dockers is obvious here. Syndicalists championed a 
decentralised brand of socialism where workers’ democratic control of the means of 
production, distribution and exchange were the defining features of a more just social order. 
 
The trade unions were viewed as both the chief agency of class struggle in the present and the 
embryo of the new hoped-for classless society in the future. . . they were anticipated to become 
an organ of economic and industrial administration in the post-revolution society. . . the guiding 
and most important principle was that management of production should occur at the base of 
society, not at its summit, with decisions flowing upward from below. . . instead of a political 
state apparatus, the only form of government would be the economic administration of industry 
exercised directly by workers themselves through the unions.117 
 
On 3 May, the embargo was called off after merchants agreed to maintain control-era 
prices on bacon and butter.118 Even conservative news outlets were impressed with this display 
of proletarian power.119 For the employers, the embargo was proof that Irish Labour was 
irredeemably Bolshevist and the culmination of the descent into anarchy that 1920 had brought. 
Government inefficacy was equally depressing. The power of Irish employers had been steadily 
shrinking since 1917 and Labour was now openly attacking the basis of capitalism. They 
desperately sought an answer but found none. Wartime state intervention had deepened Irish 
employer class consciousness by reinvigorating their federations; the growth of trade unionism 
had a similar effect. The war had generated a shift in attitudes that led many to grudgingly 
recognise the unions. But they remained firmly opposed to direct action and felt increasingly 
isolated by government inactivity against Labour’s law breaking. Only political stability could 
give them what they wanted.120  
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More white-collar militancy 
Militancy among assistants and clerks remained one of the era’s defining features. In March, 
the ICWU brought out the Steam Packet Company’s clerical staff for an increase and union 
recognition. The clerks received strong financial support from their fellow-workers, skilled and 
unskilled alike. The strike lasted for over six weeks and demonstrated that militancy was not 
the sole preserve of the manual sectors. The company was forced to recognise the ICWU.121 
Charges were brought against several strikers for intimidating scabs but were dismissed in 
court.122 Ireland’s first ever teachers’ strike was another proclamation of the zeitgeist. On 3 
May, the Association of Secondary Teachers in Ireland (ASTI) brought out its Cork branch in 
pursuit of an extra £80 a year, claiming that they had only received increases of 14 per cent 
since 1914. After a week, the Catholic Headmasters’ Association capitulated and granted a £75 
increase. Three weeks after that, the Christian Brothers did the same which settled the 
dispute.123           
 Syndicalism drove the ITGWU to try and unite all workers and to spread itself to the 
centres of white-collar ‘respectability’. From 27 May to 1 July, it led a strike of Prudential 
Insurance Company agents for a 20s. top-up on their 60s. wage. Modified improvements were 
granted.124 The Transport Union took over the Southern Law Clerks’ Association and 
negotiated improved rates for the legal clerks (see Table 2. 10). Subsuming this union was a 
victory for the ITGWU, as the legal clerks had considered joining the ICWU. In June, with 
CTC support, the Part-Time Teachers’ Association sought an increase to make pay 150 per 
cent over pre-1914 levels.125 By now, the Steam Packet Company’s salaried staff had attained 
sizeable gains from what they had in January 1919, especially those at the lower end. Most 
were on over 50 per cent more and some were now paid over 100 per cent more.126 In April 
1920, the RCA threatened all-out strike on the Irish railways from 3 May if the agreement 
reached in August 1919, which gave the clerks substantial concessions, was not implemented 
by the companies. A strike of 3,000 railway clerks and stationmasters was deferred when the 
Ministry of Transport facilitated a series of conferences to resolve the dispute. After six weeks 
of arduous talks, the same conditions as prevailed in Britain were applied to Ireland. Irish 
railway clerks obtained eleven months of arrears in a lump sum and a wage increase. Drivers 
obtained 14s. a week more and firemen 11s.127 Though strictly a temporary phenomenon, 
white-collar militancy aided the cohesion of the local wages’ movement. Tradesmen and 
labourers were happy to assist their comrades in the professions, helping to force employers to 
review their wages policy.128  
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Table 2. 10: Wage Scale obtained by the ITGWU for Cork Law Clerks, June 1920 
Position Wage 
First Year 15s. 
Second Year 22s. 6d. 
Third Year 30s. 
Fourth Year 37s. 6d. 
Fifth Year 45s. 
Sixth Year 52s. 6d. 
Seventh Year 60s. 
Eighth Year 65s. 
Ninth Year 70s. 
Over Ninth Year and First Clerks 75s. 
Managing Clerks 80s. 
Source: Watchword of Labour, 5 June 1920. 
 
The peak of the wages’ movement 
The UK economy continued to boom through the spring and summer of 1920, enabling the 
unions to get their final concessions from employers. On 17 April 1920, the bakers went out 
for higher wages. The employers offered to submit the claim to arbitration under the 
Conciliation Board or to the Ministry of Labour, but this was refused. The strike dragged on 
for nearly six weeks and was marred by the violence of old with windows smashed and 
employer property damaged. The industrious Dowling negotiated a settlement on 27 May. 
However, a new conflict between the vanmen and bakers emerged two days later and resulted 
in the latter continuing their strike.129 Unwilling to become embroiled in an inter-union dispute, 
the CTC referred the question to a Dáil Éireann court of arbitration whose ruling was accepted 
by all.130 That the trades council would refer such disputes to the Dáil, an illegal parliament 
since September 1919, and not the British Ministry of Labour is emblematic of Cork labour’s 
political transformation since 1916.  
 On 3 May, the wages movement reached its zenith in the building trade and acquired 
its workers’ final improvement for many years. A general stoppage in the trade had been 
threatened but Dowling’s intervention convinced the master builders to acquiesce.131 Table 2. 
11 shows that the new rates compared well to other towns and cities, especially for labourers. 
The Capuchin’s value to Labour was also on display when he resolved a six-week engineers’ 
strike in mid-July on the men’s terms, procuring for them a sizable 25s. increase. Cork 
engineers now had a 105s. wage, the highest in the UK (see Table C, Appendix 6).132 In mid-
May, a strike of bar assistants was planned for a 50 per cent increase and a forty-eight-hour 
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week. They settled for a fifty-six-hour week and wages of 90s. for charge hands, 75s. for second 
hands and 52s. 6d. for junior hands.133       
      
Table 2. 11: Building Trade Hourly Rates (in pence) & Working Hours in Ireland, 1920 
Locality     B    M     C&J    S Plmbr Plstr Pntr L Hrs 
Cork 24 24 24 24 24 24 24 20 47 
Drogheda 25 - - - - - - - 47½  
Dublin 26 25½  25½  25½  25¾  25½  25 19 44 
Galway - 19 19 - - 19 19 - - 
Killarney 18 18 18 - - 18 - 12 - 
Limerick 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 19 47 
Cobh 24 24 24 24 24 24 24 20  
Waterford 20 20 20 - 20 20 19½  17 50 
Wexford 18 18 18 - - 18 - - 47 
Source: Standard time rates of wages and hours of labour in the United Kingdom at 31st December, 1920, p. 9. 
 
The ITGWU was flourishing amidst the proletarian revolt and it remained the union 
most feared by Irish employers. Its pugnaciousness on the docks was rewarded with an 
impressive new wage scale from 10 May (see Table A, Appendix 6).134 Assistants continued 
to assert themselves and make gains. In mid-July, the Cork Grocers’ Assistants and Allied 
Trades Association withdrew the labour of tobacconists’ assistants for the abolition of Sunday 
work.135 The following month, the IDAA threatened to bring out 600-700 drapers’ assistants if 
its claims for better wages and conditions were not met. Consequently, in November retail 
assistants and clerks were granted an additional 25 and 33⅓ per cent respectively.136 From late 
August, the union led a seven-week strike of hardware assistants for an enhanced wage scale. 
With the intermediary skills of Dowling and Deputy Lord Mayor Donal O’Callaghan, the 
assistants were granted the bulk of their demands.137 
 Wages continued their ascent until the latter part of the year. The bacon trade granted 
a 5s. advance and Goulding’s gave its carters and labourers 10s., making wages 73s. and 72s. 
respectively. Brewery labourers got their last advance in October. Their new 70s. rate lasted 
until 1926, but numbers were severely reduced in the meantime. The coopers secured a 97s. 
rate in May 1920. It was their last advance for many years, though they continued to secure 
reductions in hours and productivity bonuses.138 The Typographical Association received 
advances of 10s. in August and 5s. in November. Like the coopers, it would be several years 
before their pay was improved again, though new rates would be conceded for apprentices.139 
Peak wages in Cork compared favourably to other localities, as Tables 2. 12 and 2. 13 reveal 
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for the cooperage and printing trades (see appendix 7 for other trades). This was the high-water 
mark for the Irish trade union movement. The massive expansion in output that the First World 
War necessitated had become a crisis of overproduction in the summer of 1920. By the winter 
of that year, the post-war economic boom had come to a sudden stop and a deep recession had 
begun. Across Ireland, pay improvements largely ended and it would be many years before 
most workers began to see advances again. Employers sought to cut wages and shed surplus 
labour in response to falling prices and reduced demand. Defending hard earned gains was now 
the imperative.140 
 
Table 2. 12: Coopers’ Wages and Hours in Ireland, 1920 
City Wage Hours 
Belfast 101s. 10d. 47 
Dublin 98s. 44 
Derry  97s. 11d. 47 
Cork 97s. 47 
Waterford 81s. 3d. 50 
Limerick 81s. 1¾d.  47½  
Source: Standard time rates of wages and hours of labour in the United Kingdom at 31st December, 1920, p. 137. 
 
Table 2. 13: Printers’ Wages in Irish Towns and Cities, 1920141 
Locality Jobbing, weekly & 
bi-weekly news 
Evening news Morning & tri-
weekly news 
Dublin 92s. 6d. 96s. 108s. 
Cork 90s. 92s. 6d. 98s. 
Limerick 81s. 6d. 84s. 89s. 6d. 
Waterford, Drogheda, 
Dundalk, Skibbereen 
76s. 78s. 84s. 
Galway 73s. 6d. 76s. 81s. 6d. 
Killarney 71s. 73s. 6d. 79s. 
Bandon, Youghal 68s. 6d. 71s. 76s. 6d. 








Chapter Notes and References 
1 Devine, Organising History: A Centenary of SIPTU, 1909-2009 (Dublin: Gill & Macmillan, 2009), p. 93; 
McCarthy, Trade Unions in Ireland, p. 53. 
2 O’Connor, Syndicalism in Ireland, p. 23; Arthur Mitchell, Revolutionary Government in Ireland: Dáil Éireann 
(Dublin: Gill & Macmillan, 1995), p. 242.  
3 Ernesto Screpanti, ‘Long Cycles in Strike Activity: An Empirical Investigation’, British Journal of Industrial 
Relations, vol. XXV, no. 1, 1987, pp. 99-124; Marcel van der Linden & Wayne Thorpe, ‘The Rise and Fall of 
Revolutionary Syndicalism’, in Marcel van der Linden & Wayne Thorpe (eds.), Revolutionary Syndicalism: an 
International Perspective (Aldershot: Scolar Press, 1990), pp. 5-7; Darlington, Radical Unionism, pp. 77-82. 
4 Van der Linden, ‘Second Thoughts on Revolutionary Syndicalism’, pp. 74-75; Darlington, Radical Unionism, 
pp. 88-92. 
5 Greaves, The Irish Transport and General Workers’ Union, pp. 175-200, 224; Lahiff, ‘Industry and Labour in 
Cork’, p. 189; Darlington, Radical Unionism, pp. 95-104; van der Linden & Thorpe, ‘Revolutionary Syndicalism’, 
pp. 7-12. Houston, a native of Donegal, had cut his teeth in Irish trade unionism through the Belfast Trades 
Council. In November 1918 he was sent to Belfast and replaced by Thomas O’Donovan. 
6 CE, 15 Jan. 1917; City of Cork Steam Packet Co. minutes, 22 Jan. 1917, U370/A/10, CCCA. 
7 CE, 16, 19 Mar., 25, 26 June, 2, 3, 4, 7 July 1917. 
8 Cork Operative Society of Masons & Bricklayers minutes, 20 Mar., 1, 12, 20, 24, 25, 30 Apr. 1917, TU/1/37, 
CCCA; CE, 31 Mar.-13, 17, 20, 24, 25, 30 Apr. 1917. Over 400 of the 900 on strike were carpenters, inclusive of 
the 144 engaged in munitions work. 
9 Van der Linden, ‘The Rise and Fall of Revolutionary Syndicalism’, p. 56. 
10 Ibid., p. 55. 
11 Wayne Thorpe, The Workers Themselves: Syndicalism and International Labour, 1913-1923 (Dordrecht: 
Kluwer Academic Press, 1989), pp. 29-30. 
12 Cited in Borgonovo, War and Revolution, p. 155. 
13 Ibid, p. 163. 
14 New Way, Mar.-June 1917. 
15 CE, 23, 25, 27, 28, 31 July, 4, 7, 10, 11, 13, 15 Aug. 1917; City of Cork Steam Packet Co. minutes, 2 Apr., 7 
May, 11, 25 June, 16, 23 July, 13 Aug. 1917, U370/A/10, CCCA. By this time, the NUDL had renamed itself the 
National Union of Dock Labourers and Riverside Workers in Great Britain and Ireland, having changed its name 
in 1912. However, the union was still commonly called the NUDL in many quarters. As such, it will be referred 
to as the NUDL throughout. For an account of this change of name, see Taplin, The Dockers’ Union, p. 104. 
16 CE, 13 Aug. 1917, 1-3, 13-20 Oct. 1917. 
17 Ibid, 2 Oct 1917. 
18 Ibid., 21, 24 Nov. 1917; arbitration award between the ITGWU and Messrs. John Wallis & Sons, 20 Nov. 1917, 
LAB 2/143/IC1803/3/1917, Min. of Labour records, UKNA; various letters of correspondence between the 
ITGWU and the Ministry of Labour, May, June, Sept. 1917, LAB 2/143/IC1803/2/1917, Min. of Labour records, 
UKNA. While the new wage was 6s. higher, the ITGWU’s claim was for 8s. The company’s counteroffer was 
2s., which was rejected.  
19 Keith Harding, ‘The Irish Issue in the British Labour Movement’, pp. 183-184. 
20 Greaves, The Irish Transport and General Workers’ Union, p. 191; Lahiff, Industry and Labour in Cork, p. 
191; Irish Opinion, 5, 12, 19 Jan. 1918; ITGWU, Wage Earners’ War News, Nos. 9-11, Ms. 33,718/B(39-41), 
William O’Brien Papers, NLI. 
21 Borgonovo, War and Revolution, p. 162; Hunt, The National Federation of Women Workers, pp. 132-133; 
IWWU executive committee minutes, 24 Apr., 20, 27 Nov. 1919, undated meeting in April 1920, 13 Apr., 27 
May 1920, 10 Nov. 1921, 5, 15 Jan., 4 May, 17, 31 Aug., 9 Nov. 1922, 15 Feb. 1923, 19/IWWU/1-4, Irish Labour 
History Museum (ILHM); CE, 9 Aug. 1920. Cork’s IWWU branch regularly collapsed and re-established itself 
over the coming years. 
22 CE, 3 Sept. 1919.  
23 Greaves, The Irish Transport and General Workers’ Union, pp. 184, 207; Devine, Organising History, p. 93. It 
had branches for carters, storemen, tramwaymen and builders’ labourers.  
24 Borgonovo, War and Revolution, p. 162; CE, 29 Jan.-4 Mar. 1918; ITGWU, Wage Earners’ War News, nos. 8, 
12, 23, 8.2-3, box no. 3, U626, Alfred Dobbin papers, CCCA. 
25 Darlington, Radical Unionism, pp. 104-111; Emmet O’Connor, Big Jim Larkin: Hero or Wrecker? (Dublin: 
Dublin University Press, 2015), pp. 93-94. 
26 Van der Linden, ‘Second Thoughts on Revolutionary Syndicalism’, in Transnational Labour History, pp. 75-
76. See also Francis Shor, ‘Masculine Power and Virile Syndicalism: A Gendered Analysis of the IWW in 
                                                             
92 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                             
Australia’, Labour History, No. 63, 1992, pp. 83-99; and Lucien van der Walt, ‘‘‘All Workers Regardless Of 
Craft, Race Or Color’’: The First Wave of IWW Activity and Influence in South Africa’, in Wobblies of the World, 
pp. 271-288. 
27 Arbitration award between the ITGWU and J.W. Green & Co., 5 Jan. 1918, LAB 2/1351/C7626/1918, Min. of 
Labour records, UKNA; letters of correspondence between the Ministry of Labour and the ITGWU, 13 Nov.-21 
Dec. 1917, LAB 2/424/IC7463/1917, Min. of Labour records, UKNA. The workers at Ryan’s applied for 6s. more 
for men and 5s. for boys. The workers at Green’s were awarded 6s. 
28 Van der Linden, ‘The Rise and Fall of Revolutionary Syndicalism’, pp. 57-58. 
29 CE, 16, 19, 21, 24 Jan., 8 Feb. 1918; trade disputes record book for select industries in the UK in 1918, LAB 
34/18, Ministry of Labour record, UKNA. Apprentices were paid on a graduated scale depending on years served. 
The painters got increases of 2s. for first to third years and 3s. for fourth to sixth years 
30 For an example of the strictures of apprentice life, see indenture of Henry Marsh to the Painting Trade, June 
1916, U233, UCC Manuscripts Collection, UCCA; Charles Callan, Painters in Union: The Irish National 
Painters’ & Decorators’ Trade Union and its forerunners (Dublin: Watchword, 2008), p. 154.  
31 In April, apprentices at the breweries got increases proportional to the senior staff. A 6s. weekly wage became 
8s., 12s. became 16s. and 15s. became 20s. Cork Coopers’ Society minutes, 27 Feb., 5, 9, 16, 19, 25, 28 Mar. 
1918, U218/A/8, CCCA; Murphy’s brewery minutes, 2, 9 Mar., 12 Apr. 1918, BL/BC/MB/206, Murphy’s 
brewery collection, UCCA; National Union of General Workers, First Quarterly Report for 1918, 
TU/GENERALA/1/11, WCML. 
32 Typographical Association Cork branch minutes, 8 June 1918, U217/A/4, CCCA; Cork Coopers’ Society 
minutes, 30 July 1918, U218/A/8, CCCA; Typographical Circular, Aug. 1918, MSS.39A/TA/4/1/47, 
Typographical Association collection, MRC, UW; Murphy’s brewery minutes, 30 July 1918, BL/BC/MB/206, 
Murphy’s brewery collection, UCCA. 
33 Cork Operative Society of Masons & Bricklayers minutes, 7 Dec. 1917, 31 Mar., 1 Apr. 1918, TU/1/37, CCCA; 
CE, 3 Apr. 1918; Callan, Painters in Union, p. 154. In December 1917, the masons had wanted a rate of 1s. 4d. 
34 Borgonovo, War and Revolution, p. 164. 
35 CE, 28 Mar., 2, 3, 6, 8, 10, 12, 15 Apr. 1918. The breadvan drivers accepted an offer very similar to that put 
forward by the employers when they offered wages of 39s. and 40s. The men also won a 4s. expense for those 
going to the country, a minimum wage for boys and an improved work schedule. See Greaves, The Irish Transport 
and General Workers’ Union, p. 199. 
36 Typographical Association Cork branch minutes, 6, 20 Apr., 13, 22 May, 8 June 1918, U217/A/4, CCCA; 
Typographical Circular, Aug. 1918, MSS.39A/TA/4/1/47, Typographical Association collection, Modern 
Records Centre (MRC), University of Warwick (UW). 
37 The former rate applies to the Examiner the latter to the Constitution.  
38 Irish Opinion, 27 July, 3 Aug. 1918; CE, 29 May, 11 July 1918; The Shop Assistant, 9, 23 Feb., 17 Aug. 1918; 
39 CE, 29 June-3 July 1918; RIC CI for Cork ER, MRs for June and July 1918, CO 904/105, UCC; trade disputes 
record book for select industries in the UK in 1917, LAB 34/36, Min. of Labour records, UKNA. 
40 Van der Linden ‘The Rise and Fall of Revolutionary of Revolutionary Syndicalism’, pp. 54-56.  
41 CE, 27 July, 27, 28, 30 Aug., 7, 9, 11 Sept. 1918; award of the Committee on Production, 10 July 1918, LAB 
2/127/IC1244/8A/1918, Min. of Labour records, UKNA. 
42 CE, 1, 29 Nov. 1918; Lyons & Co. minutes, 4 Sept., 17, 24 Oct., 8 Nov., 4 Dec. 1918, U354/9, CCCA.  The 
drapers’ assistants’ secured a 33½ per cent bonus for porters and assistants in October and an annual bonus worth 
£25 from December.     
43 CE, 20 Dec. 1918; Woodford & Bourne minutes, 23 Dec. 1918, BL/BC/WB/53, Woodford Bourne collection, 
UCCA. The grocers’ assistants also entertained the prospect of strike. The coalporters had planned to cease work 
on 23 November if their demands were not met. See CE, 14 Nov. 1918. 
44 Freeman’s Journal, 28 Oct. 1918; Irish Independent, 28 Oct. 1918. From 1916-18, Cork’s asylum attendants 
were organised into a local body, ‘The Cork Asylum Attendants’ Association, before that body merged into the 
IAWU. Prior to 1916, they were organised by the National Asylum Workers’ Union. See Ciaran Mulholland and 
Michael Walker, ‘Our cause is a just one’: trade union organisation in Irish mental asylums, 1896-1917, Saothar, 
no. 38, 2013, pp. 23-26.  
45 Arbitration award between the NUDL and the CEF Coal Section, 5 Apr. 1918, LAB 2/125/IC1438/1918, Min. 
of Labour records, UKNA; LG, Mar. 1919. In March 1918, men who discharged coal with buckets per awarded 
9½d. per ton while those who did so for holders, winchers, etc. were awarded 11d. per ton. Workers who 
discharged coal with baskets for storing were awarded 1s. 2d. per ton. 
46 A.S.E. Monthly Journal and Report, Nov. 1918, MSS.259/ASE/4/1/50, ASE collection, MRC, UW; Irish 
Independent, 20 Sept. 1918; Freeman’s Journal, 15 Oct. 1918; CE, 5, 19 Dec. 1918. 
47 Lahiff, ‘Industry and Labour in Cork’, pp. 194-195. 
48 The Shop Assistant, 21, 28 Dec. 1918. 
49 Bowley, Prices and Wages, p. 35; Lahiff, ‘Industry and Labour in Cork’, p. 194. 
93 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                             
50 CE, 1, 3, 9, 19 Jan. 1919; Voice of Labour, 8, 15 Feb. 1919; letter from RIC Assistant CI to Cork Town Clerk, 
28 Dec. 1918, CSORP/1919/5854, Chief Secretary’s Office Registered Papers, NAI. 
51 Typographical Association Cork branch minutes, 18 Jan., 15 Mar. 1919, U217/A/4, CCCA. 
52 Darlington, Radical Unionism, pp. 39-45, 78. For histories of the 1919 Winnipeg general strike, see Kurt 
Korneski, ‘Prairie Fire: The Winnipeg General Strike’, Labour/Le Travail, vol. 45, Spring 2000, pp. 259-266; and 
Benjamin Isitt, ‘Searching for Workers’ Solidarity: The One Big Union and the Victoria General Strike of 1919’, 
Labour/Le Travail, vol. 60, Autumn 2007, pp. 9-42. 
53 CE, 14 Dec. 1917, 15, 17 Feb. 1919; Patricia Curtin-Kelly, An Ornament to the City: Holy Trinity Church and 
the Capuchin Order (Dublin: The History Press Ltd., 2015), pp. 77, 114. 
54 Cork Conciliation Board minutes, 1 Mar. 1919, Fr. Thomas Dowling papers, Capuchin Archives, Dublin; CE, 
2, 3 Jan., 22 Feb., 5 Mar. 1919; Drapers’ Assistant, Feb. 1919, Vol. 16, Mandate Trade Union archives, O’Lehane 
House. 
55 Ibid, 25 Mar. 1919; LG, Apr. 1919; Voice of Labour, 22 Feb. 1919. The RCA’s Cork branch had a membership 
of 220, about 200 of which went on strike. For details of the agreement. 
56 Like most of Europe, Australasia and the Americas, Britain experienced an intense period of working-class 
unrest in the post-war years. 
57 Most, though not all of this document in cited in O’Connor, Syndicalism in Ireland, p. 72. The rest is taken from 
War Cabinet minutes, 5 Aug. 1919, WC 606A, CAB 23/15, War Cabinet papers, Cabinet Office records, UKNA. 
58 See, for example, Intercourse between Bolshevism and Sinn Féin, 1921, Cmd. 1326, XXIX, UKPP; and Richard 
Dawson Bates, Red Terror and Green: The Sinn Féin Bolshevist Movement (London: Murray, 1920). 
59 Cited in O’Connor, Syndicalism in Ireland, p. 73. 
60 Lahiff, ‘Industry and Labour in Cork’, pp. 198-199; Typographical Association Cork branch minutes, 1 Mar. 
1919, U217/A/4, CCCA. 
61 O’Connor, Syndicalism in Ireland, p. 74; Irish Independent, 22, 24, Feb., 1, 20 Mar. 1919. 
62 Van der Linden & Thorpe, ‘Revolutionary Syndicalism’, pp. 11-12, 19. 
63 CE, 11, 12, 18 May 1894, 24 Sept. 1919; Cork Coopers’ Society minutes, 18 Feb., 2, 9, 23 Apr., 24 Sept., 1, 7 
Oct. 1919, U218/A/8, CCCA; Murphy’s brewery minutes, 26 Feb., 9 Apr., 26 Sept. 1919, BL/BC/MB/207-208, 
Murphy’s brewery collection, UCCA. In February, the coopers agreed that their wages would always be 3s. above 
what the carpenters had.  
64 CE, 3 Apr. 1919; Cork Operative Society of Masons & Bricklayers minutes, 13 Dec. 1918, 16, 30, 31 Mar., 3, 
6, 22 Apr. 1919, TU/1/37, CCCA; Workmen’s Register, 1914-24, BL/BC/MB/334, Murphy’s brewery collection, 
UCCA. The settlement had disappointed the masons who in December had decided to push for a 5s. per hour 
increase to make their rate 1s. 6d. The tradesmen were also given 12s. more in their ‘country money’ travel 
expense. 
65 CE, 2, 3, 5, 7 May, 23, 26 Sept. 1919. The carpenters and joiners rejected an offer of 1s. 7d. for a forty-seven-
hour week. A proportionate increase in country money was also given.. 
66 CE, 23, 26 Sept., 16 Oct., 1 Nov. 1919; Cork Operative Society of Masons & Bricklayers minutes, 30 Sept., 29 
Oct., 4 Nov. 1919, TU/1/37, CCCA; 
67 National Amalgamated Furnishing Trades Association, Annual Report for 1919, HD 6661 W8.19, TUC Library, 
London Metropolitan University. This group included cabinetmakers, upholsters, chairmakers, carvers, turners, 
polishers and machinemen. 
68 CE, 2 May; RIC CI for the Cork ER, MR for May 1919, CO 904/109, UCC. The following CTC affiliates 
partook in the May Day procession: assurance agents, asylum workers, brushmakers, bookbinders and machine 
rulers, brewery workers, breadvan drivers, bakers, boot and shoe operatives, boilermakers, confectioners, 
carpenters, coachmakers, clerical workers, coopers, chemists’ assistants,  drapers’ assistants, electricians, 
engineers, furnishing workers, farriers, grocers’ assistants, gasworkers, barmen, hairdressers and barbers, full-
time and part-time teachers, journeymen butchers, lithographic printers, stonemasons, drivers and mechanics, 
musicians, sailors and firemen, dockers, railwaymen, painters, Board of Guardians employees, postmen, 
plumbers, railway clerks, Royal Liver agents, shipping and transport clerks, stonecutters, slaters and plasterers, 
shipwrights, shop assistants, warehousemen and clerks, steam engine makers, typographers, woodcutters and 
machinists, tailors and women workers (the most recent affiliates and were represented by the British-based 
National Federation of Women Workers. 
69 The union’s six sections were: dockers, quay workers, Corporation employees and tramwaymen; mill workers, 
Goulding’s employees, seed and manure workers, and gardeners; coal and general carriers, steamship men, 
breadvan drivers, undertakers’ drivers, coffin-makers and general carpenters; provision trade workers; printers, 
insurance agents, pawnbrokers’ assistants, harness-makers, barbers’ assistants, clerks; and warehousemen, 
drapers’ porters, mineral water workers and grocers’ assistants. It also organised workers in the oil and colour, 
laundry and hardware trades. See CE, 2 May, 1 Dec. 1919; and Greaves, The Irish Transport and General 
Workers’ Union, p. 237.  
70 Dominic Haugh, ‘The ITGWU in Limerick, 1917-22’, Saothar, No. 31, 2006, p. 31. 
94 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                             
71 Borgonovo, War and Revolution, pp. 141, 165-166. The ITGWU’s own Connolly Memorial Band also partook 
in the rally. 
72 In March 1920, the Citizen Army was still looking to restart in Cork and believed that establishing itself in the 
shop steward movement as the best means of doing so. Nothing appears to have come of this. ICA executive 
minutes, 10, 17 Feb., 10, 19 Mar., 16, 23 Apr., 1 June 1919, 7 Mar. 1920, ILHS. 
73 Borgonovo, War and Revolution, p. 166. According to James Allan Busby, both Citizen Army scout divisions 
caused a split within Fianna Éireann’s boy and girl scout ranks. See James Allan Busby, WS 1628, Bureau of 
Military records, NAI. 
74 CE, 28 May-2 Aug. 1919. 
75 CE, 13, 15 May 1919; Voice of Labour, 24 May 1919. 
76 Ibid., 15, 26 May 1919; Lahiff, ‘Industry and Labour in Cork’, p. 202. 
77 CE, 29 May-5 July 1919; Lyons & Co. minutes, 4 Sept., 17, 24 Oct., 8 Nov., 4 Dec. 1918, 28 Mar., 4 Apr., 27 
May, 30 June 1919, U354/9, CCCA; RIC CI for Cork ER, MR for July 1919, CO 904/109, UCC. The women at 
the factory were organised by the ASTT, whose women’s section was organised by Josephine Bradley. A small 
strike of three or four members took place at Bailey & Co. at the same time and was not resolved until August. 
See Drapers’ Assistant, vol. 16, June, Sept. 1919. 
78 CE, 21-30 June, 1-5 July 1919; RIC CI for the Cork ER, MR for June 1919, CO 904/109, UCC. 
79 IMTA Cork branch minutes, 4, 14 Feb., 21, 25 Mar. 1919, SM629, CCCA; Journal of the ASTT, Sept. 1919, 
L20, WCML. The proposed 70s. rate represented a 43 per cent advance.  
80 IMTA Cork branch minutes, 17, 19, 25 June, 4 July, 17 Oct., 2 Dec. 1919, SM629, CCCA. 
81 CE, 13, 15, 16, 17, 21 May, 22 Aug. 1919; Voice of Labour, 24 May 1919.   The ASTT also wanted an additional 
7s. 6d. for those aged sixteen and over and 2s. 6d. to 7s. 6d. for apprentices depending on time served. The workers 
concerned were dressmakers, milliners, bodice makers, coat makers, ladies’ tailors, children’s dressmakers, skirt 
and blouse makers, machinsts, alteration hands and underclothing makers. Their eight-hour-day was to stretch 
from 9am-6pm with an hour for dinner. 
82 CE, 17, 19 May 1919; trade disputes record book for select industries in the UK in 1919, LAB 34/37, Min. of 
Labour records, UKNA. 
83 CE, 23, 27, 30 June, 12 July 1919; Irish National Union of Vintners’ and Grocers’ Allied Trade Assistants 
executive committee minutes, 13 July 1919, Mandate Trade Union archives, O’Lehane House. 
84 A.S.E. Monthly Journal and Report, July, Sept. 1919, Sept. 1920, MSS.259/ASE/4/1/51-52, ASE collection, 
MRC, UW; Murphy’s brewery minutes, 13, 15 Aug. 1919, BL/BC/MB, Murphy’s brewery, UCCA; CE, 3 July 
1919. The ASE also sought a graduated scale from 10-40s. for apprentices, which it attained in August 1920. The 
scale was as follows: 10s., 15s., 25s., 33s. and 40s. 
85 RIC CI for Cork ER, MR for July 1919, CO 904/109, UCC; Borgonovo, War and Revolution, pp. 162-163; 
John Borgonovo, Spies, Informers and the Anti-Sinn Féin Society (Dublin: Irish Academic Press, 2006), p. 93. 
Dobbin’s Protestantism and Unionism were common features of Irish employers until the early twentieth century. 
Cork Protestants had traditionally been disproportionately bourgeois relative to their small numbers. For the 
origins development and growing importance of the Irish bourgeoisie, see Andy Bielenberg, ‘The Industrial Elite 
in Ireland from the Industrial Revolution to the First World War’, in Fintan Lane (ed.), Politics, Society and the 
Middle Class in Modern Ireland (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2010), pp. 148-169. 
86 CE, 30 July, 1 Aug., 22 Aug.-8 Sept. 1919; Watchword of Labour, 18 Oct. 1919; RIC CI for Cork ER, MRs for 
Aug.-Oct. 1919, CO 904/109-110, The British in Ireland microfilm series, Boole Library, UCC. Afterwards, the 
ITGWU continued to agitate at the gristmills, seeking 15s. more for men and 8s. for women, girls and boys, as 
well as the forty-four-hour week, better overtime rates and a fortnight’s paid holidays. At the tannery, the workers 
were compelled to return to work after the employers threatened to close the company. 
87 CE, 24 Sept. 1919; Cork Coopers’ Society minutes, 24 Sept., 1, 7 Oct. 1919, U218/A/8, CCCA; Murphy’s 
brewery minutes, 26 Feb., 9 Apr., 26 Sept. 1919, BL/BC/MB/207-208, Murphy’s brewery collection, UCCA. In 
February, the coopers had agreed that their wages would always be 3s. above what the carpenters had.  
88 Murphy’s brewery minutes, 31 Dec. 1919, BL/BC/MB/207; Workmen’s Register, 1913-24, BL/BC/MB/334, 
both found in Murphy’s brewery collection, UCCA; CE, 20 Dec. 1919. 
89 CE, 30 June, 24-31 July, 2, 4, 18 Aug. 1919. 
90 CE, 1, 4, 9, 13, 23, 27 Sept., 7 Oct. 1919. 
91 Lyons & Co. minutes, 30 Sept., 9, 15 Oct., 14 Nov. 1919, U354/9, CCCA; ibid, 25 June, 18, 21 Oct., 6-8, 11, 
15, 22 Nov. 1919. It was the IDAA’s Cork branch secretary, L.J. Duffy, who demanded the new rates. 
92 CE, 4 Sept., 12, 15, 27 Nov., 15 Dec. 1919; Lyons & Co. minutes, 19 Dec. 1919, U354/9, CCCA; RIC CI for 
Cork ER, MR for Nov. 1919, CO 904/110, UCC; The Drapers’ Assistant, Vol. 16, Jan. 1920, Mandate Trade 
Union archives, O’Lehane House. 
93 CE, 1 July, 16 Aug., 27 Nov. 1919. A stoppage in the trades was threatened unless all employers implemented 
the new conditions by 27 November. The new scale appears to have pertained only to men even though women 
had been organised by the Grocers’ Assistants since January 1919. See CE, 14 Jan. 1919. 
95 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                             
94 These rates were consequent of a strike in the hardware stores  
95 The increase at O’Connell’s was the second the staff received that year, making their annual wages £42 higher 
than the year before. 
96 Rights: Journal of the Irish Clerical and Allied Workers’ Union, Sept.-Oct. 1919, ILB 3381 p, NLI; CE, 13, 16, 
18 Jan., 19 July 1919. The ICWU was formed in Dublin November 1917 by disgruntled Irish members of the 
RCA. See Freeman’s Journal, 9 Nov. 1917. 
97 CE, 1, 3, 22, 29 Nov. 1919, 13 Feb., 19 May, 5 June 1920. Nurses working seven days a week at this time. In 
1968, the Cork Nurses’ Association later merged with the Irish Nurses’ and Midwives’ Organisation, which was 
also founded in 1919. See CE, 30 Apr. 1968. 
98 Gordon McMullan, ‘The Irish Bank ‘strike’, 1919’, Saothar, vol. 5, 1979, pp. 42-45; LG, Apr. 1920; ibid, 22, 
24, 25 Nov., 3 Dec. 1919; Cork Constitution, 19, 23 Nov. 1919. As per the agreement, in February 1921 bank 
clerks had their bonus augmented by another 8 per cent, making the bonus 28 per cent in total. 
99 CE, 22 Nov., 2-20 Dec. 1919; RIC CI for Cork ER, MR for Dec. 1919, CO 904/110, UCC. In April, the 
assistants, still members of the Irish Chemists’ Assistants’ Association, had been given a wage increase with 
Dowling’s aid. Letter from Cork branch of the Irish Chemists’ Assistants’ Association to Fr. Thomas Dowling, 3 
Apr. 1919, Fr. Thomas Dowling Papers, Capuchin Archives, Dublin.  
100 Cited in Harding, ‘The Irish Issue in the British Labour Movement’, p. 185. For the resolution of sympathy the 
passed by the NAUSAWC’s Cork branch, see CE, 26 Nov. 1919. 
101 Darlington, Radical Unionism, p. 64. 
102 CE, 30 Oct., 1, 3, 4, 13 Nov., 15 Dec. 1919; ‘Lahiff, ‘Industry and Labour in Cork’, p. 201; LG, Jan. 1920. The 
forty-eight-hour week had been agreed to at a national level in June 1919 but was not implemented by Cork 
employers. See LG, July 1919. 
103 Standard time rates of wages and hours of labour in the United Kingdom at 31st December, 1920, Cmd. 1253, 
XL, 1921, UKPP, p. 100. 
104 Lahiff, ‘Industry and Labour in Cork’, p. 202; LG, Dec. 1919; Watchword of Labour, 13 Dec. 1919; Murphy’s 
brewery minutes, 4, 6 Dec. 1919, BL/BC/MB/208, Murphy’s brewery collection, UCCA. 
105 Ibid, 2-7 9, 15 Feb. 1919; LG, Mar., Aug. 1920. Dowling was still the Conciliation Board’s chairman at this 
time. In January, he announced his resignation from the role, only to reverse his decision after appeals from both 
the CTC and the CEF. See, CE, 23 Jan., 5, 12 Feb. 1920. 
106 CE, 16, 19 Feb. 1920; Nationalist and Leinster Times, 13 Mar. 1920. 
107 CE, 12 Feb., 6, 9 Mar. 1920; letters from the board of Beamish & Crawford to the Cork Breweries Workmen’s 
Trade Union, 16 Feb. 1918, 10, 28 Jan., 5 Feb., 9, 15 May, 11, 19, 22, 24 Dec. 1919, 19 Jan., 3 Feb. 1920, 
U18/Letter Book 1911-25, Beamish & Crawford collection, CCCA; Murphy’s brewery board minutes, 24 Nov. 
1919, 19 Jan., 3 Feb. 1920, BL/BC/MB/208, Murphy’s brewery collection UCCA.  
108 CE, 16 Mar. 1920; Cork Coopers’ Society minutes, 11, 18, 20 Feb. 1920, U218/A/8, CCCA; Watchword of 
Labour, 21 Aug. 1920; Lahiff, ‘Industry and Labour in Cork’, p. 204; Cork Operative Society of Masons & 
Bricklayers minutes, 2 Mar. 1920, TU/1/37, CCCA. The stonemasons also contributed financially to the strike. 
109 Eric Hobsbawm, Labouring Men: Studies in the History of Labour (London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 1964), 
p. 283. 
110 Workmen’s Register, BL/BC/MB/334; maltings’ directors’ minutes, 1917-26, BL/BC/MB/218, both found in 
Murphy’s brewery collection, UCCA; Register of Employees, 1890-1939, U18/Acc2016/004, Beamish & 
Crawford brewery collection, CCCA. These pay differentials existed throughout the period. The maltsters’ 
differential was 13s. (see Appendix 7) and the draymen’s was 4s. Both worked a forty-eight-hour week. 
111 Cork Coopers’ Society minutes, 7, 21, 28, 31 Aug. 1923, U218/A/8, CCCA; Ó Drisceoil & Ó Drisceoil, The 
Murphy's Story, pp. 84-85; Donal Ó Drisceoil & Diarmuid Ó Drisceoil, Beamish & Crawford: The History of an 
Irish Brewery (Cork: Collins Press, 2015), pp. 264-265, 291; Irish Times, 2-6 Oct. 1923. 
112 Cork Typographical Association Cork branch minutes, 26 Apr., 10, 24 May, 7, 21, 28 June, 16, 19, 31 July 
1919, U217/A/4, CCCA; LG, Aug. 1919, p. 343; National Wages Agreement for Ireland, 14 July 1919, LAB 
83/1983, Min. of Labour records, UKNA. The Typographical Association’s Cork branch had wanted 2s. 6d. more 
than was given. 
113 Typographical Association Cork branch minutes, 3 Jan. 1920, U217/A/4, CCCA. 
114 CE, 23-28 Feb., 9, 20 Mar. 1920; Derry Journal, 28 Jan. 1921; Typographical Association Cork branch 
minutes, 31 Jan., 5, 21, 23, 28 Feb., 2-6, 15-16, 19 Mar., 24 Apr., 11, 25 Sept. 1920, 10 Dec. 1921, U217/A/4, 
CCCA; Lahiff, ‘Industry and Labour in Cork’, pp. 204-205. 
115 Irish Independent, 16 May 1920; ILPTUC, Report of the twenty-sixth annual meeting, 1920, pp. 24-31, NLI. 
116 CE, 20 Apr. 1920. For reports on the embargo in Cork, see CE, 19-24 Apr. 1920. 
117 Darlington, Radical Unionism, pp. 42-44. 
118 Irish Independent, 16-27 Apr. 1920; Freeman’s Journal, 16-27 Apr. 1920.  
119 See, for example, Londonderry Sentinel, 24 Apr. 1920. 
120 O’Connor, Syndicalism in Ireland, p. 74-76.  
96 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                             
121 CE, 8, 20 Mar., 19 Apr. 1920. 
122 Ibid., 10, 13 Apr. 1920. 
123 Ibid., 1, 3, 13, 14 May, 1 June 1920; Irish School Weekly, 15 May-5 June 1920; P.J.N. Riordan, ‘The 
Association of Secondary Teachers, Ireland, 1909-1968: some aspects of its growth and development’ (UCC: 
MA, 1975), pp. 60-63; John Cunningham, Unlikely Radicals: Irish post-primary teachers and the ASTI, 1909-
2009 (Cork: Cork University Press, 2009), pp. 47-53; John Coolahan, The ASTI and post-primary education in 
Ireland, 1909-1984 (Dublin: Cumann na Meánmhúinteoirí, 1984), pp. 48-55. For more details on the day-to-day 
events of the strike, see John Coolahan, ‘The Association Of Secondary Teachers, Ireland and the secondary 
teachers' strike of 1920’, Saothar, No. 10, 1984, pp. 43-59. The ASTI had been preparing for a strike since 
December 1919. See CE, 19 Dec. 1919. 
124 CE., 28 May, 10, 11, 18, 19, 22 June 1920; trade disputes record book for select industries in the UK in 1920, 
LAB 34/38, Min. of Labour records, UKNA. 
125 CE, 26 June 1920. 
126 City of Cork Steam Packet Company, salary book for 1921-23, U370/F/194, CCCA. 
127 Freeman’s Journal, 18-23 Aug. 1919, 23 Apr.-3 June, 21 July 1920; Irish Independent, 18-23 Aug. 1919, 23 
Apr.-3 June 1920; Belfast Newsletter, 1 May 1920. See CE, 16 Aug. 1919 for support issued to the Irish Council 
by the RCA’s Cork branch. 
128 Watchword of Labour, 5 June 1920; Lahiff, ‘Labour and Industry in Cork’, p. 206. 
129 CE, 20 Apr., 14, 28, 31 May 1920; O’Connor, Syndicalism in Ireland, p. 32. 
130 Ibid., 2, 4 June 1920. The Examiner praised the CTC for its referring the dispute to the Dáil. 
131 Ibid. 30 Apr., 1, 10, 11, 13 May 1920; LG, June, July 1920. The strike was due to begin on 1 May. 
132 CE, 3 June, 15 July 1920. 
133 Ibid., 14, 15, 17 May 1920; Rights: The Irish Labour Review, 21 May 1920, Ir 300 p 47, NLI. 
134 LG, June, July 1920; Watchword of Labour, 15 Nov. 1919 
135 CE, 17, 27 July, 3 Aug. 1920. 
136 Lyons & Co. minutes, 30 Sept., 13 Oct., 24 Nov. 1920, U354/9, CCCA; IDAA executive committee minutes, 
18 Aug. 1920, Mandate Trade Union archives, O’Lehane House. In October, the company offered raises of 20 per 
cent raise to men employed in retail and 15 per cent to women, and to convert the 25 per cent of the bonus given 
to wholesale workers into salary. The board also offered that the wholesale bonus be paid quarterly instead of 
half-yearly. On 1 October 1920, the Cork Examiner reported that the CEF was considering locking out the 
assistants after protracted negotiations were faltering. 
137 CE, 24, 27 Aug., 7, 15 Sept., 9, 11 Oct. 1920; minutes of T. Lyons & Co., 30 Sept. 1920, U354/9, CCCA. The 
IDAA wanted a scale that began at 20s. and rose to 110s. after eleven years, peaking at 120s for charge hands, 
senior departmental assistants and ledger clerks. See the abovementioned minutes for the full wage scale. 
138 Murphy’s brewery board minutes, 7, 11 Oct., 2 Nov. 1920, BL/BC/MB/209, Murphy’s brewery collection, 
UCCA; Cork Coopers’ Society minutes, 27 Apr., 2, 5 May 1920, U218/A/8, CCCA; Workmen’s Register, 
BL/BC/MB/334, Murphy’s brewery collection, UCCA; Lahiff, ‘Labour and Industry in Cork’, p. 211. 
139 LG, Sept.- Dec. 1920; Typographical Association Cork branch minutes, 17, 31 July, 14, 28 Aug., 11 Sept., 20 
Nov. 1920, U217/A/4, CCCA.; Lahiff, ‘Industry and Labour in Cork’, p. 210. 
140 Lahiff, ‘Industry and Labour in Cork’, p. 211. 




The Death of the Workers’ Republic: Class Conflict in Cork, 
1921-24 
 
In contrast to other parts of Ireland, the first eight months of 1921 were relatively peaceful for 
labour relations in Cork. As the slump took hold, employers sought to return to pre-1914 wages. 
Industrial disputes would increasingly end in defeat for workers as the employers gained the 
upper hand in the class war. The employers justified their actions by reference to cheaper 
prices. The cost-of-living index, weighed at 100 in July 1914, had peaked at 276 in November 
1920 before dropping to 169 in March 1923.1 But the slump coincided with the height of the 
war of independence, the civil war and the resulting political instability, meaning that 
employers had to delay their counterattack. When it was launched, it triggered Cork’s biggest 
ever industrial crisis. Syndicalism’s last major act in the city was to provide the ideology and 
the methodology to resist.      
 
Wage increases in 1921 – the last sting of a dying wasp 
Only two major stoppages took place between January and August 1921. The first was on the 
tramways from 1 February to 23 March for a 20s. raise. The men obtained 5s. Dowling was 
involved in ending the strike. The CTC accused the engineering managers’ union, the British-
based Electrical Power Engineers’ Association, of blacklegging.2 The other strike took place 
in the printing trade. It began on 5 February when the ITGWU brought out skilled and 
semiskilled workers in the Cork Examiner’s machine and dispatch rooms for better pay. The 
Cork Constitution’s staff were also involved. The Typographical Association remained at work 
and thus it too incurred allegations of scabbing. The dispute ended on 1 March when the 
workers accepted smaller improvements. The Constitution’s staff rejected a 3s. increase but 
resumed work nonetheless.3 Six months later, compositors secured 2s., their final increase for 




Some workers still managed to attain improvements without having to withdraw their 
labour. In January, the IDAA and the ITGWU, who organised packers and porters in the 
draperies, intended to bring out their members at Dwyer’s for an increase, but called it off in 
favour of a conference presided over by the Lord Mayor. The workers were granted 2s. 6d.5 
Six months later, the CTC averted two strikes: at the gristmills by winning a 5s. for the workers 
and in the building trade by persuading Meagher & Hayes to pay the standardised labourers’ 
rate.6 
 
Table 3. 1: Wages in the Cork Printing Trade, July 1921 
Newspaper Casehands Linotype Operators 
Morning 95s. 102. 6d. 
Evening 102s. 6d. 112s. 
Source: LG, Aug. 1921. 
 
Table 3. 2: Wage Increases in Cork by the ITGWU, 1921 
Workers Increase 
Anglo Oil Company 5-10s. 
Gristmill workers 5s. 
Tramway boys 3-10s. 
Teenagers at Lunham’s 5-20s. 
Junior bar assistants 7s. 6d. 
Source: CE, 2 July, 3 Oct. 1921, 25 Jan. 1922. 
 
Employers gain the upper hand 
Despite these minor victories, the tide was turning in the class war from 1921. That January, 
workers at Goulding’s withheld their labour in a dispute concerning their method of payment. 
A settlement was affected by arbitration, and the men were duly victimised – only half were 
re-employed. In April, the drapers ended their assistants’ 50 per cent bonus and issued 
dismissals.7 That summer, the ITGWU led stoppages against reductions at Kinmonth’s and J.J. 
Barry’s.8 The CTC proposed the establishment of a ‘Council of Action’ to co-ordinate the 
fightback but nothing appears to have come of this.9 A serious conflict was brewing in the 
flourmills. In July, the employers announced that men’s pay was to be cut by 6s. 6d. and boys’ 
and women’s by 50 per cent. Pending Dáil arbitration, this was postponed until 1 November 
and then postponed indefinitely due to the political turmoil. Mill sawyers were also threatened 
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with reductions.10 In September, when Free State shippers took 6s. off dockers’ wages, only 
the Corkmen (grain porters) put up a fight by withdrawing their labour. Dockers in the other 
ports narrowly voted to accept the cut from 12 September. The employers had originally sought 
a 3s. a day reduction but the ITGWU’s threat of national stoppage bartered it down to 1s. a 
day.11 The counterattack was aided by a depressed economy. In January 1921, the Spinning 
and Weaving Company closed for several months, adding 600 to 800 to the roll of the 
unemployed. That November, Cork’s flourmills shut down as employers prepared to attack 
wages, throwing another 400 out of work.12        
 
The railway crisis in Cork 
By August 1921, the British government still controlled Ireland’s railways. The arrangement 
had achieved what it intended: industrial harmony. But ideological commitment to private 
enterprise meant that government control was always going to be temporary measure. 
Accordingly, on 14 August 1921 the British Government relinquished control. The removal of 
state subsidies forced the railway companies to cut pay and extend the working week. The 
railway managers had never liked the eight-hour day and always sought to undermine it. Two 
years before, the NUR’s The New Way reported that drivers on the GSWR in Cork often worked 
nine to twelve hours a day. On 23 August 1921, GSWR engine cleaners struck against the 6s. 
reduction implemented by the companies. Three days later, coalmen, cleaners and firefighters 
at the Bandon Railway joined them. The strikes appeared to presage national action. NUR 
general secretary J.H. Thomas and Dowling intervened and persuaded all parties to accept 
mediation under the Irish Railways Arbitration Tribunal chaired by Sir William Carrigan.13  
 On 10 September, Carrigan issued two verdicts: wages and conditions on the Irish 
railways should be standardised following an appropriate classification and grouping of each 
railway, and the maintenance of a universal eight-hour working day was no longer affordable. 
These findings were those of the chairman himself and not the final award. In effect, Carrigan 
ruled in favour of cuts and an extension of hours.14 The response of Cork’s railwaymen was 
instantaneous. On 19 September, GSWR shopmen struck, as did the cleaners on the Bandon.15 
But the shopmen subsequently accepted the 6s. cut. Nonetheless, the unrest continued to 
spread. By 6 October, the shopmen and two store porters on the Bandon Railway were out.16 
Seven days later, another 100 men from the company struck only to return to work the 
following morning when management agreed to temporarily suspend the reductions and hold 
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a conference instead. Its shopmen also resumed work.17 The conference failed to find a 
resolution.18            
 Accordingly, on 5 November 160 shopmen and storemen from the Bandon, the Cork 
and Macroom Direct Railway and the Cork and Muskerry Light Railway withdrew their labour 
against the 6s. cut, due to come into effect in two days.19 The shopmen’s apprentices on the 
Bandon line struck seven days later. The companies had resolved to reduce the shopmen’s 12½ 
per cent bonus in three episodes: on 11 November, on 1 December and on 1 January 1922.20 
By 17 November, approximately 670 shopmen were on strike: 500 from the Bandon, 100 from 
the Cork and Macroom, and 70 from the Cork and Muskerry. A conference held five days later 
resolved nothing.21 The Irish Engineering and Industrial Union (IEIU) – the name for the Irish 
Engineering, Shipbuilding and Foundry Trades Union since 1 August 1921 – was a growing 
force in Cork’s workshops. It was leading the fightback against proposed reductions which, it 
claimed, amounted to 11s. In October, it took over the NUR’s Cork no. 4 branch and by mid-
November it was looking to poach more NUR men as well as the National Union of Vehicle 
Builders (NUVB). It received a further boost when its main rival, the Amalgamated 
Engineering Union (AEU), accepted the reduction, a deeply unpopular move. Smelling blood, 
the IEIU even contemplated – but rejected – withdrawing its members on the GSWR in Cork 
to damage the AEU (and other British unions) and poach the disillusioned shopmen. The 
IEIU’s Cork branch had grown from 320 to 358 because of its stance.22  
 On 19 November 1921, Carrigan issued the segment of his award on conditions of 
work. To the bitter disappointment of the railwaymen, it found in favour of the extension of 
hours initiated by the railway companies on 16 August. The award abolished the guaranteed 
day and stipulated the working week range from fifty-four to sixty hours.23 The NUR’s Irish 
Council had reluctantly accepted wage cuts on condition that the eight-hour day was kept intact. 
But the companies rebuffed this olive branch. Thus, under intense pressure from its rank-and-
file, the Irish Council opted to fight for the eight-hour day.24 The award would see shunters’ 
wages lessened to 59s., ticket collectors to 46s., station foremen to 55s., signalmen to 57s. and 
platelayers to 43s. 6d.25  It would result in many railwaymen losing 20s. a week.26 The Voice 





Special station foremen getting 75/6 in July, or 73/6 last month, will be reduced to 65/-. . . 
Porters who got 53/6 in July will fall to 35/- . . . Certain head porters who got 81/-, or 71/6, will 
now fall to 67/-. . . Porters in goods depots fall from 53/6, or 48/6 now, to 38/-, gangers from 
58/-, or 53/- now, to 42/-. . . Drivers who used to get 80/- on appointment and are entitled to 
72/-, will fall to 63/-. Some drivers who had 92/- and are now getting 86/- will fall to 78/-. . . 
Firemen who get 71/- after five years have now 63/-, and will fall to 57/-, while in the first and 
second year they’ll have only 45/-.27 
 
On 3 December, the GSWR’s shunters struck against Carrigan. The following day, the 
NUR’s Cork (No. 3) Branch categorically rejected the award. By 5 December, the strikes on 
the Cork railways were affecting about 800 labourers. Two days later, a further 100 clerical 
and supervisory staff struck.28 As always, the employers were supported by the Cork 
Constitution, the reactionary, Unionist mouthpiece of the city’s establishment.29 On 7 
December, just when the situation was spiralling out of control, the strikes were called off when 
Lord Mayor Donal O’Callaghan convinced both sides to agree to arbitration under the 
Department of Labour. The possibility of wage increases was also under the arbitrator’s remit.30 
The Arbitration Court sat the following day and convinced employers to postpone 
implementing the award if the railwaymen resumed work under old conditions.31 The Bandon, 
the Muskerry and the Macroom had not been a party to the national settlement and cuts had 
been imposed without negotiation. Unhappy with the support from their British unions, 
shopmen there came out in sympathy and promised to join the IEIU after the dispute. The 
arbitrator reinstated the 6s. cut, which led to members of the ASLEF, NUR and NUVB joining 
the IEIU. It was a significant victory for the Irish union.32  
On 10 December, the companies agreed to postpone Carrigan until 2 January 1922.33 
A week later, Carrigan released the portion of his award dealing with wages. It backed the 
companies’ August reductions and cuts to the shopmen’s bonus.34 Additionally, it declared that 
the sliding scale based on the cost of living should be restored. As the cost of living had fallen 
to 99 per cent above pre-war levels, this meant a further 4s. reduction. The end of national pay 
agreements was confirmed by the grouping of the railway companies by size, with each 
grouping subject to different wage agreements.35 On 28 December, Dáil intervention persuaded 
the companies to defer the Carrigan award for another two weeks.36 Crisis had been temporarily 
averted. The young Free State government’s handling of the railway crisis will be examined in 
Chapter 9.  
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Class conflict outside of the railways 
As the economic crisis deepened, employers across Ireland stepped up their attempts to roll 
back Labour’s gains. In October 1921, the Engineering Employers’ Federation in Britain, to 
which Irish employers were affiliated, enforced a 6s. cut and eliminated the 12½ per cent 
bonus.37 It is not surprising that engineers were among the first to suffer their employers were 
particularly anxious to cut pay. By 1920, their 105s. wage was 176 per cent higher than what 
prevailed in 1914 (Table 3. 5 charts similar growth in the bacon factories). On 11 November, 
Seán Moylan, acting for the Department of Labour, arbitrated a wage conflict at Wallis & Sons 
in Cork by ruling against the company’s proposal to decrease clerical wages by 10 per cent. 
Five days later, another strike took place at the same firm; this too was settled by Department 
of Labour arbitration.38 Employers were now in the ascendency. In December, coachbuilders 
began a lengthy strike against a 25 per cent reduction.39 When the Irish Master Printers’ 
Association sought a general wage reduction of 7s. 6d. (10 per cent), Cork and Belfast were 
reported to be the only two Irish centres to resist it.40   
 
Class conflict in 1922 
The New Year brought with it a renewed focus on the country’s political affairs. On 7 January 
1922, Dáil Éireann ratified the Anglo-Irish Treaty, signed on 5 December 1921, thus creating 
the twenty-six county Irish Free State. As will be described in more detail in Chapter 9, the 
new state would become a powerful ally of the employers. Amidst the political upheaval, 
employers continued to twist the knife. On 2 January 1922, the ASTT and the Irish Tailors’ 
and Tailoresses’ Union struck as part of a national action against cuts and the introduction of 
female labour, which they feared would undercut their trade.41 Male tailors earned 1s. 1½d. 
hourly and women a wage 130 per cent higher than 1914.42 Their ‘log’ rate was 1s. 1d. per 
hour.43 A threatened national strike of 5,000 dockers against a 1s. a day cut in pay did not 
materialise as it was accepted by the men under Dáil arbitration; the tailors’ strike was also 
settled in this manner.44 On 12 April, a prolonged strike began at Woolworth’s when the 
ITGWU and the Irish Union of Distributive Workers and Clerks (IUDWC) – established in 
October 1921 as the successor to the IDAA – brought out a dozen girls for better pay, union 
recognition and an end to non-union labour. The shop was forced to close but re-opened the 
following month under the protection of the IRA’s ‘republican police’. The strike dragged on 
until November 1923.45  
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 The political situation was fast becoming a crisis, ruining the stability on which the 
employers’ campaign was predicated. Like the British administration it replaced, Dáil Éireann 
kept class conflict in check by arbitrating disputes. In April, following intervention from 
Dowling, the Lord Mayor and the Department of Labour, the NUVB and the IEIU brought the 
coachbuilders back to work after seventeen weeks on strike, forced to accept reductions.46 In 
May, the Spinning and Weaving Co. issued a 25 per cent wage decrease. The workers, whose 
earnings ranged from 49s. to 66s., refused to accept this and were locked out accordingly. 
Arbitration from the Department of Labour brought a return to work the following month under 
a modified reduction.47 In June, state arbitration fixed the wages of workers at the Bandon 
Railway at the lower rates outlined in Table 3. 3. 
By late 1922, the Provisional Government had largely established its authority over the 
twenty-six counties. Most Free State workers were still on peak wages. In Cork, these wages 
were among the highest in either Britain or Ireland, as Table 3. 4 outlines regarding the baking 
trade. However, with the Free State more secure, Irish employers felt more buoyant in re-
embarking upon their counterattack. The government would set a firm example by taking on 
its own postal workers in a wage dispute (see Chapter 9). In September 1922, the master tailors 
decided that ‘the time was ripe to ask for another reduction of wages’ – and so they did. On 4 
December, they enforced a 15 per cent cut off trade board rates and 10 per cent off log rates.48 
The employers’ counteroffensive, which had spent so much time maturing, had finally 
commenced. 
 
Table 3. 3: Wages at the Bandon Railway, June 1922 
Occupation Wage 
Vicemen 67s. 6d. 
Platers 72s. 
Wheel lathe men 72s. 
Drillers 67s. 6d. 
Painters’ Helpers 63s. 6d. 
Boilermakers’ Helpers 63s. 6d. 
Labourers 62s. 6d. 
Sawyers 83s. 4d. 
Sailmakers 67s. 6d. 






Table 3. 4: Bakery Wages in Cork, London & Dublin, 1922 
Occupation Cork London Dublin 
Foreman baker 102s. 73s. 6d. - 
Doughmaker 100s. 63s. 6d. - 
Ovenman 100s. 60s. 6d. 106s. 6d. 
Stoker 100s. 60s. 6d. - 
Tablehand 96s. 57s. 6d. 94s. 
Vanman49 70s. 50s. 81s. 
Labourer 62d. 6d. 50s. 70s. 
Source: CE, 21 Oct. 1922, 1 Aug. 1923; Yeates, A City in Civil War: Dublin, 1921-24, p. 166. 
 
Table 3. 5: Wages & Hours in the Bacon Factories in Cork, 1914 & 1922 
Workers Wage (1914) Hours (1914) Wage (1922) Hours (1922) 
Bacon pumpers 27-35s. 51 81-85s. 48 
Practical men 24-27s. 51 74s. 6d.-78s. 6d. 48 
Women (first 
grade) 
5½d. per every 
100 pigs 
51 38s. 6d. 47½ 
Women (second 
grade) 
9s. 4d. 51 36s. 4d. 47½ 
Girls under 19 6-8s. 51 24-30s. 47½ 
Boys under 18 7-10s. 50 36-38s. 47½ 
Boys under 21 10-12s. 50 65s. 47½ 
Helpers 21-24s. 50 70s. 47½ 
Source: Report of the Committee on the Cost of Living, 1922, P7/A/69, Richard Mulcahy Papers, University 
College Dublin Archives 
 
The January 1923 dock strike 
By January 1923, the anti-Treatyites had been largely defeated, placing the new state on more 
stable footing. Stability meant more effective policing of (potentially violent) opposition to 
cuts, which guaranteed a more confident bourgeoisie. Dock labourers were among the first to 
suffer. A strike in all Free State ports was threatened if shippers implemented a 2s. a day 
reduction.50 However, on 12 January a daily decrease of 1s. was accepted.51 Having refused to 
acquiesce, 900 Cork dockers struck three days later.52 To make matters worse for Labour, the 
indefatigable Dowling was leaving for America on 20 January. Since late 1920, the Capuchin 
had been a peripheral figure. By early 1923, the Cork Conciliation Board was effectively 
defunct – another victim of the counterattack. Dowling’s parting gift was to arrange a 
conference between the shippers and the ITGWU. He was given a moving send-off by the 
trades council.53  
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 The dock strike brought a return of violence as a characteristic of labour disputes, 
symptomatic of the heightening sense of catastrophe. Although it was more aggressive and less 
reactive than before, violence was still a minor and intermittent feature of strikes. On 18 
January, Edward Grace, the American manager of the Ford’s plant, was physically threatened 
by strikers who set fire to his motor lorry. On the same day, the Packet Company’s clerical 
staff, who were scabbing, were picketed; this was halted by the military firing shots over the 
picketers’ heads. The following day, R.W. Sinnott, general manager of the Steam Packet 
Company, was pelted with rotten eggs upon arriving at a restaurant during a picket by 200 
dockers.54 The IUDWC and the NUR refused to scab on the dockers, resulting in a shortage of 
coal.55 On 1 February, an agreement was reached at a Dublin conference arranged by the 
Department of Labour. The dockers had lost. Hourly pay would be abolished and the ‘half-day 
minimum’ was secured. The 1s. a day cut was acceded to. The Voice of Labour reported that 
‘pay would be reduced by ½d. per ton amongst six men in the case of grain cargoes, and ¼d. 
per ton in the case of coal.’ The men accepted these terms the following day.56 The CTC 
condemned the ITGWU for finalising the agreement without a local ballot.57   
        
The flourmill soviet 
By January 1923 Irish flourmill workers and their employers had been in dispute for nearly 
eighteen months. In Cork, wages had peaked at 65s. in October 1920 after a final 10s. 
improvement.58 In late 1922, political stability gave the Irish Flour Millers’ Association the 
confidence to seek a 18s. cut which it claimed was necessitated by the importation of cheaper 
flour.59 After a series of conferences, agreement could not be reached. The employers’ final 
offer was a 16s. reduction. As Irish flourmill workers earned over 20s. more than their British 
counterparts, Liberty Hall advised acceptance. But Corkmen believed they could retain more 
and would only accept an 8s. reduction.60 Following the breakdown of talks, a national strike 
of 370 flourmill workers began on 20 January. Two days later, it became a lockout.61  
 By now, Irish workers had embraced a novel approach to addressing local grievances. 
In April 1919, the IRA had attempted a daring rescue one its volunteers, Robert Byrne, from 
Limerick Workhouse Hospital where he was being detained and treated for the effects of 
hunger strike. A confrontation between the IRA and the RIC led to an exchange of bullets in 
which Byrne was shot. He subsequently bled to death. In response, the authorities designated 
most of Limerick city and a part of the county as a ‘Special Military Area’, with permits 
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required for those seeking to enter and/or leave the city. The city’s working class responded 
decisively: A general strike was declared. The trades council then seized control of the city and 
managed it collectively as a soviet (or workers’ council) from 15 to 27 April 1919.62 The Irish 
working class rallied to support the Limerick strike with generous financial donations. At the 
1919 ITUC, Good claimed that the Cork railwaymen were willing to strike in support of 
Limerick, whether their executive in London liked it or not, but that the ‘facts’ of what was 
happening in Limerick never emerged.63  
 Although local issues primarily inspired the Limerick soviet, it was still the most vivid 
distillation of syndicalism’s and Bolshevism’s influence over Irish Labour. Syndicalist 
sentiment meant that the Limerick Trades Council regarded the situation as an industrial 
relations crisis as well as a political one. The council’s response was in keeping with the 
syndicalist current: a localised general strike which it hoped would soon become a national 
one. Limerick’s stand was highly influential. The tactics of workplace occupations were soon 
applied to the wages movement in which soviets functioned as auxiliaries that demonstrated 
Labour’s increasingly radical aspirations without threatening official strategy.64 Kostick 
estimates that over 100 soviets emerged in Ireland between 1919 and 1920.65 There is no doubt 
that the proliferation of soviets in Ireland was partially inspired by events in Europe: they were 
a central feature of revolutionary movements in Germany (1918-20), Italy (1920) and Hungary 
(1920).66 In 1919, the Voice of Labour proclaimed its support for the institution of the soviet 
system in Ireland: 
 
To-day the Soviet idea is sweeping westward over Europe . . . The Soviet has shown itself the 
only instrument of liberation in Europe. Ireland’s best and most effective answer is the 
immediate establishment of Soviets, the instruments which will bring about the dictatorship of 
the Irish proletariat.67 
 
But Irish soviets were not the result of such lofty ideological goals. On 5 February 1923, 
Furlong’s and the Cork Steam Mills were seized by the strike committee and red flags were 
hoisted above the premises. The committee had intended to appropriate a third mill, Messrs 
Shaw’s, but this was not possible as it lacked grain stocks. The occupation lasted only a few 
hours and the buildings were voluntarily returned. This soviet carried no revolutionary 
subtexts. It was, as admitted by the committee, a bargaining chip for a favourable settlement. 
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The committee vowed to pay for all materials used, to continue milling until grain stocks were 
exhausted and to sell flour at cost price. Its spokesman was even more apologetic. Promising 
that the soviet would not interfere with the companies’ documents and commercial 
correspondence, he claimed that the importation of cheaper American and British flour was the 
cause of the dispute, not friction with the employers.68 Nevertheless, illegal direct action 
continued. The ITGWU levied a tax on imported flour to supplement strike pay.69 As one Cork 
employer reported to the Manchester Guardian: 
 
The labour outlook here is as bad as ever. The Transport Union have started a levy of 8s. per 
ton on imported flour, also levies on meal and millers’ offals in order to support the hands that 
are on strike in the local flour mills, while so far the Government has refused to take any action 
against this usurpation of their authority. The situation seems to be fast drifting into the same 
state as it was in Northern Italy before the Fascists came on the scene, but unfortunately I don’t 
think there is any chance of another Mussolini arising in this country.70   
 
The soviet could only mill flour at the Cork Steam Mill. At Furlong’s, the day was spent 
repairing machinery. The soviet had its desired effect. On 7 February, a truce was called, and 
a conference was organised for that day. Seven days later, the bosses offered an amended 
reduction of 9s. 6d. (6s. 6d. immediately and 3s. from 1 June). It was rejected by 900 votes to 
500, with most of the no votes coming from Cork. It was then offered to spread the cuts over 
twelve months, which was accepted. On 6 March, Irish flourmill workers returned to work. 
Though there was no victimisation, the settlement left most with less real take home pay than 









The calm before the storm 
After the flourmill settlement, Cork was largely free of major industrial disputes until July. But 
some stoppages did take place. The egg packers struck from 5 February to 13 March to combat 
a 10 per cent wage cut. They were partially successful.72 On 15 April, ITGWU seamen in Irish 
ports struck against a 6s. 6d. reduction arranged by the National Maritime Board in London, 
which had already been agreed to by the NSFU. Three days later, it spread to Cork. Three days 
after that, the ITGWU was also forced to accept the cut.73 Another disruption was a ‘lightning’ 
strike of ITGWU locomotive men at the GSWR’s Glanmire terminus to protest the suspension 
of three porters. It began on 31 May when workers refused to shunt trains, claiming the job 
required more manpower and that a redundant shunter should be employed to help. Claims of 
victimisation also contributed to its outbreak. On 4 June, a settlement was reached by 
arbitration under the Department of Industry and Commerce. Vacancies would be filled by 
previous employees of appropriate grade and the GSWR agreed to reinstate the three men. The 
NUR, the ASLEF or the RCA did not participate.74 But the tentative industrial peace was 
illusionary, merely the calm before the storm. The CEF was preparing for an all-out assault on 
wages and conditions that would ignite the largest labour dispute in Cork’s history.75  
         
The Storm 
On 24 May 1923, the Irish Civil War officially ended when Frank Aiken, the IRA’s Chief of 
Staff, ordered his men to dump arms and to not resist the Free State. Effective policing that 
guaranteed the protection of private property could now be instituted. Fear of violent retaliation 
was all that had heretofore held back employers from waging all-out class war. Once again, the 
dockers were the first to suffer. In July 1923, the fuse that was lit in August 1921 exploded into 
total class war on the Irish docks.76 In Cork, dockers for overseas ships were earning 16s. a 
day; those for Silloth and Isle of Man boats, 14s. a day; and those for coasting vessels, 13s. per 
day. Employers intended to shrink these rates to 10s. by cuts of 2s. – a 25 per cent decrease. 
Hours would remain at forty-six for permanent dockers and storemen, and forty-eight for 
carters and loaders. Casual dockers would still work eight hours a day with a guaranteed 
minimum of four hours. Employers also wanted revised working conditions to ‘assist the free 
movement of traffic.’77 They were ready to stand firm against the unions’ ‘Bolshevik’ wing, 
which they felt the slump had empowered by drastically reducing the room for compromise 
between what was vital for commercial survival and Labour expectations. To employers, 
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‘Labour’s willingness to countenance economic catastrophe was chilling, and countered the 
normal advantages that would otherwise accrue from recession’.78 
On 12 July, a national conference in Dublin collapsed. Four days later, Free State 
dockers were officially on strike. Over 1,000 men were affected in Cork. By 19 July, most 
stores on the Cork quays had closed.79 Another conference began on 28 July under the 
supervision of the Department of Industry and Commerce before breaking down on 1 August.80 
The government could no longer contain the employers. On 1 August, the Assistant Minister 
for Industry and Commerce asked them to keep the present level of wages for three months, by 
which time it was hoped that the disputes would be reconciled. They refused. On 21 July, the 
CTC formed a strike committee to co-ordinate the fightback. On 10 August, it called for an end 
to the lockout, an immediate withdrawal of wage reductions, a truce lasting until 1 January 
1924, and a re-opening of dialogue between the employers and the ITGWU.81 But the CEF was 
not interested in such a proposition. It demanded pay decreases of 20, 25, 40 and 50 per cent 
depending on the trade from 20 August.82 For example, employers in the distributive trade 
ordered cuts of 20 per cent for assistants, 25 per cent for craftsmen and 40 per cent for 
labourers.83 Class antagonisms had soared. As Liam de Róiste noted: ‘general opinion is that 
the lock-out will lead to violence, smashing of shops, etc., perhaps even to shooting of members 
of the Employers’ Federation.’84 Meanwhile, the strike at Woolworth’s was still unresolved 
and dockers picketed the premises in solidarity. On 27 July, the CTC barred membership to 
any girl who scabbed and boycotted the company.85   
 
Table 3. 6: Quayside Wages Sought by the CEF 
Job Wage 
Casual dockers 12s. a day 
Permanent dockers 61s. a week 
Storemen 54s. a week 
Double-horse carters 58s. a week 
Single-horse carters 56s. a week 
Loaders 54s. a week 






A conference between the CEF and the sixteen unions involved sat from 14-17 August, 
when it collapsed. The next day, the employers announced their willingness to postpone the 
changes until September pending another conference. The unions rejected this and demanded 
a six-month deferral. In the meantime, they recommended that a commission of inquiry 
examine the relation between the cost of labour and selling prices.86 The CEF also demanded 
the flexibility to sack retail employees during slump periods. For the Grocers’ Assistants, 
IUDWC and ICWU, this was a bigger source of discontent than wage reductions.87 The 
stipulation, ‘if conceded, would mean the virtual end of Trade Unionism in shop life in Cork.’88 
 








Cork 94s. 78s. 4d. 94s. 62s. 6d. 78s. 4d. 
Waterford 82s. 3d. 54s. 10d. - - - 
Dublin 78s. 10d. 58s. 8d. 77s. - 72s. 6d. 
Limerick - - - - 67s. 
London 73s. 4d. 55s. 66s. 50s. - 
Belfast 69s. 8d. 44s. 66s. 43s. 64s. 5d. 
Rushbrooke Docks 69s. - - 43s. 11d. - 
Haulbowline 55s. - - 37s. 5d. - 
Source: CE, 1 Aug. 1923. 
 









Cork 80s. 92s. 6d. 92s. 6d. 63s. 
Waterford 80s. 60-70s. - - 
Dublin <80s. - 70s. 60s. 
Limerick 80s. - - - 
London 66s. 75s. - - 
Mallow - - - 45s. 
Belfast - - - 47s. 







The 1923 lockout 
On 20 August, 154 businesses closed. A mass lockout had commenced. The primary unions 
involved were the ITGWU, the IUDWC, the Cork Grocers’ Assistants’ Association and the 
Building Trades’ Federation. The Typographical Association was not involved and was 
anxious to avoid dispute with their employers. The previous January, it had accepted an 8s. cut. 
The bakers also did not feature in the lockout, despite rumours to that effect.89 On 22 August, 
more than 2,000 locked-out workers marched through the city, carrying banners displaying 
slogans such as ‘Our ideal: the Workers’ Republic’ and ‘An injury to one is the concern of 
all’.90 On the Corporation, Labour Party councillor James Allen moved a resolution that 
condemned the bosses and asked that the Corporation adjourn from 24 to 29 August to protest 
the lockout. It was debated and withdrawn; a diplomatic call for arbitration passed instead. 
Fearful of social crisis, the government intervened. Assistant Minister for Industry and 
Commerce Professor Joseph Whelehan arrived in Cork on 23 August. Two days later, he met 
with the unions and the CEF, and arranged a joint conference for the following week over 
which he would preside.91 Initially, it looked as if mediation could succeed. On 29 August, the 
grain workers returned to work after lengthy discussions. Grain workers – along with labourers 
in the coal and timber trades – had gone on strike despite not experiencing cuts. They returned 
just as the city’s stocks of flour disappeared.92 
 Amidst this industrial unrest, both sides were preparing for the upcoming general 
election to be held on 27 August. The previous spring, a local Labour Party branch had been 
formed to contest it. It nominated three candidates to contest the Cork Borough constituency: 
incumbent TD Robert Day, William Kenneally and Richard Anthony of the Typographical 
Association. Labour went into the election with unprecedented confidence that workers’ 
discontent and government conservatism would translate into seats. The employers had formed 
their own party, the Cork Progressive Association, which put forward Andrew O’Shaughnessy, 
a mill owner, and Richard Beamish. It had close links to Cumman na nGaedheal and both 
contested the election under an electoral pact.93 Across the state, the election was a disaster for 
Labour. In Cork, conservatives took four of the five seats. Day lost his Dáil seat and Kenneally 
his deposit. Locally, the party totalled only 5,300 votes. The Irish Times blamed the industrial 
situation and the conduct of some of those on strike for the poor showing in Cork. The 
Manchester Guardian also partially attributed Labour’s terrible performance to the industrial 
disputes. But the reality was more complex. It may well have been the case that workers 
abandoned the party because of how it had distanced itself from the industrial struggle. The 
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civil war had ended only four months before and most workers voted along Treaty lines. Class 
politics had once again been upstaged by the national question. Moreover, Labour’s 1922 vote 
had been artificially high, inflated by the anti-republican protest vote it received.94  
Wages were coming under severe attack across the Free State – about 20,000 trade 
unionists were affected. The counterattack took on its most savage manifestation in east 
Waterford, which since May had been gripped by a lockout of farm labourers that had 
descended into violent class conflict. Alarmed by the ITGWU’s ‘Bolshevism’ and 
‘Irregularism’, the government intervened on the farmers’ behalf, helping to ruthlessly crush 
the strike.95 In Cork, the turbulence produced a situation more critical than in any other part of 
the country as 6-10,000 workers were locked out.96 The lockout was devastating the economy 
and causing tremendous hardship. The Harbour Board was £20,000 in debt and was forced to 
fire 400 ‘non-essential’ staff. They were later re-employed on reduced wages.97 About 200 tons 
of rotting flour, valued at £4,000, was held up on the docks and had to be dumped. Alarmingly, 
medical apparatus for the city’s hospitals was held up on the ships.98 The Irish Times reported 
that ‘the shortage of foodstuffs has become acute, and, such is the shortage of coal, that. . . 
unless a fresh supply can be procured by tomorrow no food can be cooked.’99 Coal was in such 
short supply that several houses were reduced to burning coke.100 On 2 October, the Lee Boot 
Factory announced it would soon shut down with 250 job losses as it had become impossible 
to procure materials.101 
 The labour war was generating a sturdy display of inter-union solidarity. The Cork 
Lock-Out Workers’ Committee, of which J.F. Fitzgibbon of the IUDWC was secretary, co-
ordinated the fightback.102 The Voice of Labour reported that ‘practically all the employed 
Trades Unionists in the city are willingly sacrificing a day’s pay per week to supplement the 
Strike Funds’. The Irish National Painters’, Decorators’ and Allied Trade Union (INPDATU) 
issued 35s. a week strike pay to its Cork members, which was funded by a national levy.103 
On 6 September, Whelehan’s conference got under way but adjourned after eight days, 
effecting no major change. He suggested that half of the employers’ demands be conceded and 
that conditions of employment be referred to a district industrial council for consideration. His 
suggestions were rejected outright by the employers.104 On 24 September, workers in the goods 
stores at the Macroom Railway were dismissed due to a lack of traffic, adding to the throngs 
of unemployed men.105 The CEF’s war had a clear objective: that class relations would be the 
same as they had been in pre-revolutionary Cork.106 As one local employer put it: 
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In your letter of today a correspondent suggests settlement by arbitration. But I scarcely think 
any sane employer is likely to assent to arbitration, to decide whether or not he owns his own 
business. . . The arbitration of common sense has already decided this matter, i.e. – the opinion 
of the employers.107   
 
The employers wanted not only to stamp their authority over the workers, but also over 
the young state itself. On 25 September, William Cosgrave, President of the Executive Council 
of the Irish Free State, gave a speech in the Dáil on the industrial crisis in Ireland. He appealed 
‘to both parties to these disputes, both of which . . . are equally to blame, or at least could be 
charged with a considerable portion of the blame’ and urged the employers to reduce their 
prices.108 In a written response, John Reardon, CEF secretary, refuted Cosgrave’s assertions 
and issued three demands: 
 
1. Wages must be reduced immediately to an economic level to enable our 
businesses to carry on and retain their efficiency. We want to advance, not 
recede, and we cannot compete with other countries unless we can produce as 
cheaply. 
2. The government cannot finance the country unless the trade of the Free State 
is able to make profits out of which to pay taxes. 
3. The expenses of Government itself must be reduced; everything the 
Government buys is loaded with high wages; every service it pays for has to 
bear the same burden.109   
 
October began with feelings of cautious optimism as Cork’s bacon curers returned to 
work on 1 October, having assented to a 10s. reduction. This would be done in two instalments: 
7s. 6d. immediately and 2s. 6d. from 1 March 1924.110 On 5 October, a conference under the 
Cork Industrial Development Association was held. It voted to appoint a six-man ‘Committee 
of Action’ to work with Alfred O’Rahilly to end the labour war. The CEF abstained from the 
vote.111 O’Rahilly had been toiling relentlessly for a concord but was consistently met with 
employer intransigence.112 Nevertheless, the committee made an immediate impact. By 8 
October, it had formulated an agreement on the right of dismissal.113 The employers got their 
way, although the three unions retained the right to protect against victimisation.114 The 
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employers’ rigidity was beginning to cause public consternation. De Róiste observed that 
‘some fear the working people may adopt Irregular methods. So far they have been very 
restrained. Petty employers have been more determined advocates of ‘‘the strong hand’’ than 
either the larger employers or the workers.’115 However, both Chambers of Commerce called 
for the creation of industrial courts of compulsory, binding arbitration to avoid a repeat of the 
current disaster.116  
On 10 October, Cosgrave announced that the Minister for Industry and Commerce 
would shortly be communicating the following proposals to both parties: 
 
1. That on resumption of work there should be a reduction in wages of 1s. per 
day, with consequential reductions in tonnage and overtime rates and in the 
wages of men who have previously followed the settlements relating to dock 
labour. 
2. That the Minister, in the exercise of his powers under Part II of the Industrial 
Courts Act, 1919, should, as soon as possible after the resumption of work, set 
up a Court of Inquiry to report on this question of dock labour.117 
 
On 15 October, the dockers voted to resume work under these conditions. Seven days later, the 
CEF revealed that it too would accept Cosgrave’s strategy provided the men return to work on 
or before 24 October. Thus, on 24 October, after a stoppage of fourteen weeks, Irish dockers 
resumed work.118 The strike had lost its backbone and it was only a matter of time before the 
others returned. On 22 October, the CEF circulated a letter containing the terms of agreement 
as directed by Gordon Campbell, Secretary to the Minister for Industry and Commerce:  
 
1. An immediate reduction in wages amounting to one half of the employers’ 
demand. 
2. The balance of the demand to be submitted to the decision of Professor A. 
O’Rahilly, T.D., immediately after work is resumed, which decision shall 




For the CEF, the fight was for a nobler cause. As Reardon asserted, ‘in their efforts to 
place the city’s commerce on the only foundation upon which it can thrive, the employers are, 
in reality, fighting the workers’ battle’.120 On 25 October, the Distributive Workers rejected the 
agreement. But this would have little bearing because the strike was disintegrating quickly. A 
few days later, the IUDWC admitted defeat and returned to work.121 By then, commercial 
activity had been restored to Cork’s docks. The carters were the only quayside labourers to 
remain on strike.122 On 30 October, O’Rahilly attended a conference at the Department for 
Industry and Commerce’s Cork offices. On 3 November, it concluded with both sides agreeing 
to hold a ballot on the terms put forward on 22 October.123 Despite the rapprochement, active 
sabotage remained a feature of disputes. In fact, its application had evolved and become more 
purposeful, indicative of syndicalism’s enduring appeal. On 4 November, some undertakers’ 
assistants broke into a hospital mortuary, removed a corpse and smashed a coffin, actions 
strongly condemned by the CTC four days later.124 Ballots were taken on 7 November and both 
sides voted to accept the Department’s terms. On 9 November, the terms were signed by both 
parties and three days later most of the men returned to work, including the carters who had 
voted against the agreement.125 This settlement applied solely to the disputes that began on 20 
August. Other disputes were still unresolved. 
 Building trade workers took an immediate 12½ per cent cut. Gristmill workers suffered 
an immediate decrease of 5 per cent, with a 5s. cut due to come into effect from 1 August 1924. 
The wages of one-horse carters were decreased to 58s., with a proportionate decrease for two-
horse carriers. Engineering labourers experienced the following cuts: 7s. for those on 70s., 6s. 
6d. for those on 61s. and 5s. for those on 55s. Nevertheless, Cork’s engineers remained the best 
paid in either Britain or Ireland.126 In December, Goulding’s re-opened after its workers – who 
had been locked out since the first week of August – accepted a 6s., or 10 per cent, reduction, 
half of what was originally sought. Before the lockout, they earned 16s. a week more than their 
equivalents in Belfast, Derry or Britain. Workers in all other trades bar one suffered an instant 
7½ per cent reduction with another 5 per cent to come off from 1 August 1924. The exception 
was the distributive labourers, whose August reduction was 12½ per cent.127 (See Appendix 8). 
By December 1923, labourers’ wages at the Packet Company had been considerably reduced 
from their peak of 80s. Its best paid workers now earned barely 70s. and there were few such 
people.128 By November 1924, most of its carmen earned less than 60s.129 By the end of 1923, 
all but one of the disputes had been settled by the Department of Industry and Commerce.130  
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The 1923 Cork lockout was a draw.131 Proletarian spirit and unity meant that the 
employers could enforce only half of what they had wanted, an outcome largely replicated 
nationally. The ITUC had pleaded with the government for a national, all-encompassing 
settlement of disputes, but made no effort to co-ordinate unrest. Nor did it exploit the 
government’s fear of a Labour-republican alliance by merging industrial and political 
discontent.132 O’Connor regards the 1923 autumn crisis as a ‘watershed in Labour history’.133  
 
From a movement with a capacity to defend living standards and an ambition to change class 
relations, trade unionism became a destructive force with no vision beyond immediate sectional 
interests. The dock strike unleashed a wider assault on unskilled workers because employers 
had less to lose in lockouts and little incentive to make concessions to strikers.134 
 
In Cork, the general strike was extremely costly for the unions. For example, while 
most stonemasons and bricklayers accepted lesser wages, some did not. These men went on 
strike and received 11s. a week strike pay from their union. However, by mid-November, with 
funds severely stretched, they too had conceded defeat.135 The Distributive Workers received 
£3,581 from Dublin, which was funded by levying other branches. By the end of 1923, Cork 
INPDATU’s branch was on the brink of collapse. Consequently, its national executive 
disaffiliated it in January 1924. The branch then broke away and renamed itself the Cork House 
Painters’ Trade Union. Most of the £460. 7s. 1d. the INPDATU spent on dispute pay pertained 
to Cork.136 1923 had been annus horriblis for Irish Labour, arguably the worst in the 
movement’s history. No union suffered more than the ITGWU, which had spearheaded the 
fightback. The counterattack had cost Liberty Hall £128,724 in dispute pay, with Cork 
receiving more than any other branch. Having forwarded nearly £6,000 more to Dublin than it 
received in 1922, Cork had gone from being the Transport Union’s most profitable branch to 







Table 3. 9: Money Flow Between Liberty Hall and Select ITGWU Branches, 1923 
Branch Remitted to Head Office Received from Head Office 
Cork £7,019. 6s. 3d. £23,901. 12s. 10d. 
Dublin No. 1 £14,529. 15s. 1d. £27,069. 7s. 
Dublin No. 3 £7,743. 4s. 4d. £2,924. 1s. 
Limerick £3,116. 9s 1d. £5,357 8s. 8d. 
Belfast £1,677 7s. 7d. £2,409. 1s. 
Mid-Waterford £543 1s. 2d. £12,845 1s. 
Waterford £752 4s. 7d. £4,503 15s. 6d. 
Source: ITGWU, Annual Report, 1923. 
 
Cork Labour in 1924  
By January 1924, the last of the Irish autumn disputes had ended. Cork had been devastated by 
its lockout. The Harbour Board had lost over £22,000 because it. On 3 January, the jarvies and 
undertakers’ assistants, the last of the workers to hold out, resumed employment. Like the 
others, they had been forced to assent to some decreases.138 Allegations of victimisation 
prompted the sitting of an arbitration court consisting of O’Rahilly, Beamish and 
O’Shaughnessy, all of whom were now TDs.139 Irish syndicalism was dead. It had brought 
historic gains through the most intense period of working-class revolt in Irish history. The dust 
may have settled but it was Cork’s working class who had to pick up the pieces of their broken 
city. Although the employers’ energy had been drained, Labour had been almost completely 
exhausted. Workers felt compelled to accept further cutbacks throughout 1924 and showed 
little of the fighting spirit that had characterised the previous year. Having not featured in 1923, 
the railwaymen were a notable exception.  
 In early 1924, the Irish railway companies set out to cut wages by 3s. to 10s., abolish 
the guaranteed week and extend hours from forty-eight to between fifty-four and sixty. These 
changes would apply to the conciliation grades. Both the NUR and the ASLEF vehemently 
opposed any alterations.140 The ASLEF claimed the cuts would mean a weekly loss of 22s. 6d. 
for engine drivers and 18s. for firemen.141 The RCA countered with a claim that clerks should 
reach the maximum 77s. weekly salary after nine years’ service rather than fourteen, a claim it 
had first submitted in July 1923.142 Conferences held in February between the unions and the 
companies failed to produce a result. The disputes were submitted to the Central Wages Board, 
its first use since its inauguration (see Chapter 9). It met on 27 February and failed to agree.143 
The Irish Railway Wages Board was then called into action. It sat from 28 April to 2 May and, 
to the relief of the NUR and the ASLEF, decided to leave wages and conditions unchanged.144 
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The NUR was a changed union from the one that had won and defended the eight-hour day for 
its Irish members. It had abolished its Irish Council in December 1923, bringing its Irish 
branches under the authority of London once more.145  
 The RCA, however, was not as content and pressed ahead with its claims for 
improvements. It announced its intention to strike from 5 June if its demands weren’t met. The 
companies responded by threatening to terminate the clerks’ employment. However, strike was 
averted on 1 June when the claims were submitted to arbitration under the Irish Railway Wages 
Board. Four days later, the Board granted most clerks, stationmasters and supervisors 
significant increases, with many clerks receiving yearly improvements of £20-40. The award 
especially benefited the lower paid classes. Stationmasters’ annual salaries were now £160-220 
depending on grade and years of service.146 The railway unions’ executives had been supported 
throughout by their Cork branches.147 
 
Table 3. 10: Annual Salaries of Fifth Class (Male) Railway Clerks 
Year of service After the award Before the award 
First £110 £100 
Second £125 £110 
Third £140 £120 
Fourth £155 £130 
Fifth £170 £140 
Sixth £185 £150 
Seventh £200 £160 
Source: Freeman’s Journal, 6 June 1924. 
 
Table 3. 11: Wages for Female Railway Clerks (Class Two) from June 1924 
Year Wage 
First  25s. 
Second  30s. 
Third 35s 
Fourth  40s. 
Fifth  45s. 
Sixth  50s. 
Seventh  52. 6d. 
Eighth  55s. 
Ninth  57s. 6d. 
Tenth  60s. 
Source: award of the Irish Railway Wages Board, 4 June 1924, LAB 83/2367, Min. of Labour records, The 




Table 3. 12: Wages at the GSWR, February 1924 
Occupation Wage 
Vicemen 61s. 
Stationary Boilermen 61s. 
Smiths’ Helpers 58s. 6d. 
Boilermakers’ Helpers 58s. 6d. 
Drillers (machinists) 58s. 6d. 
Sailmakers 58s. 6d. 
Fitters’ Helpers 55s. 
Vicemen’s Assistants 54s. 
Labourers 54s. 
Carpenters 82s. 3d. 
Wagonmakers 79s. 9d. 
Source: GSWR Works & Traffic Committee minutes, 27 Feb. 1924, GSWR archive, IRRS. 
 
In May 1924, Jim Larkin – who had returned to Ireland in April 1923 after nine years 
in the United States – broke away from the ITGWU and formed the Workers’ Union of Ireland, 
taking two-thirds of the Dublin membership with him as well as 23 of the 300 provincial 
branches.148 Though Larkin was ‘enthusiastically received’ when he addressed a large crowd 
from Connolly Hall in May 1923, Cork stayed loyal and no local WUI branch was launched.149 
In the summer of 1924, a demarcation dispute resurfaced between the plasterers and the 
carpenters over which union had the right to lay Trafford tiles on roofs. The plasterers had 
previously walked off a job because of the issue, causing the employers to threaten a lockout 
in the trade. The dispute had first emerged in 1921. Arbitration from the ITUC found in favour 
of the carpenters but not before both were locked out by the employers. Likewise, the Building 
Trades’ Federation, Alfred O’Rahilly and the Department of industry and Commerce all ruled 
in favour of the carpenters, but the plasterers persisted. For this, they incurred the opprobrium 
of several CWC delegates.150 On 5 July, the master builders locked out the plasterers. They 
were not re-admitted for over three weeks. Under arbitration from the Building Trades 
Federation, the Plasterers’ Society agreed to refer the question to a joint industrial council for 
the trade, which also ruled in favour of the carpenters.151 One of the year’s only strikes began 
in late November at Goulding’s. About 100 labourers were involved. It was resolved in mid-
December when the men accepted the employers’ terms: a 3s. reduction, making wages 55s. 
for a forty-eight-hour week.152 Table 3. 12 demonstrates the extent to which wages had fallen 
since their 1920 peak. 
Cork Labour had come full circle since 1914. The zeitgeist had travelled from 
revolutionary upheaval to a conservative consensus that included the Irish left. Labour’s story 
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from 1917-24 is exemplified by the Socialist Party of Ireland, which was founded in January 
1917 by William O’Brien. Openly Marxist and revolutionary, it began with modest 
expectations but blossomed in the flush of domestic and international radicalism of 1919-20 
and developed strong links with the ITGWU. By late 1919, it had a Cork branch which brought 
the ‘James Connolly Labour College’ to the city the following year.153 At its 1920 annual 
conference, the ITUC ended its brief flirtation with communism, which isolated the Socialist 
Party. It also suffered from internal factionalism. In late 1921, moderates like Cathal 
O’Shannon and O’Brien were expelled for ‘reformism’ and the party was relaunched as the 
Communist Party of Ireland with a Cork branch of twenty-eight members. However, in 1924 
this incarnation collapsed having been on the retreat since its foundation.154 Like syndicalism, 
it too was a casualty of the capitalist counterattack of 1921-23 and the return of a conservative 
consensus that would dominate the Irish state for decades.  
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Class Conflict in Derry, 1917-21 
 
Like the national movement, in early 1917 Derry Labour began its most forceful period of 
agitation. Unlike most Irish cities, Derry’s economy, with its shipbuilding and shirt industries, 
benefited from the First World War. The war enhanced Derry’s importance as a city, which 
boosted Labour’s bargaining power. The successful unionisation of previously unorganised 
sectors, most notably the shirt operatives, was the second factor that empowered Labour. 
Inflation was the primary cause for the spread of unions. Fittingly, 1917 began with local milk 
cart drivers threatening to strike against the recently imposed penny per quart on new milk.1 
By July 1918, the government estimated that the cost of living had increased by 74 per cent for 
working-class families in Britain since July 1914. Labourers suffered most as their living costs 
had gone up by 81 per cent while a craftsman’s life was 67 per cent more expensive.2 As with 
other Irish cities, militancy gathered pace in 1917-18 and peaked in 1919-20 when wage 
increases surpassed inflation. The war of independence made Derry’s politics more communal 
than ever. Employers and Unionists exploited the tensions to combat Labour, proletarian unity 
and the ITGWU.  
 
Derry Labour in 1917 
Local class tensions that had been mounting since 1914 came to a head in early 1917. The 
British Government tried to diffuse class conflict by arbitrating disputes, but employers 
remained as unscrupulous as ever. For example, refusal to implement a Committee on 
Production award for metal craftsmen led to a strike of shipyard engineers from 7-13 April. 
Government arbitration gave the engineers a lesser increase, though shipyardmen were 
excluded.3 On 16 June, fifty boot and shoe workers downed tools when their employers did not 
grant them a war bonus of 10s. These factories, where wages ranged from 24s. to 29s., 
epitomised employer unscrupulousness. Workers there had received a bonus of only 1s. in the 
pound since 1914, even though the price of boots and shoes had increased by 25 per cent. After 
a few days of strike, most firms yielded and gave a 6s. increase.4 By now, the NAUL had 
established itself as the chief vehicle through which workers – especially manual labourers – 
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could channel their grievances. By March 1917, it had four local branches, two of which were 
in the city: one for shipyardmen and one for distillery workers, pork curers, gasworkers and 
bleachers (no. 112). Four months later, no. 112 also had sections for labourers and 
warehousemen.5 Table 4. 1 outlines some of the union’s agitation that year. 
By July 1917, the average price of retail and wholesale food had risen to 104 per cent 
above 1914 levels.6 Consequently, unrest continued to deepen, and class conflict moved into a 
more contradictory phase. Although strikes and lockouts were becoming much more common, 
they had become notably less violent. The use of scabs was not as prevalent and, when used, 
they did not experience the violence and intimidation their predecessors had. Nor was there the 
same level of state interference on the side of the employers. In August, a pork curers’ strike 
(whose wages ranged from 24s. to 34s.) for a 4s. increase was called off when the men 
pusillanimously accepted their employers’ arguments that trade condition did not justify such 
a claim.7 But this submissiveness was not representative of the working class. From 26 July to 
16 August, the builders’ labourers were on strike for an hourly rate of 7d., their wages being 
22s. and 24s. Having dismissed an offer of 5½d, they accepted a 5¾d. rate until May 1918.8  
The factory girls were also starting to assert themselves. The year ended with a wage 
dispute at Hogg’s (whose operatives were the worst paid in Derry) and a strike of 400 girls at 
the Ebrington factory.9 With its shipyard and shirt industry, both of which were relevant to the 
war effort, Derry stood to gain from government arbitration. In December 1917, the ASTT put 
in a claim for a 15 per cent rise. Under Ministry of Labour arbitration, timeworkers were 
awarded 12½ per cent with pieceworkers 10 per cent.10 By the year’s end, Derry Labour had 
finally achieved something that had eluded it for over twenty-five years: successful 
organisation of the factory girls. The girls were unionised with remarkable speed. In May 1917, 
they had still been unorganised; by December, however, McCarron’s union had a monopoly 
on them. Its ‘factory workers’ branch’ now had 3,354 souls, a 1,577 per cent increase in just 
twelve months. Of the 7,852 women the ASTT recruited in the UK in 1917, 3,154 of these 











Table 4. 1: Increases Secured by the NAUL, 1917 
Workers Increase Date 
Bacon & ham curers 2s. for men and 1s. for boys. First quarter 
Shipyardmen 5s. First quarter 
Gasworkers 6d. Feb. 
Gasfitters 2d. an hour July  
Red-leaders12 6s. Second quarter 
Shipyardmen on Admiralty 
work 
6d. a day Second quarter 
Shipyard helpers 12½ per cent bonus & 1s. 6d. 
per night 
Second quarter 
Gasfitters 9d. hourly rate & a fifty-four-
hour week (from sixty) 
July 
Distillery workers 3s. for men and 2s. for boys Aug. 
Seed merchant labourers 5s. Aug. 
Firemen (gasworks) 2s. 7d. Aug. 
Labourers (gasworks) 2s. 6d. Aug. 
Bleach workers 4s. Autumn 
Distillery workers 3s. for men and 2s. for boys Autumn 
Source: NAUL, quarterly reports for 1917, TU/GENERALC/1/22, Working Class Movement Library (WCML). 
 
Derry Labour in 1918 
As prices continued their upward climb in 1918, there was a significant growth in the number 
of labour disputes. Class conflict was quickly adapting to reflect this new era of mass 
unionisation of workers across economic sectors in a milieu of mass inflation. At the shipyard, 
there were short strikes for increases by platers’ helpers and labourers at the beginning of 
January, and of platers and riveters in the middle of it. The month ended with a daylong strike 
of shop assistants at J.J. Pollock and Co. for better pay and recognition of their union.13 The 
latter was obtained and the former was left to negotiation.14 In late February, Pollock’s staff 
struck again after they had been refused the 20 per cent (7s.) raise given by four other firms. 
At the same time, a brief strike over work practices occurred at W.G. O’Doherty’s shop.15 The 
other firms’ assistants threatened sympathetic strike if Pollock’s did not concede. The strike 
typified how inclusive Labour had become when the public was treated to ‘the novel spectre 
of well-dressed young men and women’ distributing leaflets. Indeed, the strikers went further 
than their union could condone when they set upon a manager on his way home.16  
The dispute ended in early March when the firm conceded increases averaging 25 per 
cent (3s. 6d. to 10s) and the union’s minimum wage scale.17 For this, the Shop Assistants 
received extensive plaudits from the ITGWU in its weekly newspaper, Irish Opinion: The 
Voice of Labour. It was the ‘generosity of the local members of the Union’, that had enabled 
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‘all the strikers to receive in strike pay the full amount of their ordinary wages’. In the absence 
of an ITGWU Derry branch, it told the shop assistants to spread their union as ‘there should be 
no more strikes in Derry . . . if your fellow workers organise as you have done and fight when 
forced to do so in the unity of the ‘Prentice Boys.’18 When the British won a 5s. increase and 
the 12½ per cent bonus for metal craftsmen, the ITGWU was similarly cheerful. It commended 
the NAUL for getting increases for meal and flourmill workers.19 The Tyneside union was 
leading the working-class charge and was growing accordingly. In May, it took over the newly 
formed Derry Butchers’ Association and immediately pressed for a lessening of hours.20 
Disgruntlement was particularly rife in the bakeries. In February, arbitration gave bakers an 
additional 6s. 6d. and upped jobbers’ pay to 7s. daily. Breadservers got a 35s. minimum but 
labourers and apprentices received no improvement. Sir Robert Anderson – Derry’s Unionist 
mayor and a prominent shirt manufacturer who owned hosiery and knitting factories in Derry 
and Gweedore – was the arbitrator.21 Still unhappy, the men ceased work on 24 June. Labourers 
desired an extra 10s. and packers 15s. Both also wanted better conditions and a ban on nons. 
The strike concluded five days later when the wages question was submitted to arbitration, 
which awarded the men 4s. 6d. in September. The nons also agreed to join the bakers’ union.22  
The summer of 1918 was one of discontent for the Derry’s beleaguered proletariat. The 
bricklayers struck from 6 to 10 May for a 1s. 2d hourly rate, which the plumbers also pursued. 
The strike led to bricklayers, carpenters and joiners getting a raise and a 3s. bonus from 1 
May.23 The carrying trade had been in dispute since 1917 when the employers reluctantly gave 
a 4s. increase. In May 1918, a request for another 8s. was refused. A settlement was reached 
seven days later when the carters accepted 6s., giving them 20s. more than what they had in 
1914.24 The shipyard was the scene for 1918’s largest strike when 350 riveters, platers and 
caulkers secured an increase after downing tools.25 Although plentiful in number, none of the 
summer strikes lasted more than five days. The intensity of the class tensions is unsurprising 
given the economic context. In August, the shirt factory operatives claimed that their pay had 
gone up only 10 per cent since the war began while the cost of living had gone up by 114 per 
cent.26 Derry’s waterside workers were at the heart of Labour militancy. They demanded 
equality with British dockers and receive the Committee on Production’s May award. The 
Committee had ruled that Derry dock workers should receive a 5s. increase, with casual men 
getting another 1½d. per hour. The Derrymen rejected this and, on 28 August, resolved to strike 
for the Belfast award. On 31 August, they aborted the stoppage pending arbitration.27 On 2 
October, the unions expressed their new-found confidence at a meeting presided over by 
130 
 
Logue. They passed a resolution demanding the forty-four-hour week and authorising 
themselves to ‘adopt any action they may consider necessary’ to enforce this.28  
The death of McCarron 
On 10 October, disaster struck Derry Labour. A German U-Boat torpedoed the RMS Leinster 
drowning more than 500 people. On his way to an ASTT meeting, James McCarron was one 
of those who perished.29 Tributes to McCarron transcended class and politics and came all 
sections of Derry society.30 A fund was established to erect a permanent memorial to him.31 
But the ASTT did not allow tragedy to disturb its mission. Despite losing its most able Irish 
official, it pursued an increase for the factory workers. On 8 November, its claim was submitted 
to the Committee on Production, which issued increases.32 Against the advice of the Merchant 
Tailors’ Federation, Derry’s master tailors refused to implement the award. Consequently, a 
tailors’ strike commenced on 11 November. The men returned to work on 3 December when 
the employers gave way and applied the award.33 In December, shirt workers were awarded 
increases via arbitration. But pay was still low in the staple industry by the war’s end: earnings 
averaged 18s. per operative.34 In late 1918, the ASE pushed for the higher Belfast rate, which 
it did not attain. Nevertheless, it got another 7s., making rates in Derry within 2s. of those in 
the northern capital. By January 1919, the ASTT Derry branch had secured a wage 32s. 6d. 
higher than August 1914.35 
 
‘Respectable’ radicals – white-collar militancy 
Such was the militancy that even lower-middle-class workers were forcefully pushing for 
improvements and were willing to strike if necessary. In late 1918, the IAWU demanded a 
wage 20s. above pre-war levels and a reduction of hours to fifty-six in all Irish asylums. In 
response, the Derry Lunatic Asylum’s committee of management, of which Logue was a 
member, upped its employees’ bonuses.36 In mid-January 1919, there was an even more 
extraordinary manifestation of the zeitgeist. Doctors employed by the Board of Guardians 
publicly threatened to strike if their annual salary was not augmented. The dispute was resolved 
when an additional £40 a year was granted on top of the £20 they had been awarded in late 
1918.37 Medical militancy stemmed from the extra hours they had to put in treating patients of 
the Spanish Flu.38  
The war years were conspicuous for the diversity, regularity and combativeness of the 
separate wages’ movements. But from early 1919 it was possible to speak of a single ‘wages’ 
movement’ that incorporated all workers irrespective of political loyalties. Between 1914 and 
1917, the pattern of industrial conflict had reflected war needs consequent to the evolution of 
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bargaining power. Workers in economic sectors relevant to the war effort, notably shipyard 
craftsmen, dominated strikes until 1917. From 1919, however, industrial conflict was more 
diffuse and involved everyone from the docker to the doctor. Shipyard militancy had been a 
defining feature of British Labour during the war years. It was driven by the introduction of 
machinery that diminished skill, degenerated apprenticeships and downgraded the tradesman’s 
privilege. With the backing of the Ministry of Munitions, employers were increasingly 
exploiting the labour of apprentices, women and semiskilled men, who could be paid below 
the craft rate. Consequently, craftsmen heretofore conservative were radicalised.39  
      
Derry and the 1919 ‘Belfast soviet’ 
The most significant Labour struggle of this period was the campaign for the forty-four-hour 
working week. On 25 January, 40,000 engineering and shipbuilding workers in Belfast struck 
unofficially for it. The unrest spread to the Belfast Corporation employees, giving the strike 
committee control over the power supply which allowed it to issue a permit system, prompting 
journalists to refer to it as the ‘Belfast soviet’. The strike was the greatest in Irish history and 
was almost general throughout Belfast. It lasted for three weeks and directly and indirectly 
affected 60,000 workers at its height. The strike committee included Catholics and Protestants, 
nationalists and Unionists, united in struggle.40  
On 3 February, Derry officials of the Federation of Engineering and Shipbuilding 
Trades oversaw a meeting of workers in the Guildhall to discuss what the local response should 
be. Thomas Cassidy, the Derry-born Irish organiser for the Typographical Association and 
ITUC chairman, advised caution, arguing that any action would have to be national. But a 
national Labour movement did not exist. Most Belfast Protestants were overtly hostile to the 
ITUC because it was now openly identifying with Sinn Féin. Besides, the hours’ movement 
was born in British shipyards, not Irish ones. Metal unions in Belfast, and to a lesser extent in 
Derry, wanted little to do with Dublin. Afraid of the ramifications of sympathetic strike, the 
meeting voted overwhelmingly not to support Belfast after boisterous exchanges. Instead, it 
decided to ballot local workers on a forty-four-hour movement. The meeting also rejected a 
resolution demanding the implementation of the forty-four-hour week by 1 May with no pay 
cuts.41 Regardless, events moved too quickly for the Derrymen. Alarmed by this dabble in 
‘Bolshevism’, Dublin Castle sent up troops to crush the strike, leading to its collapse. Inertia 
had cost Derry Labour an opportunity. Herein was its dilemma in a nationalist-majority city: 
the embrace of radicalism left it open to association with revolutionary socialism and 
republicanism, which it was ill-prepared to deal with. Throughout 1919, Derry Labour’s actions 
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did not alert the authorities. The police were confident that the city’s ‘ample’ employment 
would fend off any revolutionary working-class consciousness. Shortly after the Derry 
gathering, the ITUC endorsed a national movement for the forty-four-hour week, a minimum 
wage of 50s. and a general increase of 150 per cent on pre-war wages. In contrast to the rest of 
nationalist Ireland, Derry Labour was slow to adopt this goal.42   
 
The Transport Union in the Maiden City 
On 8 January 1919, a decade after its foundation, the ITGWU opened a branch in Derry. James 
Houston, a former organiser for the MEA in Belfast, was its first secretary. The branch (no. 
179) initially catered for employees of the city’s four cinemas.43 Derry was a vital component 
of the union’s drive into Ulster from June 1918 when it had only three northern branches. Led 
by Peadar O’Donnell, an ex-Donegal INTO county secretary, the number of ITGWU branches 
in the province grew to ten by the end of 1918.44 Born in the Rosses in the Donegal Gaeltacht 
in 1893, O’Donnell qualified as a primary school teacher in 1913. By 1918, he was an active 
trade unionist. He affiliated the INTO’s Gweedore and Rosses branch to the Derry Trades 
Council and embarked to Scotland to organise the ‘tattie hokers’ – Irish migrant potato pickers. 
Vocally pro-Bolshevik and republican, his radicalism was too much for the INTO and he joined 
the ITGWU later in 1918. That October, he was appointed the union’s northern organiser where 
he ‘blazed a trail of glory across Ulster’.45 
In early 1920, Liberty Hall decided that O’Donnell should concentrate his efforts on 
Derry, which it believed was a solid market for recruitment. O’Donnell sometimes lodged with 
Edward McCafferty of the ASE (the republican secretary of the trades council) and sometimes 
with a Gweedore man called Sweeney who owned a bar and lodging house in Waterloo Street. 
Crucially, the ITGWU missed an open goal when it snubbed a chance to have the city’s dockers 
and carters on its books. In contrast to 1909, the NUDL men was willing to join if it could bring 
McNulty, still its secretary, with them. O’Donnell agreed to this condition but Liberty Hall did 
not, and the men stayed put. How had the dockers fared under Sexton? Exceptionally, Derry’s 
port was never decasualised. On the other hand, many dockers enjoyed the freedom of 
casualism and opposed a register of workers for fear it would be used to monitor them and 
blacklist militants. The NUDL obtained a closed shop on the quays, with union men given 
priority of employment. It also controlled the manning and allocation of men to tonnage 
squads.46 Casualism accentuated dockside hierarchies: the better paid stevedores and grain 
porters were virtually immune from it. But mechanisation had diluted the ‘craft’ of ‘skilled’ 
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dockers (grain porters, coal trimmers etc.) which impressed on them the necessity of common 
action within the industry.47  
 Relations between the ITGWU and the trades council were cold from the start and the 
union was refused affiliation. The council even changed its rules to stop the Transport Union 
from joining. Derry’s conservative Labour-nationalist establishment viewed the trades council 
as its domain and lacked the revolutionary zeal of O’Donnell and his generation. On one 
occasion when O’Donnell was negotiating with employers, a group of trade unionists, 
including Logue, burst into the room and denounced the ITGWU as interlopers.48 But it wasn’t 
all gloom. In February, the branch won increases at the Opera House, making wages 70s. for 
operators, 40s. for permanent men, 21s. for stagehands and 14s. 6d. for checkers. O’Donnell 
had threatened the manager with sabotage of a show if the staff were not granted increases.49 
 
Nemesis: unrest continues to grow 
In 1919, Derry Labour faced an unprecedented level of industrial strife as class conflict 
engulfed Britain and Ireland. On 25 January, the NAUL took out the tramwaymen, who earned 
a miserly 15s., for a 10s. improvement. The strike collapsed on 3 February when the City of 
Derry Tramway Company folded. The men had to find work elsewhere. The city had lost its 
tram service for good.50 The British Government could do little to stem the tide of proletarian 
discontent. ‘It certainly looks as if the ancient goddess of Greek literature Nemesis is assuming 
the form of vast labour trouble to deal out retributive justice to Mr. Lloyd George and his 
Cabinet of reactionary and anti-democratic influences’, declared the Journal on 31 January.51 
Whether by divine providence or the contradictions of capitalism, class conflict continued to 
deepen. There was also discontent on the railways. The companies were loath to implement the 
eight-hour day and did so without paying overtime. The Derry RCA warned of trouble if they 
persisted.52 Demands for improved wages remained the key driving force of Labour 
belligerency. Employers, however, remained as intransigent as ever, giving Derry two of its 












Table 4. 2: Threatened strikes in Derry, 1917-20 
Workers/Union Date Demand Outcome 
Typographical Association Jan. 1917 Wage increase 3s. increase 
Bakers & breadservers53 Dec. 1917 10s. increase Modified increase 
Typographical Association Nov. 1918 Wage increase 50s. wage 
Pork curers May 1919 15s. increase 6s. increase 
butchers’ assistants May 1919 Wage increase 10s. increase 
Slaughterhousemen May 1919 Wage increase Extra 1s. per head 
Butchers’ assistants  Sept. 1919 Wage increase 6.s 6d. increase, 
making wages 40-
75s. 
Source: DJ, 1917-20. 
 
The 1919 platers’ and carters’ strikes 
The first of 1919’s many major strikes took place at the shipyard. On 27 January, platers and 
riveters downed tools against a wage decrease. The employers, who had initially agreed not to 
cut pay, claimed the reduction was necessitated by the lessening of hours from fifty-four to 
forty-seven.54 On the third day of the strike, 900 NAUL shipyardmen met and voted by a four-
fifths majority not to strike in sympathy. On the same day, the platers’ helpers also resumed 
work.55 The strike became entangled in the conflict between nationalists and Unionists and 
instilled into the strike the sectarianism that Labour had done its upmost to avoid. The Sentinel 
reported that on 14 February Protestants were greeted with shouts of ‘Up Dublin!’ and ‘Up 
Sinn Féin!’ upon entering a meeting of apprentice platers. At this point they left and decided 
to resume work because they now regarded the strike as political. Three days later, things took 
an ugly turn when these workers were physically attacked during their lunchbreak by strikers. 
The Journal strongly repudiated any political motives for the strike.56  
Although the Journal was less hostile to Labour than the Unionist press, it was prone 
to pronouncements every bit as reactionary. One of its ‘correspondents’ warned workers of a 
‘particularly dangerous attempt that is being made by strangers’ to seize control of and use the 
unions ‘for their own selfish ends regardless of the higher interest of the workers’. This element 
was not only ‘avowedly revolutionary’ but promulgated the ‘unsound doctrines of socialism 
and syndicalism’. More egregious was its open hostility to religion. The goal was not the 
‘material betterment of the working classes’, but ‘the establishment of a paganistic regime in 
which the sanctions of law ignored and even the Ten Commandments subverted to the 
135 
 
gratification of personal ambition and the creation of a tyrannical domination under which 
minorities would not have a semblance of freedom’. The Sentinel praised the Journal’s tirade.57  
Neither paper need have worried. One of Irish syndicalism’s defining features was its 
lack of hostility to religion, which contrasts starkly with the attitude of Spanish, Italian and 
French syndicalists. In Italy and Spain, where the Catholic Church had enormous influence and 
economic power, syndicalists were fiercely hostile to religion, especially Catholicism. In both 
places, the move towards capitalism was led by a weak and ineffective liberal bourgeoisie. 
Accordingly, Italian and Spanish syndicalism had decidedly anarchist flavours, a movement 
that despised not only landowners but also their protectors in the Catholic Church. French and 
American syndicalists had a similar view of the Church as a tool of the established order.58 
There are unique historical reasons for Irish syndicalism’s absence of anti-clericalism: 
 
. . . whereas on the continent the Catholic Church was allied with the great Catholic landowners 
and Catholic governments, in Ireland the great landowners were Protestant. Whereas on the 
continent the rising middle class had to fight for power and influence against a semi-royalist 
reaction that was allied with the Church and accordingly tended to seek popular support around 
a program of anti-clericalism, in Ireland the Church supported the middle class against the 
Protestant Ascendency and the British.59 
 
 The platers’ strike ended on 3 March. It had encompassed eighty platers and more than 
300 others who had been thrown out of work because of it. Trevisa Clarke, the Liverpool-born 
managing director of the North of Ireland Shipbuilding Co., had taken a hard-line. Clarke was 
a tough employer with an autocratic style. He prosecuted the apprentices for breach of contract 
under the 1875 Employer and Workmen Act and threatened to close the yard. Some were 
convicted of assault. Clarke made sure that local wages were lower than in the Belfast yards, 
where labourers’ rates were well below cross-channel levels.60 His shipyard was a hornet’s nest 
of industrial conflict. In January, a judge had commented that ‘ca’canny’, a Scottish term for a 
type of industrial sabotage best described as ‘poor work for poor pay’, was rumoured to be rife 
in the yard. Five months later, a shipyardman stood trial for assaulting an apprentice caulker 
for ‘working too hard’. Under syndicalism’s influence, sabotage had become a common feature 
of class conflict in Ireland. Its greatest practitioners were members of the ITGWU.61 That 
industrial sabotage was taking place in Derry demonstrates that syndicalism did penetrate, 
however mildly, its Labour movement. Sabotage was an integral part of syndicalist tactics of 
direct action and was adopted as official policy of the CGT in 1897 and the IWW in 1910. It 
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was also practised by the CNT in Spain from 1919-23. Slowing down production, working-to-
rule, producing poor quality work and, in some cases, destroying machinery were all 
considered legitimate actions aimed at hitting company profits.62 
On 23 March, Derry’s carters struck when their employers refused a demand for 
improved wages. They wanted the Master Carriers’ Association to enforce an award of the 
Committee on Production giving an extra 7s., bringing wages to 51s. The carters were well 
supported. The dockers came out in sympathy, claiming that the merchants’ refusal to release 
coal supplies had forced their hand, and the bellmen refused to scab. The strike had dreadful 
consequences. Thousands were left without coal, rendering them unable to light fires or cook 
food in an unseasonably cold spring.63 On 29 March, crowds gathered on the quays anticipating 
emergency rations of food and supplies from the Coal Controller. But provisions never arrived 
because the merchants still refused to release the coal. Extraordinary scenes ensued: 
 
For a time the crowed eyed the coal from a distance, but soon some of the more venturesome 
produced bags and began to fill them. In less than half an hour there was a regular scramble, 
men, women, and children swarming unto the piles of coal like ants. Those returning with well-
filled bags to their homes spread like wildfire the news of the raid, and gradually the crowd of 
raiders swelled, coming from the poorer quarters of the city. Bags, baskets, buckets, and 
haversacks were requisitioned to hold the coal. During a heavy hailstorm these were quickly 
filled, and in an incredibly short space of time there appeared on the scene trucks, donkeys 
carts, barrows, a lorry, and even a hackney car, all of which were sent away well laden. For 
several hours this extraordinary operation continued with the Harbour constables and a number 
of the Royal Irish Constabulary looking on. Soldiers in uniform and silver badge men were 
among those who filled and carried away bags.64        
 
After an angry confrontation, the police dispersed the crowd. The merchants’ uncompromising 
attitude incurred for them the opprobrium of the Journal, which declared: 
 
The effect of the suffering thus needlessly inflicted on thousands not connected with the strike 
has been to arouse indignation, and was in no small degree responsible for the recklessness 
displayed by the crowds at the quay on Saturday morning. . . the occurrence was regretted by 
many, but in the popular view ample justification was afforded by what is described as the 
harshness of the merchants, coupled with the impulse which cold, hunger and want inspires. As 
one of the strike leaders remarked, there is a limit to human endurance, and those who continue 
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to pill on prices and pile up profits out of the essentials of existence should take heed of the 
warning note that Saturday’s affair conveyed.65 
On top of the coal famine, there were shortages of bread and flour because bakeries closed for 
want of coke. The bakers and breadservers received a week’s notice. By now, carters, gas 
workers and builders’ labourers were affected.66 On 3 April, arbitration under Mayor Anderson 
and Councillor Patrick Meenan, an NUDL official, brought a return to work on the terms that 
prevailed before the strike pending the Committee on Production’s decision on whether carters 
fell under the remit of its award. Seventy-five summons for larceny were issued as MacDevette 
& Donnell looked for compensation for the public’s raid on the coal supply.67 
 
May Day 1919 
As explained in Chapter 2, May Day 1919 was observed everywhere in Ireland except for 
Limerick and Belfast.68 The prospect of Derry’s working class acting in unison terrified the 
authorities. The trades council called on all workers to participate in the procession, but 
powerful forces of reaction were against it. Brigadier-General Erskine banned any procession 
or assembly taking place on Derry’s historic walls, where the trades council proposed the 
workers gather. The military occupied the walls instead.69 The Derry branch of the Ulster 
Unionist Labour Association (UULA) (see Chapter 8) published a statement in the Unionist 
press calling on all Protestant workers not to take any part in the proceedings. The 
demonstration, it alleged, was ‘of a revolutionary and Bolshevik nature and supported by Sinn 
Féin propagandists’, having been concocted by the party as a covert means to undermine the 
Union through ‘the pure Labour ticket’.70 The demonstration was also condemned by the 
Orange Order and the Apprentice Boys of Derry who declared that it was ‘conceived in a spirit 
of disloyalty, in accordance with the views of men who seek the disruption of the Empire and 
the establishment of an Irish Republic’.71 In the end, May Day was only partially observed and 
inevitably took on a sectarian dimension. Most shipyard workers took the day off, as did all 
carters, dockers, tailors and many in the trades. Most, but not all, factory girls did not go to 
work.72 Although Labour had shown its inability to deal with the Orange Card, the day was a 
triumph of sorts. As the Journal observed: 
 
Labour can really afford to be jubilant over the happenings of the day, for that there should be 
such a formidable military display to prevent the organised workers of the city assembling . . . 
is an acknowledgement of their power . . . To have manoeuvred the British authorities . . . into 
such a position that they threw themselves into the arms of the Orangemen and Apprentice 
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Boys and prohibited any gathering on the walls was a far more useful thing at the present time 
than hours of speech-making could achieve.73    
Strikes and embargoes 
Derry’s increasing cost of living, which was the highest in Ireland by late 1919, continued to 
spur Labour agitation. In April 1919, even the Sentinel praised local dockers for partaking in 
the NUDL’s national food embargo.74 It was in the building trade, a regular scene of strikes, 
where the year’s most protracted dispute took place. When workers announced that they 
wanted a 7d. hourly increase and a forty-seven-hour week (instead of fifty-five), negotiations 
began but produced no result. On 7 May, the joiners came out when, after conceding the hours 
demand, the Master Builders’ Association maintained that it could not give more than 1s. 6d. 
The masons and bricklayers had their demands partially conceded and therefore did not join 
the strike. The labourers, however, struck for a 1s. 3d. rate. Shipyard joiners – who were paid 
a rate of 1s. 6¾d. per hour – briefly struck in sympathy and refused to work overtime until the 
building trade dispute was settled. The strike dragged until early July when the men accepted 
the shipyard rate. The labourers did not return until 17 July when they accepted 1s. hourly for 
a forty-seven-hour week.75   
 
More trouble at the shipyard 
In the meantime, trouble had spread to the shipyard. Within two days of the building trade 
joiners ceasing work, shipyard riveters and caulkers downed tools when the company tried to 
decrease their wages following a reduction of hours from fifty-four to forty-seven. Then, the 
yard’s plumbers and their helpers struck to bring their wages up to the level of other shipyard 
craftsmen. The drillers also left work, making 1,000 idle.76 Clarke once again threatened to 
close the yard if work was not resumed within a week, alienating those who had previously 
sympathised with him.77 After denouncing ‘agitators who do not belong here’, the Journal held 
Clarke personally responsible:  
 
The wisdom of Mr. Clarke’s often recurring threats may be questioned, and they certainly gain 
in neither weight nor authority launched through the columns of a Press which are used day in 
and day out to insult, jeer at and malign the workers. These organs have never been known to 
support the demands of organised labour no matter how well founded; the interest of the 




Clarke paid off several labourers and gave the apprentices an ultimatum to resume work 
immediately or consider their contracts terminated. Defiantly, they chose to remain out.79 By 
2 June, some of the platers had come out in sympathy with the riveters and the imported 
Scottish scabs had gone home. The strikes ended shortly afterwards when the men agreed to 
arbitration. That month, the yard’s lieu workers successfully saw off attempts to cut their pay. 
The final, and most prolonged, shipyard strike of 1919 was one of painters from 10 September 
to 8 October.80  
 
The height of the wages’ movement, 1919-20 
 Though hamstrung by sectarianism, Derry workers remained militant and poised to use the 
strike weapon when necessary. On 27 August, sawyers and labourers at Ballintine’s struck 
when the company refused to pay them shipyard rates for reconstruction work at the yard. The 
men stated that the building trade rate meant 8s. 6d. less a week. The conflict was one of the 
more protracted of the period, lasting until 4 October when a 4s 6d. increase was given.81 In 
September, a bakers’ strike was submitted to arbitration, as were shipyard and dockside 
disputes the following month (see Appendix 5).  
The zeitgeist ensured that militancy was spreading to sectors that had never experienced 
it before. On 13 October, Charles Denroche, organising secretary of the IBOA, visited Derry 
to rally bank clerks for their national strike. White-collar agitation helped to make Labour a 
more cohesive unit. From 22-26 November, no local newspapers were published for the first 
time in nearly 150 years because of a strike in the printing trade. The dispute arose when the 
local branch of the Irish Master Printers’ Association refused to apply retrospectively to 1 July 
a national agreement granting 64s. for a forty-eight-hour week – an additional 8s. for those 
engaged in tri-weekly newspapers. Another 8s. was awarded to linotype operators, giving them 
80s. Local employers argued that an increase was not warranted because they had given one of 
2s. 6d. in July, giving compositors and bookbinders 60s. The strike ended when the employers 
conceded the printers’ claim.82 By late 1920, local printing wages were the second highest in 
Ulster.  
 
Table 4. 3: Printing Trade Wages in Ulster, 192083 
Locality Jobbing, weekly news 
& bi-weekly news 
Evening news Morning & tri-
weekly news 
Belfast 93s. 6d. 96s. 105s. 
Derry 81s. 6d. 84s. 89s. 6d. 
Newry 76s. 78s. 84s. 
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Antrim, Letterkenny 73s. 6d. 76s. 81s. 6d. 
Armagh, Portadown 71s. 73s. 6d. 79s. 
Strabane 68s. 6d. 71s. 76s. 6d. 
Source: Standard time rates of wages and hours of labour in the United Kingdom at 31st December, 1920, p. 123. 
Although Irish Labour was agitating with unprecedented fervour in early 1920, it was 
not until that March that another strike took place in Derry. In Britain, the iron moulders had 
been on strike for an extra 15s. since September 1919. It soon spread to parts of Ireland where 
foundries were major employers (like Wexford and Belfast). While only fifteen foundry 
labourers in Derry partook, the stoppage had serious implications for the local economy. By 
10 October 1919, the Derry foundry had suspended all its employees and over 1,000 men were 
made idle. The shipyard was hit particularly hard. British foundrymen were financially 
supported by their colleagues in Derry and by the city’s dockers and carters. The strike ended 
on 26 January 1920 when the men accepted a 5s. increase. It involved 50,000 men directly and 
threw a further 25,000 out of work, making it one Britain’s biggest ever strikes.84 The wages 
movement continued unabated and peaked in June, the era’s most socially and politically 
disturbed month in Derry. Some of the wages and increases sought and secured were 
impressive by any standard. For example, the National Union of Clerks secured average 
advances of 30-35s. at the shipyard, resulting in a pay scale that began at 75s. and finished at 
142s. 6d.85 Builders’ labourers struck from 10-15 May for a 70s. 6d. wage (from 47s.) and won 
a 54s. 10d. rate via arbitration. Two months later, building tradesmen’s wages were 
standardised with their final increase for four years. Their ‘country money’ was also increased 
to 24s. and apprentices’ pay was upped by 25 per cent.86 The improvement made them the 
second-best paid building workers in Ulster. 
   
Table 4. 4: Building Trade Wages (in pence) & Hours in Ulster, 1920 
Locality B M C&J S Plmbr Plstr Pntr L Hrs 
Armagh 24 24 - - - - 21 - 49 
Belfast 29 29 29 29 26.5625 29 - 16 44 
Derry 25½ 25½ 25½ 25½ 25½ 25½ 25½ 14 47 
Portadown 24 - 23 24 - 24 21 10 & 
11 
49 
Source: Standard time rates of wages and hours of labour in the United Kingdom at 31st December, 1920, p. 9. 
 
Wage demands remained the primary incentive for direct action. From 3-17 May, the 
bakeries were hit by another strike. The Bakers’ Union wanted rates of 82s. 6d. for bakers and 
confectioners (from 62s. 6d.), 65s. for servers (from 45s.), 60s. for packers (from 45s.) and 
labourers (from 40s.). Wages in the Derry bakeries were poor when compared to Belfast where 
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bakers and confectioners earned 80s. and servers 70s. The stoppage led to a bread famine across 
the north-west as bakeries in Derry had agencies in Donegal. The workers insisted that all bread 
be baked by union labour, i.e., journeymen and not foremen assisted by employers’ sons. Bread 
on its way to the workhouse, Nazareth House and Victoria High School was seized and 
presented to charitable institutions. The local infirmary had to discharge many of its patients 
and workhouse inmates had to subsist on biscuits alone. In total, about 50,000 were affected. 
The strike even reached the House of Commons when Thompson Donald, a UULA MP for 
Belfast Victoria, asked whether the government intended to intervene. It did. Ministry of 
Labour arbitration issued lesser increases and concessions (see Appendix 5).87 Shortly 
afterwards, a more important strike began – the era’s most consequential stoppage in Derry.  
 
The 1920 shirt cutters’ strike 
As well as arbitration, the British Government responded to class conflict by expanding the 
number of trade boards. Between 1919 and 1920, fifteen new boards were set up for Ireland. 
There were nineteen by August 1920, covering 148,000 workers, the bulk of them in Ulster’s 
textile and clothing industries.88 Their role was to resolve disputes by providing a conciliatory 
means by which man and master could meet in a spirit of mutual co-operation. They frequently 
failed to achieve this limited function. On 12 June 1920, 286 cutters and apprentices struck for 
a rise of 15s. for the former and 7s. 6d. for the latter when Irish employers failed to pass on a 
1d. per hour increase granted to British shirt workers on 5 May. Irish cutters earned 1s. 5d. an 
hour, as set by the trade board the previous September, 2d. less than their British colleagues. 
The wage differential had finally come to a head.89 The ASTT had accepted the discrepancy 
but the United Garment Workers’ Union (UGW) did not. The UGW had unionised the cutters 
since 1919 when it subsumed the Shirt and Collar Cutters’ Union of Ireland. By mid-1920, 
200-300 cutters were members of it.90 
 On 17 June, the Derry trades council elected to open negotiations with the SMF to bring 
the dispute to an end. Its confidence was well-placed as two firms had agreed to pay the 
increase. But appearances were deceptive: the employers were out for blood. They claimed that 
as the dispute was not a local one – with Coleraine, Lisburn, Belfast, Dublin and other Irish 
centres affected – any settlement would have to be national.91 There was another reason for 
their intransigence: the long-expected employer counterattack, which started earlier in Derry 
than in most other Irish cities. The strike, with its luckless timing, covered the beginning of the 
post-First World War economic downturn. The cutters expected the profits’ boom of 1919-20 
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to deliver a quick result. The SMF realised they would soon have an abundance of stock and 
took advantage of the situation. Negotiations broke down after the employers’ offer of a 1d. an 
hour increase was rejected. Consequently, the SMF decreed a general lockout on 17 July. 
Between 5,000 and 8,000 women were thrown out of work and £10-14,000 in unpaid wages 
was being lost.92 Arbitration under the Ministry of Labour failed to deliver a resolution. The 
Parliamentary Committee of the Trades Union Congress in London also endeavoured to bring 
about an arbitrated settlement, but progress was slow and subsequent weeks of negotiations 
produced little.93  
Most of the women were members of the ASTT, whose ‘Factory Branch’ had 3,352 
members in Derry by the end of 1919. Its general secretary, T.A. Flynn, went to Derry to 
resolve the crisis. Flynn was scathing about the UGW and was highly aggrieved by the position 
in which his union had been placed. On 2 August, he told the Journal that many firms had 
diverted work to England where UGW members were working overtime. ‘Veritas’, who 
reported the allegation, added that the strike had been precipitated for political reasons. He 
believed it was a plot to destroy Irish industry, claims that were also made by the Sentinel and 
the trades council.94 A war of words that reflected the intra-Labour tensions began. In the 
Journal’s next issue, the strikers’ spokesman responded to Flynn. The ‘rumour’ that the UGW 
was doing Derry work in England was, in his words, an employer-led attempt to divide the 
workers; by propagating it, Flynn was supporting the SMF and doing its dirty work. The 
spokesman urged the women to join the UGW who would pay them 10s. a week out-of-work 
benefit. He denied the allegation that the UGW had previously refused to accept women as 
members. The Garment Workers, he claimed, brought an organiser to Derry to recruit women 
but efforts had been frustrated ‘because of the lying propaganda of people afraid of losing their 
grip on the girls’.95  
The factory girls were ripe for poaching as they were extremely unhappy with the 
ASTT’s lack of financial support. In an industry where strikes seldom lasted for more than a 
few days, Flynn concluded that his union could not afford the expense after issuing only two 
weeks’ strike pay – a paltry 8s. a week. Instead, it granted £1,250 to the distress fund and raised 
another £1,800 from its British branches. It was a meagre offer given the UGW’s £2,000 
contribution and what was being lost in wages. On 4 August, anger boiled over when hundreds 
of women besieged the ASTT’s offices to demand strike pay. When no aid was forthcoming, 
some marched in procession to the shipyard shouting, ‘up the rebels’, ‘up Dublin’ and ‘down 
with the shipyard’.96 At this point, rumours that the girls were being impelled to join the UGW 
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provoked an intervention from Peadar O’Donnell. While praising the ‘stand’ taken by the 
cutters, he criticised the UGW for deceiving the women about British unions and urged them 
to join his union instead. He believed that the women were ‘fed up with cross-channel unions’ 
and expressed contempt at the English cutters’ lack of support. He also attacked the trades 
council for its lack of solidarity with the women.97  
By now, the SMF had become more amenable to the Ministry of Labour’s continuous 
attempts at arbitration. O'Donnell's allegation that English cutters did not support their Derry 
comrades was rejected by a UGW spokesman who argued that the Englishmen had no reason 
to strike. He averred that the cutters did not expect the women to be made idle by the strike and 
wrote that a ‘large number of women’ had told him that they had wanted to strike in sympathy 
but that their union had ‘barred their way’. However, he agreed with O'Donnell that the trades 
council had done little to support the operatives but added that it had done little more to support 
the cutters.98 After O'Donnell's public excoriation of it, the trades council began to help the 
beleaguered women. Logue announced that it had joined public efforts to raise money for them. 
The committee established to administer the fund included Logue; McCafferty; Charles 
McGrellis, local secretary of the UGW; and ‘Mrs. Burke’ from the Unionist Waterside. The 
ASTT was not represented.99 The committee placed adverts in the local press and generated a 
handsome response.100 The strike had soured relations between the UGW and the trades 
council, as the ASTT noted: 
 
The shirt cutters (Garment Workers' Society) in the North of Ireland and Dublin came out on 
strike for an increase of 15s. per week. As Londonderry is the head and centre of the shirt 
industry in Ireland, the effects of this action at once became a matter of vital consideration. A 
special meeting of the Trades Council was held, at which the Executive of the Trades Council 
was instructed to take immediate action, with the object of referring the whole dispute to 
arbitration. . . They were . . . influenced by the fact that . . . the Board of Trade had already 
taken an active interest in the dispute, several meetings under an independent chairman having 
been held without result . . . A further curious fact was strongly emphasised at the Trades 
Council. Shirtmaking firms in Londonderry employing two-thirds of the workers had also 
factories in England and Scotland, and while the Londonderry workers were encouraged to 
strike, no dispute was allowed in the factories outside Ireland. This action was strongly 
condemned by members of the Trades Council, who stated that those behind the strike were not 
animated by a desire to increase wages, but were endeavouring to seriously destroy a native 
Irish industry which by sheer merit of the productions had won a foremost place in the world's 
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markets. Serious disturbances in the city, and its occupation by the military, hindered the Trades 
Council in its contemplated action. The strike was now entering upon its tenth week, and up to 
the present there is no evidence that those who engineered it have any real desire to promote a 
settlement . . . It is beyond doubt, and is, in fact, not disputed, that strike trade has been made 
on this side of the Channel, during the ten weeks which, up to the present, the dispute has lasted. 
The Londonderry Trades Council were very emphatic on this point that it was a deliberate 
attempt to strangle a native Irish industry in favour of English factory workers.101  
          
The trades council’s relief fund frightened the Unionist establishment which regarded 
it as a Trojan horse to induce the women to join the ITGWU. On 16 August, the UULA 
published the first public statement on the strike of any Unionist body:  
 
Unionist Labour Association, City of Derry Branch. Members of this association and all 
Protestant workers are earnestly requested to refuse to have anything to do with the ITGWU. It 
preaches republicanism and is used for political purposes. We strongly urge all Unionist 
workers to get into and remain in their respective amalgamated unions. The attention of female 
factory workers is specially directed to this matter. We also beg to announce that a fund for the 
relief of factory workers has been established; that collectors will be out with books bearing the 
stamp of the Unionist Association and we earnestly appeal to our fellow citizens to respond 
generously. (By order).102 
 
It was a direct response to O’Donnell (who was negotiating with employers) and the trades 
council. The ‘mandarins’ of ‘the harmless trades council’, ‘the mercenary cross-channel 
Unions’ and the UULA were all of one mind when it came to the ITGWU wrote Cathal 
O’Shannon, editor of the Watchword of Labour.103 The UULA’s open sectarianism was 
succeeding as the strike became even more embroiled in Derry’s political war. The trades 
council responded by describing the UULA’s intervention as an attempt to divide the workers. 
A spokesman proclaimed that the relief fund had been distributed to anyone who needed it 
irrespective of religion and asked the UULA to co-operate. The Journal agreed with him; the 
Sentinel did not:  
 
It is impertinent of the Derry Journal to deny the right of the UULA to issue an appeal on behalf 
of Protestant workers or describe it as 'an attempt to arouse sectarian animosities' . . . but for 
Councillor Logue there would be no need for a UULA. It was from his ruling as chairman of 
the Trades Council that the ULA sprang. He ruled against discussion of the Londonderry 
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Improvement Bill on the grounds that it was political. Yet he also ruled that conscription could 
be discussed as not being political. After inconsistencies like this is it any wonder that Unionist 
trade unionists should lose faith in the Trades Council.104 
 
The Sentinel condemned the ITGWU as a ‘purely republican organisation’ and commended 
the UULA’s relief fund. It denounced the trades council’s fund as a ploy to get Unionists into 
the ITGWU. Indeed, its next issue published a letter from a ‘factory worker’ which claimed it 
was nationalist workers and the trades council that introduced sectarianism:  
 
The first to introduce religion and politics were the Catholic factory girls themselves. When I 
went down to the Guildhall last week to get my share of relief, the Catholic girls wanted to 
know what Protestants were coming there ‘looking for Catholic benefit for’ and they kept 
continually shouting ‘up the rebels’ and ‘up Dublin’. The committee say they have distributed 
the money irrespective of creed and politics, but I know cases of families where there are two 
girls in each belonging to the Tailoresses' Society and only six shillings was given to each 
family.105   
 
Allegations like this were part of the wider propaganda battle waged by Unionists against 
nationalists. It was reprinted in a leaflet distributed among Belfast Protestants looking for 
contributions for their co-religionists in Derry.106  
On 19 August, the strike finally ended after a compromise gave the cutters an hourly 
increase of 1½d. By 23 August, all shirt factories had reopened.107 The Derry UULA had a role 
in terminating the strike via its chairman, Anderson. The cutters were disappointed at not 
having achieved parity with Britain – and O’Donnell sought to take advantage. On 26 August, 
at a ‘very large’ meeting of the ITGWU’s Derry Branch at the Guildhall, he congratulated the 
cutters and appealed to all shirt workers to join the ITGWU. He attacked the UGW’s English 
membership for working throughout the Derry strike and for contributing little to strike funds, 
claiming that only Irish workers in Glasgow had donated generously. While he considered the 
strike to be ‘inopportune’, he claimed that his presence at the negotiating table had secured the 
cutters ‘a few extra bob’. Never one to mince his words, O’Donnell announced that his 
intention was ‘not to smash the cross-Channel Unions catering for the girls, but to smash every 
cross-Channel Union in Derry’. His bellicosity struck a chord as ‘several hundred women’ 
joined the ITGWU.108 O’Donnell later claimed that they had joined on a ‘sectarian or 
nationalistic basis’.109  
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From its new offices on William Street, the Transport Union had come out of the strike 
with an enhanced popularity. The political and economic tumult provided grounds for its 
popularity and the girls began joining it even before they were locked out. On 14 July, Liberty 
Hall sent £51 to ‘Derry tailoresses’, £73. 10s a fortnight later and £48. 10s. a fortnight after 
that.110 The ASTT was the strike’s biggest casualty. Its unwillingness to support the girls led 
to an exodus from it: membership of its ‘Factory Branch’ plummeted from over 3,300 to 200. 
Most joined the UGW, which emerged triumphant and gained up to 3,000 women.111 In late 
August, the Journal advertised a meeting of the shirt and collar cutters’ section of a new union: 
the ‘Amalgamated Tailors’ and Garment Workers’ Union’, a provisional name for an industrial 
union that would become the National Union of Tailors and Garment Workers (NUTGW) later 
that year. The ASTT viewed the new union as a major threat to its existence.112  
During the strike, the carters and dockers blacked the transportation of goods to and 
from implicated companies and backed the Protestant cutters to the end. These Catholic 
nationalists stood shoulder-to-shoulder with their Unionist fellow workers which left a deep 
impression on the cutters. The NUDL also provided financial support to the women.113 But 
such action was borne out of economic necessity rather than class consciousness. Derry’s 
economy contained many ‘mixed’ workforces, and with such integration solidarity was not 
only the norm but an operational necessity. On the LLSR, Protestants stood shoulder-to-
shoulder with Catholics dismissed because of their participation in the munitions embargo (see 
Chapter 8). On the GNR, Catholics expressed their solidarity with their Protestant colleagues 
by not joining the protest.114  
Charles Desmond Greaves portrayed the cutters’ strike as the moment when the 
Protestant working class was there to be won to socialist republicanism, only for ‘reactionaries’ 
to play the Orange Card:  
 
the Unionist position was being . . . rapidly eroded. When a shirt-cutters’ strike took place in 
Derry and the leadership proved ineffective the workers turned to Peadar O'Donnell. 
Sectarianism was at an ebb and Labour morale was at its highest since 1907 . . . at this point 
the reactionaries took alarm. . . Within a few days sectarian riots turned the city of Derry into a 
shambles.115 
 
As Andrew Finlay has demonstrated, this is incorrect. The strike occurred in the context of 
inter-communal bloodshed. Following the election of a nationalist Corporation in January and 
the political prisoners’ strike in April (see Chapter 8), violence began and continued throughout 
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the summer. Sectarianism was at an all-time high, not at an ebb. Apart from the ITGWU, 
support for the strike was lukewarm, at least until the lockout was initiated. The trades council’s 
interpretation of the strike as an attempt to destroy an indigenous Irish industry alienated the 
cutters. Insofar as they did ‘turn to’ O’Donnell – and it is doubtful whether they did – it was 
because he had ‘friendly contacts with one or two shirt manufacturers’ that he could use to his 
advantage as a negotiator. Though some Unionist cutters and packers did not come out for 
political reasons, the strikers were motivated by economic grievances and not politics. If 
O’Donnell was approached, it was despite his political views, not because of them.116   
 
Class conflict after the cutters’ strike 
The shipyard remained a major centre of class conflict. On 10 September, the plumbers and 
their labourers there struck for parity with their building trade colleagues. Three days later, the 
heater boys came out for an extra 3s. in the pound of the riveters’ wages, which immediately 
made the latter group idle. The employment of two Belfast fitters caused several in the same 
department to walk off the job. When Clarke paid the two men off, the others resumed work.117  
The next month, the ITGWU brought out its members at the Picture Palace to protest 
the refusal of the company’s electrician to leave the ETU and join it. Seven staff members 
scabbed. Work was resumed when the issue was sent to the ITUC for adjudication.118 That 
month, after protracted negotiations between the INTO and the British Government, Irish 
primary school teachers obtained a higher scale of salaries. Men were given an initial annual 
salary of £170, rising by yearly increments to £370; women were given an initial salary of 
£155, rising to £300. Principals now had £155 to begin with and would receive £255 after 
annual raises, while junior assistant mistresses were to receive £110 at first, eventually rising 
to £150.119 Taking inspiration, the ASTI put forth its own demands for greater salaries.120   
In mid-November, another dispute in the baking trade erupted. The issue was the 
employment of three nons in a firm. When employers refused the Irish Bakers’ Union’s demand 
that the men be compelled to join it, strike was declared. The Master Bakers’ Association 
responded by serving notice that a lockout would be in effect from 20 November. In response, 
the union put claims for wage improvements, a forty-four-hour week and an annual seven-day 
holiday.121 On 19 November, an agreement was reached. The nons agreed to join the union and 
the claims were put to Ministry of Labour, which gave its verdict on 6 December.122 Wages 
were now 82s. for bakers, 52s. 6d. to 57s. 6d for packers, and 47s. 6d. to 57s. 6d for labourers. 
Jobbers now earned 14s. a day.123 The bakeries were in near constant state of industrial conflict, 
more so than most other trades. Before the strike was called, some breadservers sued their 
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employers for arrears of wages. The case was dismissed.124 Local bakers’ wages compared well 
with other Irish centres, as Table 4. 5 outlines. 
 
 
Table 4. 5: Irish Bakers’ Wages, 1920 
Locality Forehands Singlehands Tablehands 
Cork 88s. - 84s. 
Belfast - 90s. (day work), 
96s. (night work) 
- 
Derry - - 82s. 
Drogheda - - 74s. 
Dublin - - 94s. 
Kilkenny - - 68s. 
Limerick - - 80s. 
Newry - - 75s. 6d. 
Waterford - - 95s. 
Source: Standard time rates of wages and hours of labour in the United Kingdom at 31st December, 1920, p. 161. 
 
First Watt’s distilleries strike 
November brought one of the greatest labour disputes that Derry experienced in this era – a 
strike at Watt’s distilleries. On the surface it resembled a typical industrial dispute, but its 
timing was important as it coincided with the slump. By late 1920, the NAUL believed its 
adroit ability as a negotiator had secured a standard of living for Derry’s workers that was as 
good if not better than anywhere else in Ireland. In September (as it had done the previous 
May), the union pressed for a 15s. raise at Watt’s; the company offered only 2s.125 By now, the 
UK economy had fallen into deep recession and the employers were looking to cut wages and 
extend hours.126 In return for the increase, Watt’s wanted to revert to the pre-1914 fifty-six-
hour week, which would add nine hours to a distillery worker’s week. The NAUL rejected this 
and served strike notice for 23 November, but the company beat them to it and locked out 200 
workers on 22 November. About 300 men were employed at Watt’s and many in the ancillary 
trades – coopers, carters, pork curers, smithies, farm labourers – were affected as they depended 
on the distilleries. The lockout also left 300 shipyardmen without work.127  
 By late 1919, the NAUL had appeared to consolidate its position as Derry’s most 
popular general union. It had three city branches: one for the factories, one for the shipyard and 
one for general labourers. By November 1920, however, its dominance was being challenged. 
The ITGWU had gained a strong foothold in the distilleries and was anxious to expand after 
the cutters’ strike. According to Anton McCabe, its membership was 350 in mid-1920, a figure 
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that is surely far too high. Dublin Castle, which kept a close eye on the ‘extreme’ and ‘frankly 
Bolshevist’ ITGWU, estimated its membership in Derry at only twenty-five in April 1920. This 
figure remained static until August when the fallout from the cutters’ strike caused its 
membership to jump to 185 members (see Table 5. 1). Its ascension in Derry alarmed the 
authorities. They had predicted that the Transport Union would never take off as it ‘practically 
represents the Labour side of Sinn Féin and for this reason does not commend itself to the 
Ulster people’. But in September, the union ‘made an individual canvass throughout all centres 
of industry’ in Derry which paid off as it acquired 160 new members. By then, it had recruited 
flourmill workers (including Protestants from the Waterside), distillerymen, dockers and 
shipyard labourers.128  
The ITGWU was now the union of choice for most Derry distillerymen.129 At Watt’s, 
inter-union relations between the NAUL and the ITGWU took a nosedive when the latter 
refused to bring its members out on strike. O’Donnell explained that it could not do so as it 
was mandated by the ITUC to not engage in any sectional wages movement during the 
munitions embargo.130 But the embargo was not the primary motivator for O’Donnell. He 
considered the railway protest to be a vindication of a supreme moral principle: Ireland’s 
struggle against British imperialism and a means through which the national war could be 
turned into a class war. If transport was brought to a complete halt, then organised Labour 
should step in and create a food distribution network to keep essential supplies moving, putting 
the revolution in the hands of people in the process, as it had planned to do during the general 
strike the previous April. The ITGWU had become the victim of its own ideology. It found 
itself caught between the wars it fought for nation and class. The NAUL, on the other hand, 
was not affiliated to the ITUC. Like the trades council it dominated, it was Labour-nationalist 
rather than republican-socialist. The employers cared little about inter-union spats and seized 
the opportunity to lock out both.131  
Relations between the two unions had long been poor. The previous June, Michael 
McNaught presided over a meeting of the NAUL’s distillery (no. 112) branch which 
unanimously passed the following resolution: ‘that in the event of any of the section seceding 
from NAUL and joining the Irish Transport Workers’ Union, that NAUL members would take 
drastic action in dealing with such members’.132 McNaught, who was an undermanager at the 
Bogside distillery, wrote to the Journal and made some extraordinary allegations. He claimed 
that the ITGWU had put in a wage demand like the NAUL’s, only to rescind it when a 
Transport Union delegation met the distilleries’ management and agreed to scab on the NAUL. 
He further accused O’Donnell of poaching members from his union. O’Donnell refuted any 
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suggestion that the ITGWU had engaged in poaching or scabbing and reiterated the 
inseparability of the industrial and national struggles in Ireland. Furthermore, he attacked the 
trades council for conspiring to deport him from Derry and accused it of trying to discredit him. 
But before the situation escalated, a settlement was reached after a two-day conference in 
Belfast. The NAUL, which had reduced its claim to 7s., accepted the company’s offer of 3s.133  
Although the lockout lasted less than a week, it had important consequences. Rapport 
between the NAUL and the ITGWU had been further damaged, making the possibility of a 
unified working class, even among nationalists, more unlikely. The clash between the two 
unions was symbolic of the divisions that had emerged in Derry Labour since 1917: syndicalist 
unions vs. non-syndicalist unions; Irish unions vs. British unions; and republican unions vs. 
apolitical unions. Moreover, it vividly revealed the contradictions between national and 
working-class interests and how the ITGWU struggled to reconcile the two, especially in the 
north of Ireland. Nowhere were these conundrums more apparent than in Derry. Here, 
conservative Labour leaders attached to British unions grappled with revolutionary changes, 
both political and in union organisation, in a peripheral, predominately nationalist city with a 
large Unionist minority. Consequently, while the unions had procured wages and hours that 
compared well to the rest of Ulster, and in some cases to the rest of Ireland, the forces of 
reaction were well-placed to counterattack. 
 
Table 4. 6: Clerical Salaries at Watt’s Distilleries, 1916-25 
Date Monthly Salary 
May 1916-Apr. 1919 15s. 40s. £10 £16 13s. 4d. £41 13s. 4d. 
May-Oct. 1919 £11 13s. 4d. £16 13s. 4d. £41 13s. 4d. 
Nov. 1919 £11 13s. 4d. £16 13s. 4d. £58 6s. 8d. 
Dec. 1919-Apr. 1921 £12 10s. £20 £58 6s. 8d. 
































Source: Salaries Book, 1916-34, D1506/1/8/1, Watt & Co. Papers, PRONI. 
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Class Conflict in Derry, 1921-24 
 
As the economic slump deepened in the early months of 1921, the nature of industrial relations 
changed. Boardroom militancy put workers on the defensive. Unlike those in the south, 
northern employers felt confident enough to embark on the counteroffensive. The softening of 
the class war in the first four months of 1921 provided an illusion of harmony as the Derry 
Employers’ Federation prepared itself for the inevitable backlash. Labour had expected a 
counterassault for some time and pledged stout resistance to any return to pre-1914 wages and 
conditions. The ITGWU was keen to present itself as the steadfast alternative to the crumbling 
amalgamateds. There was some foundation for the propaganda. On 15 April 1921, Britain’s 
‘Triple Alliance’ of the Miners’ Federation, the NUR and the National Transport Workers’ 
Federation collapsed when the latter two refused to strike in support of wage cuts in the mines. 
A general assault on British wages was the outcome.1 The day is mourned in Labour lore as 
‘Black Friday’. It demonstrated the extent to which bureaucratic, non-revolutionary industrial 
unionism had tamed British syndicalism.2 Black Friday inspired employers across Britain and 
Ireland to strike while the iron was hot. In April, the Derry Chamber of Commerce held a 
special meeting to discuss wages and its president declared:  
 
The year 1920 was remarkable for the unprecedented depression in trade and commerce which 
set in with great suddenness which set in during the autumn and affected nearly every 
commercial interest. It was not too much to say that on the outcome of the present miners’ 
dispute hung the prosperity of all classes in the future. The great reduction of wages and 
increased working hours in other countries had placed British goods in a serious position in the 
world’s market and unless cheaper labour could be obtained the outlook was black . . . it was 
to be hoped that Labour would realise the impossibility of maintaining the high wages brought 
about by war conditions, and the refusal of the Triple Alliance to support the miners was a 
favourable sign.3 
 
It was statement of intent – a sign of things to come. The next three years were characterised 




The growth of the One Big Union 
On 1 July 1918, the ITGWU outlined its commitment to syndicalism by publishing The Lines 
of Progress, a pamphlet intended ‘to advance Connolly’s OBU idea’ by arguing that all workers 
be in one union, organised into industrial sections. It declared that political and economic 
freedom could only by achieved in this way and not through political parties.4 The growth of 
the ITGWU’s Derry branch reflects this national aspiration. By April 1921, it had sections for 
municipal employees, shipbuilding and engineering workers, builders’ labourers, bottlers, 
distillery workers and women/girls. The women’s section celebrated May Day 1921 in style 
with a successful concert at the Guildhall where Irish music was played and the ‘Internationale’ 
and the ‘Red Flag’ were belted out. The guest of honour was Belfast trade unionist James Baird, 
a former boilermaker at Harland & Wolff and one of the ‘rotten Prod’ who had been expelled 
from the shipyards for their republican and/or Labour sympathies. At another Guildhall 
meeting a month later, Charles Ridgeway, a Belfast Protestant who had replaced O’Donnell in 
late 1920, claimed that the union was now the biggest in the shirt industry. That meeting also 
closed with a boisterous rendition of the Red Flag.5 The ITGWU also provided a social outlet 
for its members. In June 1921, in the syndicalist spirit of creating a proletarian counterculture, 
the branch organised a picnic in Buncrana for its shirt operatives. Three months later it hosted 
a three-day social and sports carnival in the Brandywell. By then, its membership had peaked 
at 315.6  
 
Table 5. 1: Membership of the ITGWU Derry branch, 1920-21 
Date Membership 
Apr.-July 1920 25 
Aug. 1920 185 
Sept. 1920 208 
Oct. 1920-Mar. 1921 227 
Apr.-June 1921 234 
July-Oct. 1921 315 
Source: RIC, Crime Dept., Special Branch reports on the ITGWU, Apr. 1920-Oct. 1921, CO 904/185/5, Colonial 










The second Watt’s strike 
The ITGWU’s confidence was displayed most vividly at Watt’s Distilleries. On 3 June, it 
brought out its members there against a 3s. cut and the company’s refusal to recognise it. The 
ITGWU had 130 members at Watt’s to the NAUL’s forty. But the company chose to discuss 
the reduction with the NAUL solely, which enraged the ITGWU. The NAUL accepted the 
reduction because, it claimed, the distillery’s closure was the alternative. In a replay of 
November’s events but with a reversal of roles, the NAUL remained at work and was accused 
of scabbing by the ITGWU. Once again, Watt’s took a hard-line and locked out the ITGWU. 
Union recognition was the real issue of contention for the Transport Union.7 The RIC estimated 
that about 200 men were thrown out of work and Ministry of Labour thought the figure to be 
150.8  
Another inter-union war of words began in the Journal. On 8 June, Logue expressed 
his conciliatory approach to the situation. He argued that in the prevailing economic 
environment further unemployment should be avoided by accepting the reduction, if the forty-
seven-hour week remained. He also reminded the ITGWU of its failure to support the NAUL’s 
strike in November. In a subsequent letter, Logue demonstrated his conservatism by stating 
that he was not opposed to wage reductions in principle, only ‘unreasonable reductions’. His 
attachment to British Labour was evidenced by his citation of the British miners’ and textile 
workers’ recent acceptance of decreases. Ridgeway replied by stressing the ITGWU’s 
numerical superiority and contended that the NAUL must abide by the majority decision to 
strike. In response, McNaught stated that the NAUL had the majority in United Distillers’, a 
syndicate that included the Derry and Belfast distilleries.9 The bad blood between the two was 
palpable. 
 Like the first strike, political events were overshadowing what was happening in Derry. 
In November, partition had still been a prospect; now it was a reality. On 7 June 1921, during 
the first week of the lockout, James Craig, leader of the Ulster Unionist Party, became Prime 
Minister of Northern Ireland after the 24 May general election returned forty Unionists to six 
Sinn Féiners and six nationalists.10 The fallout ensured that Ulster’s sectarian tensions, which 
had deepened considerably since partition, seeped into the Watt’s dispute. The ominous 
appearance of armed B-Specials (see Chapter 9) for the first time in a strike in Derry was a 
tangible example of this. They oversaw the passage of yeast coming from the Bogside distillery 
being held up by pickets. The yeast carter could safely pass through the ITGWU’s pickets 
because the strikers were ‘concentrating their energies on the few remaining men at work’. The 
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police also intervened when ITGWU and NAUL men physically fought outside the distillery 
premises after the latter were accused blacklegging. The pickets created a ‘situation full of 
alarming possibilities’ when dockers temporarily refused to handle goods from Watt’s. On 9 
June, the employers threatened to permanently close the distilleries unless the men returned to 
work.11 But the strikers’ resolve was hardening. They were infuriated to discover that the 
clerical staff had been scabbing. Clerks were mobbed and had to be escorted to their homes by 
the police. Warnings were given to some clerks with the chalking of their names on a distillery 
wall. Intimidated, they slept in the distillery to avoid further confrontation.12  
But the NAUL was up for a fight too. On 10 June, Logue, McNaught and Sam Bradley, 
its Irish organiser, attended a meeting of the NAUL’s executive council. It was agreed that the 
ITGWU’s ‘acts of violence to coerce our members to retrograde action on the wages question’ 
justified financial assistance from the General Federation of Trade Unions. Seventy-six NAUL 
members in Derry were affected. The animosity between the two unions continued in the 
Journal but became noticeably sectarian in tone. This is evidenced by the contributions of 
‘Derryman’, who believed that the strike was a plot concocted by both unions to move 
employment from Derry to Belfast. He snidely remarked that Ridgway ‘comes from Belfast to 
preach to the workers of Derry the new religion of Liberty Hall’ and that ‘it would be unsafe 
to even attempt a discussion with a Protestant from Belfast’. Ridgeway responded by claiming 
that McNaught was responsible for two of three occasions he was denounced as a ‘Belfast 
Orangeman’.13 McNaught accused the ITGWU of ‘ruining labour in Derry by splitting it up on 
religious and political grounds’. The NAUL, he asserted, had won a 260 per cent wage increase 
and a nine-hour lessening of the week since 1914. He charged O’Donnell with coming to Derry 
‘not to make peace between two contending parties, but rather to drive an everlasting wedge 
between them’ when ‘political and sectarian feeling was at its height’.14 It was fitting that 
McNaught mentioned O’Donnell, who regarded Watt’s threat of closure as an example of 
capitalism’s war on the Irish national struggle: 
 
It is said that an effort should be made to keep the distillery going. No industry has a right to 
exist if it can’t pay a living wage. Let the threat of a close down once intimidate the workers to 
withdraw a demand intelligently decided on and the working-class organisations shall cease to 
serve any purpose . . . But the Irish workers are up against the struggle of their lives. The Irish 
nation is up against the necessity to scrap old standards and get a sense of real values . . . 
Industries shall be shut down in Derry; Donegal is blockaded. Ireland may be blockaded. What 
are we to do? Beat the blockade. It’s easy. Machinery to control the food produced in the 
160 
 
country must be summoned into being at once. Money, and money standards, must end for a 
big section, perhaps ultimately for all.15 
 
The strike and the sentiments expressed by Ridgeway and O’Donnell were popular. 
O’Donnell was very cordially received when the strike committee brought 1,000 people on a 
walk to An Grianán Aileach for a day of ‘health, pleasure and education’ with reels, games and 
lectures. The ‘Red Flag’ and the ‘Internationale’ were again sung to conclude the occasion. 
The truce between the IRA and the British Government meant that O’Donnell could appear in 
public for the first time since 1920 without fear of arrest or worse.16 Despite the militant talk, 
the ITGWU was pragmatic at heart. With the NAUL, it entered negotiations with Mayor 
O’Doherty to arrange a conference with Watt’s in early July. Two weeks later, the dispute was 
settled by mayoral arbitration. It was a technical victory for the ITGWU. While no strikers 
were victimised, they were re-employed on old wages for one week and then forced to accept 
the 3s. cut, much to the NAUL’s annoyance. Moreover, Watt’s did not employ all its previous 
workforce. Work at the distillery resumed on 28 July.17  
The distillery disputes put a heavy financial toll on both unions. The NAUL’s 
headquarters sent £306 10s. to Derry in 1921, considerably less than the £536 7s. 6d. it sent the 
year before. The branch’s membership also decreased from 508 in 1920 to 365 in 1921. Eighty-
one distillery workers joined the ITGWU during the second dispute.18 In total, Derry’s distillery 
workers cost the ITGWU £214. 5s. In 1921, Liberty Hall remitted £638 17s. 5d. to the Derry 
branch, one third of which was directed to their members at Watt’s, the highest yearly sum 
given to the Derry branch during its existence.19 The strikes heralded the demise of the once 
mighty NAUL.  
Talk of the distilleries’ closure, which the NAUL had taken seriously, was well-
grounded. Production at Watt’s halted in October 1921, from which point the distilleries 
primarily manufactured yeast. About 200 men were laid off. The last of the whiskey stock was 
sold in 1925, ending any hope of a re-opening. The United Distillers’ Company Ltd. decided 
to concentrate its Irish production in Belfast.20 The closure of the distilleries devastated Derry’s 
economy and made the city even more dependent on its shirt industry. As a major employer of 
male labour, the distilleries had helped balance the structure of employment by acting as an 





It is hard for one so long associated with Derry’s century-old distillery in Abbey Street, to 
reflect upon its present derelict condition, standing there silently aloof, so to speak, in a state of 
sad, solemn dignity. One’s memory sometimes finds it difficult to realise that less than ten years 
ago the place was a busy hive of prosperous industry, affording much-needed male employment 
locally, and holding an honoured place in Derry’s commercial life. At that period anyone would 
have been surely derided who sought to predict that the present state of affairs would have been 
brought about so dramatically in such a remarkably short space of time.21 
 
The counterattack intensifies 
Outside the distilleries, the counterattack was equally destructive. In June, the North of Ireland 
Shipbuilding Co. demanded a 6s. decrease. On 24 September, 350 carters struck when 
employers announced an immediate 3s. reduction on their 60s. wage with a further diminution 
to come into effect in October. Though the employers rejected arbitration, they agreed to a 
conference under the mayor, who had suggested a 2s. reduction. After three days, with the 
assistance of the mayor and Britain’s Ministry of Labour, the dispute was resolved when the 
master carriers agreed to arbitration. On 20 October, the 3s. cut was agreed.22 It was their first 
decrease for many years, as Table 5. 3 illustrates.  
 
Table 5. 2: Wage Increases Received by Carters in Derry, 1915-20. 
Date Increase 
Mar. 1915 2s. 
Dec. 1915 2s. 
Dec. 1916 3s. 
May 1917 3s. 
Nov. 1917 4s. 
May 1918 6s. 
Nov. 1918 4s. 
May 1919 4s. 
Jan. 1920 5s. 
June 1920 7s. 
Total 40s. 
Source: Arbitration between the Londonderry Employers’ Federation and the NUDL, 22 Oct. 1921, LAB 83/2449, 








Labour remained its own worst enemy and was crippled by internal divisions that 
facilitated the counterattack. The hostility of the local Labour establishment to the ITGWU 
remained intense. In September, some shipyard painters, left the Operative Painters’ Society to 
establish a local union. When this body affiliated to the ITGWU, its members were fined and 
blacklisted by the Operative Painters. Against the advice of its Dublin executive, the Transport 
Union began organising Derry’s painters the previous June and established itself in the yard by 
taking over the red-leaders. On 13 September, the red-leaders downed tools when the foreman 
refused to employ an equal number of ITGWU painters. The management also refused to 
recognise the ITGWU and blacklisted the union. Members of the Operative Painters were 
brought in as scabs and worked under police protection. On 24 September, the strike was settled 
when the company recognised the ITGWU. The red-leaders resumed work two days later. 
Some of the scabs, Ulster loyalists, initially refused to work with the ITGWU but most 
eventually accepted their presence.23 This was the high-water mark for the union. In October, 
it exchanged its office on William Street for a more spacious hall – a former factory, at the 
corner of Linenhall Street and Richmond Street.24 
Profiteering remained a chronic social problem and there was cross-class collaboration 
to tackle it. Even the Chamber of Commerce condemned the practice and called on traders to 
reduce their prices. For this, the NUR cordially praised them.25 Before that, at a meeting held 
on 9 September, trade unionists threatened to stop distributing milk for a week unless prices 
were lowered and called on the mayor to hold a public meeting on profiteering. At a second 
meeting held four days later, O’Donnell showed how he had not only alienated trade unionists 
with his radicalism but also those within the national struggle. He told those present that if they 
were serious about combating profiteering ‘they would remain there overnight and go out next 
morning, seize the milk carts, take them around the city, and sell the milk at a fair price’. 
O’Doherty, a nationalist (see Chapter 10), immediately rejected this ‘absurd’ idea, but local 
traders were much less dismissive. The next day, butchers reduced the price of a pound of meat 
and grocers announced that they would also cut their prices with further reductions coming 
later that month.26 Likewise, the Derry Milk Vendors Association caved and cut prices, though 
these were widely criticised as insufficient.27 In response, at a meeting of the Corporation’s 
Public Health Committee, Logue suggested that a system of public municipal dairies to sell 
milk at a reasonable price be instituted. His idea met fierce opposition from the Unionist 
councillor and arch-capitalist John McFarland. A public meeting held against profiteering on 
21 October appears to be all that came of Logue’s efforts.28  
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 That autumn, building tradesmen had their hourly pay decreased by 2½d, with another 
½d. cut from 1 May 1922. The City of Derry Operative Plasterers’ Association struck in vain 
from 1 May to 17 October 1921, as did the joiners from 6 May to 22 July 1921.29 Lower wages 
were not the only malady that workers had to endure. On 10 August, the Journal alleged that 
Catholic railwaymen had been discriminated against by the LLSR as the company took back 
workers. It claimed that less experienced and competent Orangemen had replaced competent, 
experienced Catholics. The LLSR vigorously denied this charge, as did the RCA and the NUR. 
For a month, the Journal’s pages entertained allegations of bigotry and subsequent rebuttals of 
them from the LLSR management.30 But a bigger, more protracted dispute was coming for 
Derry railwaymen, Catholic and Protestant alike.  
 
The railway crisis in Derry 
When the British Government’s control of the Irish railways ended on 15 August 1921, Derry’s 
railway directors were as happy as any in Ireland. Boardroom militancy had not lessened during 
the period of control and the companies were anxious for a return to pre-1916 local bargaining, 
with different companies giving different pay and hours. Nationally, wages had reached 90s. 
for engine drivers, 65s. for guards and 43s. to 60s. for porters. The companies considered the 
forty-eight-hour week too rigid in times of fluctuating demand.31 The LLSR participated in 
Carrigan’s arbitration tribunal, but the GNR did not because it (and the GSWR) negotiated with 
unions under strong duress.32 When the Great Northern tried to lengthen daily working hours 
to ten, it provoked a short-lived strike which included its terminus in Derry.33 The companies 
were to be divided into groups depending on their financial strength and profitability, ranging 
from the strongest in group one to the weakest in group four. The Great Northern was placed 
in group one while the LLSR and the Derry sections of the Northern Counties’ Committee 
(NCC) were put in group three. Carrigan’s proposed scheme effectively abandoned 
standardisation. Although these findings were not the final award of the tribunal, the signs were 
ominous for the unions.34 On 2 December, Derry’s RCA branch met and rejected Carrigan’s 
award and called on its leadership to withdraw from the arbitration process which had gained 
nothing for the men.35 According to Henry Hunt, general manager of the LLSR since 1916, the 
August reduction was only one-third of what was needed. His board undertook to adopt the 
same brash attitude as the GNR.36 Derry, it seemed, would be as impacted by the railway crisis 
as anywhere else. 
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The LLSR’s apprehension was unwarranted. The NUR was willing to accept a 
reduction in return for a guaranteed eight-hour day. On 13 January, the local NUR declared 
their intention to cease work if the Carrigan award was applied. On 3 February, the No. 1 
Branch (representing the Waterside station) met and condemned Carrigan for placing the NCC 
in group three, ensuring that its workers would earn less than other local railwaymen.37 The 
February agreement grouped the larger railways together instead of, as Carrigan had proposed, 
into wealthy and less wealthy classes. Wages were fixed at Carrigan’s original higher wage 
level. Consequently, the NCC men were granted their wish as the settlement brought them into 
group one.38         
 
Table 5. 3: Railway Wages in Derry as Proposed by Carrigan 
 LLSR GNR 
Porters 51s. - 
Parcel porters 54s. - 
Ticket collectors 56s. 46s. 
Shunters 64s. 59s. 
Station foremen 64s. 55s. 
Signalmen 65s. 57s. 
Porters 54s. - 
Carters 51s. 6d. - 
Passenger/goods guards 50-59s. - 
Drivers 66-90s. - 
Firemen 50-63s. - 
Cleaners 24-42s. - 
Platelayers - 43s. 6d. 
Source: DJ, 7, 14 Jan. 1922; Sweeny, ‘The Letterkenny & Burtonport extension railway’, p. 114. 
 
Class conflict outside the railways, 1922 
In December 1921, skilled and unskilled workers in the bakeries had their pay lessened by 7s. 
and 5s. respectively by British Government arbitration. Further cuts would come into effect 
depending on a reduced cost of living.39 But the class war was not the only one that employers 
were waging against workers. The Journal published more allegations of bigotry. In October 
1921, a shirt factory, S.W. Kennedy & Co., had closed for a week, probably because of the 
slump. When it re-opened, the paper claimed, it only re-employed Protestants and forty 
Catholics were replaced.40 The New Year brought the prospect of Derry’s participation in a 
stoppage by Irish dockers against proposals to cut daily pay by 2s. Strike was averted when a 
1s. cut was accepted by the NUDL, which was deeply resented in Derry.41 
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  There was an intensification of class conflict that summer. The carters threatened to go 
on strike over wage reductions but deferred because of the mayoral intervention, who 
persuaded both sides to arbitration. The slump in the world economy was deepening with 
shipbuilding hit particularly hard. On 16 June, the North of Ireland shipyard – which had 
recently experienced an engineers’ strike – closed indefinitely because of an absence of orders. 
Hundreds were made unemployed.42 Proletarian solidarity was vital for avoiding the penury of 
unemployment, even if that solidarity was driven by economic necessity rather than altruism. 
On 28 May, railwaymen on the Lough Swilly left work when four of their colleagues faced 
demotions. After three days of strike, the company agreed not to alter the men’s positions.43  
 September was the most disturbed month of 1922. The longstanding dispute in the 
carrying trade came to a head when employers issued a 5s. reduction. On 28 September, after 
mediation failed to produce a settlement, 250 carters were called out. A prolonged series of 
conferences under John Fawcett Gordon MP, secretary of the Stormont Ministry of Labour and 
a UULA member, ended the strike on 12 October. The carters had won an impressive victory. 
From 19 October, only 1s. was taken from them, making wages 54s.44 Dockers and carters 
were now represented by the Amalgamated Transport and General Workers’ Union (ATGWU). 
The Transport and General Workers’ Union had come into being on 1 January 1922 when 
fourteen unions representing transport workers amalgamated. While the NUDL was not part of 
the initial amalgamation, it joined shortly afterwards. In Ireland, the Transport and General 
Workers’ Union became known as the ATGWU to distinguish it from the ITGWU after the 
latter union took it to court. A fierce rivalry developed between the two.45 Carters were not the 
only workers to eke out minor victories. In December, asylum employees survived an attempt 
to cut pay. Instead, the committee of management fixed annual salaries at £40 for men and £30 
for women excluding allowances. However, in January 1922 it extended the attendants’ 
working week from fifty-six to sixty-three, cut bonuses and sacked staff, actions that violated 
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Table 5. 4: Pre-War and Post-War Annual Wages at the Derry Asylum 
Occupation 1914 Wage 1922 Wage Percentage 
Increase 
Tradesman £63 4s. £228 270 
1st Class Attendant £73 4s. £171 10s. 234 
2nd Class Attendant £61 4s. £142 232 
Nurse £50 8d. 142 10s. 282 
Assistant Nurse £43 18s. £124 282 
Source: DJ, 25 Jan. 1922. 
 
1923 – the counterattack continues 
The year 1922 had been another bad one for Northern workers as the counterattack gathered 
pace. The worst affected, the electricians, had their pay lessened by 25 per cent while the least 
affected, the dockers, suffered a 7½ per cent cut. Most trades experienced a 12½ per cent 
decrease.46 Greater political stability gave employers the confidence to intensify their 
counterattack. The railways remained in a troubled state. On 13 January 1923, the RCA held a 
public meeting in Derry at which T.J. O’Farrell, general secretary of the RCA’s Irish Council 
and a Labour Party member of Seanad Éireann, was the main speaker. He condemned the 
railway companies for their wages and conditions and promised a big fight for improvements 
in 1923. In March, the Swilly’s engineers threatened to strike against the 5s. 6d. bonus recently 
taken off them. Three months later, a conference under Belfast’s Ministry of Labour confirmed 
the reduction.47 Derry’s first strike of 1923 took place at the beleaguered shipyard. On 27 
January, apprentice platers downed tools for improved wages. They were joined by apprentice 
shipwrights on 19 February and by journeymen two days after that. On 23 February, apprentice 
carpenters joined the strike and demanded a 30s. wage, a vast improvement on their average of 
12s, bringing numbers on strike to 150. On 19 March, the boys returned on old terms. The yard 
had been forced to close but had re-opened on 15 March.48 In mid-April, seafarers suffered the 









Table 5. 5: Seafarers’ Wages, 1922 & 1923. 








Ordinary seamen 120s. & 150s. 50s. 95s. & 125s. 45s. 
Able seamen 210s. 68s. 6d. 180s. 62s. 





220s. -, 71s. & 68s. 6d. 
respectively 
190s. -, 64s. 6d. & 62s. 
respectively 
Source: LG, Apr. 1922, May 1923. 
 
Employers were also flexing their industrial muscles in sectors protected’ by the state. 
On 2 April 1923, the Shirtmaking Trade Board (Northern Ireland) cut wages to 7 per cent below 
British rates (see Appendix 11, Table A). It accepted – like its predecessor had done in 1915 – 
the employers’ arguments that they needed to offset transport costs. By 1925, wages were 14.3 
per cent lower than British rates for women and 16.1 per cent for men.50 Serious inter-union 
poaching ensued from the 1923 decrease. In March, the NUTGW had sent Annie Holmes, a 
Leeds-born official, to Derry as a fulltime organiser to re-energise the union. The ASTT had a 
part-time organiser in Sarah Doherty. Holmes was experienced in dealing with trade boards 
and had helped organise women in Leeds, London, Birmingham, Manchester and Liverpool. 
Within days of the reduction, shirt and collar workers crowded into the Guildhall to rebuke the 
trade board, with the trades council pledging its support for the women. Logue urged all shirt 
workers to join the NUTGW, which had enrolled 2,000 members since the cut. Several 
stoppages occurred because of the reduction. The women’s determination to resist was 
infectious and inspired the laundry workers to join the NUTGW. Laundry workers – many of 
whom worked in the shirt industry – were unorganised and among the lowest paid in Derry.51 
The Garment Workers and the ASTT temporarily put their mutual animosity aside to jointly 
lobby employers and hold public meetings against the cut.52 Relations between both unions 
remained atrocious until adversity forced them to merge in 1932.53  
 By then, most cutters belonged to the ATGWU, having left the NUTGW throughout 
the 1920s. The anomaly of a skilled elite joining a general union was partially due to the 
solidarity given to them by the dockers during the 1920 strike. However, the prospect of a 
mainly female union bringing women into the cutting departments – which, it was feared, 
would deskill the trade and undercut wages – remained an abiding concern for the cutters.54 
Derry’s sexual division of labour was typical of the UK clothing industry. But shirtmaking was 
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different in that this division did not the result from the deskilling of a male trade. Cutting was 
broken down into several discrete and specialised tasks, and apprentices did not receive a 
complete training. The nature of cutting changed in the 1920s when deskilling became a reality. 
Women were regularly employed to undertake both the less peripheral, skilled parts like laying-
up and putting-up, and the central, skilled part: pencilling. By 1926, 22 per cent of cutters were 
women.55 Deskilling was the result of three technological innovations. One was the use of 
electrically powered carts to lay the cloth. The second was pencilling by means of a perforated 
pattern and a blue powder to mark the cloth. The third, and most significant, was subdivision 
into specialised jobs where apprentices were trained to be layers-up, band knife operators, 
pencillers or putters-up with no experience outside their job or mastery of the general trade, 
which gave rise to uncertainty and insecurity.56 
         
The death of the One Big Union 
At its 1922 annual meeting in January, the ITGWU’s Derry branch declared its ambition to 
become the largest union in the shipyard. But the picture was vastly different by the spring of 
1923. Although it had a fulltime secretary in John F. Doherty, the branch went into terminal 
decline in 1922.57 O’Donnell had moved to Dublin and Ridgeway, who had sided with the anti-
Treatyites, had been arrested in Monaghan.58 The sense of despondency was palpable at a 
special meeting held on 28 February 1923. Doherty blamed ‘vested interests’ hostile to the 
ITGWU who ‘had done all in their power to crush it’.59 Undoubtedly, it had made many 
powerful enemies: Unionists, the employers, the British and Northern governments, the trades 
council and the amalgamateds. Decades afterwards, O’Donnell claimed that the branch had 
also been denounced by the local Catholic clergy who, he added, were intensely anti-socialist 
and very influential within the nationalist community.60 Speaking in Derry on 28 March, Ernest 
Bevin, general secretary of the ATGWU and the most powerful man in British trade unionism, 
attacked ‘some of the literature and some of the stupid and foolish things done and said by the 
Irish Transport Union’.61 Bevin was popular in Derry because he had bargained down cuts 
demanded by the shippers. As per agreements reached in December 1922 and March 1923, 
dockers’ wages were reduced by 1s. a day from 1 January 1923 and from 9 April 1923 until 
August 1924. After the cuts, casual dockers got 1s. 7½d. an hour while weekly men got 68s. 
3d.62 From a pinnacle of 2s. 1½d. per ton in May 1920, coal handlers’ pay fell back to 1s. 9½d. 
from April 1923.63      
169 
 
By early May 1923, the ITGWU Derry branch had collapsed. From a peak of thirty-
one Ulster branches (nearly 4,000 members) in April 1920, branch numbers had fallen to 
nineteen by 1921. In 1923, there were fourteen branches; by 1925, there were just three. The 
Workers’ Republic, newspaper of the Communist Party of Ireland, blamed ‘red tape and 
bureaucracy in Dublin’ for the branch’s demise, claiming that ‘the whole history of the trade 
unions in Derry for the last six months has been a record of sabotage by Dublin of the struggles 
of bonny fighters who remained true to the faith’.64   
 
Table 5. 6: Wages at McCorkell & Co. shippers, 1917-25 
Date Wages 
Aug. 1917 25s. 9d. 26s. 30s. 31s. 
Feb. 1918 24s. 30s. 34s. 35s. 
June 1918 29s. 35s. 35s. 9d. 40s. 
Feb. 1919 35s. 39s. 40s. 
Apr. 1919 38s. 40s. 44s. 45s. 
Aug. 1919 40s. 46s. 47s. 
Jan. 1920 45s. 51s. 52s. 
Apr. 1920 50s. 56s. 57s. 
Nov. 1920 55s. 61s. 62s. 
Apr. 1922 55s. 63s. 6d. 64s. 6d. 
May 1922 52s. 6d. 61s. 62s. 
Mar. 1923-1925 50s. 61s. 62s. 
Source: Wage Books for 1920-25, D3770/C/4/3-5, McCorkell Papers, PRONI. 
 
The beginning of the fightback 
Despite the loss of the ITGWU, Derry Labour still had fight left in it. On 2 May 1923, a strike 
of 300 building trade workers to counter a 1d. per hour cut was launched. Eight days later, the 
strike ended in victory for the men and wages were fixed until 30 April 1924. The building 
tradesmen had maintained their 4d. per hour differential over shipyard woodworkers. Builders’ 
labourers – who earned the same as sawmill labourers – would have had their 39s. 2d. wage 
decreased to 35s. By now, shipyard labourers’ earnings had been slashed to 37s. 6d., and 
shopkeepers’ labourers’ and storemen’s pay had been cut down to 35-37s.65 Remarkably, 
against the backdrop of falling wages across Britain and Ireland, some Derry unions were still 
able to obtain increases. Shipyard blacksmiths and hammermen came out for a week in mid-
May when their claim for the Belfast rate was refused. The latter won a 9s. improvement.66  
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 Industrial relations at the LLSR remained tense. On 6 August, its clerks and 
stationmasters went on lightning strike for the reinstatement of two dismissed colleagues. The 
NUR and the ASLEF joined the RCA to bring numbers affected to nearly 300. Pay was not a 
concern for the RCA as clerical salaries and conditions had been standardised across Ireland 
into five ranks. Following intervention from Belfast, the strike was called off after three days 
when the company re-employed the men. Afterwards, when the Swilly tried to pay NUR and 
ASLEF men only half for their days on strike, another stoppage was threatened until the 
company relented.67 The strike was repeated for twenty-four hours on 23 September when the 
RCA withdrew its labour to protest the sacking of the same two clerks. Redundancy notices 
were withdrawn once more.68 
 On 22 September, bakery labourers, packers and vanmen struck when employers 
refused to recognise the labourers’ union (the ATGWU), give a 40s. minimum to packers and 
labourers, and improve conditions. The master bakers initially refused to negotiate, but after 
six days they were forced to concede a 39s. minimum, four days’ paid holidays and union 
recognition. On 20 September, the Sentinel apologised for falsely claiming that the men were 
members of the ITGWU, which, it purported, was in the middle of wreaking havoc in the Free 
State.69 Labour’s victories from the summer of 1923 gave a springboard from which it could 
launch a counteroffensive of its own, which it did for much of 1924. 
 
1924 – the fightback 
Workers in Northern Ireland had another bad year in 1923. Wages had been cut by an average 
of 9 per cent with flourmill workers suffering the steepest reductions (25 per cent).70 In the 
Free State, 1923 had been Labour’s annus horribilis. Workers had put up a dogged defence of 
post-1917 gains against employer encroachment. But by early 1924, proletarian militancy had 
been crushed in the south. The enormous number of strikes and lockouts that had engulfed 
Ireland throughout 1923 had stretched Labour morale and finances to breaking point. In the 
north, however, the pendulum had swung back in Labour’s direction. By early 1924, the cost 
of living began to rise again. When trade did not improve, there were clamours for pay 
restorations across the North, including in Derry. 
 In early 1924, the local railway companies set out to attack hours and wages. In 
response, both NUR branches condemned them, demanded nationalisation of the railways, 
denounced the proposed 10 per cent wage cut and the pay differential between groups one and 
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three.71 Likewise, Derry’s RCA branch, which supported the NUR, backed their executive and 
gave tentative support to the new machinery which it urged be utilised.72 On 20 May, after talks 
with the companies had broken down, the RCA’s Derry branch demanded an immediate 
resumption of negotiations with a time limit. If a satisfactory settlement was not arrived at, a 
strike would be called.73 On 23 January, NUR and ATGWU goods yard checkers and shunters 
at the GNR terminus struck to protest the sacking of two checkers who refused to handle tainted 
goods. Both unions had previously formed a joint committee to weed out all non-union labour. 
The trouble extended to the other local railways. The men returned to work after a week 
following intervention from Belfast and a conference between the unions and the GNR in 
Dublin. They agreed to handle all traffic upon the reinstatement of the two checkers.74 
On 11 February, 300 shipyard red-leaders, stagers and stagers’ labourers downed tools 
for the same reason as the GNR men and for a ½d. hourly raise. The yard was kept open by 
scab labour. The strike ended on 23 February when Gordon persuaded the nons to join the 
NAUL.75 From 25 March to 1 April, riveters and heater boys went out when the yard brought 
in men from Belfast in lieu of local riveters who were unemployed. Although the matter was 
reported to Belfast’s Ministry of Labour, the riveters were persuaded to recommence work and 
refer all future grievances to arbitration by their union. Derry’s carters pressed for a 6s. increase 
that would bring pay to 60s. The master carriers offered 3s. and this was accepted.76  
 
Table 5. 7: LLSR Shopmen’s Wages, 1924 
Job Wage 
Labourers, lavatory attendants, gatemen, 
watchmen, sweepers-up 
42s. 
Scrap sorters, bosh attendants, wheelers, 
washhouse assistants 
44s. 
All other assistants, machinists (grade 3), 
boilermen, pumicers, painters, lifters, vicemen 
(grade 2), fettlers, washhouse men 
47s. 
Machinists (grade 2), boilermakers’ helpers, 
smiths’ strikers, crane drivers, oil-gasmakers, 
grease makers, carriage lifters, furnacemen, 
stationary enginemen, covermakers 
50s. 
Machinists (grade 1), grinders, lorry drivers, 
storekeepers, vicemen (grade 1) 
54s. 




In Derry’s staple employer, the ASTT sought to reinvigorate itself. But the memories 
of the 1920 strike loomed large in the minds of many shirt workers. The NUTGW was out to 
finally subsume its arch-rival. Relations between the two were so fraught that on 28 February 
the NUTGW called a strike at Ebrington against working with the ASTT. The week before, the 
Garment Workers had issued a manifesto demanding that all factory operatives join it. If they 
failed to do so, their work would not be handled by union labour. The ASTT condemned its 
competitor for this. The situation threatened to cause another major strike when the employers 
issued a week’s notice. The RUC mobilise fifty B-Specials to protect the factories. But on 1 
March, Belfast’s Ministry of Labour settled the dispute and the NUTGW agreed to withdraw 
its manifesto.77 The NUTGW was, at this point, the biggest union in Derry, but by 1926 it had 
contracted to about 2,000 members.78 Following its near collapse after the 1920 strike, the 
ASTT was recovering somewhat.79 It was hit by tragedy in 1924 when one its chief stalwarts, 
Con Doherty, a former nationalist councillor and a member of the boards of management for 
the Mental Health Asylum and the City Infirmary, died in June.80 
A storm of class conflict was brewing in the north-west. On 1 April, the Letterkenny 
Asylum attendants went out against a 10 per cent pay cut, the abolition of certain allowances 
and the employment of a non-union head attendant. The Letterkenny branch was affiliated to 
the Derry Trades Council. Thus, Logue and McCafferty negotiated with the asylum’s 
management to bring about a settlement. On 17 April, the council passed a resolution 
condemning the management and promising the attendants its full support. By mid-May, a joint 
committee of the ATGWU and the NUR in Derry was blocking tainted goods from reaching 
the asylum and the merchants who supplied it.81 The management was ruthless. They rejected 
arbitration, had the entire staff sacked and replaced with those who accepted the cuts. The 
attendants were never re-instated. The Mental Hospital Workers’ Union had been decisively 
defeated.82 But Letterkenny only presaged the class conflict that was about to engulf the major 
city of the north-west. Little did the unions realise that their requests for wage increases would 
trigger the worst industrial relations crisis in Derry’s history.     







Table 5. 8: ASTT Membership in Derry, 1914-31 
Year Derry Branch Factory Workers’ Branch 
1914 111 100 
1915 92 500 
1916 85 200 
1917 130 3,354 
1918 125 3,464 
1919 - 3,352 
1920 87 200 
1921 84 115 
1922 65 124 
1923 84 253 
1924 67 700 
1925 64 755 
1926 64 810 
1927 52 819 
1928 45 770 
1929 50 740 
1930 47 216 
1931 48 317 
Source: Finlay, ‘Trade unionism and sectarianism’, pp. 355-356. 
 
 
Table 5. 9: Building Trade Wages (in pence) in Belfast, Derry and the UK, 1923. 
31 Dec. 1923 Belfast Derry UK (average) 
Bricklayers 19 17 18.8 
Carpenters & Joiners 19 17 18.8 
Plumbers 19.5 19 18.9 
Plasterers 19 17 18.9 
Painters 19 17 18.7 
Labourers 12 10 14.1 
Source: Isles & Cuthbert, An Economic Survey of Northern Ireland, p. 218. 
 
The 1924 lockout 
The first of these demands came in March from the MEA. It wanted 2s. a week more for 
Corporation employees other than craftsmen. The claim was rejected. The 42s. wage paid to 
Corporation workers was the highest minimum for unskilled labour in the city. In April, the 
claim was rejected again.83 On 24 April, the first of many strikes occurred when the Ancient 
Guild of Incorporated Brick and Stonelayers struck in a dispute regarding their county money 
allowance.84 Seven days later, 600 building workers downed tools when employers refused to 
concede an hourly rate of 1s. 7d. (2d. more). From a high of 2s. 1½d. in 1920, building 
tradesmen’s rates had been reduced to 1s. 5d. for a forty-seven-hour week. Labourers sought 
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an hourly rate of 1s. 2d (from 10d.). The master builders wanted to continue the current wage 
for another twelve months, but this was rejected. Belfast’s Ministry of Labour involved itself 
in the disputes. It facilitated a conference between the pork curers – who wanted a 10s. raise – 
and the Employers’ Federation. The Ministry, through Major McConnell, also successfully 
persuaded the MEA to put off its strike – which was planned for 1 May – for a week to allow 
for mediation. But trouble was spreading like wildfire. Unrest was reported at Madden’s 
mineral water plant because of the employment of sixteen non-union workers. A Ministry of 
Labour conference ended the matter when the men agreed to join the ATGWU.85   
 On 2 May, thirty piecework riveters came out for an additional 10s. 6d., an extra 1s. 6d. 
per every hundred rivets driven. Some heater boys joined them. But after a few days, the men 
conceded defeat.86 The breadservers agitated for 15s. more and the abolition of the provision 
requiring a security deposit of up to £30. The pork curers, who turned down their employers’ 
offer of arbitration, lessened their demand to 5s. which three firms that were not attached to the 
Employers’ Federation agreed to pay. Likewise, building firms not affiliated to the Federation 
also gave increases.87 The next strike to strike were Gaslight Company masons, carpenters, 
plumbers and semiskilled workers who went out in solidarity with their comrades in the 
building trade. These men also wanted increases and rejected the company’s guarantee to give 
advances the following year. The strikes did not affect the Gaslight Company as much as other 
firms and it could give increases of 4s. to its semi-skilled men and 3s. to its labourers. Its 
firemen now had an 80s. wage.88  
 On 6 May, the Chamber of Commerce met to discuss the crisis and declared their 
solution – compulsory arbitration. Strikes, they argued, should be outlawed until an industrial 
court could make a definitive, binding decision on any labour dispute. Two days later, the MEA 
initiated its strike as the Corporation still refused to budge. It was the first strike of local 
authority workers in Derry for twenty-five years. Over 100 street sweepers, water supply men, 
ash pit cleaners, gravediggers and cemetery workers ceased work after the Corporation snubbed 
the MEA’s proposal of arbitration.89 However, the city’s supply of water remained constant. 
‘Of all the strikers’, declared the Sentinel, the gravediggers were ‘the class for whom there is 
absolutely no public sympathy’. The MEA also had twenty-three drivers, firemen and 
lamplighters at the Electric Light Station. However, most staff there were members of the ETU 
and the Electrical Power Engineers’ Association, neither of whom were part of the dispute. 
Trouble was avoided in the egg packing trade when counters and packers accepted minimum 
rates of 38s. and 44s. respectively. The NUTGW put in a request for 1d. per hour extra for 
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women and ½d. extra for girls, i.e., wage equalisation with Britain. On 9 May, after 
negotiations failed, the pork curers struck.90 In total, 1,000-1,500 workers were now on strike.91  
On 13 May, the Corporation met to discuss the MEA’s strike and considered advertising 
for blacklegs.92 Two days later, the situation became catastrophic when the union called out its 
members at the Electric Light Station on sympathetic strike, plunging the city into darkness. 
But most staff there stayed put. Many factories depended on the station for power and its 
closure would seriously imperil the local economy, especially the shirt industry. Scabbing 
under police protection kept the electric service in operation, much to the SMF’s relief. Some 
industries defied the power station’s orders and worked through the night.93 The crisis was 
devastating public life: the streets became filthy as Corporation cleaners remained out and 
thousands were without employment. A rumour was circulating that thousands more were soon 
to be rendered idle because the SMF was contemplating a lockout. Shirt firms that offered scabs 
to the Electric Lighting Station were blacklisted by dockers.94 The SMF responded by giving 
the workers a week’s notice ending on 30 May, after which the factories would close.95 The 
RUC offered to protect scabs at factories that remained open and bring extra policemen from 
outside if necessary.96 The Employers’ Federation acknowledged the support given to it by the 
Northern government. An RUC report of a 19 May Federation meeting gave credence to the 
rumour of a lockout: 
 
These employers anticipate that by working at the Electric Light Station they will influence the 
workers in the shirt factories to go on strike in sympathy with the municipal employees, and by 
this action they will render themselves ineligible to receive the unemployment donation at the 
Labour Exchange. These workers recently submitted a demand for increased pay, and the 
employers hope that a few weeks’ unemployment without Government assistance may help to 
bring about a change of feeling, and that the workers may be willing to postpone their demands 
or perhaps assent to a reduced wage on returning to work.97 
 
The Federation resolved that all members should offer their services as ‘voluntary workers’ at 
the Electric Light Station, an appeal for whom had been placed in the Belfast Telegraph on 17 
May.98 Twelve heeded the call, all of whom were either members or part proprietors of city 
firms or their sons.99 
176 
 
This was a labour relations crisis born in Derry. Inevitably, it became enmeshed with 
the political struggle for control of the city. The Journal placed blame squarely on the Unionist 
Corporation. ‘Why not arbitration?’ it asked on 23 May, its first editorial on the strike. ‘In 
declining to accept this proposal [arbitration] the Municipal Authority . . . behaved 
unreasonably. . . fair minded citizens can have no sympathy with a public body which persists 
in such a stubborn attitude, with consequences so appalling’. ‘On the other hand,’ it opined, 
‘there can be no sympathy with any section of workers who refuse arbitration, as we 
understand, some of those at present on strike in Derry have done.’100 Three days later, it took 
a harder line: ‘We wonder how far this failure is to be attributed to the obstinate attitude of the 
Corporation. It is undeniable that by their obduracy the majority of the members of the Council 
have precipitated the crisis.’101 The Sentinel, on the other hand, gave unconditional support to 
the Unionists:    
 
Londonderry has the distinction – or otherwise – of being called upon at the moment to bear 
the burden of a larger number of strikes than probably any other centre of the population 
throughout the Kingdom. . . The actions of the Cemetery grave-diggers in following into 
idleness those aristocrats amongst unskilled workers, the municipal employees, in compelling 
sorrowing relatives to dig their graves to receive the bodies of their dead friends. . . the rule 
apparently is that the declaration of a strike is to be held sufficient to justify conduct upon which 
the plain man looks with horror . . . We do not suppose what such a contingency must entail to 
the population and the injury it must inflict upon the city would greatly trouble the gentlemen 
– usually from a distance – who order these strikes . . .Whatever happens . . . the excellent 
salaries of the strike leaders goes on.102   
 
It considered the MEA a serious impediment to social stability and progress: 
 
Public opinion is so definitely opposed to the actions of the municipal employees . . . that the 
Corporation are being assured of support in resisting dictation regarding what wages must be 
paid . . .Unfortunately the promoters are for the most part strangers. It is hardly surprising that 
the fact of a number of strikes taking place in Londonderry, all of them sanctioned by 
committees in Dublin, London, or elsewhere, has given rise to the impression that the 




Table 5. 10: Men Employed by Derry Corporation 
Occupation Number of men 
Street cleaners and ash pit men 120 
Park labourers 15 
Watermen 3 
Cemetery workers 30 
Carters 20 
Source: RUC Inspector General’s report on Derry strikes, 17 May 1924, HA/5/1352, Min. of Home Affairs 
records, PRONI. 
 
Likewise, the Derry Standard cheered on the Corporation and urged it to lay down a 
marker: 
 
The position of the Corporation is perfectly plain. Certain classes of their workers made a 
demand for an increase of wages. The Council in their wisdom refused the application . . . So 
far as the Corporation are concerned they are now placed in a position from which they cannot 
recede. For if they abandon the right to conclude satisfactory arrangements with their own 
workers they must concede the dangerous principle that they are to have no control over their 
own workers but must grant whatever they demand on threat of all of the municipal services 
being brought to a standstill. To concede that principle would mean that there would be little 
necessity for a Corporation at all, for their functions would in effect be exercised by the Derry 
Trades and Labour Council, whose puppets the Corporation would become.104 
 
Despite the media hostility, workers continued to revolt. The Sentinel knew exactly who to 
blame. ‘It is known that in more than one of the affected industries there was a strong minority opposed 
to the extreme step of going out. But, as frequently happens in these distracted times, it is the extremists 
who sway policy’.105 The leaders of the MEA and the ATGWU were the primary targets of the 
paper’s ire.106   
On 22 May, 350 carters struck when colleagues were dismissed for refusing to transport 
goods to a firm providing scabs to the Electric Station. The coal yard labourers joined the strike. 
That day, the Employers’ Federation declared its support for the Corporation’s war against the 
MEA. But the most serious development that day took place at the Electric Station. By then, 
intimidation of scabs there had led many of them to stop working. Alarmed, the Corporation 
decided to cut off the electrical current from 6am to 6pm a day. Workers at thirty shirt factories, 
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at the shipyard (which employed 900) and at several other establishments were made idle. 
Another 2,000 were added to the slagheap of unemployment. Some laundries and pork-curing 
firms defied the order and worked through the night, but the Corporation quickly halted this. 
The six major shirt manufacturers could produce their own power and vowed to stay open for 
another week.107 When torrential rain hit, the uncleaned, mud-encased gully-traps were unable 
to prevent flooding. The trouble threatened to spread to the docks, the box factories and the 
bakeries. The city laundry, however, remained open. The ATGWU had tried to bring out the 
gas workers but failed as they were divided on the strike. Derry was spared a strike of 
breadservers on 24 May when they came to an amicable arrangement with the master bakers. 
Having watered down their claim to 10s., the ATGWU won 4s. for packers and breadservers 
and 3s. for labourers.108 
 Although an additional fifty-six policemen were brought into Derry to protect scabs, 
government intervention from Belfast from slow. The additional police guarded the banks, the 
post office and Corporation property. When railwaymen were suspended for not handling 
tainted goods, RUC intervention brought the men back to work.109 The authorities were 
alarmed at what had become of Northern Ireland’s second city. On 23 May, Richard Dawson 
Bates, the Belfast government’s hard-line, furiously anti-Catholic Minister for Home Affairs, 
mandated a curfew in Derry between 11pm and 5am. That day, Charles Wickham, inspector-
general of the RUC, arrived in Derry to investigate the crisis.110   
 Logue and Sam Bradley visited Belfast to discuss solutions with Andrews, but little 
progress was made. Unusually, Logue had been a peripheral figure in the strikes. But even a 
moderate like he had been disgusted by the Corporation’s behaviour. On 26 May, the 
Corporation met and opted not to give electric current to pork curing establishments to enable 
them to clear stock. In response, Logue declared that councillors were ‘simply tools of the 
Employers’ Federation’ that lent themselves to ‘carrying on class warfare by supporting one 
section of the community against another.’ On 29 May, the Employers’ Federation reiterated 
its determination to take a firm stand and refused all mediation. The next day, the SMF followed 
through with the seven-day notice it had issued, adding a further 6,000 to the army of 
unemployed. By now, 14-15,000 were without work.111 Deepening the workers’ woes, on 31 
May the Court of Referees ruled that only a small fraction of those idle – those employed in 
factories not affiliated to the SMF or the Employers’ Federation – were entitled to 
unemployment benefit. In an interview with the Journal published on 30 May, Logue endorsed 
the idea previously put forward by the Chamber of Commerce: the formation of an industrial 
179 
 
court representing capital and labour to mediate any dispute between the two, which also had 
the Journal’s support.112 Another nationalist paper, the Belfast-based Irish News, maintained 
that Belfast’s Labour Ministry had ‘signally failed’ in its major test since it was established as 
it was ‘afraid to antagonise the members of the Corporation, whom the Government expect in 
the near future to support them at the polls.’113  
Like the Corporation, the employers had the unwavering support of the Unionist media: 
 
The employers in the various industries in the city are adopting an attitude of firmness and co-
operation which was perhaps not expected by the strike agitators. In the past these agitators had 
only to stir up trouble and enforce a strike for a few days to have their way. . . employers . . . 
have found themselves subjected to victimisation, they have been involved in disputes and 
stoppages with which they had little or no concern . . . It is quite possible that the great bulk of 
workers who are now idle . . . have little sympathy with the methods of the strike leaders, who 
. . . seem to regard the unfortunate workers as so much industrial ‘cannon fodder’. A great and 
weighty responsibility rests upon these strike agitators. They have declared this industrial 
warfare in Derry, and . . . they have been more and more of the men and women who follow 
their order to the fray.114         
 
On 4 June, the wholesale houses, which employed 150 carters and drivers, closed.115 The 
unions contended from the start that the employers were using the strike as a pretext to smash 
trade unionism. They were right, as a member of the Employers’ Federation made clear in an 
interview with the Irish Independent: ‘the employers are fed up with strikes, which have 
become almost monthly occurrences in the city for years past, and they are determined to bring 
this thing through to a finish.’116  
 From 5 June, however, peace became a realistic prospect when negotiations between 
the trades council and the Employers’ Federation began under the auspices of the mayor. The 
trades council had been remarkably quiet during the labour war, which had not gone unnoticed. 
‘We are supposed to have a Trades Council in our midst’, an ‘Observer’ had previously 
commented in the Journal. ‘So far as the average public is aware this body has been dumb.’117 
Nevertheless, the RUC was suspicious of the trades council and kept an eye on it. The suspicion 
was mutual as the council feared that the B-Specials were to be used as strike-breakers. 
Arrangements were made for the payment of unemployment benefit to more than 4,000 
workers. Negotiations were arduous and nearly broke down several times. Separate talks were 
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taking place between the MEA and a Corporation subcommittee appointed to resolve the strike. 
After weeks of rejecting the idea, the subcommittee offered to submit the 2s. claim to 
arbitration. John Malcolm, the MEA’s Belfast-based Irish organiser, turned it down. Malcolm 
told the subcommittee that his union would accept the Corporation’s new offer of a 1s. increase 
provided it was made retrospective to 1 January 1924. The Corporation rejected this. By 10 
June, most of the other strikes had been settled and a general return to work now hinged on the 
MEA and the Corporation settling their differences. Building trade workers were given 1d. per 
hour from 1 September. The agreement pertained until 30 April 1925. Plumbers, however, were 
not included as they already had the 1s. 7d. rate and therefore did not feature in the strike.118  
 Finally, on 11 June, after a prolonged conference, settlements were reached in the other 
disputes. The war was over. Work was resumed the following day. The municipal employees 
were given an extra 1s. a week until 31 March 1925. Their union accepted this because it was 
anxious not to see any others not connected to their dispute suffer. The retrospective payment 
would be met by the MEA, not the Corporation. The pork curers also obtained a 1s. increase, 
making wages 50s. For both, a sliding scale of 1s. for every corresponding rise or fall in cost 
of living would dictate future pay. Some curers were not re-employed and had to be financially 
supported by the NAUL. The Ancient Guild’s country money dispute also ended in 
compromise. The carters, factory operatives and electrical workers – who had no wage claims 
but whose idleness was contingent on workers who did – could now resume work. There was 
to be no victimisation. On 13 June, the new curfew was officially lifted and the old one 
reinstated.119 Bates was impressed by the RUC’s handling of the strike as little police assistance 
was needed.120 
 Despite the General Federation of Trade Unions’ support, the labour war took a huge 
financial toll on the unions. The NUTGW gave £2,000 to the struggle. About 2,000 shirt factory 
workers were still not unionised and thus received no strike pay.121 The Garment Workers had 
ensured that no work from Derry was undertaken by its British members.122 The Court of 
Referees 31 May ruling had caused outrage and the unions immediately contested it. The 
NUTGW’s 1924 annual conference, held in London on 8 June, passed a resolution that strongly 
condemned it. The decision was reversed in late June and by early July £2,000 worth of 
unemployment benefit to 1,600 shirt factory women had been paid out.123  
 Life in Derry had been immiserated. The indignity of citizens having to dig their own 
graves to bury the dead and the filthy, flooded streets were stark reminders of what had become 
of the Maiden City. The Journal estimated that over £45,000 in wages had been lost.124 The 
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Unionist press was in no doubt what Derry could learn from its plight. To the ‘dupes’ of the 
agitators, the Sentinel had a firm message: 
 
the lesson of the strike will not be entirely missed if they should bring home not to the strikers 
along but to trade unionists generally a sense of the mischievous activities of their 
representatives on the look-out for notoriety.125  
 
In a subsequent condemnation of the MEA, whose conduct it believed ‘amounted to an attempt 
to hold the business of the city to ransom’, the paper affirmed: 
 
It was said in the usual talk of the agitators that the Corporation, in resisting the demands of the 
employees, were ‘fighting the battle of the Capitalists’, and so forth. The truth is that the 
Corporation conceded the advance mainly owing to the pressure put on them by the 
‘Capitalists’, who were more anxious to see the factory workers again earning money than the 
strikers.126  
 
Though less vituperative, the Standard expressed similar sentiment: 
 
The wiser trade union leaders have begun to realise that the strike weapon is a double-edged 
sword, which often injures more severely those who wield it than those against whom it is 
directed, and accordingly they hesitate to lift it unless as desperate last remedy. In Derry the 
strike weapon seems to have been taken up without any attempt to count the cost or the 
consequences. But if the experiences now gained of the use of this weapon in Derry are taken 
to heart they city may be saved an outbreak of strikes and sympathetic action for a long number 








Labour after the lockout 
The strike was a draw. Labour had gotten a portion of its demands and had shown great courage 
and resolve throughout against the odds. Long-term victory, however, lay with the employers. 
While they had not crushed trade unionism, they had disempowered it by brute force. Though 
Labour liked to publicly demonstrate its strength, as it did on 1 August when Ernest Bevin 
visited Derry again, it had suffered a huge setback and was neither as confident nor as assertive 
after the lockout.128 Employer hegemony was assured. But Derry workers retained some 
fighting spirit. From 24 October, permanent dockers got a 3s. advance, giving them a 68s. 3d. 
wage. The docks were the scene of the year’s final improvements: in December, the ATGWU 
secured better overtime rates and two hours off the week to forty-four for tonnage dockers in 
the cross-channel trade.129   
 In September, a strike was threatened when the master bakers employed a man with 
whom the ATGWU refused to work. The situation was diffused when it was referred to a 
conciliation board.130 The growth of the AGTWU as the union of choice for labourers is 
synonymous with the decline of the NAUL from 1921. Shortly after the lockout, the NAUL, 
MEA and the National Union of General Workers merged to become the National Union of 
General and Municipal Workers. The new union was central to Derry’s last labour dispute of 
1924. It began on 20 October at the Opera House when the ATGWU refused to work with a 
member of the General and Municipal Workers. The stoppage lasted over a month and led to 
the dockers going out on sympathetic strike. It was settled in late November when the man in 
question agreed to join the ATGWU.131 The situation risked becoming much more serious 
when an ATGWU man threatened to cut off electricity to the Opera House by stopping coal 
supplies to the electrical station. A similar threat was issued by a Corporation employee who 
told the Opera House that he could have the fuse of their electrical current drawn. The 
Corporation subsequently sacked the man after an inquiry into the matter.132  
 October delivered a decisive blow to Derry’s working class. That month, after many 
years of strikes and financial struggle, the troubled North of Ireland Shipbuilding Company 
finally closed its doors for good. Once again peripherality was Derry’s Achilles heel as Swan 
Hunter gave preference to their home shipyards. It was intended to re-open the yard when 
conditions improved but this never materialised. Hundreds were made destitute. The 
shipbuilding industry had recently come through a depression and many smaller British 
shipyards had closed with the larger yards consolidating their position.133 The closure of the 
shipyard and the distilleries rendered Derry a single-industry city. The shirt factories and their 
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auxiliary industries of box-making, hosiery, laundry and cloth-finishing now employed about 
three-quarters of the workforce. Having peaked at 8,000 in 1919, numbers in the shirt industry 
severely contracted over the coming years as War Office contracts ceased. However, by 1924 
the industry was recovering, and numbers had climbed back up to 4,500.134    
 In 1918, Logue had publicly defended northern Labour from ITGWU criticisms. Far 
from being conservative and parochial, unions in Ulster had ‘in a large measure succeeded’ 
and secured a standard of living that could ‘compare favourably with any part of the United 
Kingdom’. Although politically divided, he believed that northern class consciousness was 
strong and, as a result, Ulstermen would soon ‘fully realise’ their strength.135 The counterattack 
showed his optimism to be wildly misplaced because wage militancy did not easily translate 
into class consciousness in divided Ulster, but it did have some impact. From 1921-23, 
employers across the North had done much to rescind Labour’s gains since 1917. But their 
confidence had gotten the better of them, resulting in the 1924 crisis. In its aftermath, Derry 
Labour entered another prolonged period of quiescence as the employers cemented their 
authority with the blessing of the young Unionist state. This time, however, there would be no 
revival of fortunes. 
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Nothing crystallised the fundamental divisions within Irish Labour more than the proliferation 
of syndicalism in the south, and the lack of it in the north, from 1917. Irish syndicalism was 
the logical conclusion of Larkinism’s organisational revolution in an era of mass inflation, 
international turmoil and anti-imperialist struggle. Its success led to an evolution of tactics, 
with sympathetic strikes escalating into general action, and of strategy, with industrial 
unionism developing into the One Big Union. Syndicalism impacted every union, but its 
influence was reflected most strongly in ITGWU, followed by the IDAA/IUDWC and the 
NUR. Though few ITGWU members considered themselves syndicalists, revolutionary ideas 
percolated down from the leadership to a rank-and-file that subscribed to syndicalism’s 
methods rather than its aims. As Darlington adduces in his comparative analysis of twentieth 
century syndicalism in America, Britain, France, Italy, Spain and Ireland:  
 
Even in the ITGWU, the least formally ideologically syndicalist-committed of the bodies within 
this comparative study, the general revolutionary union and direct action philosophy and 
orientation of Larkin, Connolly, O’Brien and other national leaders would appear to have been 
absorbed to a greater or lesser extent by most members.1 
 
Syndicalism inspired unions to go beyond the economic sphere and create a proletarian 
counterculture. In 1919, the ITGWU asked members to view it ‘as a social centre, round which 
they can build every activity of their existence, and which, wisely used, can be made to remedy 
all of their grievances’.2 Having adopted the co-operative idea from the NUR, ITGWU 
members established a co-op in Cork in 1917.3 The counterculture was evident in both Cork 
and Derry: May Day parades were organised by the trades councils, socials and sports days 
were held and co-operatives were launched. But it was only in the southern city that 
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syndicalism penetrated so deeply to inspire soviets, industrial occupations and takeovers, the 
waving of red flags, a Labour Party, praise for the Bolsheviks and talk of a ‘Workers’ Republic’ 
or a Co-operative Commonwealth’. In July 1922, Cork’s trades council became the more 
inclusive Cork Workers’ Council in solidarity with such ideas.4 Neither city saw the 
dissemination of radical newspapers as occurred elsewhere in Ireland. Nationally, 1919 was 
the ne plus ultra of the syndicalist years. The ITUC adopted a socialist programme, complete 
with a 50s. minimum wage and the forty-four-hour week. It also considered establishing an 
Irish Workers’ Union inclusive of all sectors.5 But if syndicalism had such a profound influence 
over Irish Labour, why did it have a far greater hold in Cork than in Derry?  
Industrially, Irish syndicalism was a southern solution to southern problems. While 
Labour faced many of the same obstacles in Ulster, they were not deep enough to warrant a 
syndicalist organisational revolution. ‘Syndicalism made a big impact on Ireland because it 
was less industrialised, had a less developed system of conciliation and arbitration and 
relatively militant employers, and was a marginal area of trade unionism within the United 
Kingdom, neglected by the British trade unions’.6 This neglect had serious consequences. 
Between 1905 and 1912, Irish food prices rocketed by 25 per cent while unemployment soared 
to 20 per cent.7 While there was not necessarily a direct link between economic deprivation 
and radicalism (as in France and Britain), Irish labourers – like their counterparts in the US, 
Italy and Spain – were undoubtedly attracted to the ITGWU’s syndicalist rhetoric of class war.8 
Thus, material conditions – poor industrialisation and a predominantly unskilled labour force 
– provided the basis for Irish syndicalism, which is reflected by its north-south geographic 
divide. A similar divide for similar reasons existed in the US and Canada.   
Unlike the south, Ulster craftsmen had no need of an alliance with labourers to secure 
their bargaining power. Moreover, the link between sectarianism and craft exclusiveness 
militated against the development of class politics in divided Ulster. But there were also 
structural reasons for Derry Labour’s alignment with Britain. The shirt factories were typical 
of industries created by Ulster’s nineteenth-century textile boom. Like Belfast’s linen mills, 
the shirt factories created a sociology of production far removed from anything that existed 
Leeside. They generated their own subcultures based on acute hierarchies of grade, religion 
and sex. Men monopolised the more comfortable cutting departments while women toiled on 
the factory floors as operatives. Though divisions of labour based on sex were not unique to 
Ulster, sectarian divisions were. The cutters were overwhelmingly Protestant and operatives 
overwhelmingly Catholic. At Derry’s shipyard – which employed men only and where 
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approximately two-thirds were highly-skilled, highly-paid workers – the same sectarian 
division existed: tradesmen were largely Protestant and labourers chiefly Catholic. Craftsmen 
could establish effective bargaining power via the powerful, well-resourced amalgamateds that 
dominated the British yards, linking Derry’s trade-union culture to Britain and Belfast and not 
to the south. The shipyard gave Derry a craft elite of the metal trade that was concentrated, 
sizeable and strong, and conscious that its prosperity was contingent on the labourers’ 
weakness. The dispersed nature of craft unionism in Cork ensured that tradesmen were more 
supportive of the mobilisation of the unskilled because it helped them assert their own 
industrial muscle.9   
The origins of Derry’s rejection of syndicalism had its genesis in its 1909 rejection of 
Larkin’s most enduring legacy, the ITGWU. Unlike Cork, Derry only participated in the first 
of Irish Labour’s three stages of modernisation (new unionism). Its split from Larkin, after two 
years of embracing him, was a pivotal moment in the history of its working class. Larkinism, 
and later syndicalism, demanded separate Irish unions. It was this, more than its militancy, that 
antagonised Derry’s conservative, Labour-nationalist trade-union establishment. The mental 
decolonisation of Irish Labour initiated by Larkin did not reach Derry in any meaningful way 
until the ITGWU set up shop in 1919, by which time the British had cornered the market. Local 
officials of these unions like Logue and McCarron strove for a united movement where 
Catholic and Protestant could link arms as workers. But how could this be achieved given the 
city’s demographics and the depth of its religious and political divisions? Though it spoke a 
radically inclusive language, Unionist propaganda ensured that the ITGWU never brought on 
board more than a handful of Protestants during its time in Derry. Sectarianism was the primary 
reason for the stunted development of syndicalism in the north, giving northern radicals an 
unenviable task that Labour in Cork did not have to deal with. Given the socio-political context, 
that syndicalism influenced Derry Labour at all, however mildly, was extraordinary. The 
remarkable thing about northern trade unionism is how little, not how much, it was influenced 
by sectarianism. 
 
Ulster had a fractured society, tormented by religion and politics . . . These diversities were 
pressed together into a single economy with, for the most part, mixed workforces. . . people 
coped with the density of difference by compartmentalising their mentalities and adjusting the 
response code in each. That learned behaviour made it easier to detach the trade unions from 
sectarianism, though the separation could never be complete. In a society in which religion 
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mattered ubiquitously, including in the workplace and the unions themselves, sectarianism 
invariably curbed solidarity. . . behaviour was determined simply by an instinct to survive.10 
 
These mixed workplaces were centres of a single, Anglo-centric trade unionism. When 
the shirt factories and shipyard boomed during the First World War, work was plentiful for 
both Catholics and Protestants who worked together in the sectarian peace that the war had 
created. Trade-union attempts to avoid sectarianism detached them from politics which ensured 
that militancy was less likely to mature into radicalism in Derry than in Cork. It was enough 
that nationalists and Unionists could unite on wages and conditions.11 British unions, rather 
than republican or loyalist ones, offered an attractive and enduring resolution to the conundrum 
of sectarianism: a willingness to be wage militant while simultaneously parking the Ulster 
question. It was a strategy that Unionists found particularly appealing. It was only when these 
unions failed to deliver on wages in 1920-21 – concomitant to the height of the war of 
independence – that the Transport Union got its chance to shine. But even in these revolutionary 
years, the ITGWU struggled to dislodge its non-syndicalist British rivals. Its peak membership 
of 315 was a small number for a nationalist-majority city at a time of republican insurrection. 
Partition and the Irish revolution’s swing to the right helped to kill the radicalism that had 
helped to fuel the union’s growth across Ireland, including Derry, leading workers to drift back 
to the amalgamateds. The Derry branch stood little chance when the counterattack was 
launched and it declined steadily throughout 1922 and collapsed in 1923.12 In Cork, where all 
but the most conservative unions backed the republic by 1920, the ITGWU went from strength 
to strength from 1917, swallowing up its smaller rivals on its quest to become the One Big 
Union. 
The ITGWU’s brief stint in Derry suggests that the era’s Connollyites were not naïve 
about the problem that working-class Unionism posed for both Labour and the republic. Unlike 
many southerners, O’Donnell, Ridgeway and O’Shannon – all Ulstermen who had spent time 
in Derry – recognised the Ulster Protestant’s ability to be paradoxically wage militant and 
politically conservative. They were convinced that Protestants could be won over to the 
Republic if it was a workers’ republic: only socialism could transform class consciousness into 
anti-imperialism. But their argument failed to recognise the rational basis for cross-class 
Unionist homogeneity. Protestant workers did better, at least in the short-term, by embracing 
sectarianism as doing so maintained an economic superiority over Catholics that reinforced a 
psychological feeling of communal superiority.13 British unions were happy to uphold this 
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inequality and to park the national question, which was good enough for most Protestants. 
Mental colonisation meant that this was enough for most nationalists too. The result was a 
tenuous unity across the sectarian divide masked by the veneer of class rhetoric: a provincial, 
insular movement whose foremost goal was to track cross-channel wage levels.14 That 
syndicalism took hold so strongly in Cork and not in Derry demonstrates that a homogenous, 
united proletariat did not exist in Ireland, even among nationalists. 
 
The wages movements 
The First World War was a war of two halves for workers in both cities. The first half was 
characterised by mounting class tensions as food shortages, inflation and profiteering 
eviscerated workers’ incomes. This provoked an upsurge of class consciousness that laid the 
foundations for syndicalist militancy. As a Larkinite movement, Cork Labour spent 1914-16 
rebuilding from the 1913 lockout. Derry’s ships and shirts put it in a better position to benefit 
economically from the war. Industrial regulations imposed from 1915 had a far greater impact 
in Derry than in Cork and its workers took advantage of the new environment. With lucrative 
War Office contracts, the shirt factories and the shipyard dominated industrial conflict there 
until 1917. Accordingly, Derry had more disputes than its larger Munster counterpart in this 
first half. In contrast, from October 1914 to April 1917 class conflict in Cork resembled that of 
the Larkinite days: Labourers largely called stoppages. They did so under the umbrella of the 
ITGWU, which seized the initiative after its re-establishment in the city and became the biggest 
union by 1917. The NAUL did the same in Derry. The inflationary spiral equally motivated 
workers in both cities to seek redress. The employers’ response – offering war bonuses – was 
the same. Societal distinctions laid the foundation for syndicalism, the most vivid manifestation 
of the divergence of northern and southern Labour. Cork’s embrace of syndicalism set its wages 
movement on course for a more impressive record than Derry, especially for labourers. 
Syndicalism gave Cork Labour an unprecedented cohesion and unity that began in late 1916 
with the reunification of the trades council, heralding an era of proletarian self-assertion. To 
understand the dynamics of the wages movement in both cities, it should be divided into three 
subperiods: 1917-19, 1919-20 and 1921-24.  
 The first subperiod was characterised by the explosion of class tensions and the 
consequent reinvigoration of militancy. Like the rest of Ireland, from 1917 Derry Labour 
spread from its traditional bases to include women, assistants and clerks. White-collar 
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militancy was one of the period’s defining features in both cities that aided the coherence of 
the wages movement. The assistants’ gains were nothing short of magnificent. For example, 
the wages of Cork’s drapers’ assistants jumped by 220 per cent between July 1917 and late 
1920. Even more extraordinary was the shop assistants’ experience. Between February 1918 
and late 1920, their pay expanded by an astonishing 640 per cent, resulting in a tremendously 
improved standard of living even when mass inflation is accounted for (see Appendix 9).  
 The organisation of women was one of Derry Labour’s most significant achievements 
during these years. The rapid expansion of union membership on the shirt factories floors from 
mid-1917 undermines the argument that poor organisation of women before this was primarily 
due to Labour misogyny.15 The truth is more complex and multifaceted. Men wanted women 
to organise because it strengthened their hand. Women would have organised sooner but for a 
lack of incentive and employer hostility. However, sexism clearly existed in the factories. The 
cutters’ opposition to sharing a working environment, or even a union, with women was 
primarily motivated by their desire assert a separate, male identity. This raises the question of 
whether gender, rather than skill, politics or religion, was the main dividing line in the industry, 
even within the unions that organised it. These unions reflected Derry’s complex, contradictory 
gender dynamics. ‘After all, in 1920 the Derry branch of the UGW was exclusively composed 
of men, most of them Protestants, who embarked on the strike with no apparent thought for the 
conditions of their female colleagues, Protestant and Catholic alike, or for the effects which the 
strike might have on them’. However, the UGW was overwhelmingly female in the rest of the 
UK. Plus, during the strike the cutters publicly rejected allegations that his union refused to 
accept women as members in Derry and actually urged them to join.16 Cutters conceded that 
women could work as layers-up, putters-up and pencillers, but not as band knife operators, a 
job that supposedly expressed the trade’s inherent masculinity.17 Though undoubtedly an 
inhibitor, sexism was not an insurmountable barrier to a stronger wages movement in the 
factories. The cutters’ yearning to protect craft privilege motivated their behaviour as strongly 
as gender did, proving that Labour could not easily or quickly replace a craft consciousness 
acquired over decades with a class one.18 
 From 1914-16, wage increases lagged inflation; from 1916, however, wages began to 
rise faster. Militancy was precipitated by price increases and a spirit of radicalism ushered in 
by revolutionary fervour at home and abroad. The improvements sought were typically 3-5s. a 
week in both cities with workers usually getting about half of their demands; they rarely 
obtaining them in full. Nevertheless, the results were impressive. By early 1919, the unions 
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appeared to be winning the class war as wage gains overtook price rises, thus improving 
workers’ living standards. The era of subsistence wages, which had prevailed since the 
Industrial Revolution, had ended. Employers were more obstinate in granting decreases in 
hours. The pre-1917 standard week of fifty-four to sixty hours had been in place since the 
1890s. But progress was made here too, and hours began fall dramatically. The fifty-hour-week 
was the norm in the Cork trades by the war’s end. Derry would have to wait until the second 
stage of syndicalism to see progress on this front.19  
The scale of the increases augmented from 1919 as worker militancy intensified. In 
Cork, this was facilitated by the republican insurrection. The destruction of British authority 
helped to create a climate in which a new, more egalitarian society appeared possible. 
Attempted proletarian revolutions across Europe also inspired Cork and Derry Labour in this 
respect. But it was Cork that led the way in militancy. The number of strikes, and the threat of 
them, rose exponentially in 1919, more so than in Derry. So did wage claims, as applications 
for an additional 10-20s. a week, and sometimes as high as 25s., became commonplace in both. 
Workers still generally failed to get all their demands, but unions were now obtaining most of 
them, giving major gains. By the onset of the slump, both Cork and Derry Labour had much to 
be proud of. Since January 1919, most sectors had seen considerable improvement in living 
standards. In real terms, Cork labourers’ wages were 25 per cent better by 1920 than their pre-
war value, reaching a high of 60 per cent better by 1921. In both cities the trades showed a 
smaller enhancement. Cork’s coopers and building craftsmen, for example, saw their standard 
of living improve by about 10-15 per cent. Though some classes of printers in Cork suffered a 
marginal decline in the value of their earnings, most made sizeable gains. It was fitting that the 
city’s unskilled gained the most from Labour’s struggles. Without the labourers’ unionisation 
and support, no group could have improved their lot to the extent to which they did.20  
Labour activism peaked in Derry in 1919; in contrast to Cork, the number of strikes in 
Derry decreased greatly in 1920. But Derry Labour was starting from a lower base. Come the 
slump, wages – especially those of labourers – were inferior in most sectors, significantly so in 
many cases. Herein lies another difference between the two movements: syndicalism promoted 
greater unity between trade and spade which allowed the latter to prosper. Deindustrialisation 
and technological development led to the numerical growth of transport and white-collar 
workers that accentuated this convergence. Mechanisation reduced the number of ‘labour 
aristocrats’ and transferred this group’s centre of gravity from the pre-industrial crafts to the 
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metal industries, which Cork lacked. Derry contained some modern industry like its shipyard, 
a major male employer where the labour aristocracy was reinforced rather than dismantled.21  
In both cities tradesmen’s wages were about double that of their labourers in 1914. But 
by early 1921, the ITGWU had reduced this disparity to 65-75 per cent in Cork. An analysis of 
the building trade is particularly illuminating here. By the downturn, the pay gap between 
labourer and craftsman in Derry’s building trade was still at 1914 levels; in Cork, it had been 
reduced to 25 per cent. From 1917, changes in technology and the nature of work galvanised 
Cork’s tradesmen to put aside their traditional hostility to the labourers and joined with them 
to advance their own bargaining power through militant action. Carpenters, for example, 
witnessed a 153 per cent growth in pay between 1917 and 1920. Even after the 1923 lockout, 
their wages were 121 per cent above pre-1917 levels. In Derry, where building trade wages had 
been lower than in Cork, the improvements were even more astonishing. From early 1919, craft 
rates exploded and climaxed in August 1920 when they were over 6 per cent higher than what 
prevailed in Cork.22 In total, building artisans’ wages in the northern city rose by 177 per cent 
from 1917-20. They were one of the few groups in Derry to secure better pay than their Cork 
counterparts. Why was this? Building tradesmen went from being one of Derry’s most 
conservative workers to some of their most militant. The answer is unclear, but it may lie in 
the shipyard, not the building trade. Wages in the former were always close to the latter. The 
shipbuilding boom during the war forced upwards the wages of workers whose trade straddled 
both shipbuilding and construction (carpenters, joiners, plumbers etc.). With no such point of 
reference, Cork’s building tradesmen lacked such a bargaining chip to push for higher pay.  
 Even more remarkable was the scale of the increase received by builders’ labourers in 
Cork, who experienced 273 per cent pay improvement. Their post-lockout wage was 216 per 
cent better than in 1917. These achievements are even more extraordinary given that builders’ 
labourers had seen their pay advanced by only 3s. between 1902 and 1917, and tradesmen only 
¼-½d. an hour more. Builders’ labourers in Derry won a peak that was 43 per cent less than 
their Cork equivalents. In 1925, Cork’s builders’ labourers’ earned a wage 55 per cent higher 
than the Derry rate. In both cities Labour was even more successful on hours than on wages 
from 1919-21. Unlike Cork, in early 1919 most craftsmen in Derry still worked a fifty-four to 
fifty-five-hour week. But over the following two years these hours were cut to a norm of forty-
six to forty-eight (forty-seven being the most common), allowing leisure time to become a 
reality for working-class families, vastly upgrading their quality of life.23 However, like the 
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national movement, Labour in both cities largely failed to obtain the forty-four-hour week 
coveted by the unions since February 1919.  
 
Table 6. 1: Wage Growth in Cork, 1912-21 (1900=100) 
Year 
(Dec.) 













1912 100 111 104 105 106 - 
1913 100 111 104 - 111 - 
1914 108 116 109 130 117 127 
1915 108 116 109 135 - 158 
1916 117 116 109 150 167 202 
1917 125 126 145 180 194 225 
1918 167 138 153 200 222 252 
1919 225 182 227 255 278 257 
1920 269 206 274 350 348 310 
1921 269 230 274 350 - - 
Source: Lahiff, ‘Industry and Labour in Cork’, p. 214. 
 
Table 6. 2: Builders’ Labourers’ Hourly Wages in Cork, 1917-24 
Date Builders’ Labourers & 
Carmen 
Scaffold-Makers 
Jan. 1917 4⅔d. 5⅔d. 
Apr. 1917 6½d.  7½d.  
Apr. 1918 9d. 10d. 
Apr. 1919 11½d.  1s. ½d.  
Nov. 1919 1s. ½d.  1s. 1½d.   
Jan. 1920 1s. 4d. 1s. 5d. 
May 1920 1s. 8d. 1s. 9d. 
Nov. 1923 1s. 5d. 1s. 6d. 
Source: LG, 1917-21; CE, 1917-24 
 
Table 6. 3: Builders’ Labourers’ Wages in Derry, 1900-25 
Date Wage 
1900 15s. 
1905 14s. 2d. 
1913 15s. 
Jan 1917 22s. or 24s. 
Aug. 1917 25s. 10d. 
Jan. 1920 47s. 
May 1920 54s. 10d. 
May 1923 39d. 2d. 
June 1924 43s. 1s. 
Source: LG, 1893-1925; DJ, 1917-25; O’Connor, 2: Larkinism and syndicalism, p. 32. 
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The slump accentuated the differences between Labour in Cork and Derry: different 
patterns of conflict arose in response to similar economic, but significantly different political, 
circumstances. The biggest difference was the employers’ response. Ulster’s relative political 
stability enabled the counterattack to begin sooner in Derry. By mid-1921, unions were firmly 
on the defensive. In the interim, the establishment of a six-county statelet dominated by the 
Unionist Party, many of whom were large capitalists overtly hostile to Labour, aided the 
counterattack. Sectarianism incapacitated Derry Labour’s capacity for resistance and 
heightened tensions with the south, leading to Derry becoming isolated from Britain and the 
rest of Ireland.25 Over the next two years, the confidence of Derry’s employers in asking for 
bigger cuts grew with the restoration of political stability. The unions’ response was 
increasingly feeble. The cuts sought grew from 3s. in June 1921 (at Watt’s), to 6s. in August 
(on the railways) to 13s. 8½d. in September (in the building trade). Similar decreases were 
demanded throughout 1922. It was in the building trade where the most aggressive pushback 
came and where Labour’s fightback was weakest. By November 1922, the master builders had 
shrunk craftsmen’s rates by a staggering 33s. 4d. a week. An attempt to decrease pay by another 
3s. 9d. a week in May 1923 was a step too far and was defeated. Labourers suffered less than 
half the cuts that tradesmen endured, in contrast to Cork where the master builders reduced the 
pay of both by 3d. an hour.   
In Cork, the political turmoil of 1921-23 prevented employers from cutting wages on 
incremental basis. The consolidation of the Treaty settlement in 1923 encouraged them to 
attack wages in one swoop, provoking a titanic showdown. Cork’s employers had wanted 
cutbacks like those enforced in Derry, but militancy forced them to make concessions. Building 
tradesmen would have been reduced to Derry rates were it not for the inter-union solidarity 
demonstrated in the autumn crisis, the swansong of syndicalism. In Derry, the staggered, earlier 
implementation of cuts meant that the pendulum had swung back in favour of the unions by 
1924. Dreading a return to 1919-20, the Derry Employers’ Federation sought to nip this Labour 
revival in the bud. Given the bosses’ tenacity, the outcome of the 1924 lockout – 1922 wage 
levels – was quite an achievement for Labour.26 Though the roles were reversed, Derry’s 1924 
crisis had a similar outcome to 1923 in Cork: settlements based on 50 per cent compromises. 
But both crises exhausted Labour. It was only in Derry where the lockout became a concerted 
effort to smash the unions. Class relations reminiscent of pre-1917 days returned to both cities 




The trades councils 
Syndicalism’s transformation of Labour was reflected in the CTC. After re-unification, the 
atmosphere of mutual suspicion that had characterised relations between Cork’s two trades 
councils was replaced by one of class-conscious, proletarian unity. Most unions had been 
affiliated to one of the old councils, but there was still room for expansion. The reunited council 
was branching out from the manual sectors to white-collar groups. By October 1917, the 
chemists’ assistants, Poor Law Union employees, the RCA and the INTO were all affiliates.27 
By the year’s end, the Irish Automobile Drivers’ and Mechanics’ Union (IADAMU) and the 
Shop Assistants had joined. In May 1918, it received another boon when the coopers re-
affiliated.28 By May Day 1919, nearly every union was affiliated to the council. The NFWW 
was its most recent affiliate. But there was still room for growth. The ASTI joined that October, 
the National Union of Sheet Metal Workers in September 1921 and the IEIU in May 1922. In 
July 1922, the council renamed itself the Cork Workers’ Council to reflect the new reality.29 
From 1919-24, it claimed a membership of 10,000, an unprecedented figure. However, 
labourers remained underrepresented in the leadership positions.30 
 In 1916, Derry Trades Council also reformed to reflect the rebirth of militancy. The 
Derry Trades and Labour Council was reconstituted on 25 March 1916, having been disbanded 
in late 1911. The following unions attended its inaugural meeting: ASCJ; ASTT; ASE; NUR; 
the IDAA; the Postmen’s Federation; the NUDL; the Typographical Society, of which Logue 
was still a member; the Shirt and Collar Cutters’ Union of Ireland; and two branches of the 
NAUL. Logue was elected chairman and Dealtry P. Thompson, of the Typographical 
Association, secretary.31 Its activities were identical to other trades councils, including Cork: 
supporting affiliates in industrial disputes, running ‘buy-Irish’ campaigns, agitating for cheaper 
rent and better housing for working-class families, reducing unemployment, promoting 
educational opportunities for workers and, later, struggling against profiteering and high food 
prices.32 The advance of working-class consciousness was reflected in the council’s steady 
growth. Affiliated unions grew from fifteen in June 1916 to twenty-three the following month 
– a record membership of over 2,000 – and to twenty-eight by October 1917. By May 1917, 
the agricultural labourers had become ‘enthusiastic members.’ Thirty-three unions attended the 
council’s 1918 annual general meeting. The addition of ‘Labour’ to its title was symptomatic 
of its growth. Like its Leeside equivalent, many new affiliates were from non-manual sectors 
like teachers, clerks and asylum attendants. In spring 1918, the NFWW joined the council. That 
June, the Gweedore and Rosses branch of the INTO and the National Association of 
199 
 
Discharged Soldiers and Sailors followed suit. Formed in early 1917, the Association consisted 
of working-class men who had fought in the war but had since been discharged. It cultivated 
links with the Labour movement before severing them in 1919 when it moved sharply to the 
right. It merged into the British Legion in 1921.33  
 By mid-1920, the Derry Trades Council’s remit had extended beyond the city 
boundaries to the suburbs, west to Letterkenny, south to Strabane, and to farms and rural 
employment in between. Reflecting its regional status, it renamed itself the Derry and District 
Trades and Labour Council. While southern trades councils were in the process of dropping 
the ‘trades and labour council’ from their titles in favour of the more inclusive ‘workers’ 
council’, their Ulster counterparts were less likely to do so. Impressive as the Derry council’s 
growth was, its reported membership of 10,000 from 1919 to 1921 and 12,000 in 1922 is surely 
incorrect.34 The council had notable membership omissions that prohibited it from being as 
representative as the CTC. From 1920-23, major unions like the ITGWU, Shop Assistants, 
NUBSO, Ancient Guild, Cabinetmakers, Coachbuilders/NUVB, NSFU and Shipwrights were 
not affiliated. The RCA had left by 1921, the ASTT by 1922 and the IADAMU by 1923. The 
NAUL, NUDL, ATGWU and the building trade unions formed the backbone of council 
affiliates throughout.35  
 By 1918, the main players in the Derry Trades and Labour Council were Logue, who 
was still president; A.C. Aitken, a boilermaker and council vice-president; McCafferty, its 
secretary; and John Limerick, its treasurer. Its leadership remained alternated little over the 
coming years. Logue remained president until his death in August 1925 and McCafferty 
remained secretary until 1921 when other commitments forced his replacement by J. 
McMullan. The vice-presidency saw more regular change with George Hegan holding the 
position from 1919-20 and Christopher Oxford of the IAWU holding it from 1921-22.36  
 
Table 6. 4: Presidents of the CTC, 1917-25 
Year(s) Name Occupation 
1917-18 Patrick Lynch Tailor 
1918-20 Éamonn O’Mahony Railway Clerk 
1920-23 George Nason Coachbuilder 
1924-25 Richard Anthony Linotype Operator 




Table 6. 5: Secretaries of the CTC, 1917-25 
Year(s) Name Occupation 
1916-17 John Good Railwayman 
1917-19 Thomas Twomey Carpenter 
1920 Michael Hayes Painter 
1921 John Fitzgibbon Draper’s Assistant 
1922-25 George Duncan Lithographic Printer 
Source: CE, 1917-24. 
 
A major difference between the two councils was Cork’s greater role as an industrial 
relations mediator which, because of Dowling, grew exponentially from 1917.37 The Capuchin, 
who became a patron of the council shortly after his arrival to Cork, was elected CTC honorary 
president on 7 September 1917. His involvement in working-class affairs was so popular that 
on 4 May 1919 a stained-glass window was unveiled in his honour at Holy Trinity Church and 
a commemorative dinner held that evening in the Victoria Hotel. The window had been donated 
to the church by the trades council in 1918. At the dinner, Dowling – a Freeman of Cork since 
21 June 1918 – was presented with a scroll by Éamonn O’Mahony, the RCA official who had 
replaced Patrick Lynch as council president. It had embossed on it the council’s minutes of the 
meeting that elected Dowling honorary president.38 Like its Derry counterpart, the CTC was 
not a radical organisation, much less a revolutionary one. Resolving industrial disputes on 
terms partially favourable to workers and avoiding strikes remained its primary concern. When 
strikes did erupt, arbitration was sought, and compromise accepted. The trades council was 
involved in most of the strikes, disputes and wage claims that the city experienced from 1917-
20. From February 1919, it was happy to subcontract arbitration to the Cork Conciliation 
Board.  
At the CTC’s 1922 annual general meeting, Dowling outlined his vision for industrial 
relations in Cork: 
 
As one who has been brought into intimate contact with the ideals of the workers and the 
sentiments of employers, you expect my opinion as to how the present deplorable tragedy could 
be ended. It can only be ended by a fusion of the interests of capital and labour. I bitterly deplore 
irresponsible declarations made by individuals that tend to widen the breach between capital 
and labour. It is unchristian and unpatriotic to foment discord and arouse animosity between 
those two great forces, on whose fusion depends the social advancement of individuals and the 
economic progress of our country.39  
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His speech was warmly received by the delegates and applauded by the Examiner.40 In a lecture 
delivered at UCC on 26 November 1919, he had warned against the pernicious influence of 
‘extremists’ and ‘agitators’ who advocated the ‘fallacy of socialistic principles as a panacea for 
present-day abuses in the relations between capital and labour’. Equally critical of the 
complacency of ‘the privileged classes who enjoy a monopoly of the wealth of the world’, he 
declared that only a proper application of Rerum Novarum could end the perseverance of class 
conflict.41 The Capuchin’s message of class harmonisation had long been shared by Cork 
Labourites anxious to put his words into action. Syndicalism only momentarily ameliorated the 
conservativism of a Labour movement that reflected Ireland’s deeply traditional, Catholic 
society. The strength of religious sentiment among workers guaranteed that Marianism formed 
a much bigger component of the CTC’s ideological armoury than Marxism. In contrast, clerical 
involvement in Derry Labour was virtually non-existent and its trade council was anxious to 
stress its apolitical, secular nature to avoid sectarian ruptures. With no such concerns, the CTC 
could freely engage with the religious faith of most of its members. 
 Dowling was emblematic of an evolution of the Catholic Church’s views on the social 
question. The clergy had underestimated popular resentment of wartime inequality and 
hardship and had failed to put forward a realistic alternative to industrial strife. No longer was 
inequality considered inevitable and a reinterpretation of Church teaching took place through 
a clerical discourse that was more public than in the past. Priests were now more likely to 
sympathise with workers and condemn employer rigidity and greed. However, policy remained 
fundamentally conservative and never deviated from Rerum Novarum. The scale of the unrest 
forced clerics to develop a response to socialism (attacks on which softened and became less 
frequent). Profit-sharing, co-operation and other types of mutualisms based on private property 
were all proposed as alternatives to the status quo, especially in 1920 and 1921. Moreover, the 
Church propounded little of the ferocious anti-communism that characterised it between 1930 
and 1965. However, clerics were simply putting up with tendencies of which they were still 
deeply suspicious. Most priests were sons of the rural middle class – farmers and shopkeepers. 
Though friendly towards the Church and its progress on the social question, Labour rejected 
clerical denunciation and censure on issues of class conflict, internationalism and Bolshevik 
Russia. However, it never developed an anti-clerical attitude and there were few attacks on 
hostile clergy. For instance, Liberty Hall only regarded Dowling’s condemnations of ‘socialist 
agitators’ as tiresome and self-important. Only with the conservative settlement of 1923 did 
the Church re-establish its authority over Labour, at which point Labour was happy to oblige.42  
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 Syndicalism’s elevation of a working-class counterculture had an impact on the CTC, 
though to a lesser extent than in Derry. In conjunction with UCC, the CTC began to offer 
evening education courses for workers.43 On 4 November 1919, Cork Corporation established 
the Cork Profiteering Committee which had trades council representation. Its remit was to 
campaign against and bring attention to exorbitant prices charged by shopkeepers. The 
committee lasted until 1922 and proved a thoroughly ineffectual organisation that made no 
tangible impact.44 The Derry council made a greater effort to give its members something 
beyond the paradigm of industrial relations and satisfy more than economic needs. In October 
1918, it set up a literary committee to establish a workers’ library. Cassidy called it ‘the most 
important step that has ever been taken by organised Labour for the advancement of the 
workers of the city’.45 Like the ITUC, the First World War bequeathed to the Derry council an 
expanded role. This led to its assistance in the establishment of a local co-operative movement 
in October 1917 and a local Food Control Committee a month later.46 Railwaymen were 
instrumental in forming co-operatives in the city the following year.47 Throughout the 
syndicalist period, the Derry Trades Council reflected Labour’s growing sense of itself as a 
social, as well as industrial and political, movement, and did so with greater gusto than Cork. 
On 19 December 1919, it held a well-attended Christmas dance at the Guildhall and marked 
May Day 1920 with a day of athletics for men and women at the Brandywell.48 
 The republican revolution sparked a growth of nationalism within the ranks of the Derry 
council that alienated Unionists. In response, trades council leaders tried to maintain unity by 
pursuing independent Labour politics. Hence, the Derry Trade Council’s absence from the 
1920 local elections in which the CTC had been heavily beaten by the ITGWU-Sinn Féin joint-
ticket. In March 1924, the Derry Trades Council sent delegates to discuss the Belfast Labour 
Party’s proposal to form the Labour Party of Northern Ireland. The ITUC was not involved in 
this initiative, symbolising the wide political divergence that now existed between northern and 
southern Labour.49 By the following year, Derry workers were ready to pursue class politics 
once more, ‘the hatchet was buried between Orange and Green’.50 The trades council sponsored 
the Northern Ireland Labour Party, which contested all Derry wards in the 1926 local elections. 
Candidates in the mainly Catholic wards were returned unopposed but none were elected in the 
predominantly Protestant wards.51   
 Nationalism had a vastly different impact on the CTC. By late 1920, the council was 
far more concerned with politics than the wages movement. Thus, it was poorly prepared for 
the employers’ counteroffensive. One of the most striking facets of the 1923 Cork lockout is 
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the trades council’s lack of involvement in it. It is symptomatic of the council’s insignificance 
in 1923 that its most irate remarks had nothing to do with the lockout. Rather, they related to 
the government’s reduction of teachers’ salaries and the old-age pension.52 The CTC struggled 
to play a meaningful role in Cork’s political and industrial life for the remainder of the decade, 
a microcosm of Labour’s national fate. To make matters worse, shortly after the 1923 lockout 
the ITGWU and the Distributive Workers left the council, seriously harming its 
representativeness. As a result, it reverted to its craft-union character of old. In 1927, one 
delegate complained that ‘the position between the skilled and unskilled workers in Cork is 
deplorable.’53   
 Throughout the syndicalist era, the Derry Trades Council remained a conservative and 
ineffectual organisation. Its belated action during the cutters’ strike reflected its mistaken, 
nationalistic view that the strike was part of a British scheme to undermine Irish industry. Its 
absence from the 1924 strikes illustrates how meaninglessness the slump had made the 
institution. A flirtation with mild brands of syndicalism and leftism had ended. The rise and 
fall of the Derry Trades Council can be adduced by its appearances in the local public directory, 
The Derry almanac, North-West directory, and general advertiser. Having featured in it from 
1920-23, in 1924 its place was taken by the UULA which was, fittingly, situated underneath 
the Londonderry Employers’ Federation.54 
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Cork Labour and the Irish Revolution, 1917-23 
 
Labour’s amiable relationship with the republicans was one of its defining features during the 
War of Independence. Rapprochement between the two movements began in July 1915 when 
United Trades and Labour Council representatives attended the funeral of Jeremiah 
O’Donovan-Rossa. On 11 May 1916, the District Trades Council appealed for clemency ‘to 
those concerned in the tragic and deplorable events of Easter week’ and strongly condemned 
its leaders’ execution. The CEF had previously convened a special meeting to ‘humbly convey 
to His Most Gracious Majesty the King the expression of unfailing loyalty.’ The UTLC was 
conspicuous by its muteness on the rebellion.1 A rapid growth in separatist sentiment among 
the Irish working class was a by-product of the Rising. From 1918-21, Irish Labour played a 
vital supporting role in the republican struggle. From 1921, however, Labour’s relationship to 
nationalism was less clear. The ambiguity was reciprocated and defined relations between the 
two movements for decades thereafter. Cork Labour was a microcosm of this ideological 
journey.   
 
The food crisis, 1917-18 
As war raged in Europe, inflation and food shortages produced revolutionary or semi-
revolutionary situation in many countries. John Borgonovo has written at length about Cork’s 
wartime food crisis. Accordingly, it is necessary only to further examine Labour’s involvement 
in it. Despite initial ideological reticence, in early 1917 the British government introduced price 
regulations and created a Minister of Food Control to combat profiteering and food scarcity. 
Nevertheless, shortages of food and exorbitant prices remained a feature of wartime life. In 
September 1917, after much nationalist campaigning, the government established the Irish 
Food Control Committee. However, it had no Labour representation, much to the CTC’s ire.2 
The trades council called for the formation of food depots across the city with every trade 
unionist contributing 1s. to this end.3 Two months later, the Corporation founded the Food 
Control Committee to monitor shortages and profiteering. The IPP, which controlled the 
208 
 
committee, allocated no seats to Sinn Féin and only one to the trades council, provoking the 
latter to boycott it. The food crisis contributed to the growth in friendly relations between the 
republican and Labour movements. On 28 December 1917, John Good, Denis Houston and 
Cathal O’Shannon (a Cork-based ITGWU organiser since July 1917) attended a Sinn Féin 
conference on the crisis. It established a food preservation committee.4 On 18 January 1918, a 
public meeting was held to inaugurate the ‘People’s Food Committee’. Good, O’Shannon and 
Patrick Lynch were committee members from the start. With the support of Good’s NUR 
branch, the committee established a potato depot and moved aggressively against the 
exportation of food. It spurred direct action from the Corporation which established its own 
food depot in March, collapsing the committee. With some justification, the ITGWU’s Irish 
Opinion newspaper subsequently deemed the Cork People’s Food Committee to be a ‘local 
soviet in embryo’.5 More significant, however, was the commonality of interests that now 
existed in the minds of many local trade unionists between the Labour and republican struggles, 
as April 1918 would demonstrate.         
  
The 1918 anti-conscription strike 
Cork Labour’s biggest and most efficacious protest during this period was not about wages or 
conditions. Rather, it was its implementation of the ITUC’s one-day general strike on 23 April 
1918 to oppose the imposition of conscription in Ireland. This ‘semi-revolutionary’ stoppage 
was a resounding success. It was unprecedented for an Irish strike and brought commercial life 
in Cork to a standstill.6 ‘Cork’s trade unions moved into the vanguard . .  shops and factories 
closed, trains and trams were idle, pubs shut their doors, and the harbour fell silent’.7 About 
30,000 attended the largest protest in Cork’s history. They listened to anti-conscription 
speeches from trade unionists and Dowling before signing an anti-conscription pledge. Always 
in touch with the prevailing mood, Dowling boldly declared that:  
 
there is a power that controls the destinies of a nation that has to be reckoned with . . . that 
power is that of the workers. . . the force that builds up a nation’s prosperity, and carries on its 
industry and commerce. The workers are the final and determining power on which rests the 
decision of any government in enforcing laws, and your presence, workers . . . is eloquent proof 
of your determination to resist the imposition upon you of a serfdom.8 
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A separate meeting was held for women at the City Hall where they pledged not to perform the 
job of any conscripted man. During the crisis, O’Shannon and Tomás MacCurtain brokered an 
amalgamation between the tiny ICA Cork branch – which was founded in July 1917 – and the 
Irish Volunteers.9 Crossover between the ITGWU and militant Irish nationalism was strong in 
Cork. In 1917, the authorities reported that the union was ‘in close touch with the Irish 
volunteers.’10 
 
The trades council and the 1918 general election 
The conscription crisis had further reinforced the growing Labour-republican alliance in Cork. 
Thus, by late 1918 working-class attention remained firmly focussed on the national question, 
especially after the First World War ended on 11 November. On 10 October, tragedy had struck 
the CTC when Patrick Lynch, heading to an ASTT meeting, went down with the Leinster.11 
His death opened the way for Éamonn O’Mahony, a republican and RCA official, to become 
council president. The CTC’s AFIL-orientated leadership of Michael Egan, Patrick Murphy 
and Alderman Jeremiah Kelleher, disparagingly referred to by O’Mahony and other Labour-
republicans as the ‘old gang’, was dealt a heavy blow by Lynch’s death.12  
 The republicanisation of the CTC, which had been ongoing since late 1917, accelerated 
as republicans were now poised to take control. The historic 1918 general election illustrates 
the extent to which republicanism now permeated Cork Labour. In the autumn of that year, 
O’Shannon had been approached by Sinn Féin to stand for the party as its second candidate in 
the Cork City constituency. He declined, citing his primary allegiance to the Irish Labour Party 
whose position on the election was still undecided. Liam de Róiste was selected instead.13 
While de Róiste was no socialist, rank-and-file trade unionists opposed a separate Labour 
candidate entering the race. De Róiste observed that there was little proletarian class 
consciousness in Cork. He believed that nationalism had a far greater hold over workers than 
class consciousness and that most would vote for Sinn Féin over Labour.14 As O’Mahony 
revealed to him, ‘everyone as far as I can judge . . . is against a fight between Labour and Sinn 
Féin’.15 De Róiste predicted that the CTC would split into republicans and constitutional 
nationalists if a Labour candidate was put forward.16 
 Hence, republican efforts to mobilise their trade unionists proved unnecessary as the 
Labour Party abstained from the election. It was a decision that cost them dearly. Having 
deferred to Sinn Féin, Labour received nothing in return. The 1918 Representation of the 
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People Act meant that the working class was now about three-quarters of the electorate. 
Prominent CTC members were central to the republican campaign. Trade-union leaders spoke 
at fifteen of the eighteen Sinn Féin election meetings.17 At one such rally, John Good 
proclaimed that ‘Labour and Sinn Féin were one and the same thing’. At the same meeting, de 
Róiste, in the most Bolshevik of rhetoric, told the crowd that ‘the day had come when the 
working classes would have power in the government of the country’. Later, Good announced 
that only a Sinn Féin victory could deliver the coveted ‘workers’ republic’.  No trade unionist 
spoke at any IPP rally or played any role in its campaign.18   
 
The motor permits strike 
The outbreak of the war of independence in January 1919 turned working-class attention to the 
national struggle as never before. Inevitably, throughout 1919 the fight for independence 
occupied the minds of Irish workers, even amid unprecedented class conflict. As the war 
intensified across Ireland, the British government issued a decree, known as the Motor Permits 
Order, stipulating that from 29 November 1919 motor vehicles could only be utilised with a 
permit. The order was designed to assist the authorities to monitor private transport, through 
which arms were being carried. The IADAMU refused to apply for permits and called its 
members out on strike. As one member put it, the order would force his union to co-operate 
with the authorities and turn it into a ‘semi-spy organisation’. They received unequivocal 
support from the trades council. Apart from uniting motor trade unions, Labour’s opposition to 
the order was deepening its commitment to national independence. Cork’s IADAMU branch 
successfully petitioned the Harbour Board, the Board of Guardians and the Corporation to hold 
a rally against the order at the City Hall on 28 November. Over 200 people attended the 
meeting. A committee was formed to co-ordinate opposition, a deputation from which was 
well-received by the CTC, which strongly backed the protest.19   
 By early 1920, however, the strike began to dissipate. By 6 January, it was reported that 
there was a ‘tendency to apply for permits.’ On 8 February, the strike was called off by the 
IADAMU executive, though it persisted in Cork a few more days.20 The strike demonstrated 
the potential power that Labour could exert. At the 1920 ITUC annual conference, James 
Hickey reported that his union, the NUDL, had completely stopped motor traffic in Cork. 
Likewise, Richard Anthony claimed that the Cork printers were ready to support the strike by 
any means necessary but were halted by their national executive.21  
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 Across Ireland, republican involvement in the motor permits strike appears to have been 
minor and, where it did occur, a product of local initiative rather than national endeavour. Like 
the conscription strike before it and the April 1920 strike and the munitions embargo after it, 
the motor permits stoppage stemmed from Labour initiative and retained an independent 
character. It was Irish Labour’s first instance of direct support for the republicans. The 
deepening of republican sentiment within Cork Labour continued and helped to advance 
working-class interests. By subverting British institutional authority in Ireland and establishing 
rival institutions of state, the republicans undermined the legitimacy of heretofore recognised 
authority. Additionally, the IRA’s armed campaign crippled state agencies of power, especially 
the military and the police. The revolutionary nature of the independence struggle and its 
popular support further radicalised proletarian agitation, even if the republicans were slow to 
reciprocate.22 British attempts to portray Sinn Féin as a Bolshevik front organisation were 
regarded by local republicans as a reincarnation of the absurd German Plot. De Róiste believed 
it was a ploy to get ‘Bishops and moneyed men on the British side’.23  
 
Cork Labour and the 1920 local elections 
While Cork Sinn Féiners were no crypto-Bolsheviks, local trade unionists were no less 
enamoured by them. The republicanisation of Cork Labour peaked in the municipal elections 
of 15 January 1920. The British government had introduced proportional representation to 
Ireland to undermine republican electoral success. In Cork, as in other parts of Ireland, the 
ITGWU publicly nailed its republican colours to the mast by running on a joint ticket with Sinn 
Féin. The coalition contested all districts and won thirty seats out of a possible forty-nine, 
giving them a four-seat majority on the Corporation. The trades council ran twelve candidates 
in five districts for the Labour Party, three of whom – Kelleher, Egan and John Murphy – were 
elected. Little was new in the CTC’s manifesto. It ran on a programme that offered a class 
analysis of Irish society, promising medical treatment for children, provisional of school meals, 
scholarships, direct labour on public works and trade-union rates for Corporation employees.24 
Day, Kenneally and Good were among the Labour republicans while Sir John Scott and 
Alderman Richard Beamish, both Unionists, were elected for the pro-establishment 
Commercial Party.25  
 But the trades council had proven itself to be as politically irrelevant as ever, even in 
this radicalised political climate where the potential for proletarian advances was never greater. 
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As de Róiste noted, ‘Labour, official or otherwise, has done very badly. These elections clearly 
show that the appeal to a war between classes is not a very moving one in Ireland’.26 But the 
results contradict this assertion. Nationally, Labour had its best ever municipal election and 
returned 324 candidates. Sinn Féin returned 422, compared to 213 nationalists and 297 
Unionists. Labour secured one-quarter of the vote, second only to Sinn Féin, which secured 
one-third of it.27 Craft union constitutional nationalism lingered in Cork’s Labour movement. 
The ITGWU had wanted the trades council’s nominees to take a republican pledge, much to 
the annoyance of the Typographical Association which refused to fund the campaigns of such 
candidates.28  
 
Labour and Lord Mayor Tomás Mac Curtain 
The next great show of Labour support for the republic emanated the new Sinn Féin-ITGWU 
Corporation. On 21 March, at a special meeting convened to condemn the murder of Lord 
Mayor Tomás Mac Curtain by the RIC, the trades council passed the following resolution: 
 
That we, the Cork and District Trades and Labour Council, representing the organised workers 
of Cork, place on record our abhorrence of the dastardly murder by the enemies of Ireland of 
revered Lord Mayor, Alderman Tomás MacCurtain; and that we tender to Mrs. Mac Curtain, 
family and relatives our sincerest sympathies, and that we call on all workers, wherever 
possible, to cease work to-morrow to pay a tribute of respect to the memory of the late 
Republican Lord Mayor of this city, whom all Ireland to-day mourns.29 
 
The one-day general strike in Cork was duly observed by all council affiliates.30 The trades 
council had acted on its own initiative. This was a localised action not called by the ITUC. 
Although Cork Labour had long supported nationalist political causes, this strike was its first 
independent act of direct solidarity with the republicans. Across Ireland, the most significant 
industrial actions all had strong republican dimensions; gone were the days when Labour’s sole 





The April 1920 general strike 
It is indicative of Irish Labour’s political transformation that its biggest protest of the era was 
another political action: the general strike called by the ITUC on 13 April 1920 for the release 
of republican hunger-strikers at Mountjoy Prison and Wormwood Scrubs.32 The strike, which 
lasted for two days, was a resounding success. Like April 1918, Cork was brought to an 
industrial and commercial standstill. ‘Not a shop is open. The trams are off the street  . . . Even 
the hackney cars are off the stands. Railway termini are closed. Ships at the quayside are there 
untouched . . . all schools are on ‘holiday’. Solicitors’ offices are also closed and the business 
of the Cork Quarter Sessions Court had to be adjourned for the day’.33 As Róiste noted, ‘the 
stoppage was even more complete than during the anti-Conscription crisis . . . the postal 
officials also ceased work’.34 Even some bakers and breadvan drivers struck despite being 
ordered not to. A mass meeting of workers under trades council supervision was held at the 
City Hall where George Nason – a vehicle builder and current council president – promised 
Labour’s utmost support for the republicans.35 
     
The munitions embargo 
Though not as comprehensive as the April 1920 strike, the era’s most momentous Labour 
endeavour was another political action: the embargo on the transportation of military forces 
and munitions by Irish railwaymen and dockers. It began at Dublin’s North Wall on 24 May. 
Two days later, two of Cork’s NUR branches (Nos. 1 and 3) resolved to bring the embargo 
Leeside. The same meeting passed a resolution criticising their national executive for not 
backing the action and called on the ITUC to direct it. That the NUR now obeyed Congress 
rather than its own national executive is indicative of both the depth of its republicanism and 
the alienation of the Irish NUR from their executive. On 23 May, the Cork NUR had demanded 
greater autonomy from London and an additional 20s. for their members, the same claim that 
had been put forth in Britain. Dockers joined the embargo on 5 June when they refused to 
unload barbed wire from a ship and to raise Brian Boru drawbridge to allow it to pass.36 The 
military unloaded munitions ships over the coming weeks.37 In late July, a strike was averted 
on the tramways when certain workers agreed to contribute to the fund established to aid the 
railwaymen, having previously refused to do so.38 
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 The national embargo lasted until 21 December and crippled the British government’s 
attempts to counter the IRA insurgency.39 The strike was loudly championed by the CTC which 
raised funds for the 1,200 victimised railwaymen. The council had sent about £300-400 a week 
to Dublin to sustain the battle. In July, the council accused the ASE of blacklegging and 
undermining the struggle when its members at Victoria (now Collins) Barracks continued to 
repair military vehicles. By now, Labour had no qualms about acting as a republican auxiliary 
body. The growth of republicanism among workers meant that notions of class consciousness, 
trade union agitation, political independence and anti-militarism all became deeply intertwined. 
Cork Labour increasingly viewed its struggle as a matter of politics rather than industrial 
relations.40          
  
The growth of Irish unions 
Given the political context and their industrial grievances, it is not surprising that Cork workers 
were drifting towards Irish unions with a republican philosophy. The ITGWU was not the only 
beneficiary of this. By 1920, most Irish artisans were still affiliated to British craft unions with 
little understanding of or sympathy for their Irish members. They were hostile to what they 
considered to be political actions like the motor permits strike and the munitions embargo. In 
January 1920, the executive of the ASE – Britain’s largest craft union – rescinded its support 
for the boycott of motor permits and other unions soon followed suit. Consequently, on 9 May 
1920 craft workers gathered in Dublin’s Abbey Theatre to launch a new Irish union for the 
trades: the Irish Engineering, Shipbuilding and Foundry Trades Union (IESFTU).41 It aimed to 
represent fitters, turners, patternmakers, engineers, blacksmiths, machinists, brass finishers, 
iron and brass moulders, electricians, boilermakers and allied workers. It immediately 
embarked upon setting up a Cork branch and one was reported by 1 July. On 9 August, the 
branch was formally launched at a public meeting at which Lord Mayor Terence MacSwiney 
spoke.42 The IESFTU had been formed with the goal of uniting all Irish artisans into a ‘One 
Big Union’. For this reason, it received republican sponsorship from the beginning. It quickly 
became a powerful craft union and took over members from many of the amalgamateds.43  
 In August 1920, labourers at the Passage West Dockyard seceded from Ben Tillett’s 
Dock, Wharf, Riverside and General Labourers’ Union – its only Irish branch – to join the 
ITGWU on ‘national grounds’.44 The ITGWU had long targeted this union, which had 
expanded its operations in Cork since 1917. Although both unions had taken joint action in 
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March, by June the British union was complaining of the ITGWU’s ‘unfair activities’ and its 
use of ‘political propaganda to make our men secede’.45 However, when amalgamation took 
place, Tillett’s union was magnanimous:  
 
We do not begrudge the other Union the success of its effort to get the men to transfer; we have 
no animosity in our hearts; on the contrary, we hope the Irish workers will progress 
industrially.46  
 
Likewise, by 1920 the Shop Assistants were very anxious to leave Ireland, with several 
speakers supporting a proposal to do so at that year’s annual conference. However, a 
withdrawal was deferred for twelve months because of the political situation. As the War of 
Independence intensified, with reprisals and counter-reprisals becoming more common, the 
Shop Assistants’ Union collapsed in many parts of Ireland. At the 1921 conference, a transfer 
of Irish membership over to the IDAA was announced. It was conducted in a very amicable 
fashion.47 The IDAA was now the dominant union in the distributive trades. In the same 
nationalistic spirit, Cork Labour joined with Sinn Féin and the business establishment by 
contributing generously to distress relief funds established to aid workers who had been 
expelled from the Belfast shipyards in July and helped to enforce the Belfast boycott.48 
 The impact of nationalism and industrial unionism on Irish Labour can be gauged by 
the number and nature of Congress’s affiliates. In 1916, nineteen of the thirty-seven affiliates 
were British-based; five years later, only thirteen of the forty-two affiliates were British, 
representing less than 25 per cent of ITUC membership.49 Between 1917 and 1923, eleven new 
Irish unions were founded by breakaways from the amalgamateds, four of which adopted an 
industrial union structure. The IUDWC, created from the IDAA in October 1921, was the most 
salient example of this endeavour and represented a partially successful venture in industrial 
unionism. The INPDATU’s Cork branch was set up in July 1921 by about half of the local 
National Amalgamated Society of Operative House and Ship Painters and Decorators breaking 
away.50 The rise of Irish unions shifted Irish Labour’s centre of gravity from north to south.51 
 The ITGWU, the greatest exponents of Labour-republicanism, grew enormously in 
Cork throughout this period. Its expansion is significant as it was not necessarily replicated in 
other Irish centres despite an extremely favourable industrial and political climate. For 
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example, it struggled to dislodge the NUDL and other British unions in Waterford city between 
1916 and 1920.52 Shortly after the 1920 brewery strike in Cork, the labourers opted to merge 
their union with the ITGWU; it already organised the maltsters.53 That August alone, the Cork 
branch subsumed the National Union of Gas and General Labourers, the Workers’ Union and 
the Irish National Union of Vintners’ and Grocers’ Allied Trade Assistants. In October 1921, 
it received a major boost when James Hickey joined and brought what was left of the NUDL 
with him. It also took over the Farriers’ Society. Hickey and his union had been targets since 
at least February of that year. In December 1921, the ITGWU had 9,022 members in Cork city. 
In 1922, the Cork IAWU – which became the Irish Mental Hospital Workers’ Union later that 
year – the Amalgamated Musicians’ Union and the IADUMU all transferred. In April 1923, 
the NSFU branch followed suit.54 
 
Cork Labour and the republican courts 
As they offered prompt settlements of disputes with binding arbitration, both employers and 
unions recognised the courts that republicans had set up to undermine British rule. They were 
formally established by Dáil decree in July 1920, having been operational since June 1919.55 
While republicans sympathised with Labour goals, Irish independence, in their minds, 
demanded national unity. Internal class conflict was therefore seen as a threat.56 The courts 
were popular among Irish workers as they were quite kind to them. In June 1920, in one of the 
first industrial disputes in Ireland involving the ITGWU arbitrated upon by the republicans, a 
Dáil arbitration court gave carters in Cork minimum wages of 62s. 6d. for a single horseman 
and 68s. 6d. for a double horseman (their peak wages), a forty-eight-hour week and six paid 
holidays a year.57 The ease with which the ITGWU co-operated with the republican 
administration undoubtedly contributed to the authorities’ view of it as subversive. In October 
1920, its hall on Camden Place was raided by the British military. On 12 November, it was 
burned down by the Black and Tans, a month before the rest of the city centre suffered the 
same fate. The Tans had previously smashed up the hall on 2 August.58 
 The most notable intervention by Cork republicans in a labour dispute was in September 
1920. The ITGWU had brought out the milkmen at Douglas, Lehanagh and Bishopstown for 
higher wages, rendering milk in short supply in the city. It then spread to the farm labourers 
who wanted 15s. above the Agricultural Wages Board rate and a 100s. harvest bonus. After 
initially refusing arbitration, strikers forcibly blocked milk supplies to the city, placed pickets 
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on the roads and attacked delivery vehicles. The men were infuriated when the Cork city IRA 
began protecting these wagons. Most of those on strike were members of the same IRA 
company that was scabbing. Fearing a split, both the IRA and ITGWU rushed to arrange an 
arbitration hearing at a republican court, which was reluctantly accepted by the men. The 
prompt resolution of the strike came as a relief to everyone and the men re-joined the IRA.59
   
Labour and Lord Mayor Terence MacSwiney 
The political environment continued to intensify Labour’s republicanism. Throughout the latter 
months of 1920, political concerns, especially regarding MacSwiney, dominated Labour 
discourse. On 12 August, MacSwiney was arrested in a military raid on City Hall and jailed in 
Brixton Prison. He immediately went on hunger strike. MacSwiney was popular among Cork 
trade unionists and had addressed the 1920 ITUC annual conference, which was held in Cork.60 
On 19 August, the CTC issued the following declaration: 
 
That we, the members of the Cork and District Trade and Labour Council, condemn in the 
strongest possible manner the inhuman treatment meted out to our Lord Mayor and other 
political prisoners at present confined in English and Irish goals; that we further condemn the 
action of the Government in deporting these prisoners to England as most inhuman and 
barbarous, seeing that they had been already several days without food, and were as a 
consequence unable even to stand, and we hereby pledge, on behalf of Labour here, our fullest 
support in bringing about their release.61 
 
Five days later, it conducted a one-hour strike in support of MacSwiney and the republican 
hunger strikers imprisoned in Cork gaol.62  
 In September, a trades council delegation tried to visit the prisoners to assess their 
condition but were refused entry. Throughout that month, the council also campaigned against 
a British Act of Parliament allowing landlords to increase rents on their tenants by up to 30 per 
cent. Instead, it obeyed a Dáil Éireann decree that permitted a maximum rent increase of 15 
per cent.63 That the trades council utilised an institution of Dáil Éireann, an illegal body since 
September 1919, rather than the British Ministry of Labour is emblematic of its political 
transformation. On 22 September, the CTC called another hour-long stoppage to facilitate 
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workers attending a special mass for MacSwiney. The council subsequently adjourned for the 
duration of the hunger strike to protest the Lord Mayor’s treatment.64 On 15 October, a third 
mass stoppage took place to allow workers to attend another mass in the Lord Mayor’s honour. 
By then, the patience of some employers was running thin. Though Ford’s had warned that any 
walkout without permission would result in dismissal, its employees were undeterred. Plant 
manager Edward Grace, an American, shut down the factory with the intention of keeping it 
closed until he could replace those who went out. Intervention from J.J. Walsh TD spared these 
workers – whose actions were praised by Deputy Lord Mayor Donal O’Callaghan – their jobs.65 
MacSwiney died in Brixton Prison on 25 October after seventy-four days on hunger strike. The 
next day, the CTC held a special meeting and unanimously declared: 
 
That we, the members of the Cork and District Trade and Labour Council, extend to the Lady 
Mayoress, the brothers and sisters of the late Lord Mayor, his colleagues of the Corporation 
and his comrades of the Irish Volunteers, our deepest sympathy in the loss they have sustained; 
that we emphatically condemn the tyranny which has caused his untimely end in foreign 
dungeon, and we call upon the workers of Cork to hold themselves in readiness for any call that 
may be issued to register this sympathy and show their appreciation of his great sacrifice for 
land and liberty.66  
 
In conformity with the ITUC, the CTC ordered its members to cease work on 29 
October as a tribute to MacSwiney. A few days later, representatives from the trades council 
and affiliated unions attended his funeral.67 MacSwiney’s hunger strike resonated across the 
world, especially among the working class. Several British trades councils and Labour Party 
branches had passed resolutions vociferously condemning their government’s treatment of him 








From Truce to Treaty and back to war 
Cork Labour’s actions during the MacSwiney affair served to reinforce in the public mind, and 
in working-class consciousness, the commonality of interests between Labour and 
republicanism. This strongly militated against the formation of an independent Labour identity 
in the public sphere. The trades council discussed few of the several industrial disputes at this 
time. Instead, it regularly adjourned to protest the British government. Labour’s preoccupation 
with the country’s political situation meant it was poorly prepared for the employers’ 
offensive.69 Following MacSwiney’s death, there was a lull in class conflict until mid-1921 as 
the national struggle took priority. However, the truce lessened the need for cross-class, 
national unity, resulting in the re-emergence of unrest across Ireland. The first three months 
after the truce saw a dramatic surge in class conflict. A major reason for this was the incipient 
breakdown in the republican-Labour alliance that had brought the British to the negotiating 
table. As O’Shannon warned in his presidential address to the 1921 annual conference of the 
ITUC: 
 
 . . . we, as a Labour movement, are not bound to the tail of the Dáil or even to the very gallant 
men and women who have put the Dáil in the position it is today – I refer to the members of 
the IRA – because at any moment in industrial troubles we may have to fight some of them, 
and keep as clear of them as we did of the British Army.70 
 
In contrast to the city’s commercial classes, Cork Labour, like the ITUC, abstained from the 
Treaty debate and urged its membership to remain neutral. A meaningless call for a ‘workers’ 
republic’ and a plebiscite to decide the issue was all that union officials could muster.71 Even 
the leadership of the ITGWU, famously militant and republican, urged neutrality from its 
membership on the Treaty.72  
 From the truce to the end of the civil war, employers felt inhibited by the instability and 
lack of effective policing. They had been forced to put their counterattack on hold. By the 
Spring of 1922, much of the ‘Munster republic’ remained beyond the Provisional 
Government’s reach. Cork was in the hands of anti-Treatyites unable to police the city and 
counter the increasing lawlessness. Thus, on 13 April the Lord Mayor formed a committee 
comprised of representatives from both Chambers of Commerce, the Harbour Board, the 
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Corporation and the CTC to address policing.73 Labour had no representative at a meeting held 
later that month to discuss the foundation of the force, whereas representatives from both 
Chambers of Commerce were present. In the meantime, the business class took matters into its 
own hands. The two Chambers of Commerce and the CEF established a temporary police force 
to protect their property and re-establish their hegemony. It was established with contributions 
of £1,000 from Cork’s leading merchants who also loaned male staff to it. This employer-
controlled police force lasted until mid-August when it was replaced by another ad hoc force.74  
 The political situation was spiralling out of control. On 13 April, the IRA began an 
occupation of the Four Courts in Dublin that would provoke civil war. The ITUC executive 
decided to act to stop the slide into fratricidal violence. On 24 April, it brought out Free State 
workers in a one-day strike against ‘the spirit of militarism’. It was the third time in four years 
that Labour had brought Cork to a standstill: 
 
All the city banks were closed, as well as the General Post Office. . . Work of all kinds was 
suspended, train, tram and transport services ceased, and the city, with its closed shops and 
shuttered windows, presented a lonely aspect, which, however, in its gloom of silence, supplied 
an earnest of the people’s determination to stand by those who are striving for peace in the 
country.75 
 
Vast numbers of workers gathered in what was possibility Cork’s biggest ever union meeting. 
As in 1918 and 1920, several working-class bands partook. The attendees listened to anti-war 
speeches from prominent trade unionists that condemned both sides of the split and 
unanimously backed the ITUC executive.76 This ineffective action was indicative of the return 
of Labour ambiguity and ambivalence towards the national question. Whereas Labour’s 
attitude to Sinn Féin during the war of independence can be summarised as ‘first the republic, 
then the workers’ republic’, Congress now felt that the Treaty split was a ‘plague on both your 
houses’.77   
 Nevertheless, its stance was popular with Cork’s working class. In the general election 
of 16 June 1922, Robert Day, the Labour Party candidate, topped the poll in an emphatic 
victory. He defeated two strong candidates fielded by the city’s commercial class: Frank Daly, 
pro-Treaty merchant and the Harbour Commission chairman, and Richard Beamish, the famous 
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brewer.78 Nationally, Labour had surpassed all expectations as it benefited from anti-Treaty 
losses; non-republican parties gained over 78 per cent of the popular vote. Labour won 
seventeen out of the eighteen seats it contested.79 That so many ITGWU members, including 
Day, could stand for election without internal dissent in their union demonstrates that Irish 
syndicalism was more sympathetic to parliamentarianism than other syndicalist movements – 
like France and the US – where the rancorous debates on the issue occurred.80 But once again 
events moved too fast for Labour. On 27 June 1922, Free State troops began shelling the Four 
Courts to dislodge the IRA units that had occupied the buildings. The Irish Civil War had 
begun. The IRA quickly cut off Cork from the rest of the country and established military rule. 
The ‘Cork republic’ was born.    
  
Labour and the Cork republic 
Initially, both capital and Labour sought accommodation with the republican regime. However, 
the civil war quickly scuppered any such possibility. The anti-Treatyites regularly seized 
commercial vehicles, which damaged the local economy. Still, merchants agreed to keep their 
businesses open and to share among themselves the costs of this commandeering. To bolster 
their war effort, the IRA occupied the Customs House and Inland Revenue office on the South 
Mall and redirected to themselves the taxation merchants paid on goods flowing through the 
Port of Cork. In 1920 and 1921, many citizens and businesses boycotted the British 
administration and did not pay their rates and/or income taxes. Republicans estimated that they 
could recover one-third of this, horrifying the bourgeoisie who had enjoyed tax-free profits for 
two years.81 
 The republicans also faced hostility from Ford’s, Cork’s largest employer. IRA 
engineers tried to commandeer pig iron for the construction of grenades and mines. Grace 
warned them that if they seized anything, he would close the factory, costing 2,000 jobs. Ford’s 
was left alone.82 The exigencies of guerrilla war meant that the IRA administration was 
alienating the merchant classes, creating a real possibility to engage Labour. Trade unionists 
met the IRA to discuss how the war would affect unemployment. Labour leaders were similarly 
fearful that a siege of the city would lead to famine. In response, O’Callaghan established the 
‘Cork Food Committee’ to protect local supplies. The committee ensured the continuation of 
Cork’s commercial life.83 But a republican-Labour alliance would never materialise, and trade 
unionists joined with the two Chambers of Commerce in calling for an end to the violence. On 
222 
 
17 July, Labour helped to initiate the peace movement at a special conference attended by local 
civil society organisations. Here, trade unionists rubbed shoulders with the commercial elite 
and established the People’s Rights Association, which demanded an end to hostilities and a 
reconvening of the Dáil. A week later, a delegation from the Association, which included 
Nason, met the Minister for Education Eoin MacNeill to discuss the civil war. Nason implored 
the minister to reconvene the Dáil, but to no avail.84  
 Labour’s hostility toward the republican occupation is unsurprising given how badly 
workers were suffering. Isolation brought by severed telegraph and mail services caused the 
economy, already in recession, to drip into depression. Drapery shops shut their doors for want 
of stock. Railway and quayside workers were often fired due to the lack of shipping into the 
city. After a year of poor trade, in mid-July the Lee Boot Factory closed, having sought wage 
cuts earlier that year.85 Fuel shortages threatened to shut down Ford’s, whose famously high 
wages were vital for the local economy. Ford’s mechanics earned 120s. a week, 8s. more than 
the local standard rate, and its labourers earned 2s. 1d. per hour, more than building tradesmen 
earned.86 Though IRA officers forbade the GSWR to discharge its staff if train services were 
disrupted, they struggled to halt the haemorrhaging of jobs.87 Thus, the working class continued 
to suffer. As one Free State officer reported:  
 
A man, on seeing some lorries with armed men pass by, said to his companion: ‘if they were as 
hungry as we are, they would not have much stomach for fight’’ . . .  There are many men with 
them (the anti-Treatyites) who will fight only half-heartedly; with such men it is a case of bread 
and butter. Many of them would have joined the National Army had they the opportunity of 
doing so.88 
  
After two-year delay, the Corporation-backed reconstruction of Cork began, promising work 
in the building trade.89 
 Unemployment was approaching 8,000, more than 30 per cent of the male workforce. 
The ITGWU claimed that it had 1,800 idle members, many of whom were homeless. 
Unemployment was so acute that a ‘Cork Unemployed Central Committee’ was established 
with CTC and ITGWU support.90 The trades council demanded that the republicans do 
something to stop ‘the cry of hungry children and starving workers.’ Complaining of IRA 
indifference, Nason commented that ‘thousands and thousands are starving in the city, and who 
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cares?’.91 In early August, the Cork ITGWU prepared to call a general strike to stop the 
fighting, which the Cork Ex-Soldiers Federation promised to join.92 Tensions between Labour 
and the republicans continued to mount, as typified by Richard Anthony’s contribution to the 
1922 Congress: 
 
as far as Cork city is concerned. . . under the present regime there are people afraid really to 
speak out what is in the back of their minds. . . we are living under a most intolerable militaristic 
system in Cork City today. . . I have seen examples of Republican militarism in Cork City, 
which would be enough to make any Irishman blush.93 
 
The CTC had condemned IRA censorship of the Examiner and the Constitution because it was 
costing printers their jobs.94 One such typographer, Richard Cody, asserted that ‘the 
unemployed were indifferent to the government of the country whether they were Republicans 
or Free Staters, but a settlement must come’.95 On Monday 8 August, posters appeared 
announcing a mass meeting of the unemployed for the following Sunday. However, events 
overtook Labour. That same Monday, National Army troops sailed into Cork Harbour. The 
ensuing Battle for Cork resulted in a decisive victory for the Free State, which took control of 
the city on 10 August.96 
 
Labour and the anti-Treatyites 
Having lost Cork, the IRA was forced to conduct guerrilla warfare against the National Army. 
The republican administration had been quite efficient, having operated a competent system of 
taxation on Cork’s largest businesses. Accordingly, had the anti-Treatyites adopted a social 
programme, they may well have received far more favourably by the working class. Instead, 
the regime brought nothing for the proletariat, which deepened Labour’s disenchantment with 
the republicans. With the Free State now in control, the capitalists could fulfil their aims with 
state approval.97  
 After the Cork republic, the estrangement between Labour and the republicans gathered 
pace. An essential component of the IRA’s campaign was the destruction of railway 
infrastructure, which isolated the city and incurred immense financial losses for the railway 
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companies. Services were closed and wage cuts and redundancies carried out to pay for repairs. 
In August, the Muskerry and the Bandon dismissed many of its staff. The next month, the 
Blackrock and Passage closed, the Muskerry engaged in another purge of employees, and the 
Macroom Railway sacked many of its station washers and clerks. In October, the Muskerry 
estimated that a 25 per cent wage reduction for its full-time staff was needed if the company 
was to survive.98 A month later, the Bandon decided to dismiss its clerical staff after 1 January 
1923 and re-employ them as caretakers at two-thirds salary.99 Even more alarming was the 
IRA’s declaration in August that workers who assisted the Free State, like repairing damaged 
railways, were legitimate targets for execution.100 In response, the government established the 
Railway Protection, Repair and Maintenance Corps within the National Army in October 1922. 
The corps largely consisted of unemployed railwaymen and operated until the civil war’s 
end.101 By early 1923, four Cork railway companies were still not operating: the Blackrock, 
the Bandon, the Macroom, and the Schull and Skibbereen Railway. Roughly 1,000 railwaymen 
were unemployed as a result.102 
 Railwaymen were not the only workers in Cork who were feeling increasingly 
estranged from the anti-Treatyites. Before it evacuated Cork, the IRA smashed the presses of 
the Unionist Constitution and the Treaty-supporting Examiner, resulting in more job losses in 
the printing trade. On 21 September, these actions were condemned by the trades council, 
which demanded an end to the violence. On 5 October, the government issued an amnesty for 
IRA men who handed in their weapons by 15 October. The CTC supported the offer, purporting 
that Cork’s high unemployment was because of the activities of armed men.103 Out of a 
population of 78,000, Cork had 10-12,000 unemployed citizens. Consequentially, when 
families are included, around 50,000 people were struggling daily to avoid starvation. About 
4-5,000 of the jobless were not receiving any unemployment benefit.104 In November, the 
trades council ‘respectfully urged’ the government to release Mary MacSwiney, sister of 
Terence, who was on hunger strike from Mountjoy Jail as ‘public opinion was strongly against 
it’. On the council’s behalf, the following month Dowling tried to bring an end to the hostilities 
but to no avail.105  
 Working-class support for, or at least acceptance of, the Treaty presented an awkward 
reality for republicans considering that so much of their class-infused rhetoric was aimed at the 
Free State government’s bourgeois character. Moreover, it refutes simplistic Marxist 
arguments of a clear class basis to the conflict. Naturally, the recession spurred much working-
class recruitment into the National Army, a useful solution for the government to the social 
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problems created by the high unemployment. The republican response vacillated between 
sympathy for the workers and a moralistic, puritanical hostility typical of Irish middle-class 
prejudice. Recruits were often denounced in explicitly class-based terms: ‘undesirables’, 
‘criminals’, ‘low caste hirelings’, ‘gutter scoundrels’, ‘tramps’, ‘tinkers’, ‘Soupers’, etc.106 Free 
State rhetoric was little better and similarly infused with bourgeois, anti-working-class bias. 
Republican volunteers were dismissed as ‘of pot-house derivation’, ‘city scum’, ‘tramps and 
wasters’, ‘corner boys’ and ‘the dregs of society’, i.e., as lazy, feckless individuals with a 
parasitic relationship to the ‘respectable’. This outlook manifested itself in Treatyite fears that 
republicans posed an incipient threat to the very social order itself, implicitly revealing the Free 
State’s reactionary nature. Furthermore, it suggests a post-colonial dynamic of mental 
colonisation where the attitudes of the departing power are embraced by the nationalist 
revolutionaries who displaced it.107   
 Accordingly, when the civil war ended in May 1923 both republicans and Free Staters 
were as antipathetic to Labour as Labour was to them. What had Labour received from 
investing so much in Sinn Féin and their revolution since 1917? Everything it asked for: self-
determination, neutrality towards the wages movement, a safe space for direct action, toleration 
of red flag radicalism and an extraordinary prestige for local and national Labour officials. That 
it should have asked for more is another matter.108  
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Derry Labour and the Irish Revolution, 1917-21 
 
The 1917 annual meeting of the ITUC, which was held in Derry, revealed the emerging gulf 
between northern and southern Labour on the war and constitutional nationalism. Congress 
voted to send delegates to the proposed socialist peace conference in Stockholm. McCarron 
and Logue, both of whom supported the war, spoke against it; Cassidy spoke in favour. Cassidy 
was Derry Labour’s primary link to the Dublin leadership. He had topped the poll in the 
elections to the executive and was its vice-chairman in 1917 and chairman in 1918. McCarron, 
on the other hand, was becoming estranged by the turn from Labour-nationalism to republican-
socialism. He strongly opposed a motion at the 1917 conference for a ‘Federation of Labour’ 
as he feared it would wipe out the amalgamateds. Later, he disobeyed Congress by taking a 
seat at the Irish Convention which ITUC and southern trades councils boycotted. By the 1918 
Congress, Logue had changed his position on Labour and the national question. He supported 
the Labour Party’s decision (over which Cassidy presided) to abstain from the coming general 
election as he agreed that Labour candidates would split the nationalist vote.1 An orientation 
towards Dublin had begun within Derry Labour and it would only get stronger as time 
progressed.  
 
The 1918 anti-conscription strike 
Like most of Ireland, Derry Labour’s most significant act in 1918 had nothing to do with an 
industrial grievance. Rather, it was its participation in the general strike against the imposition 
of conscription in Ireland. It had taken until then for the trades council to fall in line with Labour 
in the south by speaking in socialist terms and adopting a critical-to-hostile stance on the war. 
On 21 April, Derry’s NUR branch passed a resolution condemning conscription and demanding 
a national referendum on the matter.2 The NUR primarily represented the railways’ lower 
grades, where Catholics dominated. Two days later, the Sentinel published a statement from 
indignant Unionist railwaymen that claimed that they had not been invited to the meeting and 
they repudiated it in its entirety. The separate organs of the press reflected Derry’s ethno-
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political divisions and therefore made no pretence towards impartiality or balance. The Journal 
called the strike a ‘great demonstration of fidelity’; the Sentinel denounced it as a ‘coward’s 
day’.3 The strike inevitably deepened the political chasm dividing its proletariat. Sectors 
dominated by Catholics, especially in commercial and infrastructural work where unskilled 
labour prevailed, took part in the strike while many craftsmen and white-collar workers (most 
of whom were Protestant) were decidedly hostile. Nevertheless, as a majority nationalist city 
the stoppage was widespread. The Journal reported that Derry was ‘Sunday-like’ in 
appearance. Most of the dockers, grain millers, carters, engineering and shipyard workers 
partook, as did many tradesmen and shirt operatives. The anti-conscription pledge was 
‘extensively’ signed at local trades and labour halls. As employees of a nationalist paper, the 
Journal’s staff abstained from work. At the June monthly meeting of the trades council, Logue 
proposed a resolution of ‘emphatic protest’ against conscription that bound the council to 
support the ITUC. He persuaded Unionist delegates that conscription was purely a Labour 
question and the motion thus was passed by thirty-three votes to one.4 
 
The 1918 general election and the war of independence 
By the 1918 general election, held on 14 December, separatist feelings had heightened among 
Catholic workers. With an expanded franchise and no Labour Party competition, nationalists, 
Unionists and republicans all aggressively pursued the working-class vote. Anderson, the 
Unionist candidate, cited his record as a fair employer to highlight his pro-Labour credentials.5 
But Eoin MacNeill, the Antrim-born historian and Sinn Féin candidate, won the Londonderry 
City constituency for the Republic. Thus, Derry had a participant in the legendary first Dáil 
Éireann: the seventy-three Sinn Féin MPs who gathered in Dublin’s Mansion House on 21 
January 1919. MacNeill had previously visited Derry in September 1918 when he addressed a 
meeting of 2,500 people under the auspices of the city’s P.H. Pearse Cumann, which was 
formed only a month previously. The local Sinn Féin leadership tended to be younger than the 
IPP and more lower-middle class. Publicans, shopkeepers and clerks predominated with a 
sprinkle of teachers, lawyers and other professionals.6 As the first Dáil deliberated in Dublin, 
Irish Volunteers in Tipperary assassinated two RIC officers at Soloheadbeg. The Irish War of 
Independence had begun.7 Though working-class involvement in the struggle was minimal in 
Derry, there were examples of workers taking severe risks for the Republic. Edward 
McCafferty was a close associate of Peadar O’Donnell and a member of the IRA who 
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successfully smuggled weapons from Ulster to Dublin.8 The struggle for independence and 
against partition was increasingly occupying the minds of Derry’s Catholic workers, a 
preoccupation that would deepen as 1919 progressed and moved Labour to the left.  
     
The Ulster Unionist Labour Association 
This leftward shift terrified Dublin Castle. Sir John French, the Lord Lieutenant for Ireland, 
urged the British government to change its policy towards Irish Labour. Instead of trying to 
lure trade union leaders away from republicanism, French proposed the release of republican 
prisoners. It would, he argued, strengthen Sinn Féin’s moderate leadership who were no friends 
of Bolshevism: 
 
I did not, however, consider that the time was ripe for an actual move in the direction of an 
immediate release of the prisoners until the strikes in the North occurred and a very dangerous 
crisis was at hand which might plunge the whole country in disaster. Bolshevist propaganda 
was undoubtedly at the root of the strikes, and it came to my knowledge that a close alliance 
exists between the Bolshevik element and the advanced Sinn Féin section. Further, it became 
evident that this Bolshevik – advanced Sinn Féin – combination was utilising the case of the 
prisoners in England to cover their revolutionary aspiration. Moreover, I found out that this this 
junction with the Bolsheviks was condemned in the strongest manner by the real Sinn Féin 
leaders such as John McNeill, De Valera and Griffiths.9 
 
The Ulster Unionists were equally terrified of Protestants being won over to the Republic with 
Bolshevism, but they had a more dexterous way of dealing with it. The UULA had been 
formally constituted to contest the recent general election and it won three seats in working-
class loyalist areas of Belfast courtesy of its parent body, the Ulster Unionist Party. The UULA 
had a notional existence since 1911 when its establishment was proposed to combat any 
potential for Ulster Protestant support for Home Rule. Its goal was to stymy any growth in 
independent working-class consciousness among Protestants by offering them a forum within 
the Unionist Party. Sir Edward Carson was a staunch supporter of it. He hoped it would become 
a mechanism of Tory paternalism by incorporating Ulster into Britain’s conservative political 
culture thus avoiding the social upheaval and class conflict he feared in the post-war era.10 
Though a product of Ulster sectarianism, the UULA was not entirely divorced from the 
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conservative, narrow, defensive Labour advocacy also found in Britain at the time.11 Another 
innovation was the creation of the Ulster Workers’ Trade Union in December 1918, an overtly 
loyalist alternative to Irish unions and their apolitical British counterparts. Widely regarded as 
a ‘yellow union’, its secretary, James Turkington, had been a founding member of the UULA.12 
While the Ulster Workers’ Trade Union made little impact in Derry – though it tried to organise 
shirt operatives in 1920 – Turkington and his sectarian patronage of the Protestant working 
class did, albeit comparatively late.13  
By 18 January 1919, the UULA had established a branch in Derry with about 500 
members. It was formally launched on 14 February and claimed a membership of 700. Two 
weeks later, it held another meeting that elected Mayor Anderson as president. Henry A. 
Greenway, a member of the Postmen’s Federation, became vice-president and Alex 
McFarland, Alex Davies and Dealtry Thompson were elected honorary secretaries. Carson was 
made honorary president. The same meeting claimed that the branch already had 1,000 
members.14 The branch’s aims were to advance the Unionism by forming a Unionist 
employment bureau, maintaining a Unionist Corporation, and fostering harmonious relations 
between Unionist employers and Protestant workers. The UULA received a cordial welcome 
from the Derry Standard, which excoriated the ITUC for ‘its approval of the Bolshevist regime 
of terror in Russia’. 
 
It is absolutely necessary that the Unionist working men of the city in common with their 
fellows throughout the province should make it clear that the vast majority of workers in the 
one industrial province of Ireland are neither separatists or Revolutionaries. . . Irish labour 
leaders have ignored the opinions of Ulster Unionist workingmen on the Home Rule question. 
They have represented Irish labour as being solidly behind the Home Rule movement and are 
so enamoured of Sinn Féin aspirations and methods that they refused at the recent general 
election to nominated Labour candidates against the republican nominees.15 
 
Thompson suggested appointing an Orange Order man as secretary and thought that while the 
Unionist Clubs might be successful in Belfast, ‘they would not work successfully in Derry’.16  
The UULA immediately undertook a canvass of Derry’s factories and met Unionist 
employers there. Fiercely anti-socialist and anti-Bolshevik, it led the Unionist charge against 
the ‘revolutionary’ and ‘subversive’ ITUC.17 It had an open admirer in the Sentinel, which 
would later christen the ITUC as ‘Sinn Féin Labour’.18 The UULA made no secret of its 
sectarianism and became notorious for being more jealously Protestant than the Unionist Party 
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when Protestant jobs were at stake. When campaigning for the 1921 Northern Ireland 
parliamentary elections, Alderman John Mark, a future chairman of the UULA’s Derry branch, 
assured electors that his brother, a bacon curer on Foyle Street, employed no nationalists.19  
The UULA would regularly ‘play the Orange card’ to stop any perceived threat and did so with 
remarkable success. The trades council struggled to counteract its malign activities, as 
evidenced by the 1920 shirt cutters’ strike.  
After partition, the UULA turned its focus to defending the six-county state against the 
threat of the Boundary Commission.20 Derry’s nationalists put their hopes in the commission 
as it was assumed that it would propose transferring the city to the Free State. On 21 March 
1924, Thompson Donald, a Belfast Unionist-Labour MP, addressed the annual meeting of the 
UULA’s Derry branch, ‘that bigoted fraternity’ as the Derry People and Donegal News dubbed 
it. He urged his fellow Unionist workers to forcefully resist any attempt by the Boundary 
Commission to give an inch of Northern Ireland to the Free State. In an even more 
extraordinary outburst, to loud cheers he warned the British government that ‘we will take 
Donegal, whether you like it or not’. The UULA had been similarly aggressive about the 
Boundary Commission in 1922 and 1923.21   
 
The Motor Permits Order and sectarian splits 
Throughout 1919, Derry Labour grappled with how it should respond to and treat the ongoing 
national struggle for independence. It was a conundrum made explicit by its feeble response to 
the Motor Permits Order crisis. While most IADAMU branches went on strike against the 
order, not all did.22 On 7 December 1919, its Derry branch met to discuss how it should respond 
to the order. By thirty-three votes to five, it chose to work under the order’s oppressive 
strictures.23  
Derry’s lack of participation in the motor permits strike did nothing to dissuade 
Unionists. For many, Irish unions were irredeemably republican and Bolshevist, and Derry 
Labour was guilty by association. On 18 November 1919, the self-styled Londonderry 
Teachers’ Association – which had disaffiliated from the ITUC for political reasons in 
December 1918 – met and called on the government to give teachers in Ireland a higher scale 
of salaries.24 By November 1919, this Unionist teachers’ association had become the Derry 
branch of the Ulster Teachers’ Union (UTU). The UTU had been founded earlier in 1919 by 
disgruntled northern teachers antagonised by the INTO’s support for the general strike against 
conscription and its affiliation to the ‘frankly Bolshevist and Sinn Féin’ ITUC. The UTU’s 
origins lay in the Irish Protestant National Teachers’ Union, a caucus within the INTO.25 In 
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1919, the INTO noted the loss of its branches in Derry, Coleraine, Newtownards and Lisburn 
to the UTU. Unsurprisingly, the UTU was overtly conservative, as its president made clear in 
May 1920 when he declared that ‘as honest men we could not identify ourselves with the party 
of which Larkin was prophet and Connolly was the martyr’.26 Likewise, when the ASTI 
affiliated to Congress in 1920, it lost Protestant members in the north. However, perhaps out 
of loyalty, many Protestants stayed with both the INTO and the ASTI.27  
Working-class organisations instituted along sectarian lines were not the preserve of 
Unionists. In October 1919, Catholic workers in Derry established a ‘National Workers’ 
Association’ to counteract the UULA. Its professed aim was ‘to safeguard its members from 
loss of employment because of religious or national beliefs; to provide assistance as far as 
possible in case of victimisation; to promote harmony and smooth working between members 
and employers, and to strengthen and consolidate their position in the city.’28 In response, the 
Unionist Belfast Newsletter warned: 
 
Sinn Féiners, Separatists and the Bolshevists are at work . . . As an example of their methods 
we may refer to the formation in Derry of a ‘National Workers’ Association’ . . . a Roman 
Catholic and Sinn Féin organisation and its object is sectarian and not industrial. The suggestion 
that workers lose their employment because they are Roman Catholics and Nationalists is 
baseless; but in Belfast and other parts of Ulster Nationalists came from the South and West to 
take the places of men who joined the Army, and they have no cause of complaint if they are 
required to make way for these men when they have returned after fighting for their King and 
country. That is not ‘victimisation’ but simple justice. . . It is only by maintaining the Union 
that justice for all classes can be secured. It is a guarantee of liberty and progress, and the Ulster 
Unionist Labour Association is taking a prominent part in its defence.29 
 
The National Workers’ Association made little or no impact.  
 Besides the ITGWU, Irish unions were similarly ineffectual in Derry during this period. 
The city had small branches of the Irish National Union of Vintners’ and Grocers’ Allied Trade 
Assistants and the IDAA/IUDWC. Likewise, a branch of the Irish Tailors’ and Tailoresses’ 
Union – founded in Dublin in October 1918 to compete with the ASTT – had existed since 
October 1919. With sections for men and women, its chairman was Sinn Féin councillor Robert 
McAnaney.30 There are no records of any of these unions calling a strike, putting forward wage 
claims or organising Protestants. The IADAMU was the dominant union among Corporation 
235 
 
motormen. In February 1921, it had threatened to take ‘drastic action’ unless the Corporation 
compel ‘nons’ to join it.31 Local asylum attendants joined the IAWU upon its foundation in 
October 1917. Of the four Ulster branches of the Dublin-based Ancient Guild of Incorporated 
Brick and Stonelayers that existed in 1914, Derry was the only one that was still there in 1924. 
However, no local branches of the ICWU, the INPDATU or the IESFTU/IEIU were launched 
during this time, even though ‘a certain amount of support’ was reported for the establishment 
of an IESFTU branch.32 Ulster Protestant animosity was something no Irish union could 
overcome, as some trade unionists conceded. At its 1919 annual conference, the IDAA reported 
rising membership everywhere except Belfast. The city was ‘hopeless’, the president  
announced, adding that ‘they seemed to view everything south of the Boyne with suspicion’.33  
 
Derry Labour and the 1920 local elections  
Industrial relations in Derry were calm in the first half of 1920, part to the political turmoil that 
the city underwent. The 1920 municipal elections saw it starkly divided. But the trouble was 
only brewing. In an historic victory that undermined the case for partition, the elections gave 
nationalists and republicans a majority on the Corporation for the first time. Eleven nationalists, 
ten Sinn Féiners and nineteen Unionists were returned. The loss of Derry to Catholic 
nationalists was a bitter pill for Unionists to swallow because the city had a special place in the 
history and culture of Ulster Protestants. For many Ulstermen, the victory at the Siege of Derry 
was the beginning of the province’s resistance to Catholic domination. Its famous walls were 
therefore deeply symbolic and represented the continuity of Ulster’s heroic struggle. The 
current threat of Sinn Féin was the latest manifestation of a continuous fight against Ireland’s 
Catholic majority who were determined to dominate and subjugate them.34 The Derry 
correspondent of the Morning Post – a right-wing London daily – predicted that ‘Sinn Féin 
will be ruthless in its manipulation of Corporation employment and Unionist workers will be 
misplaced’. The paper bemoaned the growth in the number of Catholic in a once homogenously 
Protestant city blamed this on the growth of the shipyard.35  
 On 30 January, the new Corporation met for the first time to elect its mayor and 
committees. Nationalists and republicans had run on a united ticket to ensure victory. Alderman 
Hugh C. O’Doherty, an independent nationalist and a respected local solicitor, was their agreed 
nominee. He became Derry’s first Catholic mayor since 1688. Following his election, elated 
scenes consumed the Guildhall as overjoyed nationalists and republicans belted out ‘The 
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Soldiers’ Song’ and ‘God Save Ireland’, and tricolours were frantically waved. O’Doherty’s 
inaugural speech ended in a dramatic fashion with a warning to his Unionist colleagues: 
‘Ireland’s right to determine her own destiny will come about whether the Protestants of Ulster 
like it or not’.36 Within days of his election, the Dorsetshire Regiment and the RIC raided 
houses and seized munitions and ‘seditious’ literature.37  
 The trades council had resolved to field candidates under a Labour banner that stood on 
a Labour platform. But ‘difficulties’ ensured that trade unionists stood as nationalists like 
Logue, as republicans like McCafferty, or as UULA men like Greenway (soon to be chairman 
of the local branch of the Union of Postal Workers). In October 1919, Derry was one of only 
four centres not represented at an all-Ireland meeting of trades councils to discuss the 
forthcoming local elections. Moreover, it was the only one that ‘was unrepresented without 
valid reason.’38 Of the forty elected councillors, the Dáil reckoned that only five were also 
Labour activists, but the number was higher than that. Other than David Mitchell, every 
working-class candidate that stood was elected. But once again Derry was the only city in 
Ireland without designated Labour councillors as the national question took precedence over 
everything else. A bitter atmosphere prevailed at the Guildhall for the next three years, 
especially among the nationalist and UULA trade unionists.39  
 Labour was hopeful that it could achieve more for municipal workers under the new 
regime given its less haute-bourgeois composition. The mutual alienation of local Labour 
leaders and official Unionism, which began in 1918, had gathered pace throughout 1919 and 
was acute by the time the new Corporation assembled. The wave of strikes and discontent in 
the city forced Unionist councillors to accommodate the working class to a far greater extent 
than ever before, which predictably resulted in it satiating the demands of working-class 
loyalism. In January 1919, a nationalist ex-soldier on the Corporation who claimed to represent 
the working class demanded that action be taken to alleviate the poverty and unemployment of 
demobilised soldiers. A committee was set up to help returning men find work. In November 
1919, the Derry Trades Council was infuriated by the Corporation’s allocation of three of the 




Table 8. 1: Candidates with Working-Class Occupations at the 1920 Municipal Elections 
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North 11 8 (Henry, 
Greenway, 
postman) 
3 (-) 2 (Edward 
McCafferty, 
engineer) 
South and east 12 8 (David 
Mitchell, tailor) 













2 (-) 2 (-) 












Source: O’Connor, 2: Larkinism and syndicalism, p. 39. 
 
Growing sectarianism and general strikes 
As the independence struggle intensified in early 1920, workers retreated into their sectarian 
camps. Like April 1918, Derry’s biggest strike of the period had nothing to do with wages, 
conditions or workers’ rights. It was the general stoppage called by the ITUC for the release of 
republican hunger strikers incarcerated in Mountjoy Prison and Wormwood Scrubs. The strike 
took place from 14-16 April across Ireland except for the Unionist north-east. On 13 April, the 
Derry Trades Council recommended a general cessation of work from the following morning. 
All workers, except for those employed at newspapers, at the telegraph service, in the baking 
of bread and essential food distribution, in humanitarian services and in necessary work with 
horses and cattle were to withdraw their labour. Like April 1918, the strike was sectarian in 
nature as only Catholics partook. Protestants had been asked not to do so by the UULA. The 
stoppage was another reminder that Labour had still not resolved its identity crisis: how it could 
express the political aspirations of most of its members and achieve and maintain the working-
class unity for which it had always struggled. The dockers and most carters came out, as did 
Corporation omnibus drivers and conductors. A section of the shipyard workers obeyed the 
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trades council’s directive, as did the teachers in the city’s Catholic schools, primary and 
secondary alike.41  
 But even republican unions were unhappy with what they perceived to be the trades 
council’s tepid support for the national struggle. In May 1920, the ITGWU and the Irish Union 
of Tailors and Tailoresses boycotted the trades council’s annual May Day sports event in 
solidarity with hunger strikers in Belfast and Wormwood Scrubs. During Terence 
MacSwiney’s hunger strike, the sectarian scenes repeated themselves. On 21 September, 
Catholics abstained from work to attend a mass to honour the martyred lord mayor and marched 
through the streets in solidarity with him. No such action had taken place in March when Tomás 
MacCurtain was murdered by the RIC, demonstrating the growth in republicanism among 
Catholics in the interim. Work at the quays, the shipyard and at many shirt factories was 
brought to a standstill, the omnibuses halted and teachers from Catholic schools marched 
alongside their pupils. On 29 October, the scenario was again repeated when work was 
suspended to allow nationalists to attend McSwiney’s requiem mass which was arranged by 
Derry’s ITGWU branch. There are no reports of any Protestant groups attending either event.42 
 
Labour and the 1920 riots 
The April 1920 strikes did much to deepen the latent sectarian tensions that had scarred Derry 
for centuries. Relations between nationalists and Unionists had plummeted since the outbreak 
of the war of independence. However, serious intercommunal rioting occurred only once, on 
15 August 1919.43 By April 1920, however, animosities were at boiling point. On 16 April, 
many strikers assembled at the GNR station to greet an arriving Sinn Féin prisoner. When the 
RIC and the British military were called upon to disperse the crowd, they responded with cries 
of ‘Up Dublin!’, ‘Up the republic!’ and a rendition of The Soldier’s Song. A barrage of jeers 
and stones were meted out to the police and the Dorsets. The latter responded with force. Shots 
were fired and a riot ensued. Several people, police, military and civilian alike, were injured. 
The military’s actions aroused the intense indignation of the nationalist community. Three 
nights later, more destructive riots engulfed the city. Hundreds of soldiers were mobilised, and 
many were seriously injured. Both police and the crowd repeatedly fired shots. It was only a 
matter of time before the riots became sectarian. Mob violence between nationalists and 
Unionists brought community relations to an all-time low. The former sang the ‘Soldier’s 
Song’, ‘A Nation Once Again’ and ‘God Save Ireland’ and the latter bellowed out ‘Derry’s 
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Walls’, ‘Dolly’s Brae’ and ‘Rule Britannia’ amidst the carnage. Over £2,000 worth of damages 
was done to property as windows were smashed and buildings damaged in the melee. The 
unrest was repeated the following night. The IRA was quick to exploit the lawlessness to bring 
its campaign to Derry. Throughout 1919, it had recruited in working-class nationalist areas, 
mainly drawing its support from demobilised soldiers. On 16 April, it launched attacks on a 
RIC barracks in the Bogside.44  
 Another riot broke out on 16 May, this time initiated by Unionists. Shots were fired and 
Derry had its first fatality of the war of independence when the local head of the RIC’s Special 
Branch was killed. The RIC and British Army retaliated by firing shots and launching bayonet 
charges into Catholic areas. The introduction of the IRA to Derry alarmed Protestants, as did 
the Unionist leadership’s seeming inability to mount a fightback. The Ulster Volunteers Force 
(UVF) was re-instituted by local Protestant ex-servicemen. Its goal was to provide an armed 
resistance to the IRA without sanction from Unionist leaders. A small Catholic enclave in the 
Waterside was attacked, followed by reprisals against Protestants in the Brandywell and 
Bogside. The growing inter-communal hatred peaked in mid-June with sectarian riots so 
destructive they resembled an internal civil war. The riots began on 13 June when Catholics 
walking at Prehen Wood were assaulted – both sides interpreted this as casus belli. Sectarian 
fighting took place throughout the following week and culminated in a major riot in the 
Waterside. But worse was on the way. Between 19 and 25 June, the violence climaxed as the 
IRA and the UVF fought sporadic gun battles for control of the city. Attacks on Catholics 
provoked a retaliatory IRA invasion of the walled city and gun battles engulfed much the city. 
The UVF’s superior firepower eventually forced a republican retreat. In revenge, they looted 
and burned the property of Unionist supporters and businessmen on the fringe of the Bogside. 
Although few combatants were injured, several innocent civilians were killed in the crossfire. 
Lack of manpower and the complete breakdown of British rule in many parts of Ireland 
rendered the task of the authorities impossible. It was nearly a week before enough troops 
arrived in Derry to put down the disturbances.45  
 On 23 June, a heavy military interference curbed the shootings but not the 
intercommunal strife. The military intervention was so blatantly on the side of the UVF that 
several RIC men resigned in protest. The April to June violence claimed the lives of forty 
people, nineteen of them in that vicious week in June. The IRA had suffered a devastating loss 
and its activity practically ceased in Derry. The confidence of the local republican movement 
had been irreparably damaged. The violence confirmed not only the scale of ethno-national 
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identities and communal hatreds, but also the influence of both the IRA and the Catholic clergy 
in the nationalist community. Local clergy had begged the volunteers to take revenge against 
the UVF. Community leaders, including IRA and UVF officers, set up a ‘Citizens’ Conciliation 
and Protection Committee’ to prevent further unrest.46 From late June to early July, the 
committee facilitated three unsuccessful meetings between the SMF and the UGW to bring the 
shirt cutters’ strike to an end. Bizarrely, the strike had continued through the city’s civil war – 
a vivid example of how this fractured society was forced to function by the interconnectedness 
of its economy.47 Although acts of violence ended, social unrest and sectarian attacks 
persisted.48  
 The trades council and most of the unions were mute on the violence that had brought 
Derry to a shambolic state. In contrast, the ITGWU blamed both sides equally and attributed 
the influence of the Orange Order and the Ancient Order of Hibernians, of which Logue was a 
member, as the cause of sectarian animosity. As a solution, it proposed an anti-sectarian ‘Red 
Guard’ to impartially defend all workers from violence. In May, O’Donnell had unsuccessfully 
attempted to set up such a body – a local ICA unit – in anticipation of turbulence. This did not 
endear him to some in the IRA who resented his efforts to make the Citizen Army more active. 
In January 1920, the ICA had discussed the possibility of instituting a Derry unit, but nothing 
appears to have come of it.49 Greaves asserted that the ‘Ulster Protestant and Unionist Workers’ 
Association’, a ‘yellow’ Labour Party in Ulster, deliberately instigated the violence by stoking 
sectarianism to ward off working-class unity ‘under the pretext of defending Protestant ex-
servicemen from Catholics who had taken their jobs’. There is no evidence to support these 
claims.50       
 
Derry and the 1920 Belfast shipyard expulsions 
Derry’s April-June ordeal was reflective of the explosive sectarian violence now engulfing 
Ulster. In July, a Unionist on Belfast Corporation tried to justify the Belfast shipyard expulsion 
by alleging that Protestant shipyardmen in Derry were being driven out of their employment. 
Derry Corporation resolutely denied this and there is no evidence to support it. The Belfast 
expulsions took place on 21 July when 8,000 Catholics and left-wing/republican Protestant 
workers were ejected from the shipyards. In response to the Belfast expulsions, Dáil Éireann 
initiated the Belfast Boycott, an embargo on goods coming from the city that was co-ordinated 
by the its Labour Department and backed by the ITUC.51 A relief fund was established for the 
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expellees to which Irish Labour generously donated, with the Journal reporting the weekly 
subscriptions. The Derry UULA branch supported Turkington’s counter-boycott of southern 
products in 1921.52 In October, the Unionist Belfast Evening Telegraph preposterously claimed 
that Unionists in Belfast merely copied what nationalist shipyard workers in Derry had done 
when Unionists refused to join the April general strike.53 
 
Derry and the munitions embargo 
When the munitions embargo began in Dublin on 23 May, it quickly spread across nationalist 
Ireland.54 The NUR’s leadership in London quickly tried to moderate the action, at which point 
the ITUC stepped in to offer its support. On 13 July, Derry became the first centre in Ulster to 
partake in the embargo when a railway driver on the LLSR refused to move a train carrying 
troops. The Journal, however, questioned whether patriotism was the driving force: ‘It is stated 
that the railwaymen were intimidated, the threat . . . being that if they worked the train carrying 
armed military or police, serious consequences would befall them’.55 Whatever the reason, the 
protest spread throughout the north-west and munitions trains leaving Derry were regularly 
held up.56 By late July, thirty railwaymen on the Lough Swilly had been suspended. Derry’s 
NUR branch resolved to give them its full support: 
 
That we, the representatives of the majority of the employees of the Lough Swilly Railway . . . 
wish it to be clearly understood that under no circumstances will we convey or assist in the 
conveyance of armed military or police to be utilised for the destruction of our fellow 
countrymen. We absolutely refuse to be party to the creation of a second Amritzar, and we 
pledge ourselves to support by every means in our power our colleagues who have already been 
suspended for advocating this principle.57 
 
The Jallianwala Bagh massacre in the Punjab had a deep resonance in Ulster as Carson was a 
well-known apologist for the man responsible for it, General Reginald Dyer.58  
 The munitions embargo was split on sectarian lines in Derry. A week before the NUR’s 
resolution, a ‘well-attended meeting’ of all grades at the Waterside station had pledged its 
support to the British government and the railway companies. This gathering of the ‘Loyal 
Railway Workers of Derry’ also dissociated itself entirely from the strike and called on the 
executives of the NUR, the RCA and the ASLEF to withhold strike pay for those engaged it.59 
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By early August, the inevitable had happened. The munitions strike had split the railwaymen 
along political lines. A section of Protestant workers decided to cut themselves adrift and a new 
branch was formed from which Catholics were rigidly excluded. However, some Protestants 
remained with the original branch through loyalty to the union. The railwaymen were, like the 
rest of Derry’s working class, now hopelessly divided and no appeal to class consciousness 
was capable of overcoming sectarianism.60  
 The embargo had cross-class Catholic support. On 10 August, at a meeting presided 
over by Sinn Féin Alderman Cathal Bradley, a local fund was set up to assist the embargo. A 
committee with Peadar O’Donnell as chairman was appointed to oversee the fund’s 
distribution. The railwaymen had hitherto forgone financial aid so that the locked-out shirt 
factory workers could be helped. Collections were made and concerts and dances were held 
across Derry and Donegal to supply the fund.61 But morale was running low and the men on 
the LLSR were getting anxious to return to work, even if it meant doing so unconditionally. 
O’Donnell was central in galvanising them to sustain the battle, telling them that ‘we are not 
exactly fighting because we are going to win but because it is right to fight’.62 An ITUC 
conference on the strike was held in Dublin in November. At it, John Limerick, secretary of 
one of the NUR’s Derry branches, pleaded for an end to the embargo, claiming that he had 
come from his branch with a mandate for peace. O’Donnell, on the other hand, proclaimed that 
he ‘represented the workers of Derry, and he would tell the Congress that in the North they 
would carry the foodstuffs in their bare feet on their backs through the country rather than give 
in in the present fight.’ The men on the Swilly, however, thought differently and returned to 
work on 26 November. The line had been closed to passengers for twenty-five days.63  
On 14 December, with over 500 railwaymen sacked, the ITUC recommended an end to 
the munitions embargo. So too did a national conference of the Irish NUR seven days later. 
Aside from the crippling the British government’s counterinsurgency, the embargo severely 
affected the economy.64 Derry merchants applied pressure on the LLSR to get trains running 
again because of the loss of business to the city. The company capitulated and quietly began to 
take back dismissed workers without victimisation.65 The NUR obtained similar outcomes 
across Ireland. The GNR, however, had enough scabs to demand a pledge of loyalty, including 
in the transportation of troops, from its reinstated men. The strike compelled the NUR 
leadership to summon a meeting of the British Trades Union Congress that condemned the 
military occupation of Ireland.66 Derry’s railwaymen received a total of £1,930 from the 
ITUC’s Munitions of War Fund, with the majority NUR branch getting £1,747, the minority 
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branch £117 and the ASLEF £66. The strike prompted the only intervention from the IRA’s 
First Northern Division in a labour dispute when volunteers kidnapped a train driver from 
Derry who had scabbed and took him prisoner. They released him after he gave a passionate 
speech of repentance. Most of the men under O’Donnell’s command were from working-class 
or small-farmer backgrounds, a considerable number of whom were trade unionists. Johnny 
Fox, the Second Brigade’s quartermaster, had heard Eleanor Marx speak at the Guildhall in 
1891. But the IRA was not dedicated to social revolution and therefore rarely intervened in 
strikes. When it did, it was on the side of the employers.67  
 
Peadar O’Donnell’s revolution 
O’Donnell, however, was dedicated to social revolution. Like many revolutionaries, he was a 
firebrand agitator rather than an organiser and was not well-suited to trade unionism, work he 
found tedious.68 In the summer of 1919, he had tried, and failed, to establish a branch of the 
short-lived Socialist Party of Ireland, a Bolshevik faction within the Irish Labour Party, in 
Derry. He later claimed that these efforts were undone by internal feuding in Dublin. In 
February 1920, he and McCafferty established a Workers’ Education Committee, intended as 
the nucleus of a branch of the James Connolly Labour College. It offered courses in history 
and economics. That September, Eoin MacNeill delivered its first public lecture, entitled 
‘Ireland’s future: a co-operative commonwealth’. In April, O’Donnell had been nominated to 
the June 1920 Poor Law Guardians elections and gave his occupation as ‘Workers’ Republican 
Organiser’.69  
 On 23 October 1920, ‘the stormy petrel of the Transport Workers’, as the Sentinel had 
once dubbed him, took his last pay cheque as a full-time ITGWU organiser. But he continued 
to write, speak and agitate on its behalf. His regular letters to the Journal ceased when he 
became the commandant of the IRA’s Donegal Brigade.70 O’Donnell had joined the IRA in 
1919 and began his military career innocuously, transporting arms and doing ‘odd jobs for one 
IRA officer or another’. In the summer of 1920, he assumed command of the 2nd Battalion of 
the Donegal Brigade, whose area of operations included Derry city. Having been warned of his 
impending arrest by a Unionist RIC sergeant – a man whom O’Donnell had helped in setting 
up the Irish Prison and Police Officers’ Union – he fled Derry and devoted himself fully to the 
republican struggle. Apart from occasional work with tattie hokers and the Scottish Farm 
Servants’ Union, his stint as a trade unionist was over. His position as an ITGWU organiser 
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was viewed with suspicion within the IRA, some of whose officers regarded the union as 
unfriendly towards it.71 But O’Donnell was a committed republican who rejected the Anglo-
Irish Treaty. He was among the IRA volunteers who occupied the Four Courts in June 1922. 
He escaped its shelling, only to be captured by the National Army shortly afterwards. From his 
cell in Mountjoy, where he remained until 1924, he excoriated the Labour leadership for its 
acceptance of the status quo and timorousness on the national question. ‘It is England’s devilish 
luck that the Labour Party is led by Johnson just when Labour is faced with tremendous 
opportunities’, he decried in 1922.72  
 Across Ireland, the ITGWU was being targeted for harassment by the authorities 
because of its republicanism. On 22 January 1921, the military raided the Derry branch’s 
offices on William Street which the IRA had sometimes used as a meeting place, much to the 
apprehension of the ITGWU. Labour was often caught in the crossfire of Derry’s internal war, 
sometimes literally. On 2 October 1920, more than twenty bullets had perforated a window of 
the NUDL offices on Butcher Street.73 But violence could not stop the ITGWU, which motored 
on, failing to win over Unionist workers along the way. O’Donnell took this more seriously 
than most within his union. On 13 November 1921, he gave a lecture on the Irish Labour and 
movement partition. Before challenging Turkington, who had recently been in Derry, to a 
debate, he warned: 
 
It is a mistake to assume that many Ulster workers are not in favour of partition. They are. If 
anyone had got as many mobbings and howlings down in dealing with Ulster workers as he had 
got they would have the same views. But this much he could say: he had never known a case 
where one comes on Unionist workers suddenly, before the Lodge gets a move on, without 
getting a ready allegiance enough to the working-class movement in this country. . . He was 
certain he could shake to pieces any Orange Lodge in Ulster where he was allowed to develop 
freely economic and national theories, and he’d benefit mostly from the fiery opponent, who 
would smother economic sound sense with the big drum or the memory of Billy and his Papish 
victory at the Boyne.74    
 
Working-class Ulster Protestant support for Unionism would be a recurring theme in 





In this respect, however, O’Donnell was in a small minority within both the republican and 
Labour movements. No coherent strategy to deal with working-class Unionism emerged from 
the leadership of either, greatly aiding the Ulster Unionists. After a third reading of the 
Government of Ireland Bill 1920 took place in the House of Commons on 11 November, the 
partition of Ireland looked certain to occur on 23 December 1920.75 Derry, as a part of the six 
counties that would compromise Northern Ireland, was about to be cut off from Donegal and 
lose its main economic hinterland. In October 1920, the British government had already 
capitulated to James Craig’s demand that a special constabulary of ‘loyal’ citizens be 
established to protect the north, or at least the six counties, from the republican insurrection 
when it announced the formation of the Ulster Special Constabulary. The new force was 
composed of three sections: A-Specials, B-Specials and C-Specials. The A-Specials formed 
the basis of the Royal Ulster Constabulary founded in 1922; the C-Specials were later 
dissolved. Only the B-Specials survived as a part-time, quasi-military auxiliary force to the 
police. Many old Ulster Volunteers became B-Specials, effectively turning the UVF into a 
state-sponsored militia. Like the UVF, the Specials became a de-facto capitalist militia who 
were often organised by local landlords and/or employers like Wallace Kennedy, a leading 
UVF organiser in Derry.76 Determined to keep nationalists and Unionists together, unions in 
Derry stayed extraordinarily silent on partition.  
 Partition deepened the divide within the working class, making the possibility of 
proletarian unity even harder to achieve. By early 1921, having initially gravitated towards 
Belfast and Britain on political matters, Derry Labour began to take its cue from Dublin. Its 
participation in political strikes was often unenthusiastic and always divisive. The result was a 
working class more divided along sectarian lines than ever before. The carnival of reaction 
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Local Government, the Central State and Municipal Labour in 
Cork and Derry, 1917-23 
 
In 1917, Cork’s local authorities were dominated by constitutional nationalists whose 
conservatism was often a reflection of their upper-middle-class background. Like the private 
sector, they too were put under pressure by Labour’s resurgence to make concessions to their 
employees, having given only small war bonuses until then. Sinn Féin’s demolition of 
constitutional nationalism at the 1918 general election positioned it perfectly to replicate this 
success in Cork at the 1920 municipal elections – and so it did. With the ITGWU by its side, 
the party took control of the Corporation and the Harbour Board in January 1920 and, with 
Labour’s support, the Board of Guardians that June. Nothing illuminated the amiable 
relationship between Labour and the republicans in Cork more than this Labour-facilitated 
change of hands. However, within eighteen months relations would sour, which exposed the 
class nature of the republican project.  
 By 1917, Derry’s public authorities had long been governed by Unionists, many of 
whom were wealthy employers with a strong anti-Labour bias. Hence, municipal workers had 
long fared badly under institutions dominated by unrepresentative oligarchs. Robert Anderson, 
mayor from 1915-20, was a prominent industrialist and his successor, Maxwell Scott Moore, 
was a landowner and railway director. Councillor H.S. Robinson was the secretary of the 
Employers’ Federation. Robert Watson, chairman of the Harbour Commissioners from 1917-
23, was a Justice of the Peace and his successor, A.A. Crockett, was a tramway proprietor. John 
McFarland, Derry’s answer to William Martin Murphy, was a prominent Unionist voice on 
both the Corporation and the Harbour Commissioners throughout this period. Derry’s 
municipal workers experienced three momentous changes in their lives from 1917-24, as their 
places of employment became arenas for revolution and counterrevolution. Firstly, they were 
as affected by the rebirth of Labour militancy as any of their comrades in the private sector. 
Secondly, the historic local elections of January 1920 returned Derry’s first ever nationalist 
Corporation. Thirdly, in 1923 Stormont gerrymandered it back under Unionist control. 
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Accordingly, an analysis of the relationship between Labour and the Corporation during these 
tumultuous years reveals much about the class nature of the Irish revolution and the Ulster 
Unionist counterrevolution.         
 
Derry Corporation and Labour 
Though faced with hostile employers, the MEA was as active as any private sector union in 
combatting the rampant wartime inflation. In April 1917, it secured only a fraction of the 6s. 
increase it sought for workers who earned 40s. or less.1 Though the Corporation publicly 
condemned retailers for their exorbitant prices, it was no less scrupulous. In April 1917, its 
carters, who were paid 6s. daily, ceased work when their claim for 10s. a day was rejected. The 
Corporation was willing to increase this to 8s. 6d. but this was not accepted. The MEA received 
similar treatment when its demand of a 4s. bonus was put on the long finger.2 On 17 December, 
Unionists voted down the nationalists’ proposal to give a wage of 40s. 6d. to their own 
plumbers and water inspectors even though outside plumbers would receive 45s. from 22 
December for a fifty-four-hour week. Corporation plumbers earned 38s. 6d. for a fifty-four-
hour week while its water inspectors received the same for a fifty-five-hour week. Strike was 
threatened but never materialised.3 Clashes between unions and the Unionist Corporation 
increased in 1918. The MEA threatened to withdraw its labour on 23 February if its claim for 
an increase was not acceded to. Strike was deferred to allow the Corporation to consider the 
claim. In March, the union was granted its claim.4 Nine months later, after threatening strike, 
the Ancient Guild of Incorporated Brick and Stonelayers won from the Corporation the 12½ 
per cent bonus that had been awarded by the Committee on Production.5 Although its 
tradesmen’s wages tracked those in the private sector, the Corporation was often remarkably 
slow to pass on increases and typically only did so under strong duress from unions.   
 The same was true of increases awarded by the British government. In March 1919, 
despite much objection, the Corporation was forced to give employees electricity department 
employees a Committee on Production award.6 In May, having sought the forty-four-hour 
week, the MEA obtained a forty-seven-hour week for those workers and a forty-eight-hour 
week for its other members. It also won three days’ annual holidays and a raise.7 Three months 
later, the Corporation demonstrated its anti-worker bias by substantially augmenting the annual 
salaries of its Town Clerk and Assistant Town Clerk – already the best paid municipal officials 
in Britain or Ireland – instead of its waged staff, to £450 and £260 respectively.8 The 
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employees’ bonus was also raised to 14s. 6d. But the MEA was not still satisfied and demanded 
10s. more in October. On 22 December, 5s. was given when nationalists and Labour-Unionists 
voted together to defeat a proposal that would have given only 2s. 6d. An attempt by non-
Labour Unionists to sabotage it by staging a walkout and claiming that no quorum was present 
was defeated. 
As described in Chapter 8, the January 1920 local elections brought to power Derry’s 
first nationalist-majority Corporation. Unlike its Unionist predecessor, the new Corporation 
prided itself on not having a single capitalist in its ranks.9 Within three months of its election, 
it had proven its value to workers, nationalist workers at least. In April 1920, its omnibus 
drivers joined the political prisoners’ strike without fear of victimisation.10 The new 
Corporation’s first wage increase came a month later when nationalist and UULA votes gave 
labourers and the semi-skilled an extra 8s. 6d. In August, the office staff and the sanitary sub-
officers got the increase. Given the new possibilities, the MEA fancied its chances of getting 
another advance and put in a claim in December. But within its first year, the limits of progress 
for workers under the new regime were evident, as the MEA learned. Citing the costs incurred 
by its compensation for damages inflicted during the 1920 riots, non-Labour nationalists and 
republicans, including O’Doherty, sided with the Unionists in voting down the new wage. The 
UULA voted with Labour-nationalists and Labour-Sinn Féin councillors to give the increase. 
Unlike Corporation tradesmen, the MEA did not experience any reductions in 1921, much to 
the dismay of the Chamber of Commerce which attacked the Corporation that September for 
its high rates, high wages and high expenditure on unemployment relief.11  
A tentative peace between the municipal body and its employees prevailed until 
November 1921 when workers at its slaughterhouse threatened to withhold their labour over 
the poor-quality gas lighting that prevented them from seeing their work properly. The 
Corporation undertook to install electric lighting instead as gas was charged at an exorbitant 
price in Derry. Later that month, it considered the question of wages and McFarland demanded 
a 25 per cent cut for labourers, which would bring their pay from 55s. to 42s. But he would not 
yet have his way. The slump had sent unemployment rising again. The Corporation was 
negotiating with London for funding to institute public work schemes for unemployment relief 
and discussed the issue in October, the first public body to do so since 1914. Workers on these 
schemes were entitled to only 75 per cent of trade union wages. In December, the Corporation 




Table 9. 1: Wage Increases Obtained by the MEA, 1917-20 
Union/Workers Increase Date 
MEA 1s. 6d. Feb. 1917 
Electricity department 
employees 
3s. 6d. Mar. 1919 
MEA 3s. 6d. May 1919 
MEA 3s. Aug. 1919 
DJ, 1917-21 
 
But McFarland had an unlikely ally against the working class – his nationalist political 
opponents on the Corporation. On 22 February 1922, the Corporation, which had re-elected 
O’Doherty as mayor in January, cut employees’ wages by 8s. Claiming that the Corporation 
was alone in not cutting pay in Derry, the mayor proposed that it follow the example of the 
Unionist-led Harbour Board and issue reductions of 4s. from January, 2s. from March and 2s. 
from May. Enunciating his capitalist acumen, Doherty outlined that labourers’ wages had gone 
from 18s. in 1914 to 55s. in 1920 (a 206 per cent increase) and that rates needed to be reduced. 
The MEA threatened strike in response although nothing came of it and the cut was accepted. 
Employers were no doubt pleased. Separately, at the 22 February meeting McCafferty 
complained of preference for employment at the electric light station being given to the 
ITGWU over other unions.13   
By early 1923, Craig’s government had consolidated the six-county Northern Ireland 
statelet. The Unionist government was deeply suspicious of its Catholic population and 
considered undermining nationalist political influence to be a security imperative. The 
abolition of proportional representation and a gerrymandering of wards restored an artificial 
Unionist majority to the Corporation in January 1923. Convinced they would lose, nationalists 
boycotted the elections.14 William Maxwell Scott Moore, a railway director, was elected 
mayor. The reactionary capitalists were back in charge and workers were among the first to 
suffer. Under pressure from the master builders, the Corporation resolved to cut its labourers’ 
pay by another 5s. in March, having considered cuts of 7s. 6d. and 10s. Strike was averted 
when the MEA negotiated it down to 3s. Labourers’ wages were now 42s. – exactly what 
McFarland had wanted.15 In June, employees at the electricity supply department had their 
wage diminished. The MEA initially declined to accept the lower rates and wanted arbitration; 




Table 9. 2: Wages and Hours of Derry Corporation Workers from 23 June 1923 
Power Station Hourly rate Working hours 
Fitters’ assistants 1s. 2d. 47 
Greaser, cleaner and general 
helper 
1s. 47 
Leading stoker or driver 1s. 4½d. 48 
Stoker 1s. 4d. 48 
Driver and cleaner 1s. 4½d. 48 
Ash wheeler & coal trimmer 1s. 2½d. 47 
Switchboard attendant 1s. 2½d. 48 
Outside Staff   
Cable ganger 1s. 1d. 47 
Jointer’s mate 1s. 47 
Meter fixer and reader 1s. 2d. 47 
Leading lamplighter 1s. 5d. 47 
Lamplighters 1s. 3d. 47 
Time switch attendant 1s. 4d. 47 
Source: Schedule of wages of Derry Corporation, 8 Aug. 1923, LAB 83/2277, Min. of Labour records, UKNA. 
 
The nationalist Corporation’s refusal to recognise the Northern government meant it 
ran out of funds for unemployment relief work in 1922. The return of the Unionist Corporation 
gave Stormont the recognition it wanted and so funding for public works projects returned.17 
But workers suffered here too. In June 1923, the Corporation cut its mechanics’ pay. Two 
months later, relief scheme labourers struck for twelve days in a dispute concerning wages.18 
Similarly, from 23-26 October, Corporation omnibus drivers, conductors and cleaners 
unsuccessfully struck for the re-employment of a driver who was suspended for dereliction of 
duty and a disrespectful attitude. By this time, the Corporation had been in conflict with its 
omnibus workers for months. In August, it had reduced omnibus wages by 1s. for men and 6d. 
for boys.19 More serious was the Journal’s allegation of sectarianism against the Corporation 
for its dismissal of three Catholics in the department for leaving work early.20 The 
Corporation’s 1924 clash with the MEA illuminates how far it was willing to go to uphold its 








Derry Harbour Commissioners and Labour 
The Derry Port and Harbour Commissioners were established in 1854. Comprising of ex-
officio members and nominees from the Corporation and business interests, it become a tool 
of the Unionist establishment. Like the Corporation, it met monthly and acquired a more 
nationalist membership in 1920, albeit only slightly. Inevitably, it too was affected by the tide 
of syndicalism.  
 Under pressure from the unions, wage rates and increases at the Derry Port and Harbour 
Commissioners mirrored those given in the private sector. Like the private sector, the NAUL 
was the union that the Commissioners had to deal with. Industrial relations were tense at the 
port. On 12 September 1917, the Tyneside union took on the Commissioners in a two-day strike 
for an increase and forced a concession.21 In February 1918, it secured another advance after 
issuing strike notice again.22 In May 1920, the labourers struck when their application for a 
50s. minimum, a 9s. increase, was declined and the company’s 3s. offer rejected. As a show of 
force, the NAUL even brought out the cranemen, who also wanted increases, on sympathetic 
strike. At the end of the month, work was resumed when the dispute was sent to arbitration, 
which sided with the Commissioners. Earlier in May, the cranemen had won the higher Belfast 
rates.23 Labourers’ wages peaked in April 1920 at 55s., a 245 per cent increase on 1914 levels.24 
 
Table 9. 3: Labourers’ Wages at the Derry Port and Harbour Commissioners, 1914-18 
Date  Wage 
1914 17s. 
Mar. 1915 19s. 
Nov. 1915 20s. 
Oct. 1916 21s. 6d. 
Apr. 1917 23s. 6d. 
Sept. 1917 27s. 6d. 
Feb. 1918 32s. 6d. 
June 1918 37s. 6d. 
Oct. 1918 41s. 
June 1919 44s. 
Jan. 1920 46s. 6d. 
Apr. 1920 55s. 
Jan. 1922 51s. 
Mar. 1922 49s. 
May 1922 47s. 
Apr. 1923 44s. 
Source: Rates of wages paid to labourers at the Londonderry Port and Harbour Commissioners, 1914-23, LAB 
83/2614, Min. of Labour records, UKNA. 
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As he did on the Corporation, from August 1921 McFarland aggressively championed 
wage decreases for harbour employees. Things came to a head on 13 January 1922 when 
workers struck against an 8s. cut. The wage alteration, which was originally 10s., affected 
labourers, capstanmen, engine drivers and firemen and shunters, who were represented by the 
NAUL and the NUDL. A coal-laden vessel bound for Derry had to be diverted to another port 
because of the strike. On 23 January, after arbitration by the Northern Ministry of Labour, the 
men returned to work after assenting to the change.25 At the Commissioners’ annual general 
meeting held a few days later, McFarland took the initiative. He called for drastic wage cuts 
across the economy and urged employers to assert their authority when confronting the unions. 
For this, he received lavish praise from the Derry Chamber of Commerce.26 McFarland 
continued his campaign against wages throughout 1922. In August, another strike at the 
Harbour Commissioners, this time of cranemen, was provoked. The NAUL had previously 
agreed to a 6s. reduction: half in July and half in August. They accepted the first cut but 
requested a conference to discuss the second. The commissioners were not interested in talk 
and enforced it without negotiation. On 14 August, the NAUL brought out the cranemen. When 
500 coal porters came out in sympathy, it was feared that the carters would do the same. On 22 
August, the men accepted defeat and resumed work on a 60s. wage.27  
The Harbour Commissioners never went through the political change in its composition 
that the Corporation had experienced. Accordingly, it recognised the Stormont government 
and, unlike the Corporation, continued to receive funding from Belfast to continue its relief 
schemes.28  
At the 1923 annual meeting of the Derry Port and Harbour Commissioners, held on 15 
January, McFarland continued his crusade against Labour. He urged his fellow Commissioners 
to continue reducing wages and lengthen the working day from its ‘absurdly low figure’ of 
eight hours, for which he received trades council opprobrium.29 He attacked workers again at 
the LLSR’s 1923 annual general meeting in February, maintaining that wages had to come 
down if the company was to survive and unemployment – which afflicted 8,232 people in Derry 
– avoided.30 A year after the previous harbour strike, on 11 August 1923, the labourers struck 
for two days to fight a 2s. decrease. Arbitration forced the NAUL to accept the new cut. There 
would be two 1s. decreases: one from 1 September and another 1 January 1924, giving the 
labourers 42s., the same as Corporation employees, their lowest of the era. Further cuts would 




Cork Corporation and Labour 
Like their comrades in the private sector, by 1917 Cork Corporation workers were on the 
march. For example, that October the domestic scavengers struck for an additional 11s.-14s.32 
By the end of 1917, Corporation carters’ wages had doubled since the war began because of 
their unionisation by the ITGWU. In contrast, the wages of Corporation general labourers, who 
were not unionised, rose only 35 per cent over the same period when the cost of living had 
reached of its 1914 level.33 By March 1918, however, the labourers had joined the burgeoning 
Transport Union. Organisation quickly proved its worth. That April, after a month’s agitation, 
the ITGWU secured a 36s. wage. However, it failed to obtain a fifty-one-hour week. Eight 
months later, the Corporation group of unions successfully negotiated another 5s., or 12½ per 
cent, improvement for all workmen after threatening strike. That increase gave Corporation 
labourers a wage 20s. higher than what they had in 1914.34   
 On 2 May 1919, after another threat of strike, the ITGWU won a 50s. minimum for 
labourers via the Cork Conciliation Board. The Corporation also voted to give masons and 
bricklayers another 12s. 6d. a week to give them 70s. 6d. a week. The new wage maintained a 
2d. per hour differential with the private sector, which put pressure on the Master Builders’ 
Association to give concessions. Corporation painters got a similar increase.35 Building artisans 
were the only Corporation craftsmen to receive higher rates than what prevailed in the private 
sector. Wages were standardised in the trade from 1 January 1920.36 In late May 1919, the 
Corporation’s clerical staff, recently organised by the ITGWU, ceased work in pursuit of a 50 
per cent salary augmentation. It was their first dabble in industrial action. In June 1917, they 
received their only increase, 25 per cent, since 1914. By May 1919, typical annual clerical 
salaries were £130, £137, £140, £170, £180 and £210.37 On 5 June, the Conciliation Board 
enticed them back to work. A committee was appointed to draw up new pay scales. The new 
salaries disappointed the men.38 However, Corporation employees were well-paid by local 
comparison, often earning above private sector rates. For example, by mid-1919 the 







Table 9. 4: Wages of Cork Corporation Labourers, 1914-21 
Date Wage 
Apr. 1914 21s. 
Apr. 1916 22s. 
Apr. 1917 28s. 
Sept. 1917 31s. 
Apr. 1918 36s. 
Dec. 1918 41s. 
May 1919 50s. 
May 1920 62. 6d. 
Source: Borgonovo, War and Revolution, p. 161; CE, 1917-20 
  
From January 1920, they had a more sympathetic ear from their new employers: the 
ITGWU-Sinn Féin coalition. Republican socialists like Tadgh Barry, Robert Day, William 
Kenneally and John Good were now at the helm.40 On 9 March 1920, it convened to discuss 
potential remedies to the city’s constant labour disputes. At the behest of Lord Mayor Tomás 
Mac Curtain, the meeting established a twenty-man Cost of Living Commission to determine 
a proper living wage for Cork’s workers.41 Its terms of reference were as follows: 
 
1. To define a standard of living. 
2. To define a suitable wage to that standard 
3. That the standard of living must be higher than the war standard 
4. The basis of calculations to be taken from the existing rates prevailing in the districts in 
which the workers live and from the kind of commodities usually used and in the quantities 
usually purchased by the workers 
5. Miscellaneous – insurance, clothing, light and fuel 






The new regime was certainly more favourable to workers than its predecessor. In May 
1920, the water inspection staff had their pay augmented to 85s. (an 8s. 6d. increase) and, after 
months of pressure, labourers obtained another 12s. 6d., giving them the standard city rate for 
general labour.43 Now that the ITGWU was in a position of political power it sought to take 
full advantage, both inside and outside the parameters of the wages movement. In May, it 
ensued that all Corporation vacancies were filled by union labour.44 The following month, on 
behalf of the clerks (whose top grade earned 81s. 1d. a week), it applied for an annual salary 
scale that began at £100 and rose to £450 – a £50 improvement. After some wrangling, the 
clerks received the scale in November.45 These were to be the final improvements the 
Corporation would give any of its employees. In August, the Cost of Living Commission 
reported that a living wage was 70s., rather more than most workers received. On 19 October, 
the Corporation endorsed this wage but did not give it to their labourers. The 62s. 6d. rate was 
the highest they would attain during the period. A month later, the Corporation voted to not 
pay its employees a wage or salary higher than trade union rates prevailing in the private sector, 
bringing alterations in wages to an end until 1924.46   
From the July 1921 truce, the Corporation reflected the conflict that was emerging 
across Ireland between Labourites and republicans. Sinn Féin had sought the benign neutrality 
of Labour in the hope that working-class interests would not undermine the fight for 
independence; Labour gave it even more than that. The ITGWU-Sinn Féin Corporation was a 
testament to how local syndicalism advanced the republican agenda and it illuminated the 
symbiotic relationship between the two struggles. The conflicting class interests of proletarian 
Labour and petit-bourgeois Sinn Féin ensured that the two movements came into conflict when 
peace was declared. As the RIC reported in October, ‘The Labour Party are not so much 
interested in Sinn Féin as heretofore; their attitude towards it has changed considerably’. That 
month, Sinn Féin Lord Mayor Donal O’Callaghan, who was not as sympathetic to Labour as 
his two predecessors, clashed with the CTC when he suspended two Corporation clerks. In 
January 1922, Kenneally denounced O’Callaghan’s re-election as Lord Mayor because of his 
social record.47 In early 1921, the Corporation established the Cork Reconstruction Committee 
to rebuild the city centre after its destruction during the Burning of Cork. The CTC hoped to 
that the committee, on which it had three seats, would ease the impact of the slump on building 
trade workers, but progress on this, like other relief schemes, was slow.48 
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Table 9. 5: Increases Given by Cork Corporation, 1917-20 
Workers Increase Date 
Plumbers ¾d. an hour Jan. 1917 
Firemen 7s. a week Aug. 1919 
Carpenters & joiners 6d. per hour (making wages 
69s. a week) 
Oct. 1919 
Drivers & firemen 3s. a week July 1920 
Lamplighters 16s. 6d. a week (making wages 
83s. 2d. a week) 
July 1920 
Source: CE, 1917-1921. 
 
Corporation workers escaped the 1920-23 employer fightback unscathed. Thus, they 
did not feature in the 1923 lockout. But in 1924, their luck ran out. Taking inspiration from the 
CEF, in February 1924, the Corporation set up a committee to examine wages for staff other 
than labourers. Two months later, it enacted the committee’s report: salary cuts of 10 per cent 
for those on £300 or more a year, and of 5 per cent for those on £250-300. Labourers, however, 
retained their 62s. 6d. wage after an attempt to reduce it at the Corporation’s Salaries’ 
Committee was defeated in July.49  
 On 31 October, the Minister for Local Government and Public Health dissolved Cork 
Corporation under the Local Government (Temporary Provisions) Act 1923. From 11 
November, the city was administrated by Philip Monahan, a government-appointed 
commissioner. From 21 August to 7 September 1924, the Corporation had been subject to a 
public inquiry into its efficiency and ability to function after heavy campaigning by local 
business interests for such an inquest. The Examiner, Cork Progressive Association and both 
Chambers of Commerce – who had been vocal critics of the Corporation for its unwillingness 
to cut wages and the high commercial rates it imposed to rebuild Cork – welcomed the move.50 
Monahan immediately began cutting wages and staff numbers to reduce rates, and earned for 
himself a notorious reputation among trade unionists.51 The Corporation was, in his words, ‘not 
an institution for the relief of unemployment’, but ‘a business concern, to be run on business 
lines’.52 Shortly after the dissolution, Lord Mayor Seán French claimed that the Corporation 
had been abolished because it refused to cut its workers’ wages.53 In early 1925, Monahan’s 
ruthlessness nearly provoked a strike of Corporation employees. He forced a 4s. 6d. reduction 
of labourers’ wages in March 1925 under the threat of dismissal, having already sacked several 




Table 9. 6: Numbers Employed by Cork Corporation, 1914-24 
Occupation 1914 1919 1920 1921 1922 1923 1924 
Mechanics 9 6 6 6 7 6 6 
Labourers 116 105 104 96 97 98 97 
Carters 26 28 29 28 28 30 30 
Stonebreakers 5 3 2 5 1 1 1 
Source: Quinlivan, Dissolved, p. 86. 
 
Cork Harbour Board and Labour, 1917-21 
Instituted in 1814, the Cork Harbour Board was composed of five ex-officio members, five 
Corporation representatives and twenty-five mercantile representatives, all appointed by the 
Corporation. Though the Board had long been a home for Cork’s commercial elite like railway 
directors, shipping agents and large merchants, the presence of Sinn Féin-ITGWU members 
from 1920 gave it a more democratic veneer.55 Wages at the Harbour Board largely followed 
those given at the Corporation, though increases were issued at a slower pace, especially before 
the republicans took their places on the Board in January 1920. Like the Corporation, wages at 
the Harbour Board were initially higher than in the private sector. But from late 1919, Labour 
succeeded in closing the gap and standardised the wages of many groups.   
 For example, a major batch of improvements came in May 1918 when £2,602. 5s. worth 
of raises were issued to bring wages in line with those of the private sector. The increases 
reflected union demands, with the ITGWU at the forefront of struggle. In May 1918, it forced 
the Board to make labourers’ pay 33s.56 Other unions were also making ground. That October, 
the NSFU successfully secured a wage 20s. above its 1914 rate.57 The ICWU also won modest 
improvements after agitation. By the year’s end, it had acquired an additional £25 annually to 
make maximum clerical salaries £250-275 for the first grade, £200-225 for the second and 
£150-175 for the third. Their only previous increase had been in March 1917 when clerks 
earning under £120 were given a 10 per cent war bonus.58 The ITGWU had more success. In 
August 1918, it had sought a 10s. increase and the 12½ per cent bonus, which the Board refused 
to grant. The dispute was sent to arbitration, which awarded a 7s. increase, a 43s. wage. The 
union promised to not seek another increase for twelve months.59 Like their colleagues at the 
Corporation and in the building trade, by late 1918 Harbour Board labourers’ pay had grown 
by 105 per cent since 1914, when they earned only 21s.60 But some workers were still 
chronically underpaid. The office cleaners, for example, earned only 16s.  
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 By early 1919, many Harbour Board workers were still on wages superior to the private 
sector. For example, its carpenters and joiners were on 68s. while those in the building trade 
were on 58s. 4d. But the Board still largely followed the private sector’s lead. In January 1919, 
it gave its quay and yard workers a forty-seven-hour week only after the Cork shipyards had 
done so.61 Harbour Board shipwrights experienced significant gains throughout this period to 
maintain their status as some of Cork’s best paid workers. In March, the Shipwrights' 
Association gained an extra ¾d. per hour (the bulk of the demand) when its 5s. claim was 
arbitrated upon by the Ministry of Labour. By late 1918, shipwrights worked a fifty-one-hour 
week.62  In May 1919, the Board’s only sawyer was given a 59s. wage after the Amalgamated 
Society of Woodcutting Machinists won 10s. for those in the private sector, thereby 
standardising sawyers’ pay in Cork. That month, the ITGWU applied for a 50s. minimum and 
the forty-four-hour week, a claim which had the support of de Róiste and Kelleher. The union 
withdrew the claim in deference to the November 1918 agreement.63  
 As has been discussed, Sinn Féin’s revolutionary war was predicated on strict class 
unity and the suppression or taming of class conflict. Arbitration was a central component of 
this strategy. By mid-1919, the Dáil’s ability and legitimacy as an arbitrator appears to have 
been accepted by the Board, an institution still dominated by constitutional nationalists. In July 
1919, the NSFU gained 7s. for its Harbour Board members after having its 15s. claim arbitrated 
by the Dáil’s Department of Labour.64 That the Board and its workers turned to the Dáil, and 
not the British Ministry of Labour, is indicative of the rapid and ongoing delegitimisation of 
British rule in Ireland. Political instability was translating into real gains for workers. In 
November 1919, after threatening strike, the pilots were granted their 20s. demand, giving them 
a 70s. wage. Having waited the twelve months, the ITGWU won a 50s. minimum for labourers 
later that month. Harbour labourers now had the same wage as their comrades at the 
Corporation and at most private sector firms. The Transport Union had wanted a 14s. 6d. 
increase but settled for 7s. The wage rise complemented the week-long paid annual holiday it 
had secured in August, which survived until 1934.65 By late 1919, the ASCJ had secured the 
78s. 4d. rate paid by the master builders. Labour militancy was leading to increased 
standardisation of wages within trades. The 78s. 4d. rate meant that, to their chagrin, Harbour 
Board carpenters were now paid the same as those in the private sector. Following the 1919 
carpenters’ strike, the ASCJ put in an unsuccessful claim to the Board for 90s. 6d. a week.66 
However, the Board’s class composition remained the same and it therefore continued to exude 
a social conservatism that was a defining feature of the Irish middle classes. The ICWU was 
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brought to the verge of strike when its application for increased remuneration was recurrently 
rejected. Concomitantly, shipwrights were refused and an extra 8s. 10d. The clerks’ claim was 
resolved in February 1920 when salary increases instituted a new scale ranging from £175 to 
£300 – their peak rates.67 
 With the municipal elections of January 1920 bringing a more republican and 
proletarian flavour to the Harbour Board, workers had solid grounds for optimism. One of the 
last acts of the old Board was to reject applications from the NSFU for 20s. and the 12½ per 
cent bonus, and from the ITGWU for 12s. 6d. for labourers. But the new Board continually 
declined both claims. On 7 March, the labourers met and announced their willingness to strike 
only for the counsel of ITGWU organiser Thomas Donovan, who urged restraint, to prevail.68 
In May, the union finally got the advance, making wages 62s. 6d. That month, the NSFU won 
12s. through the Maritime Board’s arbitration, despite the Harbour Board previously rejecting 
mediation. This gave wages of 70s. to sailors and firemen, and 75s. to boatswains, their peak 
rates.69 On 1 June, the ASE brought out the Board’s engineers and fitters as part its city-wide 
strike for a 25s. increase. After nine days, the Board yielded.70 In mid-June, boathands won 
20s. to give them a 60s. wage. Simultaneously, the Boilermakers’ Society secured 6s., giving 
wages of 89s. 5d. to boilermakers and 65s. to their labourers. These rates were the highest these 
workers attained in this period and are emblematic of the scale of Labour’s success: the 
boilermakers’ labourers procured weekly advances of 11s. between December 1919 and June 
1920. But there were limits to the Board’s altruism. In March 1921, an application for another 
15s. for boilermakers’ labourers – this time from the IEIU – was refused.71 In November 1920, 
after four months of struggle, the Cork Conciliation Board awarded shipwrights a 103s. 9d. 











Table 9. 7: Increases given by the Cork Harbour Board, 1917-21 
Workers/union Increase Date 
Boilermakers’ Society 6s. July 1917 
Boathands 10s. (wage now 40s.) Oct. 1917 
Labourers & mechanical 
helpers 
3s. Nov. 1917 
Engineering apprentices 5s. 6d. for adults and 5s. for 
boys 
Dec. 1917 
Shipwrights and boilermakers  8s. May 1918 
Masons and stonecutters 10s. 7½d. May 1918 
Carpenters & Joiners 14s. 10½d May 1918 
Sawyer 12s. 9d. May 1918 
Labourers, sailors and firemen, 
shipmasters, harbourmaster’s 
staff 
5s. May 1918 
Engineering apprentices 5s. for adults and 2s. 6d. for 
children 
June 1918 
Carpenters and joiners, 
shipmasters and engineers 
12½ per cent bonus (via 
Committee on Production) 
July 1918 
ASE 3s. 6d. Oct. 1918 
NSFU 7s. Oct. 1918 
Boilermakers’ Society 6s. & 12½ per cent bonus (9s. 
3d.) 
Nov. 1918 
Office cleaners 3s. 6d. Dec. 1918 
NSFU 5s. Nov. 1918 
Masters of the dredgers and 
hoppers 
5s. Jan. 1919 
Sawyer 2s. May 1919 
Boilermakers’ Society 7s., making wages 77s. Sept. 1919 
Harbourmaster’s staff 7s. Sept. 1919 
Masters of the dredgers and 
hoppers 
7s. 6d. Sept. 1919 
Boilermakers and holders-up 5s. Feb. 1920 
Harbourmaster’s staff 12s. 6d. June 1920 
Source: CE, 1917-21 
 
Table 9. 8: Shipwrights’ Wages in Cork, 1918-22 
Date Wage 
Jan. 1918 55s. 2¼d.  
Mar. 1918 59s. 
Sept. 1918 63s. 
Nov. 1919 71s. 
May 1920 87s. 2d. 
Nov. 1920 103s. 9½d. 
Apr. 1922 94s. 




The Cork Harbour Soviet of 1921 
On 16 February 1921, the Harbour Board received a letter from the ITGWU asking that the 
70s. rate be put into effect. The Board deferred the matter.73 On 3 April, Robert Day, a member 
of the Board, assured the workers that matters were progressing.74 On 8 June, the expected 
rejection of the claim finally came. The Board maintained that it could not afford to implement 
the wage. Nevertheless, the ITGWU persisted. On 10 August, the Board again refused the 
claim. Five days later, the union served strike notice for 26 August. On 24 August, Day 
proposed arbitration at a Harbour Board meeting. His motion collapsed as it did not have a 
seconder. The next day, the CTC called for arbitration and passed a motion to discuss the 
situation with the Board.75 When its delegates met Harbour Board chairman Frank Daly, he 
agreed to arbitration and proposed Richard Beamish, Mr. McDonnell (of the Cork Incorporated 
Chamber of Commerce and Shipping) and Fr. Cahalane as mediators. This was acceptable to 
the workers. Strike was deferred for a week to allow their status as arbitrators to be ratified.76 
However, on 31 August the Board rejected the chairman’s idea. At the same meeting, 
arbitration under Dáil Éireann’s Department of Labour was also dismissed.77  
 From 2 September, the harbour workers were officially on strike.78 The river pilots and 
four Cobh harbour workers came out in sympathy, but the men at the Steam Packet Company 
and the Clyde did not.79 In total, 180 were out, of which 150 began the strike by marching, four 
deep, behind a red flag to raise another one over the Harbour Board’s offices.80 The men 
blockaded the port, preventing merchant ships from reaching their destination. The ITGWU 
declared its intention to issue permits for the pilotage of the ships stranded in Cork.81 At a 
special Harbour Board meeting on 5 September, de Róiste proposed arbitration under the 
Department of Labour. The motion was carried overwhelmingly. Day was one of only three to 
vote against it. The secretary, Sir James Long, was mandated to write to the ITGWU. The letter 
stated that the Board had decided to refer the dispute to arbitration and had nominated its 
chairman as its representative. It also asked the Transport Union to state if it accepted 
arbitration and, if so, to give the name of its representative. But Day made it clear that the time 
for reconciliation had passed as far as he was concerned: 
 
If this Board are willing to eat its own words and give the men a £3. 10s. minimum from the day 
the application was sent in, the men will go back under the control of this Board and present 
officials. If not, the men are going back, but not under the control of the Board. We are going to 
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take action. If you say you cannot run the port and pay these men a living wage, then the men are 
going to run the board themselves. . . The position, Mr. Chairman, is that we are prepared to take 
the action and we are prepared to abide by the consequences. . . If the Irish Republican Government 
put me out of the office tomorrow they can do it, but they have to count the cost.82    
 
He warned the Board that the red flag was ‘not coming down until the workers get every penny 
they are looking for. If anyone else wanted to take that flag down they will do so against my 
life, and 10, 20, aye 100 lives.’83 The meeting adjourned to give the ITGWU sufficient time to 
respond to the letter. Upon resuming, Daly read the ITGWU’s reply: ‘No’. Long locked away 
the Board’s documentation in preparation for the takeover. De Róiste added: ‘the Irish 
Government recognises the right to strike, and also to protect property.’84 The Board was right 
to be worried, as events the following day would prove. 
 On 7 September, 135 of those on strike gathered outside the Cork Custom House. Later, 
Day, accompanied by fellow ITGWU comrades William Kenneally and Thomas Coyle, entered 
Long’s office. They announced their intentions to take over the port and enquired if he was 
prepared to continue as secretary under the new regime. He refused and was duly replaced by 
Day, who announced that ships could only enter and leave the port with his permission. The 
three men collected dues from shippers to pay the 70s. wage.85 Workers were not coerced into 
the soviet and could leave if they wished. The engineers, telephonists and caretakers agreed to 
partake, but the clerks were less favourable. Most staff in the Accountant’s and Collector’s 
Department voted to leave. Nevertheless, the takeover was successful, and Day was elected 
‘Chief Commissioner of the Port of Cork’.86 Afterwards, he told the men that ‘no man is to go 
inside that building unless he gets an order from me. I am Chief Commissioner now. You are 
members of the workers’ army, and as workers go and do your duty’.87 Coyle was made 
‘General Steward’ and Kenneally ‘Chairman of the Soviet Board’.   
 Shortly afterwards, Daly arrived. He was soon joined by Seán French, the secretary to 
the Minister for Labour, and by Messrs Mercier, Higgins, Dowdall and de Róiste. Together 
with Day and Keneally, they reached an agreement. Day and Kenneally now proposed to 
surrender to what had previously been rejected. Work would be resumed at the old rate, pending 
Dáil-sponsored arbitration on 10 September which would decide on the wage claim 
retrospective to February. At a mass meeting of the men, Day successfully sold the agreement 
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by spuriously claiming that the talks did not constitute arbitration but a conference.88 He also 
promised to renew the soviet if the workers’ claim was not won: 
 
Friends, comrades and Bolsheviks (laughter). . . He did not think that there was any better title 
for them than Bolsheviks, for the word meant to him an anxiety that the bottom dog should go 
up and the top dog should come down (cheers). . . When they raised their Red Flag people 
laughed at them and said they were a pack of sillies. They had proved that whatever flag the 
people had faith in, the workers had faith in the Red Flag, and the Red Flag only (loud cheers). 89 
 
The red flag had flown over a workers’ soviet for approximately five hours before 
Florence O’Donoghue and other Cork IRA men replaced it with a tricolour. The watchmen 
resumed work that night and the rest of the staff the following morning.90 The conference held 
on 10 September gave the workers what they demanded: 7s. 6d. backdated to 14 February in a 
lump sum until another cost of living commission had reported, which would decide any 
increase to be given.91 The Harbour Board ratified the agreement on 14 September. However, 
the next day the CTC passed a motion refusing to work with the allegedly capitalistic 
commission. At the same meeting, Richard Cody, a Typographical Association delegate, 
condemned the soviet. He was alone in this.92 Although the CEF was willing to work with the 
commission, the ITGWU agreed with the CTC. As a result, the Corporation never established 
the commission and the 70s. wage was never instituted.93  The rate would have given harbour 
workers higher wages in real terms than what they had in 1914 and possibly 1904.94  
The political aftermath of the Cork harbour soviet led to a breach in the Sinn Féin-
ITGWU coalition.95 The breakdown was perhaps inevitable given the predominately lower-
middle-class composition of Sinn Féin.96 Shop and drapers’ assistants, clerks, teachers and 
tradesmen (especially apprentices and journeymen) were disproportionately featured in the 
IRA in Cork city relative to their number in the general population.97 As Peter Hart analysed: 
 
Artisans and tradesmen provided a solid core of support for the movement throughout the 
revolution . . . In the city, the Volunteers recruited at least a third of their members from among 
the skilled trades . . . The organization had particular success among the building trades, motor 
drivers, and especially drapers’ assistants. Shoe- and boot-makers . . . were also prominent. . . 
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Artisans and trades provided a solid core of support for the movement throughout the 
revolution. . . Another key group of Volunteers came from the white-collar world of shops and 
offices. . . Their employers . . . rarely joined the movement, but their sons (who often worked 
as apprentices or assistants for their fathers) frequently did . . . Assistants and clerks tended to 
be educated, ambitious, and highly status conscious—habitual joiners of clubs, leagues, and, 
latterly, trade unions. Such men tended to prize their respectability as well as their political 
ideals, thus helping to set the social and moral tone of organized republicanism. The chronically 
underemployed general labourers . . . may have voiced support for the I.R.A. . . but they 
remained outsiders to the movement.98 
 
Though upper-middle- or upper-class people almost became militant republicans, the same was 
true of casual labourers and the unemployed. Most ‘professionals’ in the IRA were at the lower 
end of the middle classes: teachers and assistant or part-time teachers. Nearly all skilled 
workers in the movement were apprentices or journeymen. Most volunteers who worked as 
labourers had regular jobs as hotel, shop or railway porters; drivers; or mill and factory workers. 
The Ford’s factory became a hotbed of working-class militant republicanism. However, very 
few dockers – the backbone of the trade union movement – joined the IRA.99 Cork volunteers 
were of a similar social background to their comrades in Mayo, Tipperary, Dublin and Derry, 
while volunteers in Clare, Kerry, Longford and Sligo were more proletarian. From 1922, the 
Cork IRA became more working-class because farmers’ and merchants’ sons began to leave 
it.100  
 
Table 9. 9: Occupations of IRA volunteers in Cork city, 1917-23 
Officers Men 
 1917-19 1919-21 1921-23 1917-19 1919-21 1919-23 
Sample 34 49 35 43 195 272 
Un/semiskilled (%) - 2 14 21 30 42 
Skilled (%) 33 39 41 45 37 34 
Shop assistant/clerk (%) 32 35 28 20 23 15 
Professional (%) 2 16 14 - 1 1 
Merchant (%) 2 2 - 3 2 3 
Student (%) - - - 12 5 - 
Other (%) 11 6 3 - 3 4 





Table 9. 10: Occupations of the Cork City Sinn Féin Leadership 
Occupation Number Per Cent
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Un/Semi-skilled 6 10 
Skilled 16 25 
Organiser 6 10 
Clerk 5 8 
Shopkeeper 7 11 
Teacher 5 8 
Professional 13 20 
Merchant 5 8 
Source: Borgonovo, War and Revolution, p. 80. 
 
The raising of the red flag had angered local republicans who felt that the tricolour had 
been dishonoured. The IRA was willing to expel the workers and reinstate the old Board.102 
The Cork Sinn Féin executive charged Day and Kenneally with defying Dáil authority, 
prompting the local ITGWU to send a letter in response which endorsed their actions as being 
‘in accordance with trade union principles’.103 Both were tried at Cork Courthouse and expelled 
from the republican movement.104 There were even rumours circulating that the IRA intended 
to assassinate Kenneally.105 British Intelligence noted the growing divergence between Labour 
and the republicans and cited the harbour soviet as an example of this. In September, a report 
warned that, ‘the danger from the extreme wing of the Irish Labour Party is a very real one 
cannot have escaped the attention of Sinn Féin leaders.’106 It did not: 
 
Republicans and Conservatives are united in their opposition to the Red Flag. . . It must be a 
surprise to the Conservatives [unionists] that Republicans are so strenuously in opposition to 
the Red Flag and what it signifies.107  
 
He predicted intense class conflict in post-revolutionary Cork:  
 
In fact, it is of intense interest to me to see how this struggle of what I may term Red Flag versus 
Irish tricolour has come about so soon. . . It is one of the things I anticipated but did not expect 
would come so soon in Cork.108  
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 The ‘conservatives’ with whom de Róiste’s movement found themselves in agreement 
were hysterical in their denunciation of the soviet. The Cork Constitution even praised the Dáil 
for the first time for dismantling it.109 However, neither republicans nor Unionists need have 
worried. Despite Day’s flamboyant rhetoric there was little revolutionary potential in the 
soviet. Its lavish pageantry masked its true nature as a newly acquired strike tactic carried out 
by a confident proletariat and ended by a pragmatic leadership.110 The relationship between 
Sinn Féin and Labour would never be repaired. Another break in the link was the murder of 
Tadgh Barry by Crown forces on 15 November 1921 in an internment camp in Ballykinlar, Co. 
Down. His death was mourned and condemned by both trade unionists and republicans and 
removed a major personality who straddled both camps.111  
 
Cork Harbour Board and Labour, 1922-24 
The soviet had permanently ruptured relations between the Board and its employees. With the 
possibility of a 70s. rate for labourers gone, wage increases at the Harbour Board largely, 
though not entirely, ended. In August 1921, clerks received a £25 salary top-up (with a £10 
bonus) and obtained another £25 in February 1922. Two months later, boathands got 7s. 6d., 
making their wage 67s. 6d.112 But friction between the unions and the Board remained strong. 
In August 1921, it had voted to give preferential treatment to Irish unions when filling 
vacancies. The CTC, which felt that the trade-union values of solidarity and internationalism 
were at stake, strongly objected. After applying much pressure, it got the Board to rescind the 
motion in May 1922.113 The wages of Harbour Board employees remained at peak levels at the 
standardised city rate until 1923. Table 9. 11 outlines these rates and how they compared to the 










Table 9. 11: Wages at the Cork Harbour Board and the Royal Victoria Dockyard, 1922 
Workers Cork Harbour Board Passage West 
Fitters & Smiths 94s. 6d. 83s. 6d. 
Boilermakers 89s. 6d. 96s. 6d. 
Shipwrights 103s. 9d. 86s. 3d. 
Carpenters & joiners 94s. 87s. 11d. 
Painters 94s. 80s. 6d. 
Sawyers 78s. 4d. 73s. 
Labourers 62s. 6d. 61s. 6d. 
Smiths’ helpers 63s. 6d. 63s. 
Other helpers 63s. 6d. 61s. 
Masons 94s. 94s. 
Watchmen 82s. 3d. 55s. 
Firemen 70s. 61s. 6d. 
Source: CE, 14 Feb. 1922. 
 
Taking inspiration from the private sector, wage cuts became a reality from early 1923. 
In January, engineering craftsmen experienced an 11s. cut. From 1 April, watchmen’s pay was 
reduced from 82s. 3d. to 72s. 11d., the same as Corporation watchmen. Private sector 
watchmen earned 45-60s. The harbourmaster’s staff also had their application for a forty-
seven-hour week denied.114 But, like private sector employers, the Board waited until autumn 
before initiating the bulk of its cuts, implicating its employees in the 1923 lockout. From 20 
September, all staff except for the lightkeepers, Harbourmaster’s deputy and a labourer in 
Ballinacurra were given a week’s notice.115 On 28 November 1923, a settlement was reached 
between the CEF and the Harbour Board on one side, and the AEU, IEIU, ETU and the 
Boilermakers’ Society on the other. Like the private sector, there would be hourly reductions 
of 1d. immediately and ½d. from January 1924. Work was resumed at the Board and at the 
affected engineering firms on 3 December. The Board’s temporary staff were not re-employed. 
Labourers acceded to a 4s. 6d. decrease, with watchmen also put on this 58s. rate. Sailors’, 
firemen’s and sailors’ watchmen’s pay was lessened to 65s. 6d. On 1 August 1924, the Board 
took another 2s. off pay, as per the November 1923 agreement. It did so without negotiation 
which infuriated the ITGWU and NSFU, the latter of which had recently clawed back 6s. 6d. 






Cork Board of Guardians 
Boards of Guardians had been established in Ireland in 1838 by the British government to 
implement of the Irish Poor Law Act, heralding a turn towards a decidedly Victorian approach 
to relieving the widespread poverty of the time. Self-incarceration in the workhouse became 
the central, and most notorious, feature of this strategy. Half of each board’s membership was 
elected by ratepayers and the other half was there ex-officio. Funded by local rates, they were 
dominated by the Unionist landed classes until the 1880s when nationalists began to take 
control of them. Having first gained influence over the Cork Board of Guardians in 1917, Sinn 
Féin took full control of it in June 1920 when elections for the Boards of Guardians, County 
Councils and the Rural District Councils took place. As echoed in the Dáil’s 1919 Democratic 
Programme, republicans regarded the workhouses as one of the most hideous manifestations 
of British rule in Ireland. Closing them down was a matter of priority. In November 1920, the 
financial stress caused by the war of independence prompted the guardians to disband. Three 
paid vice-guardians replaced them, initially for a three-month period.117 Despite its changes of 
hands, Poor Law relief was consistently dominated by men with austere, Victorian attitudes to 
the causes of poverty. Accordingly, a punitive regime based on deterrence remained throughout 
this period, especially under the vice-guardians. Though Labour had supported the republican 
takeover, the Board of Guardians became another arena for the emerging conflict between the 
two movements. 
  During the First World War, though increases were occasionally granted, war bonuses 
were largely resisted.118 Like the Corporation, the guardians’ tradesmen and labourers were 
paid at the standardised rates.119 From 1917, the guardians’ policy toward their employees’ 
wages and conditions mirrored the approach taken by private-sector employers and bonuses 
were increasingly granted to offset inflation.120 In February 1919, nurses received a 15s. 
advance, a compromise on their demand for £25 a year and a reduction of their unenviable 
eighty-four-hour week, a direct consequence of the Spanish Flu epidemic. In June 1919, the 
dispensary medical officers got a £40 annual salary augmentation. They would now start on 
£190 and move up to £250 after fifteen years’ service. The medical officers would subsequently 
secure a salary that began at £250 and rose incrementally by £5 until it reached £300.121  





Table 9. 12: Pay Increases Given by the Cork Board of Guardians, 1917-20 
Workers Increase Date 
Nurses 10s. a week June 1917 
Midwives 10s. a week Nov. 1917 
Dispensary midwives 3s. a week Dec. 1917 
Dispensary medical officers £40 a year June 1919 
CE, 1917-20. 
 
However, except for John Good, the guardians were no Labour sympathisers. In 
November 1919, they rejected higher scales of salaries for their employees, arguing that the 
Dáil should first approve of them. This approval was issued in June 1920 via the Local 
Government Board. But many workers, who were organised by the ITGWU, considered the 
new scale to be insufficient.122 It gave female nurses £130, rising to £150 after increments; 
male nurses £170 rising to £185; and £52 to most midwives.123 In September 1920, an 
arbitration board was formed to resolve the question, but it never met, despite the workers’ 
insistence that it do so. The only increase that several of the workers had received over and 
above their salaries was a 12s. weekly war bonus plus 10 per cent on salaries for men, and £20 
yearly plus 10 per cent for women. A typical bonus at the Guardians was £46. 4s. whereas it 
was £239. 7s. in the civil service.124 In December 1920, the newly appointed vice-guardians 
promised to give their employees a substantive bonus. However, they later claimed they could 
not afford to do this and put off the question until April 1921, when it devised a scale that 
disappointed many. Thus, the ITGWU continued to press for increases. In August 1921, the 
two-year-old dispute reached a crescendo and strike was set for 17 August. But in the nick of 
time, the case was submitted to arbitration, which took place a month later under the 
Department of Labour. The employees were granted considerable increases retrospective to 1 
April 1921 depending on positions and years served. The new scale gave the top worker £300 
a year and the bottom worker £40 a year including allowances.125 The settlement signified the 
end of salary improvement for the guardians’ employees. Tradesmen and labourers employed 
there suffered the same fate as their counterparts in the private sector in the autumn of 1923.126 
But the divisions between Labour and Sinn Féin went deeper than wages disputes. 
Although local trade unionists had supported the appointment of the vice-guardians, on 17 
August 1921 the ITGWU called for them to be made subservient to the elected guardians, who 
should control appointments, dismissals and salaries. The CTC also clashed with the vice-
guardians when its building trade workers struck for a few days in early August to protest 
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working alongside someone who they believed was a non-unionist. Though the vice-guardians 
initially refused to negotiate, an agreement was brokered by the ITGWU. The vice-guardians, 
however, refused to pay the men for the days they were on strike.127 Separately, The CTC 
criticised the maltreatment of inmates, allegations that the vice-guardians strenuously denied. 
The Cork Chamber of Commerce was more enamoured by the vice-guardians’ management of 
the workhouse’s financial crisis. In July 1921, it praised them for their ‘very efficient 
management’ in slashing expenditure, which seriously impacted the inmates, and the sacking 
of nearly twenty staff.128  
Tensions between the vice-guardians and the trades council continued to grow 
throughout 1922 and 1923. In May 1922, at a meeting to decide whether to re-appoint the vice-
guardians, Good made a litany of charges against them. He contended that inmates were 
subjected to physical abuse and hunger, and that the vice-guardians had acted in an autocratic 
manner that showed ‘no sympathy for the poor’. Shortly afterwards, vice-guardian Séamus 
Lankford, a prominent local Sinn Féiner, accused Good and other trade unionists of being 
charlatans, ‘masquerading as protectors of the poor’. In May 1923, Nason submitted a report 
to of his previous inspections of the workhouse to the ITUC executive that was highly critical 
of conditions in which inmates were forced live. In contrast, the administration of the Cork 
Mental Hospital, which was also inspected, received glowing praise.129 The Poor Law 
Guardians were abolished in 1925 and replaced by County Health Boards. 
 
Cork Labour and the Free State: the railway crisis 
As described in Chapter 3, by January 1922 the railway crisis remained unresolved. However, 
the Cork railway companies had a new ally: The Provisional Government of the Irish Free 
State. While the split over the Anglo-Irish Treaty, signed on 5 December 1921, was not a socio-
economic one, components of a class-based division can be detected. The Irish bourgeoisie 
overwhelmingly supported the Treaty for several reasons, one of which was that it facilitated a 
quicker launch of the counterattack. In Cork, calls for its endorsement came from the local 
clergy, the two Chambers of Commerce, the Cork Farmers’ Union and the South of Ireland 
Cattle Traders.130 The support given to it by the ‘men of property’ gave the new state some 
much needed legitimacy and created a solid nexus of interests between employers and 
Treatyites.131 The government regularly ascribed its highest levels of support to ‘shopkeepers’ 
and ‘commercial and farming elements’, and the clergy, doctors and bankers’; the working 
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class, on the other hand, was seen as more susceptible to ‘Irregularism’.132 Conversely, the 
government’s beliefs about its own middle-class support were widely held by its anti-Treatyite 
opponents.133 Amid much dissent, on 7 January 1922 the Dáil ratified the Anglo-Irish Treaty, 
facilitating the birth of Saorstát Éireann on 6 December 1922. Until then, a provisional 
government was in power. Immediately after its foundation, it had to deal with the industrial 
crisis on the Irish railways. The new administration largely opposed state intervention in the 
economy as a matter of principle. However, its desire to minimise economic disruption – 
pending resolution of the political crisis – meant that some compromise was inevitable.134  
 On 11 January 1922, the government proposed to the companies that they defer 
Carrigan’s rulings on hours and conditions for a maximum of four months while the wage 
reductions would apply immediately. The government would subsidise the companies for any 
monetary loss incurred. It was hoped that staggering the implementation of the award would 
moderate working-class militancy, but only a repudiation of Carrigan could achieve this. On 
13 January, Cork’s No. 1 and No. 3 NUR branches voted to strike from 15 January. The RCA 
did likewise the next day.135 Last-minute conferences under the Department of Labour 
produced a truce on 14 January. The companies suspended enforcing Carrigan’s rulings on 
hours and conditions for one month. In return, they received state subsidisation to recuperate 
their losses. The workers agreed not to strike in return for their cherished eight-hour day. The 
government hoped this would give it enough time to work out a permanent resolution to the 
crisis.136  
 
Table 9. 13: Railway Wages in Cork, 1922 
Job Wage 
Passenger porters 46s. 6d. 
Parcel porters 47s. 6d. 
Train ticket collectors 63s. 
Station firemen 53s. 
Goods porters, platelayers 48s. 
Goods checkers 51s. 6d. 
Working foremen (goods) 55s. 
Permanent way gangers 56s. 6d. 
Steamraisers & coalmen, firelighters, 
capstanmen, station ticket collectors 
50s. 
Shed labourers 48s. 6d. 
Cranemen 57s. 
Carriage examiners, guards 54s. 
Carriage & wagon greasers 47s. 6d. 
Source: Railway Workers’ Strike Committee demands, 3 Feb. 1922, file no. 3686, GSWR archive, IRRS. 
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 On 26 January, the frail peace on Cork’s railways collapsed when the engine cleaners 
on the Bandon ceased work against Carrigan and for two suits of protective overalls, like those 
issued to drivers and firemen. A day later, 400 NUR men on the GSWR struck against Carrigan. 
The ASLEF and the RCA remained at work. On 28 January, workers at the Cork, Blackrock 
and Passage Railway withdrew their labour and the GSWR strikers demanded the 70s. 
minimum proposed by the Cost of Living Commission in August 1920. On 30 January, the 
locomotive cranemen joined the strike.137 By the end of January, the IEIU had brought out 
shopmen.138 On 31 January, the railwaymen’s Joint Strike Committee reconstituted itself as the 
‘Industrial Co-Operative Strike Committee’ to takeover and operate the city’s railways. It 
called this plan ‘Document No. 2’, a direct reference to Éamon de Valera’s alternative to the 
Treaty. Though seemingly audacious, the document was essentially a revised timetable for the 
Cork-Cobh train. However, the committee did adopt radical proposals as official policy. It 
demanded a 70s. minimum for railwaymen, and a 50s. minimum, unaltered conditions and two 
suits of overalls per annum for the cleaners.139  
Once again, the Provisional Government established conferences involving the unions, 
the companies and the Ministers for Labour of the Free State and Northern Ireland. But progress 
was slow and the talks continued for nearly two weeks.140 The intended takeover of the railways 
would begin with the line to Cobh’s port to meet the liners due there on 2 and 3 February.141 
Accordingly, on 2 February railwaymen in Cobh seized the local station and occupied it for a 
few hours before handing it back to the stationmaster.142 That day, a letter from the strike 
committee was published in the Examiner: 
 
The workers had made and perfected their machinery to take over control of the railways. . . 
and to assume complete control and management thereof. This project was to be brought into 
effect today. . . The forcible appeal of Dr. Thomas induced the men not to give effect to their 
determination to take over control of the railway in order to afford the Dáil Minister of Labour 
an opportunity of redressing the men’s grievances. The Strike Committee desire to have it 
known to the public that the men have only yielded for the moment. . . and that they hold all 
the machinery which they have already perfected ready to put their purpose into effect the 




By now, Joseph McGrath, Free State Minister for Labour, had met the strike committee and 
was led to believe that the lines would be taken over on 6 February. The government was 
determined that this would not happen.144 But the fears were unwarranted. The men had agreed 
to suspend Document No. 2 upon learning of negotiations between the minister and the GSWR. 
Instead, the committee sent its chairman, William McGinn, a checker; its secretary, Patrick 
Crowe, a cloakroom porter; John Roche, a foreman; and James Mooney, a steamriser and the 
locomotive men’s representative, to Dublin to participate in the talks. They claimed that they 
had no power to negotiate on behalf of the strikers and would not ‘consider any offer with 
embraces arbitration or sliding scale arrangements.’ Moreover, they asserted that the NUR did 
not represent them, and they therefore would not be bound by any forthcoming settlement 
between that union and the companies. They requested that all correspondence should be 
directed to Liberty Hall. This meant that discussions could not continue because they would 
compromise negotiations and potentially open the Irish railways to more localised, unofficial 
action.145 As a result, the strike committee sanctioned another takeover of Cork’s railways.146  
On 5 February, a mass meeting of strikers decided to call out the Macroom Railway’s 
workers and to renew plans for working the lines from 8 February. The local RCA refused to 
strike as it felt bound by the 14 January agreement.147 Nevertheless, the government was 
fearful. The takeover threatened not only the whole Irish railway system but the stability of the 
new state. The cabinet was determined to protect the companies’ property. McGrath made 
military preparations to prevent the planned appropriation and gave assurances to the GSWR 
that it would receive protection.148 The men had declared that midnight, 8 February was the 
deadline for the takeover. Once again, Dowling – who had assured the workers that 
negotiations were progressing – persuaded them not to execute their plans. The next day, the 
railwaymen gave a final warning that if nothing came of the conference by 1pm, 10 February, 
then Document No. 2 would be enforced without delay.149 The GSWR, however, was in no 
mood to make concessions and made further requests to the government for protection.150 
 On 10 February, a settlement finally emerged from the Dublin talks. There were three 
documents in total: one on hours for both the NUR and the ASLEF, and one for each on wages. 
The Carrigan award was adjourned from 15 February until August and the eight-hour day was 
guaranteed.151 The NUR accord gave the men a week’s paid holiday and a 4s. improvement in 
the conciliation grades from 15 February, subject to a 2s. cut from 15 May.152 Under Carrigan, 
the lowest paid raiwaymen would have been paid 44s.; from February, they were paid 51s.153 
The ASLEF wages agreement, completed on 9 February, did not require state intervention. The 
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larger railways were grouped together at Carrigan’s original higher wage level.154 The railway 
crisis appeared to be over – but the relief was short-lived.      
       









On appointment 66s. 72s. 50s. 57s. 
1st Year 70s. 72s. 50s. 57s. 
2nd Year 73s. 72s. 50s. 57s. 
3rd Year 76s. 78s. 60s. 63s. 
4th Year 82s. 78s. 60s. 63s. 
5th Year & after - 86s. 63s. 66s. 
8th Year & after - 90s. - - 
Class One 86s. - - - 
Class Two 90s. - - - 
Source: Irish Independent, 11 Feb. 1922. 
 
Table 9. 15: Railway Cleaners’ Wages, 1922 
Age Already in service 
(Carrigan) 




16 & under 20s. a week 24s. a week 4s. a day 
17 & under 24s. a week 30s. a week 5s. a day 
18 & 19 33s. a week 42s. a week 6s. a day 
20 & after 40s. a week - 7s. a day 
Source: Irish Independent, 11 Feb. 1922; Railway Workers’ Strike Committee demands, 3 Feb. 1922, file no. 
3686, GSWR archive, IRRS. 
 
The Cork railway soviet 
The Cork railwaymen had not won the 70s. wage and, on 10 February, McGrath was wired to 
this effect. When no reply was received, the strike committee decided to act. That afternoon, 
800 gathered outside its headquarters on the Grand Parade. They divided into four groups to 
take control of the railways; the largest, containing 300 to 400, would take over the Glanmire 
station. An hour later, the workers controlled the railways. The soviet quickly ran into problems 
as neither the RCA nor the ASLEF supported it and the IRA blockaded the stations. The RCA 
later wrote to the GSWR to explain that the absence of clerks that day was unavoidable.155 
There were no soldiers on duty when Document No. 2 was enacted, much to the companies’ 
anger. Workers’ control of the railways lasted just twenty-four hours, with the men operating 
an emergency timetable. On 13 February, a ballot at the GSWR yielded a 313 to 225 majority 
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in favour of accepting the agreement. That day, the Macroom and the Bandon Railway’s 
employees returned to work. Due to their different demands, the GSWR’s cleaners had a 
separate ballot and they rejected the settlement by twenty-five votes to seven.156 By 16 
February, most railwaymen had resumed work, though the Passage and Blackrock Railway 
workers held out until 25 February. The agreements maintained the rise in real wages that had 
been taking place on the Cork railways since 1904. Railway militancy remained potent. 
Workers on the Cork and Muskerry got their way when they threatened to strike for an increase 
to bring their pay up to the levels of the other lines. On the Bandon, the cleaners stayed out 
until 15 February, when they successfully obtained the oilskins they demanded and an extra 4-
6s.157             
 The railway soviet was a stylised token act – a strike tactic and a belated effort by the 
rank-and-file to apply industrial unionism by outwitting the NUR leadership. It revealed the 
failure of industrial unionism and its increasing irrelevance in the class war.158 The railway 
takeover achieved nothing for the workers involved. Moreover, it seemed to attain little public 
support. As de Róiste deciphered, ‘even the anti-Treaty republicans are opposed to the 
‘‘Bolshevik’’ labour element’.159 He further claimed that, ‘those who talk of a ‘‘Workers’ 
Republic’’ can now see it in being in Cork’; however, public opinion was, in his words, 
‘entirely opposed to it.’160 Both the strike and the soviet demonstrated the frustration felt by 
many Irish NUR members towards their union’s leadership. The day of the takeover, Crowe, 
Mooney and a representative from the Department of Labour arrived from Dublin to report the 
agreement to men. McGinn told the press that its terms ‘were so indefinite that no consideration 
could be given to them.’ He stated that the men would only accept them if they came directly 
from McGrath.161 The NUR’s dominance on the Cork railways was now being challenged in 
an unprecedented manner by internal elements and by the ITGWU, which presented itself as a 
radical alternative. Its appeals reflected contemporary calls for a separate Irish railway union.162  
 The railway crisis was finally over. It affected about 1,000 railwaymen in Cork and 
over 4,000 nationally. It demonstrates how political instability could translate into Labour 
gains. The new government was not yet able to stamp its authority on the railwaymen, even 
though it was willing to forcefully put down any attempt to appropriate property. Placating the 
railway unions was central to the government’s campaign to consolidate itself. Despite its 
ideological hostility to state intervention in the economy, pragmatism ultimately prevailed. The 
government knew it needed content railwaymen more than it needed content shareholders, 
putting the unions in a strong position to negotiate a favourable settlement. But this pragmatism 
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was heavily outweighed by the intense ruthlessness that characterised these revolutionaries- 
turned-statemen, a shift made explicit by the nature of their counterinsurgency against the anti-
Treatyites. On 24 April 1922, McGrath announced the formation of the Irish Railway 
Commission to ascertain the optimum operation of the national railway system.163 The 2s. cut 
came into effect on 15 May. Nothing came of the threats of strike against it given by McGinn 
and Crowe, now with the ITGWU.164 Several other Cork railwaymen had joined the ITGWU 
by April 1922, though McGinn had re-joined the NUR by late 1923.165 
 
The 1922 postal strike in Cork 
The fall of Cork to the National Army in August 1922 gave the Free State a much firmer 
footing. The anti-Treatyites had to resort to guerrilla warfare against a regime that was 
becoming aggressively authoritarian in its efforts to suppress them. From November 1922, 
military courts were operational with the power to inflict the death penalty for subversive 
activity.166 This military repression soon translated into an attack workers’ rights. The 
government now took the lead in taking on the unions, setting an example for the capitalists to 
follow. Its new-found confidence manifested itself in a readiness to face strikes in the civil 
service. The postal workers were the first in line. 
  The dispute was incited by the threat of Postmaster-General J.J. Walsh to cut civil 
servants’ cost-of-living bonus.167 This bonus was paid in twice-yearly instalments. It was 
introduced by the British government during the First World War to shore up wages against 
inflation. The bonus provided an increase of 130 per cent on the first 35s. of wages and 60 per 
cent on the remainder. When the war ended, prices continued to rise and the bonuses, calculated 
as a percentage of the workers’ basic wages, were kept in place. For the postal workers, these 
bonuses were vital. In 1891, the maximum earned by a postal clerk, after seventeen years’ 
service, was 54s. In 1922, it had risen (excluding bonus) to 61s. – a gain of just 7s. in over 
thirty years.168  
In January 1922, the government indicated its intention to cut postal pay. Walsh claimed 
the postal service within the twenty-six counties had been run at a loss of £1.5 million in 1921, 
a financial burden the new state could not afford.169 Although the postal workers preferred 
arbitration, they would not shirk a fight. Edward O’Keefe, secretary of the Cork branch of the 
British-based Union of Post Office Workers, warned that the men would oppose reductions ‘by 
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every constitutional means at their disposal’.170 On 19 February, Cork’s General Post Office 
staff voted unanimously to strike against the cuts, which would be in effect from 1 March.171 
The political context helps to explain the government’s pugnacity. From the start, ministers 
viewed the threatened strike as an attempt to sabotage the new state. The workers categorically 
refuted claims and insinuations that their motive was political. One Cork postal union official 
maintained that his members ‘knew no politics . . . they knew only nationality and they need 
never be ashamed of the part that Cork had played in establishing an Irish government. 
Economic pressure, not politics, was behind this strike.’172 But declarations like this were 
ignored. The government prepared for the inevitable. In a leaked telegram, it was revealed that 
Walsh had requested scabs from his opposite number in London to break the coming strike.173  
But the workers’ determination forced concessions. On 28 February, the government 
entered negotiations with the newly formed Irish Postal Union (IPU). The de-facto 
establishment of the Free State had necessitated the creation of Irish civil service unions. Strike 
was averted on 5 March – just four hours before it was due to begin – when it was agreed to 
establish an independent commission of enquiry into wages and conditions under the 
chairmanship of Senator James G. Douglas.174 The Douglas Commission issued its interim 
report on 11 May. It advocated a basic wage rise of 12.5 per cent to compensate the workers 
for the bonus reduction. It also recommended that any further cuts should be postponed until 
an Irish cost-of-living index was agreed upon, or until the commission produced its final report. 
The government ignored these findings and drew up a cost-of-living index based on false 
figures to justify pay cuts. It claimed that the cost-of-living was 90 per cent above 1914 levels 
and that a bonus reduction of 11-12 per cent from 1 September was necessary.175 Excluding 
the bonus, postal workers earned 57s. and senior clerks 90s. After the cuts, wages (including 
bonus) would be 55s. 6d. for the former and 75s. for clerks and telegraphists. Postmen’s wages 
on entrance were only 30s. with the bonus.176 On 5 September, the IPU reissued its threat of 
strike, which received unanimous support from its Cork branch.177 Five days later, the three 
postal unions – the IPU, the Irish Postal Office Workers’ Union and the Irish Post Office 






Table 9. 16: Postal Wages minus the Bonus, February 1920. 





Class One     
On Entrance 20s. 44s. 16s. 18s. 
Ten Years’ 
Service 
34s. 6d. - 31s. 42s. 
Highest 
Attainable 
40s. 52s. 33s. 61s. 
Class Three     
On Entrance 18s. 26s. 14s. 16s. 
Ten Years’ 
Service 
29s. 6d. - 29s. 36s. 
Highest 
attainable 
34s. 42s. 29s. 49s. 
Source: Ms. 10/IPU/11/Box 2, Post Office Workers’ Union collection, Irish Labour History Society (ILHS).  
 
On 11 September, the government began its campaign to defeat the strike, repeating its 
declaration that civil servants had no right to withdraw their labour.179 That day, a ‘special 
notice to staff’ was placed on Cork’s GPO. It warned that, ‘any officer withdrawing his labour 
automatically forfeits his position; and that in the event of subsequent reinstatement on 
settlement, reinstatement would not carry with it restoration of pension rights for previous 
service or of continuous service.’ In March 1922, de Róiste had sensed that there was ‘a trace 
of political opposition’ in the postal workers’ actions.180 By September, however, he had 
become far more critical of the government. He denounced its attitude to the workers as 
‘irritating, to say the least’, and its notice to picketers as ‘atrocious’. Ministers were ‘narrow, 
petty, supersensitive, resentful of criticism, too much inclined to the ‘mailed fist’ towards their 
own people . . . some of them . . . are certainly developing views that we always regarded more 
pro-English than Irish.’181 The insinuations that the strike was an act of subversion were more 
powerful than they had been in February. They deeply coloured the government’s perceptions 
of the strike. This was probably unavoidable given the outbreak of civil war. 
Inter-postal union relations were poor in Cork. After only a day of strike, the IPU 
announced it could no longer co-operate with the Irish Postal Workers’ Union.182 However, the 
local stoppage was effective. By 14 September, all blacklegging had ended, and the postal 
system had completely shut down. Two days later, the trades council called for an end to the 
strike and for the government to re-employ the workers on old wages until arbitration made a 
binding decision. The council correctly believed that a government victory would galvanise 
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private sector employers to cut wages.183 The government was ruthless in putting down the 
strike. The military and police harassed and arrested picketers, with shots fired at pickets on 
occasion. Scabs were also utilised:   
 
a flying column of strike-breakers is the latest effort by the P.O. Dept. to break the postal strike. 
It is reported that two dozen have arrived in Limerick. It is quite on the cards that the same 
party will arrive here (Cork) in a day or two to keep up the farce.184 
 
On 29 September, an agreement hailed as a ‘substantial victory’ by the Cork Postal 
Strike Committee was announced. Thomas Dowling was involved in bringing it about. Five-
eighths of the cut would be retained until 1 December and the remainder would be taken off 
retrospectively from 1 September. The Douglas Commission would resume its sitting and issue 
its final report before 1 December. Although the postal unions won the right to strike and picket, 
the government was the real victor. The final settlement had been put to the unions before the 
strike and rejected.185 The cabinet had predicted strike since February and successfully 
imported scabs to operate the postal services under military protection. Walsh and his 
colleagues had sent out a resonant message that public servants would have to know their place 
in the Free State. Walsh’s promise of no victimisation was quickly broken. The postal unions 
spent the rest of 1922 and much of 1923 dealing with workers sacked or demoted because they 
had gone on strike.186 The other civil service unions had remained aloof from the strike and 
accepted the cuts.187 The Douglas Commission’s final report was issued on 14 December 1922. 
It recommended improved conditions, increases in pay and various other benefits in many 
sectors of the postal service. Walsh rejected the report.188 In response, in June 1923 the newly 
established Post Office Workers’ Union, an amalgamation of the three postal unions, 








The resolution of the railway crisis 
On 16 August 1922, the Irish Railway Commission reported in favour of nationalisation of the 
railway system, which was attacked by the conservative press.190 Their importance to the 
economy notwithstanding, the cabinet’s determination to keep industrial relations free from 
state intervention was reflected on the railways. When the commission’s majority report 
recommended nationalisation, it was immediately rejected in favour of the voluntary 
amalgamation of the companies into a single, privately-owned firm. Although the companies 
rejected this idea, they did agree to a ‘grouping’ scheme like that which existed in Britain. The 
government gave the companies until March 1923 to come up with a grouping arrangement; in 
the absence of one, it would enforce its own.191 In the interim period, the February agreement 
was due to expire on 31 December 1922. In late 1922, the railway companies sought a 3s. 6d. 
decrease; the GSWR wanted an even deeper cut. The Cork NUR vowed to fight any 
alteration.192 The government was once again forced to compromise. Strike was avoided when 
it announced that it would bring the GSWR under its control to sustain the existing wage and 
keep the line open.193 The GSWR promptly reversed its decision to close and undertook to pay 
the same wages as the other companies, thereby ensuring they would be free of government 
control.194 Its duplicity had been exposed.   
 The state’s willingness to maintain pay levels kept the Cork railways free of wage 
disputes in 1923, in stark contrast to the rest of the city. Nevertheless, the loss of business 
incurred by the companies during the lockout meant that they were forced to reduce pay and 
staff numbers. The IEIU assented to shopmen’s wages being decreased by 2s. 6d. from 1 
January 1924 and by another 2s. 6d. from 1 July 1924.195 Due to the merger of the railway 
companies, these reductions did not come into effect until May 1925. However, the settlement 
was not the permanent solution the cabinet sought. Once again, it had no option but to partially 
yield on its free market ideology to keep workers, rather than shareholders, happy. Hence, in 
December 1923 directors, unions and the government agreed to establish a comprehensive 
machinery of arbitration for wage and conditions. A hierarchical scheme of five institutions 
was put in place: local departmental committees, sectional railway councils, railway councils, 
the Central Wages Board and the Irish Railway Board. Directors, trade unionists, businessmen 
and members of the public would sit on these bodies. The Carrigan award was finally shelved 
for good.196 The machinery proved its worth for workers in 1924 (see Chapter 3).   
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 The experience of public authority workers in Cork and Derry from 1920-25 was an 
early indication of what class relations would be like in Sinn Féin’s republic and the Unionist 
state. Although workers in Cork did better under republican-dominated institutions than their 
constitutional nationalist predecessors, both were governed by men with middle-class biases 
against workers. This is unsurprising given that Sinn Féin’s labour policy was premised on 
conducting a successful constitutional revolution that would leave class relations undisturbed. 
Separating politics from economics was central to republican strategy, a reflection of the petit-
bourgeois nature of the movement.197 The victory of Sinn Féin’s conservative wing, embodied 
in the Free State, sounded the death knell for even a mildly social democratic construction of 
class relations, as the postal strike made clear. In Derry, wage alterations at the Harbour 
Commissioners followed those issued at the Corporation until 1922. Then, the Commissioners 
took the lead in taking on municipal Labour and rolling back gains. Both nationalists and 
Unionists on the Corporation were impressed. Despite political changes, the class interests of 
those who controlled state institutions, not those employed by them, prevailed in both cities. 
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Labour, Revolution and Counterrevolution in Cork and Derry 
 
If Cork’s adoption of syndicalism differentiated it from Derry Labour industrially, then Cork’s 
greater embrace of republicanism from 1916 distinguished them politically. In Cork, the 
disintegration of the IPP and the AFIL, along with their feud, was reflected in a Labour 
movement that was firmly behind the republic from 1918, having previously acted as a conduit 
for intra-nationalist conflict via its two antagonistic trades councils. After the 1918 general 
election, Cork Labour was happy to act as an auxiliary to the republican movement and aid it 
accordingly. The 1918 general strike against conscription marked the beginning of Cork 
Labour’s awareness of itself as a weapon in the struggle against British rule in Ireland. This 
consciousness intensified throughout 1919 as the war of independence gathered pace across 
the country and as state repression increasingly targeted the unions. A crescendo was reached 
that November with the IADAMU’s strike against the Motor Permit Order, the first instance 
of direct union support for the national struggle. As Cork was an epicentre of the revolution, 
its trade unionists were central to Irish Labour’s contribution to national independence, none 
more so than the Transport Union. Although the ITGWU and Sinn Féin ran on a joint-ticket in 
the 1920 local elections in several areas, Cork was the most prominent example of this alliance. 
The relationship between the two organisations in Cork was arguably closer than anywhere 
else in Ireland.1 Cork was also central to the railway munition stoppage, Labour’s most 
significant contribution to the republican cause. By late 1920, local Labour was effectively a 
republican ancillary organisation.  
 Far from harming working-class interests, Labour’s embrace of the republic aided them. 
The political climate caused by republican insurrection oxygenated a Labour militancy that 
made historic gains for workers that employers found difficult to take away during the 
counterattack. Irish and international syndicalism must been put in its political context. Its 
proliferation owes much to the failure of the parliamentary process, especially in Spain, Italy 
and Ireland. The narrowness of the franchise and weakness of parliamentary socialist parties 
was responsible for the syndicalism’s anti-statist, anarchist tinge in southern Europe. In the US, 
strict registration rules eliminated many black, immigrant and migrant workers from voting, 
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and it was among these groups that the Wobblies’ message of class war at the point of 
production resonated most strongly. Even in Britain and France, where the possibility of 
parliamentary redress of grievances appeared more realistic, parliamentary socialists 
moderated their agendas in favour of ‘welfare capitalism’ shortly after making political gains. 
Syndicalism emerged at a time of stagnation in socialist thought and thrived in the period 
between pioneering Marxism and the victory of Lenin’s vanguard party in 1917. Moreover, 
syndicalism was attractive to workers in these countries because it harnessed their antipathy to 
the capitalist state. At one extreme were the authoritarian regimes of Spain and Italy, where 
troops were regular deployed to crush strikes and demonstrations. But anti-union coercion were 
also central features of the French and British states, resulting in violent clashes between 
workers and the authorities during strikes. Such experiences fuelled support for the syndicalist 
message that the capitalist state was a tool of the employers and parliamentary democracy was 
a sham.2  
 The Irish political context moulded native syndicalism in ways that were both distinct 
and similar. The emergence of the ITGWU has to be set against the backcloth of British 
domination, lack of a native parliament and the failure of constitutional nationalism. Hence, 
although the Transport Union concentrated on the industrial rather than political arena, 
republicanism and syndicalism were easy bedfellows. Syndicalism thrived in Cork and pushed 
Labour to the left. Several prominent trade unionists – from the ITGWU especially – were also 
members of Sinn Féin and/or the IRA, and this interaction accelerated the radical impulse. 
Another manifestation of this dynamic was how republicans forced Irish Labour to consider 
the issue of state power for the first time, politicising the movement as never before. The 
republican shadow administration demonstrated to Labour the political nature of the state, 
something especially apparent in a time of revolution. Labour discourse on the nature of the 
state evolved from a social democratic to a revolutionary syndicalist analysis, characterised by 
an adherence to a ‘workers’ republic’ and/or a ‘co-operative commonwealth’. By 1920, 
rhetorically at least, Labour’s political project was a radically democratic proletarian 
alternative to the bourgeois, capitalist state. Thus, by July 1921 Cork Labour was immeasurably 
more unified, numerous, self-assured, anti-imperialist and socialist than it was in January 1919. 
Its embrace of republicanism from 1918 made it an open, if unofficial, ally of Sinn Féin, whose 
revolution was consolidated by Labour direct action.3 Tellingly, Sinn Féin never sought this 
support, but received it nonetheless.        
 While nationalist revolution was a unifying force for Cork’s working class, the exact 
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opposite was the case in Derry where Labour tried desperately to hold together a working class 
so desperately divided. Unsurprisingly, it was slow to embrace the republicanism that, by 1920, 
had largely wiped out constitutional nationalism outside of Ulster. In Cork, by contrast, Labour 
was at the heart of revolutionary change. However, like syndicalism, political change in the 
south influenced Derry Labour, albeit to a much smaller degree. The debate on establishing an 
Irish Federation of Labour at the 1917 ITUC conference is representative of the divergence of 
Cork and Derry Labour that the embryonic revolution was causing. McCarron’s stout defence 
of British unions in Ireland was rooted in their catering of both nationalists and Unionists in 
Ulster, and his sincere desire to uphold this fragile unity. From 1918, the revolution stretched 
this delicate harmony to breaking point and significantly widened the gulf with southern 
Labour.  
 The Derry Trades Council was put in an unenviable position. Its implementation of the 
1918 general strike against conscription was a preview of what would be made explicit from 
January 1919: the difficulty of avoiding political splits in a city with a nationalist majority and 
a large Unionist minority in a time of nationalist revolution. Hence, the council’s assertion that 
humanitarian and not political reasons were behind its support for the ITUC’s 1918 anti-
conscription stoppage, a claim it repeated with less credibility in April 1920. The humanitarian 
reasons given for participation in what were political strikes may explain why the IADAMU 
opted not to bring the strike against the Motor Permit Order to Derry. Protestants, however, did 
not buy it and a hardened clannishness on both sides resulted. The sectarianism that Logue had 
done his upmost to avoid partially emanated from the April 1920 general strike, occasioning 
the worst riots in Derry’s history. By July 1920, the two sectarian camps were irreconcilable. 
Thus, nationalist railwaymen had little compunction in bringing the munitions embargo to 
Ulster despite the trades council’s reticence in supporting what was clearly a political strike. 
As it was not hamstrung by sectarianism, Cork Labour was able to throw in its lot with Sinn 
Féin until mid-1921, when the party’s pan-class nationalism caused the two movements to 
clash. Derry Labour’s detachment from the revolution ensured its muteness on partition despite 
its nationalist majority. Cork Labour was actively involved in what was essentially a southern 
revolution born out of southern conditions. As a participant in that revolution, Labour also 
reflected an indifference to Ulster that enabled partition, indicative of the limits of Irish 
syndicalism and Labour-republicanism. A psychological partition had long existed in Ireland 
between north and south, even among nationalists, and Labour was no exception.4   
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 In Cork, the revolution coincided with a proliferation of Irish trade unionism and the 
dislodging of several British unions. In Derry, however, the amalgamateds’ long-term 
stranglehold over Labour was strengthened by the revolution. Even Peadar O’Donnell, one of 
Ireland’s foremost Connollyite in the post-Connolly era, could not successfully extricate them 
in a nationalist city – a testimony to their established position in Ulster. Even in these disturbed 
times, room for expansion for Irish unions was slight as worthwhile gains could only be made 
by poaching, which risked the dreaded sectarian split. Several of the smaller Dublin unions 
collapsed or refused to enter Derry because of the heightened political tensions. Given that 
Derry’s wages movement lacked a syndicalist character, the ITGWU’s advantages over its 
British rivals were not as evident as in Cork. Moreover, the higher social insurances offered by 
some of these unions had a strong attraction. It is debatable whether or not the ITGWU’s stay 
in Derry was divisive and counterproductive. Other Irish unions were too weak to compete 
with the amalgamateds and Unionism too conservative an ideology to produce a formidable 
Labour organisation, the UULA being a case in point. If the UULA was the ITGWU’s sole 
competition, O’Donnell’s faith that socialism would win over the Protestant working class to 
the republic may well have been vindicated. But the amalgamateds’ skilful manoeuvrability in 
combining some degree of wage militancy with an aloofness to the national struggle kept most 
Protestants away from both the loyalist Ulster Workers’ Union and the republican Irish unions. 
The ITGWU viewed the amalgamateds as a relic of British colonialism whose presence 
perpetuated the sectionalist, parochial and conservative attitude of northern workers. This 
assessment may have been correct, but its straightforward appeal to proletarian militancy was 
destined to fail in a city as split as Derry. With no such sectarian divisions in Cork, the same 
call to militancy was remarkably successful and allowed the union to poach many of its British 










The way the pre-1920 IPP/AFIL-dominated Cork Corporation treated its own employees 
illuminates the bourgeois nature of constitutional nationalism. Like the city’s private sector 
employers, it resisted many calls for wage increases until the chorus of demands overwhelmed 
it from early 1917. In 1915, an IPP councillor declared that a request for wage increases for 
was: 
  
one of the most brazen and indiscreet of officialism he had experienced at the Council. . . an 
attempt to wreck a system which was the only means by which they could maintain discipline 
and respectability. If the Corporation desired to control their officials it would take all the 
bayonets of the British Army. The more was done for these people the more the wanted.6 
  
 Under pressure from Labour, it took the Corporation until April 1916 to issue its first 
wartime wage advance for labourers. The 10 per cent increase was miserly considering the rate 
of inflation. But it was no less parsimonious than what prevailed in the private sector paid. 
Indeed, the nationalist Corporation was happy to track private-sector wage rates for these 
employees and never exceeded them. Corporation tradesmen, on the other hand, were paid 
above what the master builders would tolerate. With trade union complicity, the Corporation 
was happy to allow this labour aristocracy to be maintained until syndicalism compelled the 
unions to standardise rates across the board. This inequity generated antipathy among certain 
groups of Corporation workers that manifested itself in strikes, and the threat of them, from 
late 1917. The clerks’ 1919 stoppage was the culmination of the workers’ disillusionment with 
the old Corporation – a tangible demonstration of the zeitgeist. By January 1920, like the 
constitutional nationalism it represented, the Corporation was a relic of a bygone era and was 
swept aside in the separatist fervour that now engulfed the Rebel City.  
 Nine trade unionists, six from the ITGWU, now occupied seats on the Corporation. 
Their influence mitigated the petit-bourgeois Sinn Féin and ensured a Corporation more 
sympathetic to working-class plight. However, by its own definition and by its own metric, the 
Sinn Féin-ITGWU Corporation failed to deliver for workers. The 70s. rate advocated by its 
own cost of living commission as a minimum living wage was never given to its labourers, 
even though it was granted at some private sector firms like the breweries. Goulding’s gave 
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their labourers an even higher rate. However, the Corporation took inspiration from the avarice 
of that private sector in 1924 when clerical and tradesmen’s wages were cut. Nevertheless, it 
defended the labourers’ 62s. 6d. rate for a considerable period after the employers had 
dismantled it. It took direct central government intervention following prolonged campaigning 
by the business class before it could be cut. 
 Accordingly, the experience of workers under the new Corporation is telling. It offers 
a glimpse of how Labour fared, and could expect to fare, under those at the heart of the Irish 
revolution. It shows the paternalistic view of republicans towards organised Labour, a 
perception informed by the different class interests of the two movements. The war of 
independence provided a common external enemy that gave a nationalistic veneer of the 
harmony of interests between Labour and the republic, a façade that began to crumble as soon 
as the truce was called. Having co-opted Labour, Sinn Féin adroitly kept it in line by 
subordinating it and giving it the minimum of what Labour achieved in the private sector. If 
Labour did not rock the boat, the republicans gave it a sympathetic ear. From July 1921, with 
the common enemy neutralised, the opposing class interests came to the fore and the two 
movements came into direct and sometimes bitter conflict. Relations would never heal and 
remained tense until Monahan became Commissioner, when relations between Labour and the 
Free State deteriorated even further. However, workers did better under the petit-bourgeois 
Sinn Féin regime than under the upper-middle-class constitutional nationalist one that it 
replaced.7 Within a few months, the clerks’ grievances had been satisfied, tradesmen’s wages 
were fully standardised and labourers received another 12s. 6d., a bigger individual increase 
than any the previous Corporation had given. Furthermore, in contrast to the Harbour Board, 
in November 1921 the Corporation resisted pressure from the IEIU to give preferential 
treatment to members of Irish unions in employment despite Sinn Féin’s support for such a 
measure.8   
 An analysis of how the Unionist Corporation that governed Derry until January 1920 
treated its own employees is important in several respects. Firstly, unlike Cork, there were no 
independent Labour representatives on the Corporation as Ulster’s sectarian politics meant that 
common working-class concerns were swallowed up by the national question. This 
Corporation enunciated the true scale of Unionism’s conservatism as an ideology and, 
paradoxically, its flexibility. To survive in a nationalist majority city, the Unionist elites were 
forced to satiate workers by partially accommodating the interests of the Protestant working 
class, whose support it desperately needed for self-legitimacy. Labour-Unionist votes were 
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often the difference in forcing wage increases through an institution led by an undemocratic 
rump that explicitly championed the interests of employers. Strikes were threatened but, in 
contrast to Cork, never materialised as just enough was conceded to stave them off. In this way, 
hegemony was maintained, and the political goal of Unionism fulfilled. However, the 
Corporation’s domination by reactionary industrialists guaranteed that workers did better under 
the constitutional nationalist Corporation – its own bourgeois composition notwithstanding – 
albeit only slightly. Come the demise of both Corporations, Cork’s municipal labourers earned 
50s. a week while Derry’s earned 46s. 6d., 7 per cent less.  
 The nationalist victory in Derry in the municipal elections appeared to signal a new 
dawn in the new Ireland-in-embryo. Although the new Corporation lacked the syndicalist 
character of the Sinn Féin-ITGWU coalition in Cork, the conservative Unionist establishment 
was horrified by it. Workers hoped to get more from this novel Corporation with its 
unprecedented working-class composition. Initially, the signs were positive as workers 
received a boost of 8s. 6d. in 1920. But, like Cork, non-Labour republicans on the Corporation 
were a bourgeois ruling class-in-waiting who stood in sympathy with workers but not in 
solidarity with them. By the time they were gerrymandered off the Corporation in 1923, 
nationalists and republicans had cut labourers’ wages by 8s., having taken guidance from a 
Harbour Board that was dominated by Unionists and industrialists. Indeed, intra-class unity 
was evident regarding Corporation wages on several occasions, with working-class councillors 
struggling together in vain against a nationalist-Sinn Féin-Unionist bloc. Like Cork, Derry’s 
republican-led Corporation shows the conservativism of those who led the Irish revolution. 
While both cities’ working classes suffered as a consequence, far more damage was done in 
Derry. The conservatism of the republicans helped to ensure that Protestant workers would 
never leave the sectarian camp that bound them to the Union and to their employers. Local 
Unionism’s domination by acerbic reactionaries like McFarland, Moore and Anderson 
provided a tantalising opportunity for republicans to appeal to Protestant workers’ class 
instincts with a progressive social programme. But, like a deus ex machina, the UULA was 
brought over from Belfast to drain any growth in class consciousness among Protestant workers 
and to channel it instead into support for the Union.   
 With the return of the gerrymandered Unionist Corporation in 1923, Derry’s working 
class was soon given a foretaste of how class relations would be in Northern Ireland. Political 
stability and the consolidation of partition gave the councillors the security they needed to wage 
class war against their own employees. Although the MEA bartered down cuts with warnings 
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of stoppage, the Corporation’s authority had been asserted. When the Association led the call 
for partial pay restorations the following year, the Unionists were both intransigent and 
ruthless. With the blessing of the Belfast government and support from the Unionist press, the 
Corporation bled the MEA dry. While it was forced to make concessions, it obtained the bulk 
of its demands and succeeded in disempowering one of Derry’s foremost unions. At peak rates, 
wages for Corporation employees in Cork were 14 per cent higher than Derry; by early 1924, 
the difference was 49 per cent, which shrank to 35 per cent after Monahan’s first cut. By late 
1924, municipal workers in both cities found themselves confronted with remarkably similar 
situations. Both were members of formerly powerful unions that were major casualties of 
recent labour wars; both had to deal with a central state hostile to local democracy; and both 
had to deal with unrepresentative local administrations. Hence, the stories of municipal Labour 
in Cork and Derry during this period are illustrative of the outcome of the Irish revolution as 
far as workers’ class interests were concerned.       
     
The Harbour Boards 
A comparative analysis of the two Harbour Boards is similarly revealing. The Derry Port and 
Harbour Commissioners were decidedly less affected by transformational change than the 
Corporation from which some its members were nominated. Its membership changed little 
throughout the revolutionary period and a Unionist consistently chaired it. The Commissioners 
were bastions of conservatism amidst revolution. Its treatment of its employees is indicative of 
how Unionist elites perceived the working class. Strikes broke out there before they did at 
either Derry Corporation or the Cork Harbour Board as the NAUL was regularly forced to 
assert the rights of the workers. The Tyneside union was remarkably successful and kept 
Harbour Board labourers among the best paid in the city, as they were in 1914. By the period 
of peak wages in 1920, these men were on rates superior to those given to building-trade 
labourers. This starkly contrasts with Cork where public authority labourers were paid the same 
as general labourers in the private sector, significantly lower rates than in the building trade. 
But the greater syndicalist character of Cork Labour ensured that even the lowest wages 
secured by labourers were higher than those of the Maiden City’s best paid labourers. Derry’s 
harbour labourers were still the city’s best paid in 1923 and were therefore not featured in the 
1924 fightback. The Derry Harbour Commissioners had taken a leading role in the 
counterattack, slashing pay and mercilessly breaking strikes, providing a model for the 
Corporation and the Employers’ Federation. Like the Corporation, the Commissioners felt able 
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to take on the NAUL in the knowledge that they had the backing of the Stormont government. 
The experience of Derry’s harbour workers was emblematic of the rise and fall of Labour 
during these years, and the place of Labour after partition and Unionist reaction.  
  Cork’s harbour workers did comparatively well under the pre-1920 Harbour Board, 
with many clerks and tradesmen on wages above those prevailing in the private sector. Its 
labourers, however, were among the lowest paid in the city. The greater Labour and republican 
influences from 1920 gave harbour workers a direct stake in the Irish revolution and the 
ITGWU was keen to exploit this. Sinn Féiners like de Róiste and Labourites like Day now 
supplemented Kelleher’s moderating effect on the traditionally establishment-dominated 
Harbour Board. Like the Corporation, it standardised tradesmen’s pay at the higher rates. But 
like the Corporation, it too failed its most vulnerable workers – its labourers – by refusing to 
grant the 70s. wage to them. When the ITGWU sought the wage, the Board proved itself as be 
as anti-worker as any private sector employer. The culmination of that clash, the Cork harbour 
soviet, was crucial to the collapse of the republican-Labour alliance. The Harbour Board would 
never again show itself amenable to working-class interests and allied itself with the CEF 
during the 1923 counterattack. By 1925, it had come full circle and was once again a citadel of 
establishment interests.  
 The Irish revolution was even less kind to workers at the Cork Board of Guardians. The 
1921 dispute between the vice-guardians and their employees was another pivotal moment in 
the collapse of the republican-Labour alliance that indicated the subordinated position of 
workers in the nascent Irish state. However, wages and salaries were superior at Cork’s 
Harbour Board and Board of Guardians than at the Derry Harbour Commissioners. This 
demonstrates that workers fared better under the Irish revolution, conservative and bourgeois 
though many of its leaders were, than under the Unionist counterrevolution.    








The Free State and Cork Labour 
When the National Army invaded Cork in August 1922, General Emmet Dalton was given a 
hero’s welcome by the city’s bourgeoisie.9 De Róiste watched with revulsion as cliques, ‘each 
vying with the other for power’, tried ‘to ingratiate themselves with the military victors’. ‘The 
old ‘‘toadies’’, he protested, ‘were the first to pay Dalton ‘reverence’’.10 With Dalton’s 
blessing, the two Chambers of Commerce, the CEF and the Cork Farmers’ Union spearheaded 
the establishment of an unarmed municipal police force called the ‘Cork Civic Patrol’. 
Advertisements for the force called for recruits with good education only, a move designed to 
exclude working-class men. It was overseen by the Cork Civic Committee, which included 
Nason and Day, and continued to operate until November, when the government introduced 
the Free State’s Civic Guard.11 In September, the Chambers of Commerce and the CEF formed 
a ‘watch committee’ to safeguard their property during the ‘present disturbed times’.12 This 
body became the Cork Commercial Committee and included representatives from the two 
Chambers of Commerce, the CEF, the Cork Farmers’ Union and the Cork Traders’ Protective 
Association. It survived well into 1923.13 But the Cork bourgeoisie need not have been so 
fearful. A strong police force to protect private property was a vital component of the Free 
State’s schema of industrial relations.  
 From the beginning, the government of Saorstát Éireann sought to defeat industrial 
unrest by delineating points of principle beyond which it would not compromise. On 30 January 
1922, the cabinet agreed to lay contingency plans for a national rail strike rather than guarantee 
a wage agreement during the railway crisis. Elsewhere, it declared strikes in the public service 
to be illegal. Accordingly, forty-nine Labour Exchange clerks in Cork were dismissed when 
they left their posts on 10 February 1922 to protest a 6s. cut in their 67s. wage.14 The postal 
strike marked the first example of forceful intervention from the state to manage the course of 
industrial action rather than merely responding to its excesses. By early 1923, with the civil 
war largely won, the government felt more assured in reverting to its preferred laissez-faire 
economic model. It no longer needed to actively restrain employers in the interests of stability 
as in 1922. A staggering of wage cuts had been the result of this, a policy aimed not at reducing 
class conflict but prolonging it to make it manageable. Greater control over the twenty-six 
counties impelled a modification of procedure from the government without an abandonment 
of principle. Dáil arbitration was gradually scaled down throughout 1922 until it was 
effectively redundant by early 1924, except for the most severe crises. Machinery of 
conciliation developed only where necessary – like on the railways – and where possible direct 
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negotiation between workers and employers was ensured through state-sponsored conferences. 
Though effective policing would not be introduced until June 1923, after the civil war’s 
conclusion, the National Army filled the void in the meantime by protecting essential services 
during a dispute. Thus, scabs received military protection during Cork’s January 1923 dock 
strike. Military interventions like this did not smash Labour, but it did prevent workers from 
outflanking the employers by maintaining the flow of commerce, creating stalemate strikes that 
would bleed unions dry.15 In this way, employers had the tacit backing of the government.  
When Cork’s dockers struck once more in July 1923, military intervention was again 
considered. Noting that the strike was ‘assuming a grave aspect and that feelings on both sides 
were hardening’, the government resolved to use the military if necessary to keep the peace.16 
The Committee of the Order of the City of Cork urged the cabinet to do just that. Fearing the 
growing unrest, it claimed that the ‘presence of military on the streets will be found necessary’: 
 
The position in Cork ... has now become quite unsupportable ... The city is governed, not by 
the Government but by the Transport Union . . . The Civic Guards when approached frankly 
confessed their powerlessness to do anything . . . The present utterly inadequate handful of men 
cannot possibly suppress intimidation and lawlessness. There is therefore widespread 
dissatisfaction with the present anarchic state of affairs and it is felt that unless this 
demoralisation is drastically and immediately countered the Government will have abdicated 
its responsibilities in Cork City.17 
 
The 1923 lockout was the last major instance of state intervention in a local industrial 
clash. The intensity of the conflict ensured that a voluntarist approach to resolution was 
impossible. However, holding firm to its ideology of minimal intervention, the cabinet rejected 
all corporatist options and instead utilised conferences between capital and labour to resolve 
the crisis. Labour doggedness forced the employers to accept the result of this course of action. 
In this sense, the government’s strategy was vindicated by the outcome of the crisis, a strategy 
that was, paradoxically, guaranteed by the cabinet’s willingness to use repression to enforce 
it.18 By January 1925, the paternalistic attitude to public sector workers remained. When 
Monahan’s wage-cutting provoked the possibility of a strike, the government decided that ‘any 
requisite protection should be afforded’ to ‘support the Commissioner fully in all reasonable 
measures a good employer might ordinarily take’.19 Fittingly, the government’s economic 
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philosophy received lavish praise from William Dinan, president of the Cork Incorporated 
Chamber of Commerce and Shipping, at the Chamber’s 1925 AGM.20 
 
Derry Labour and the Orange State  
Partition impacted Derry deleteriously in a variety of ways. With its economic hinterland in 
neighbouring Donegal, now in a different state, the city’s economy suffered badly and its 
industrial decline was accelerated by the new customs and tariffs. In May 1925, the Free State 
government imposed a 15 per cent tariff on shirts, having placed a duty on biscuits the year 
before that damaged Derry’s milling, bread and biscuit industries. Cross-border trade with 
Donegal was severely affected.21 Partition also copperfastened the peripheral position of Derry 
in Ulster as the Unionist government effectively made Northern Ireland a Belfast-centric 
statelet. Moreover, Derry’s nationalist majority made it a constant target of Stormont suspicion.  
None suffered more than Labour which had, in Stormont’s eyes, a steadfast nationalist agenda. 
Hence, it was inevitable that sectarianism would raise its ugly head in Northern Ireland’s public 
sector.    
 There were some instances of nationalist workers resisting Stormont until economic 
pressure won out. For example, about one-third of Northern Ireland’s Catholic schools refused 
to recognise the government and thus had their teachers paid by Dublin until October 1922.22 
But there was localised defiance too. In August 1923, much unrest was generated among 
Labour Exchange clerks in Derry when a Protestant, Mr. Dougan, of nine months’ employment 
was promoted to undermanager instead of Mr. J.F. Hoey, a Catholic of twelve years’ 
experience. Dougan was then transferred to Belfast and Hoey was made deputy manager of the 
Derry Labour Exchange. Two months later, the Ministry of Labour proposed that Hoey be 
transferred to Belfast and replaced by a Mr. Mercer, another Protestant. The ATGWU publicly 
promised to take drastic action if this happened. The police dreaded the prospect of the dockers 
and carters being brought out on strike. Catholics feared that the change would lead to 
religious/political discrimination against them. In November, the NFSU repeated the 
ATGWU’s threat and the trades council passed a resolution refusing to work with the Belfast 
government until the transfer was cancelled. RUC protection was given to Mercer and nothing 
more came of the affair.23  
 Partition also forced a reconfiguration of local industrial relations. As Derry 
Corporation did not officially recognise the republic until January 1922, the Dáil’s arbitration 
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courts never operated in Derry as they had in Cork. Belfast’s Ministry of Labour took over 
arbitration functions from its London equivalent in late 1921/early 1922, having established its 
own conciliation schemes from May 1921. Its first major test was to resolve the railway crisis 
within the six counties. Like the Provisional Government, Stormont knew it needed 
railwaymen more than shareholders and collaborated with Dublin via conferences of 
conciliation between the railway unions and the directors. The northern government was also 
willing to subsidise the companies to offset loses accruing from the February 1922 agreement. 
Despite their claims of near bankruptcy, the northern railway companies were able to pay the 
wages stipulated in the agreement until 31 December 1922 without any state aid. They had 
resolved to do this at a meeting with Andrews on 12 July 1922.24 On 9 December 1922, the 
Railway Commission of Northern Ireland issued its final reports, divided into a majority report 
and a minority report. As in the Free State, the commission had been established the previous 
May pursuant to the February agreement to investigate the most efficient means of managing 
the railway system in Northern Ireland, including wages and conditions of staff. In contrast to 
its southern counterpart, it published a minority report that favoured nationalisation on an all-
island basis and a majority report that rejected exactly that.25 Throughout December 1922, 
several conferences were held to ensure peace on the railways from 1 January 1923 when the 
February agreement was due to expire. On 30 December, under the chairmanship of Andrews, 
it was agreed not to alter wages or conditions for two months. In the meantime, a committee 
representing companies and unions would draw up a scheme of pay and working hours.26  
 The railway crisis was the northern government’s last major intervention in a labour 
dispute in Derry. Its concept of class relations was remarkably like Dublin’s, but with an even 
greater attachment to unregulated capitalism. Like the Free State, the Unionist government was 
happy to allow market forces to dictate wages with minimal intervention from Belfast. 
However, its own legitimacy problems aside, it did not feel the need to restrain employers in 
the name of security from 1921-23 the way Dublin did. This enabled the counterattack to be 
launched sooner in Derry than Cork. The northern government’s rapport with the employers 
was cordial from the beginning, far more so than with the unions, even the loyalist ones. This 
is hardly surprising given Stormont’s composition. Of the forty Unionist MPs, three were 
landowners, twenty were employers or merchants, ten were professionals and only four were 
working class.27 Irish employers had opposed the introduction of trade boards and participated 
in them without enthusiasm, even when their rulings lowered wages. The bosses seized the 
opportunity to lobby for their abolition. They had a sympathiser in Andrews, himself a linen 
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manufacturer, whose 1923 Trade Boards Act more closely resembled the 1909 Act than the 
1918 one. It minimised the role of the state in wage negotiations and abolished the flax and 
hemp trade boards, lacerating the numbers covered by the trade boards in Northern Ireland 
from 115,000 to 51,000. Trade boards provided subsistence wages which progressively 
declined form 1924-35. The shirtmaking trade board, which covered 6,000 in Derry, was 
maintained.28   
 Given Stormont’s commitment to laissez-faire, its Ministry of Labour involved itself in 
remarkably few of the many strikes that took place in Derry from 1922-24. When it did, its role 
was one of conciliation rather than arbitration and it was as likely to rule in favour of the 
employers as the workers. Even its role as a facilitator of conferences was scant, more so than 
its southern equivalent. But if differences existed between Belfast and Dublin on soft state 
intervention in industrial disputes, both were equally willing to utilise the forces of the state 
against Labour. In the absence of a military, the RUC kept a close eye on strikes in Derry, 
especially in the key industries and economic arteries, lest they become protracted. If they did, 
the B-Specials were sent in to protect scabs, as happened during the 1921 Watt’s strike and as 
was considered during the inter-union shirt factory dispute in the spring of 1924. During the 
1924 summer crisis, Craig’s government discussed the possibility of intervening to ensure the 
safe provision of transport with scab labour.29 But still, intervention was kept to a bare 
minimum. Andrews said as much in the Stormont parliament on 27 May when debating the 
situation in Derry, even though seven days later he proclaimed it to be the most serious calamity 
Northern Ireland had experienced since its establishment.30 Although his Ministry intervened 
with kid gloves to stop the strikes from beginning, it was not involved in their termination. 
Appropriately, the crisis was ended by the Corporation and the Employers’ Federation, an 
alliance that would rule the city in each other’s interests for many decades thereafter.  
Both governments saw themselves as guarantors of private property and enterprise, 
willing to protect them with draconian state force from the military or the B-Specials if 
necessary. Their selective interventions in industrial disputes in Cork and Derry aptly 
demonstrate this commonality, as does their lack of intervention when strikes broke out. That 
both governments shared remarkably similar attitudes to the working class while 
simultaneously representing the opposite sides of the Irish revolution is a testament to the class 
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The nature of Irish society for the rest of the twentieth century was fundamentally influenced 
by what happened between 1914 and 1924. A class-based analysis of this period raises 
questions about the role of working class in a nationalist revolution. During such a revolution, 
how can proletarian interests be served by an alliance with bourgeois forces whose economic 
interests conflict with those of the working class? A comparative study of Labour in Cork and 
Derry from 1917-24 crystallises this dilemma in an Irish historical context. It reveals the class 
forces behind republican revolution and Unionist reaction, and those forces’ attitudes towards 
the working class. Furthermore, it assesses whether a psychological disconnection existed 
between northern and southern nationalists, and if so, to what extent this was reflected within 
Labour.  
 The republican revolution was precipitated by the First World War, which demolished 
the old constitutional nationalist consensus and brought separatism from the margins to the 
political mainstream. Ulster Unionists remained utterly intransigent and mobilised as fervently 
against the new threat as they had done against the old. The necessities of war unintentionally 
took the unions off life-support and back into the pulse of Irish life. Mandatory, binding 
arbitration functioned by recognising unions on the factory floor and employers no longer had 
the luxury of surplus unskilled labour. Greater class consciousness and unionisation was the 
result. The Great War was the culmination of what the Industrial Revolution had given to 
warfare; its human cost was staggering. As the dead bodies mounted, the Irish public 
increasingly questioned its participation in the calamity, leading to the de-legitimisation of 
British rule in Ireland. Exorbitant inflation aided this process. The Easter Rising provided a 
catalyst for anti-British sentiment and the execution of its leaders was the seismic turning point 
in the de-legitimisation of British authority. Uprisings across Europe, not least the proletarian 
one led by the Bolsheviks, aerated Irish revolutionary impulses. From this wreckage came the 
war of independence, Unionist mobilisation and partition. Two Irish states emerged from this 
period of conflict: first Northern Ireland and then the Irish Free State. The Treaty settlement 
and the civil war both consolidated the new political reality.1  
 By early 1917, Labour had risen from the ashes of the 1913 lockout and was on the 
precipice of syndicalism. In both Cork and Derry, unprecedented power and influence were 
awaiting the unions, as were unparalleled defeats. Syndicalism was made possible by a 
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confluence of the extraordinary national and international events that took place between 1914 
and 1917. Unlike new unionism or Larkinism, it was created from international events outside 
of Irish Labour’s control. By early 1916, Irish Labour was still licking its wounds from its 
defeat in Dublin and was in no position to engineer a revival. Unintentionally, it was the First 
World War that did this. In late 1916/early 1917, mass inflation and food shortages led to trade 
unions being inundated by labourers whose class consciousness was rooted in a profound sense 
of injustice. The character and role of unions changed utterly, as did the pattern of industrial 
relations. Labour was the conduit for, rather than the generator of, a discontent that could not 
be contained by the parameters of established trade unionism. A precondition for syndicalism 
was disillusion with the prevailing Labour struggles to defend workers’ living standards. As 
such, international syndicalism was the spawn of a crisis in socialism rather than capitalism. In 
Ireland, where there was a scant socialist base on which to build, it was the product of a 
different ambience.  
 Syndicalism was a flexible ideology that adapted quickly to the Irish context. A product 
of revolution at home and abroad, it integrated with ease into a non-revolutionary Labour 
movement. Irish syndicalism encapsulates the ideology’s strengths and weaknesses. If 
international syndicalism was shapeless, contradictory and incoherent, then so was its Irish 
variant. However, if international syndicalism was simultaneously capable of inspiring 
discontent and (even non-revolutionary) class consciousness, mobilising the masses, and 
generating and sustaining direct action, then Irish syndicalism was a minor but brilliant 
example of the ideology’s fortes. It led to extraordinary, lasting gains for the working class that 
could not have happened without a redistribution of power and wealth. Its Irish iteration was 
Ireland’s contribution to the social tumult and intense class conflict that characterised Europe’s 
‘two red years’ of 1919 and 1920. But syndicalism’s impact on Irish Labour would be far more 
enduring.  
 For economic, political and ethno-sectarian reasons, syndicalism permeated Labour in 
Cork far more thoroughly than in Derry. Indeed, nothing symbolised the disunity of the Irish 
working class more than Cork’s wholehearted embrace of syndicalism and Derry’s half-hearted 
effort. This divergence was emblematic of fundamental differences between the two cities, 
which Labour reflected.  
 Since 1889, Irish Labour had sought to build trade unionism in an underdeveloped 
economy. From the 1850s, free trade between Britain and Ireland severely weakened Cork’s 
manufacturing base, stunting local development and making Labour entirely dependent on its 
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British counterpart. Southern backwardness and northern sectarianism severely restricted both 
new model and new unionisms’ ability to make gains in either Cork or Derry. Themes of 
modernisation and decolonisation suffused each of the three phases of transformation which 
built upon what the other had given to produce syndicalism. Labour unions evolved into 
industrial unions, into general unions and finally into the One Big Union; blacking evolved 
into the sympathetic strike and finally into generalised action. The maturation was reflected 
politically too: the formation of the ITUC in 1894 gave way to the establishment of an Irish 
Labour Party in 1912 and its adoption of a socialist constitution in 1918. The ITUC’s decision 
in 1919 to create a single Irish Workers’ Union was the pinnacle of Irish syndicalism.2 But 
these transitions deepened the ridge between northern and southern Labour, as evidenced by 
the different trajectories of the wages movements in Cork and Derry.  
 The strong moral advocacy Larkin infused into Irish trade unionism was the basis for 
generalised action in the south from 1918, the only tactic capable of winning concessions in a 
de-industrialised economy with a vast pool of unskilled labour. Accordingly, an all-
encompassing wages movement, though operational in both cities from 1919, advanced more 
rapidly in Cork. In both places a vast dispersal of unionisation occurred from 1917 as Labour 
spread from the manual sector to white-collar workers. Although the increases sought were 
similar, syndicalism gave Cork a greater willingness to strike than Derry, resulting in better 
wages except for building tradesmen. Progress on hours was faster in Cork, but by 1921 similar 
working weeks prevailed in both cities with Labour largely failing to achieve the forty-four-
hour week.  
 The capitalist counterassault vividly revealed the differences between these syndicalist 
and non-syndicalist Labour movements. Cork’s 1923 lockout demonstrates the importance of 
a decentralised structure and local control as pre-conditions for syndicalist direct action. It also 
illustrates how localism could be a force for proletarian spontaneity and solidarity. Syndicalism 
had always been hostile to hierarchical organisational structures, setting it apart markedly from 
established trade unionism which was more authoritarian in nature. The ITGWU’s post-1914 
emphasis on devolution and industrial unionism was stronger than syndicalist unions in Britain, 
America, Spain, France and Italy, many of which were more centralised and organised along 
craft lines. But the onset of the slump led caused Liberty Hall to enlarge officialdom at branch 
level and strengthen central control in an increasingly bureaucratic union machine. Irish 
syndicalism was the melding of direct action and industrial unionism, and this was its ruinous 
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flaw. The failure to create a rank-and-file movement in the south divorced militancy from 
industrial unionism during the slump.3 
However, with wages falling across Britain and Ireland, the central ethic of syndicalism 
– working-class solidarity – galvanised Cork Labour to put up a gallant defence of its post-
1917 gains in 1923. Unity and solidity forced the CEF to accept compromise. The crux of the 
conflict lay in retail employers’ insistence on their right to reduce staff numbers during slack 
periods. Wages were a secondary factor. A moral drive for justice inspired workers as much as 
economic rationale, a testament to syndicalism’s allure and a fitting farewell to it. As was the 
case nationally, and indeed everywhere syndicalism took hold, Cork Labour was unable to 
withstand the employers’ state-backed counter-mobilisation without serious long-term 
damage. Syndicalism was the greatest causality.4 In Derry, where political stability allowed the 
counterattack to start much sooner, there was far less unity in combatting employers. Similarly, 
union co-ordination was poor during the 1924 clawback. There was no committee directing 
generalised action or mass meetings of workers characterised by militant speeches. Though the 
outcomes of both endgames were similar, Cork had more to be proud of given the severity of 
the CEF’s demands and the weakness of union demands in Derry.  
The three Cork soviets of this era were the most salient representation of the city’s 
syndicalist swagger. They were created by the grassroots of Ireland’s two most radical unions, 
the ITGWU and the NUR. ITGWU officials like Day, Kenneally and Barry genuinely 
supported the concept of a workers’ republic, however amorphously they understood it. The 
NUR was the quintessential industrial union. During the railway crisis, Cork railwaymen tried, 
and failed, to re-orientate industrial unionism in a revolutionary direction. These soviets were 
opposed not only by employers but by republicans and the national Labour leadership because 
they functioned as potential alternatives, rather than auxiliaries, to the wages movement. They 
were the result of disillusion with the self-proclaimed agents of revolutionary change – the 
republicans and trade union executives – when industrial unionism’s limitations in obtaining 
gains and resisting the counteroffensive became clear. Such tensions were not unique to 
Ireland. International syndicalism was tormented by its immediate goal of achieving reforms 
with its goal of revolution. The CGT, CNT, USI and IWW were all crippled as organisations 
by this contradiction. In Ireland, O’Brien embodied syndicalism’s moderate wing and his 
bureaucratic leadership did much to stifle revolutionary sentiment among the Irish working 
class from 1923.5 But he was not alone: most union leaders joined him in a collective and 
protracted drift to the centre. Derry Labour was not syndicalist enough to countenance soviets 
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or any viable alternative to national executive diktats. Its post-1923 rightward shift was thus 
less traumatic for the rank-and-file. 
The cities’ trades councils embodied the differences between northern and southern 
Labour. It was only in Cork where red flags were flown, the Bolsheviks were praised and 
promises of a workers’ republic or a co-operative commonwealth were issued at trades council 
gatherings. However, Dowling was an even more powerful influence on CTC leaders than 
syndicalism. Class conciliation rather than class conflict more accurately reflected their agenda. 
The Derry Trades Council echoed the zeitgeist with its promotion of a proletarian 
counterculture through co-operatives, sports days and concerts. Its push against the ITGWU 
was unique and would have not happened without the amalgamateds. The Transport Union was 
deliberately isolated and the city’s wages movement left devoid of its greatest purveyor of 
social and national revolution.6  
The proliferation of syndicalism was predicated on the initiation of mental 
decolonisation. The major, though indirect, ideological agents of decolonisation, Larkinism 
and syndicalism, encountered local realities in Derry that compelled its Labour leaders to 
eschew modernisation. From 1917, the new milieu encouraged Irish craftsmen and recently 
organised clerks and assistants to establish native unions, the IEIU and the IUDWC being prime 
examples. Irish Labour’s most successful ever period marked the first time in which the 
movement relied on native organisers and resources. This was syndicalism’s most enduring 
legacy: it finally ended dependency on British Labour. Although the amalgamateds had not 
been killed off, there was now a viable alternative to them. The failure of Irish unions – the 
ITGWU in particular – to win significant support in Derry widened the gulf with Cork. Larkin 
had already pushed Labour’s geographic orientation from north to south, from Belfast to 
Dublin; syndicalism completed the job. As a result, the ITUC increasingly became a southern-
centric echo chamber of southern problems. The shrinking influence of British unions over 
Congress from 1917 marginalised northern trade unionism. McCarron’s death brought this 
reality to Derry as Logue was anonymous within the national movement. Partition was merely 
the physical confirmation of the political and organisational division extant within Irish Labour. 
The ultimate contradiction of Irish syndicalism – an ideology premised entirely on proletarian 
unity – was its sequestering of Ulster, including its nationalist population, from the south.7  
 The Irish unions’ lacklustre performance in Derry substantiates the depth of working-
class ethno-sectarianism in the six counties, a debilitating problem that Labour has yet to 
overcome. Ulster radicals like Peadar O’Donnell struggled in vain to get the Dublin leadership 
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to embrace what he considered the only solution: class politics. But the sectarian instinct was 
too powerful in divided Derry. Most Ulster Protestants remained highly suspicious of Dublin 
unions, especially the ITGWU, as Trojan horses in the belly of which was a republican agenda. 
With no other alternatives but loyalist yellow unions and the UULA stooges, Unionists stuck 
with the amalgamateds. Conversely, these unions tolerated republicanism within their ranks to 
retain Catholics, who in turn remained loyal if the British delivered on wages. As they never 
endangered Unionism, British unions received benign neutrality from the UULA. By 1925, 
their position in the Maiden City had been solidified over the previous eight years, having seen 
off a major threat from the ITGWU and a minor one from the Ulster Workers’ Union. The 
result was a dysfunctional Labour politics and a frail unity between nationalists and Unionists 
overseen by a conceited leadership desperate to avoid sectarian splits. With no such ethno-
sectarian baggage to surmount, Irish unions thrived in Cork. By 1922, they had subsumed most 
labourers and assistants, as had most clerks. Considerable progress was also made in the 
building and engineering trades. Only the railways remained impervious.  
 The historians’ verdict on the ITGWU’s four-year presence in Derry has been negative, 
especially regarding O’Donnell. He has been blamed for the closure of Watt’s distilleries, 
stoking sectarianism by appealing to ‘Catholic nationalism’ and engaging in Anglophobic 
attacks on British unions.8 Derry barely features in his later writings and by the 1980s he had 
allegedly come to regret bringing the ITGWU there at such a sensitive moment in its history, 
especially when levels of unionisation were already sufficient.9 However, this is contradicted 
by other interviews he gave in the same decade and by his 1985 observation that Derry Labour 
was infected with the ‘vapid socialism characteristic of the British labour movement’ until the 
ITGWU entered the scene.10 But it was this ‘vapid socialism’ that ensured that the Transport 
Union inadvertently deepened the sectarian divide among Derry’s working class.   
 The organisation of women into trade unions from 1917 was something that defined 
Labour in both Cork and Derry. In the latter city, it was the First World War’s most significant 
long-term consequence. The process was underway before the war with the introduction of an 
Irish shirtmaking trade board. Trade union membership peaked in 1918-19 (as it did in Britain) 
with a density that was comparatively high (at least 50 per cent) by the standards of British 
clothing workers. Subsequent membership declined in the 1920s also followed the British 
pattern.11 Women’s experience was remarkably similar in both Cork and Derry regarding the 
support they received. Men supported women’s unionisation because it strengthened their own 
position, but there were limits to the generosity. Resisting the ‘encroachment’ of women 
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influenced the Derry cutters as strongly as any desire for better pay, hours or conditions. The 
same was true in Cork. Tailors resisted female labour at every opportunity and were willing to 
strike against it if necessary, as they did in January 1922.12 But the compositional differences 
in the workforces produced major differences in the two cities as well. Male attitudes towards 
women was another reason for syndicalism’s lack of success in Derry. The preponderance of 
female workers threatened male ascendency, not just within the shirt industry but across 
society. Women had culturally designated roles in the shirtmaking process (like operating 
sewing machines) that men, despite their willingness to see women organise, were anxious to 
preserve. Like sectarianism, male hegemony could be maintained through British trade 
unionism, providing syndicalists with another roadblock that was difficult to overcome. 
Women were also more likely to join British unions, which linked them to the British 
movement where syndicalism was weak. Furthermore, women were more difficult to turn into 
a powerful force. All were unskilled, which created surplus supply and made them easily 
replaceable, and many had home commitments which made them more difficult to organise 
outside of work hours.13 Cork’s significantly lower number of female workers meant that there 
no such challenges to surmount. This made the city much more suited to the ITGWU’s 
unionisation of the unskilled and, consequently, syndicalism.  
 Why did syndicalism die? Internationally, state intervention is one of the most obvious 
factors. Authoritarian governments crushed the movements in Italy, Spain, Portugal, Germany 
and the Netherlands, and the Bolsheviks did the same to the Russian movement. State 
persecution also significantly weakened syndicalism in the US, Australia and Mexico. The 
ITGWU experienced some Free State repression in 1923, most notably during the Waterford 
farm labourers’ strike, but there was little of this in Cork and so it cannot be considered a 
primary reason. Thorpe and van der Linden maintain that the emergence of the welfare state 
and state-sponsored collective bargaining structures did much to sap the international 
syndicalist appeal, as did changes in capitalism. ‘Fordism’, revolutionised the capitalist mode 
of production by allowing working-class people to operate as units of individualised mass 
consumption, purchasing many of the goods they produce within a system that permits capital 
to grow and workers’ living standards to improve. There were also specific reasons for 
individual movements declined. In France, the state was initially friendlier to the syndicalists 
than in other countries, but militant strikes eventually drove frightened employers and state 
officials into an alliance to smash the CGT. In the US, the appearance of the motor car in the 
1920s changed the culture of migratory labour, meaning that the physical protection that the 
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Wobblies could provide men was no longer as important. In Russia and Italy, many syndicalists 
were subsumed into the communist and fascist movements respectively. When presented with 
such milieus, syndicalist movements had three options: maintain their principles and risk 
marginalisation; abandon their principles and adapt to the new situation; disband, or merge into 
a non-syndicalist union. The IWW went for the first; the CGT picked the second; and the SAC, 
having initially opted for first, then chose the second before eventually accepting the third.14 
Like most, the ITGWU also chose the second option. 
 Like the rest of Cork society, Labour began to politically re-align after the Easter 
Rising. It abandoned the IPP and the AFIL, and the reunited trades council rallied behind Sinn 
Féin. The synchronous food crisis produced the People’s Food Committee, which did much to 
aid relations between the Labour and republican movements. The general strike against 
conscription effectively, if unofficially, made the CTC an ally of Sinn Féin. By December 
1918, republicans controlled the council and pushed the Labour Party into abstaining from the 
that year’s general election, a move strongly supported by the rank-and-file.  
 Throughout the war of independence, a tremendous synergy existed between Labour 
and republicans in the Rebel City. The struggle produced a climate conducive to radicalism. 
Political strikes were creations of Labour, not Sinn Féin, and the Dáil neither invoked nor 
sought to control them. After MacCurtain’s murder, the CTC took matters into its own hands 
and launched its own general strike without ITUC approval. The council collaborated with the 
republican authorities and not Congress during the stoppages called in support of MacSwiney. 
The most outstanding political strike, the munitions embargo, crippled the British 
counterinsurgency and demonstrated the true power of organised Labour. Political strikes 
initially aided working-class interests by cultivating an impression that Labour was acting 
partly outside the law, which fostered an atmosphere of class warfare. Unions were willing to 
support direct action and even engage in violence to express a deep hostility to capital and 
private property, indicating an authentically anti-capitalist strain within Labour. However, by 
early 1921 the CTC fixation with the country’s political affairs allowed the employers to seize 
the initiative to embark on the rollback.  
 Politically, the limits of Labour’s radicalism had been exposed during the war of 
independence. Syndicalism’s intellectual neglect of the state nurtured a belief that proletarian 
power could be attained solely by industrial means. Whilst Labour was undoubtedly politicised 
by the independence struggle, its refusal to politically engage with the republic confined 
revolutionism to the industrial arena. Consequently, it allowed Sinn Féin’s embryonic 
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bourgeois state to mature into the reactionary Irish Free State.15 The ITUC’s strike against 
‘militarism on both sides’ underscores the extent to which it had failed to develop a coherent 
policy on the class nature of the state. The anti-Treaty IRA was no better in this respect and 
their governance of Cork brought no tangible benefits to workers. Labour’s estrangement from 
the republicans was finalised when the anti-Treayites’ campaign became a guerrilla war that 
incurred job losses and wage cuts for workers. 
   As the war of independence brought the workers together in Cork, it drove them further 
apart in Derry. The Derry Trades Council incrementally replaced its implicit Redmondism with 
the ITUC’s republicanism. It turned to Dublin on issues that were highly controversial and 
divisive in Ulster like conscription and the political prisoners’ and railway munitions’ strikes. 
Ergo, it became an easy target for Unionist propaganda. The UULA was the most effective cog 
in this campaign. Its deft playing of the Orange card whenever Labour looked like uniting did 
much to inflame communal tensions, already at breaking point by the war of independence. 
The 1920 riots, which climaxed in what the Sentinel called ‘civil war week’, emanated from 
the April stoppage.16 Peadar O’Donnell’s war against British unions was reciprocated by the 
UULA, which collaborated with employers against the ITGWU. O’Donnell and Ridgeway, 
Derry’s leading revolutionaries, tried to use their union as the means of linking the national 
and class wars to win over Unionist support. For their efforts, they were regularly maligned in 
the local press as anti-Catholic because of their socialism, anti-Protestant because of their 
republicanism, anti-British because of their antagonism to the amalgamateds, and anti-Derry 
because Ridgeway was a Belfast Protestant. Were it a choice between the ITGWU and the 
UULA, their struggle may have succeeded. But the ‘apolitical’ British unions ensured that it 
was not.17  
 Although Labour’s political consciousness was transformed by the national revolution, 
traffic in the other direction was negligible. In Cork, even the CEF had shifted from moderate 
Unionism to pro-Treatyism when it became clear that the Treatyite party would not harm its 
interests. The paradox of the Irish revolution was that the seeds of reaction were sown into its 
modus operandi. The foundation of a shadow state whose institutions were modelled on those 
they sought to dislodge ensured that the Irish revolution would be a conservative one. 
Republicanism could accommodate, even nurture, radical aims from which workers benefited. 
However, as a pan-class, nationalist movement led by the petit-bourgeoisie, the republican goal 
was staunchly conservative. Social radicalism was at best secondary to separatist aims; class-
based politics that endangered national unity was a threat.18 This was the course of the Irish 
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revolution. It is evident in how the public authorities that were strongly influenced by Sinn 
Féin from January 1920 treated their employees in both Cork and Derry.  
 In Cork, workers did better under the Sinn Féin-ITGWU Corporation than under the 
constitutional nationalist one, partially because the city’s most militant union now had political 
power. Labour had sympathisers in MacCurtain and MacSwiney and could now exercise a 
greater influence on the Harbour Board. But the partnership began to unravel from the July 
1921 truce as class differences dictated irreconcilable social outlooks. By late 1920, most 
workers had received their last pay increases from these institutions as Sinn Féin increasingly 
looked to the bourgeoisie for guidance, exemplifying who would ultimately emerge victorious 
from the revolutionary process. The harbour soviet was the straw that broke the camel’s back, 
rupturing the largely amicable relations between the two movements. By the Corporation’s 
dissolution, the Labour-republican alliance seemed like a distant memory.19  
    While Derry’s historic 1920-23 nationalist Corporation was unquestionably a more 
progressive entity than the one it replaced, it is another case study of the Irish revolution’s 
contradictions and class biases. Like Cork, Sinn Féin in Derry was primarily petit bourgeois in 
composition. Accordingly, during the slump the Corporation’s non-Labour republicans and 
nationalists joined with Unionists, several of whom were capitalists, to cut wages. Trade 
unionists on both sides of the divide sided together to stop this anti-worker alliance. With 
Stormont’s blessing, the Unionists regained the Corporation in 1923 and immediately escalated 
the war on workers, forcing the 1924 strike. However, the nationalist Corporation cut its 
employees’ pay more deeply than the Unionist one had, a revealing instance of the class 
dynamics of nationalist revolution.   
  Similar dynamics are apparent when analysing the role of the central state in class 
conflict in both cities. Though Cumann na nGaedheal ministers were a social step below the 
Ulster Unionist elite, the Dublin and Belfast governments had remarkably similar perceptions 
of class. Both saw themselves as overseers of capitalism and private property, willing to 
intervene only to maintain the major economic arteries like the docks and railways. Conflict in 
these sectors forced both governments to compromise, as evidenced by the railway crisis. 
Although Belfast had a greater affinity to laissez-faire, the difference was minimal. Once the 
anti-Treatyites had been defeated, the Free State laid down a marker to Labour. The message 
was unambiguous: capitalist class relations would remain unaltered in the Irish Free State, as 
would bourgeois hegemony. The postal strike marked a key turning point in the Irish 
revolution’s swing to the right. It is impossible to exaggerate the impact the civil war had in 
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informing the Provisional Government’s view that the strike was a subversive political act. 
False though it was, this perception remained for many years thereafter, as republican-socialist 
Liam Mellows had predicted from his Mountjoy prison cell.20  
 Although de Róiste had promised political power to the working class in 1918, it was 
the 1923 declaration of his Treatyite colleague, Kevin O’Higgins, that the Irish were ‘probably 
the most conservative-minded revolutionaries that ever put through a successful revolution’ 
that seems more apt.21 The situation for the proletariat in Derry was even worse than in Cork. 
Little did Stormont realise it was laying the foundations for an even more prolonged political 
conflict that would engulf the city from the 1960s. The turmoil of 1916-23 birthed two states 
where the ruling philosophies were aligned much more with the interests of employers than 
workers. Herein lays the tragedy of the Irish revolution: those who invested so much in it, the 
working class, received little in return whereas those who invested little, the employers, 
received much.   
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Appendix 1: Strikes in Cork, 1917-23 
Workers Date(s) of Strike Demand Outcome 
CCSPC joiners May 1917 50-hour week Successful 
Iron moulders 2-11 June 1917 7s. increase 4s. increase1 
Bag openers on grain 
boats 
24-27 July 1917 Wage of 8s. a day (2s. 
increase) 
Compromise 
Cork Spinning and 
Weaving Co. 
engineers  




Farriers 22 Oct. 1917 Wage increase 7s. 6d. increase2 
Sailors & firemen 20-23 Nov. 1917 20s. increase to make 
wages 80s. 
17s. 6d. increase 
Quayside piledrivers 27-28 Nov. 1917 10d. per hour (rate for 
Ford’s labourers) 
Compromise 




28 Jan. 1918-N/A Reinstatement of 
dismissed workers 
Unsuccessful 
Coachmakers 4-7 Mar. 1918 7s. increase 5s. increase 
Journeymen butchers 9-23 Mar. 1918 40 per cent increase3 Unsuccessful 
Breadvan drivers 2-13 Apr. 1918 12s. increase and 
improved conditions 
5s. increase and a 
review of conditions 
Fitters, plumbers & 
boilermakers 




27 May-29 June 1918  Wage increase 33 per cent increase on 
piece rates 
Boot and shoe 
operatives 
Early June-early July 
1918 




Mineral water workers Early June-2 July 1918 Increase of 5-10s. Compromise 
CCSPC labourers Early June 1918 Higher wages 7s. 6d. more for 
constant men 2½d. 
extra per hour for daily 
men. 
Farriers 10-17 June 1918 Wage increases Modified increases of 
6s. 6d. for firemen and 
7s. 6d. for floormen 
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Flax workers 29 June-1 July 1918  No deduction in bonus 






7 June 1918 Wage increase Modified increase 
given 
Vanmen, carters & 
porters 
28 June-1 July 1918 Increases of 10s. and 
8s. to vanmen & 
porters respectively 
New flat rate agreed 
Labourers at Ford’s 14-20 Aug. 1918 Wage increase Unsuccessful 
Labourers & carters 24-28 Aug. 1918 1s. per hour wage, 
half-day on Saturdays 
and better working 
conditions 
Compromise 
NUDL dockers 23-27 Dec. 1918 Implementation of 
Min. of Labour award 
Successful 
Coalporters at Scott 
Harley & Co. 
31 Dec. 1918 Implementation of 
Min. of Labour award 
Successful 
Mattress-makers 13-18 Jan. 1919 5-6s. increase Compromise 
Corn porters & fillers 5-8 Mar. 1919 To be paid for waiting 
time 
Successful 
Coachbuilders 24 Mar.-17 May 1919 1s. 6d. an hour and a 
forty-seven-hour week 
1s. 5d. an hour and a 
forty-seven-hour week 
Plumbers 5 May 1919-N/A 1s. 6d. hourly  Successful 
Egg-packers 12-14 May 1919 A 50s. minimum for 
men, 10s. increase for 
women and a forty-
two-hour week for all 
A 47s. 6d. minimum 
for men, a 7s. 6d. 
increase for women 
and a forty-eight-hour 
week. 
Mattress-makers 13-18 June 1919 Wage increase Compromise 
Tailors 23-28 June 1919 10d. (from 3d.) per log 
hour 
Successful 
Gristmill & Cork 
Tanning Co. labourers  
25 Aug.-6 Oct. 1919 10s. increase and the 
forty-four-hour week. 
50s. and a fifty-hour-
week 
Gasworkers 27-30 Aug. 1919 Wage increase Successful 
Quay labourers 12-27 Nov. 1919 Better overtime rates 
and 10¼d. per ton (1d. 
more). 
Successful 
Grain porters 17-20 Nov. 1919 Extra rates of pay Compromise 
Benchmen, stitchmen 
& finishers 
27 Oct.-13 Dec. 1919 Better piecework rates Compromise 
fitters, cutters, pressers 
and girls 
16 Mar.-28 Apr. 1920 Wage increase Compromise 
Boot and shoe 
assistants 
Late Apr.-21 May 
1920 
Wage increases Compromise 
Shop assistants & 
clerks 
28 Apr.-22 May 1920 Wage increase Compromise 
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Cycle mechanics (who 
earned 25-55s.) & 
improvers 
16 May 1920-N/A Hourly rates of 1s. 6d. 




week and seven days 
paid annual holiday 
- 
Undertakers’ drivers 10-16 July 1920 20s. increase 15s. increase, making 
wages 55s. 
Engineers 1 June-12 July 1920 25s. increase Successful 
Cork Taxi Co. 
employees 
7 July-11 Aug. 1920 75s. wage plus 
commission 
80s. wage 
Sailors & firemen 6-18 Oct. 1920 Wage increase Work resumed at 
request of Lord Mayor 
of Dublin 
Gas Company clerks4 15-18 Nov. 1920 20s. increase 10s. increase 
Mineral water 
operatives at Kiloh’s 
11-18 Aug. 1921 Dismissal of vanmen Work resumed on old 
terms and the issue 
submitted to 
arbitration. 
Dockers 22-25 Sept. 1921 6s. reduction Unsuccessful 
Reelers 30 Sept.-29 Oct. 1921 Wage Reduction Compromise 
Spinning & Weaving 
finishers. 
26-30 Nov. 1921 To be paid for ‘lying 
time’ 
Unsuccessful 
Bar assistants at the 
Vineyard 
19 Dec. 1921 Enforcement of 
standardised wage for 
a colleague 
Successful 
Tailors 2-15 Jan. 1922 Hourly cuts of 2d. for 
men and 1d. for 
women, 10 per cent 
off log rates and 
introduction of female 
labour 
12½ per cent reduction 
under Dáil arbitration  
Coachbuilders 1-31 July 1922 2d. per hour reduction Unsuccessful 
Engineers Jan. 1923 Wage reductions Successful 
Soap workers 15 July-10 Sept. 1922 Reinstatement of three 
sacked workers 
Settled by arbitration 
under the Cork 
Industrial 
Development 




Journeymen butchers 23-26 Jan. 1923 Re-hiring of colleague 
dismissed for refusing 
to perform certain 
duties 
Successful 
Source: CE, 1917-23; trade dispute books for select industries in the UK from 1917-21, LAB 34-36, Min. of 






Appendix 2: Strikes in Derry 1917-23 
Workers Dates Demand Outcome 
Builders’ labourers Late May to mid-June 
1917 
Re-instatement of a 
dismissed colleague 
Unsuccessful 
Bottle-washers 9-12 Aug. 1917 8s. increase 4s. increase 
Platers’ helpers 12-15 Sept. 1917 Improved conditions Improved conditions 
for platers’ helpers & 
furnacemen 
Shipyard labourers 12 Sept. 1917 No staff reductions Successful 
Labourers at William 
Thompson’s 
21-26 Sept. 1917 Wage increase 4s. increase 
Engineers Nov. 1917 No staff reductions Successful 
Platers & riveters 14-19 Jan. 1918 5s. Successful 
Jones and Lowthers 
laundry workers 
Mid-Jan. 1918 Wage increase Modified increase 
Packers, washers, 
firemen 
25 Jan.-4 Feb. 1918 Increases of 10s. for 
men & 5s. for boys 
Increases of 5s. for 
men & 2s. 6d. for boys 
Cornmill labourers 25 Feb.-2 Mar. 1918 Wage increase Increases of 4s. at one 
firm and 2s. at the 
other 




Hosiery workers 3-8 June 1918 25 per cent increase 12½ per cent increase 
via arbitration 
Carpenters, joiners and 
their labourers 
7-12 June 1918 Wage increase Workers sacked 
Heater boys 17-19 June 1918 Conditions Unsuccessful 
Riveters, platers & 
caulkers 
27 June-1 July 1918 10 per cent advance on 
piece rates 
Successful 
Bottlers, storemen & 
vanmen 
2-10 Aug. 1918 Wage increase 5s. increase 




riveters & platers 
12-13 Aug. 1918 Eviction of colleague Successful 
Platers & angle-smiths 28 Oct. 1918 Method of payment Successful 
Pork curers 13 Dec. 1918-4 Jan. 
1919 
Wage increase Increases of 4s. to old 
hands and 3s. to new 
hands 
Housepainters 1-3 Mar. 1919 Shipyard rate of 1s. 
3d. per hour (from 
10¾d.)  
2d. an hour increase 
Municipal drivers and 
collectors 
3-8 Mar. 1919 Reinstatement of 
Colleagues 
- 
Mineral water bottle 
washers 




upholsters & French 
polishers 
8-30 May 1919 Hourly wage of 1s. 9d. 
(from 1s. 1d.) and a 
forty-eight-hour week 
(from fifty-four) 




General labourers & 
shunters 
19-30 May 1919 50s. wage 48s. wage and forty-
eight-hour week 
Shop assistants June 1919 25s. increase Modified increase 
Motor drivers June 1919 40s. wage (20s. 
increase) 
Modified increase 
Carters June 1919 12s. increase 4s. increase 
Coal-fillers June 1919 4s. increase Modified increase 
Carpenters & joiners 1 July 1919 Wage increase Granted 
Bottlers, vanmen & 
mineral water workers 
10 July-6 Aug. 1919 10s. increase on wages 
of 35-46s. and the 
forty-eight-hour week 
Belfast rates granted, 
making wages 42s. for 
storemen & 46s. for 
bottlers  
Shipyard painters 10 Sept.-8 Oct. 1919 Wage increase 5s. increase 
Bakers 27-29 Sept. 1919 Wage increase  Arbitration 
Seed merchant 
labourers 
6-30 Oct. 1919 Wage increase & 
shorter hours 
4s. increase and a 
forty-eight-hour week 
(from fifty) 
Dockers 25 Oct. 1919 Wage of 20s. a day Successful 




Tailors 19 Apr. 1920 Hourly wage of 1s. 2d. 
(from 9¾d.)  
Hourly wage of 1s. 1d. 
Printers 9 June-19 July 1920 Wage increase Unsuccessful 
Dockers & carters 14-18 June 1920 Wage increase Successful 
Electricians 25 Sept.-10 Nov. 1920 Higher wages & 
shorter hours 
Compromise 
Dockers 23-28 Apr. 1921 New conditions Successful 
Dockers 20-23 Jan. 1922 Reinstatement of 
colleague 
Inquiry into dismissal 
Plumbers 1-14 Feb. 1922 Surplus apprentices Additional apprentices 
dismissed 
Housepainters 1 Mar.-12 Aug. 1922 Wage reduction Modified reduction 






Dockers 2-4 Sept. 1922 Against dismissal of 
two dockers 
Settlement reached 
Dockers 27-29 Sept. 1922 Refusal to obey orders Work resumed 
Plumbers & gasfitters 7-17 Nov. 1922 Wage reduction Workers at one firm 
accept reduction; 




5-11 July 1923 Reduction in piece-
rates 
Reduction withdrawn 
Fancy linen smoothers 18-21 July 1923 Wages issue - 
Carters 15 Aug. 1923 Wage reduction Successful 
Dockers 3-6 Dec. 1923 Reinstatement of a 
man sacked for 
assaulting a stevedore 
Unsuccessful 
Source: DJ, 1917-24; trade disputes records, 1917-23, LAB 34/38, Min. of Labour records, UKNA; O’Connor, 
2: Larkinism and syndicalism, pp.  57-60. 
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Appendix 3: Government Arbitration in Cork, 1919-21 
 
Table 3. A: Ministry of Labour Arbitration Awards in Cork, 1919 
Workers Demand Outcome Month 
Flourmill labourers 12s. increase and a 
forty-eight-hour week 
7s. 6d. to men and 5s. 
to boys and women 
Jan.  
Wallis & Sons carters 10s. increase 7s. increase Jan.  
Corkmaker labourers Wage increase 7s. 6d. increase, 
making wages 43s. 6d. 
Jan.  
Distributing 
Purchasing Office of 
Stuffs labourers 
5d. an hour increase 1¼d. an hour increase Mar.  
Flourmill labourers forty-seven-hour week forty-seven-hour week Mar.  
Corn porters & fillers Pay be 2s. 6d. per ton 1s. 7½d. per ton, 5s. 
increase for storemen 
and weighmen, and 2s. 
6d. for boys 
Mar.  
Wool workers 25s. increase 8s. increase Apr.  
Railway carters 10s. increase 4s. increase May  
Railway shopmen 70s. 6d. wage and a 
12½ per cent bonus 
1s. increase May 
Source: Report on conciliation and arbitration. Including particulars of proceedings under the Conciliation Act, 
1896, the Coal Mines (Minimum Wage) Act, 1912, the Wages (Temporary Regulation) Acts, 1918 and 1919, the 
Restoration of Pre-War Practices Act, 1919, and the Industrial Courts Act, 1919, 1920, 221, XIX, UKPP. 
 
Table 3. B: Ministry of Labour Arbitration of Disputes in Cork, 1920 
Workers/union Demand Outcome Date 
Flourmill labourers 10s. increase 7s. 6d. increase 27 Mar. 
Carters Wage increase 4s. increase 17 Apr. 
Dockers Wage increase Wages of 16s. daily 
for casual men & 85s. 
weekly for permanent 
men 
15 May 
Sawmill machinists & 
labourers 
Wage increase 3d. hourly increase for 
labourers. Hourly rates 
now 1s. 4d. 
22 July 
Flourmill labourers Wage increase Increases of 10s. for 
men & 5s. for women 
& boys 
12 Oct. 
Source: Report on conciliation and arbitration, being particulars of proceedings under the Industrial Courts Act, 
1919 [including the Wages (Temporary Regulation) Acts, as amended], the Conciliation Act, 1896, and the 






Appendix 4: Disputes and strikes resolved by the Cork 
Conciliation Board, 1919-20 
 
Disputes 
Trade/Company Workers Dates of 
Resolution 
Demand Outcome 
Ogilvie & Moore Assistants and 
Clerks 
1 Mar. 1919 Higher wages Improved wage 
scale for male 
learners and 22½ 










A 10s. increase 
and reduced 
hours. 
A 5s. increase 
and a 51-hour 
week (from 52) 
for firemen and 
48½-hour week 
for yardmen and 
others 
Strikes 
Trade/Company Workers Dates Demand Outcome 
Cork Gas 
Company 












11-14 Nov. 1919 9am start and 
increases of 20s. 
for men and 10s. 
for women and 
boys 
10s. increase for 
men and 5s. for 
women and boys. 
Jennings & Co. Labourers & 
carmen 
















Appendix 5: Government Arbitration in Derry, 1919-21 
Workers/union Date Demand Outcome 
Bottlers & vanmen 13 Feb. 1919 Better wages & 
conditions 
Increases of 6s. for 
men & 3s for boys. 
Builders’ labourers at 
Ebrington Barracks 
19 Mar. 1919 12½ bonus Granted 
Engineers 31 May 1919 15s. increase (to give 
Belfast rates) 
Not granted 
Shipyard carpenters & 
joiners 




7 Oct. 1919 Wages of 81s. 3d. for 
machinists and 77s. 
8d. for sawyers 
Increases of 6s. for the 
former and 7s. for the 
latter, and 12½ per 
cent bonus for both 
Shipyard plumbers 7 Oct. 1919 4d. an hour extra 6s. 6d. a week extra, 
making wages 79s. 
10½d.  (71s. & 12½ 
per cent bonus) 
Bakers 8 Oct. 1919 Increases of 20s. and 
15s. for bakers & 
packers respectively; 
13s. a day for jobbers; 
45s. wage (from 35s.) 
for labourers; 50s. 
wage (from 35s.) for 
servers 
62s. 6d. wage for 
bakers & 
confectioners; 45s. 
wage for servers; male 
packers an extra 4s., 
female packers an 
extra 2s. 6d., child 
packers an extra 2s.; 
5s. increase for 
labourers; and 10s.a 
day to jobbers 
Dockers 20 Oct. 1919 Wage increases & a 
forty-six-hour week 
Additional 5s. 3d. a 
week for permanent 






27 Jan. 1920 Increases of 15s. and 
7s. 6d. for apprentices. 
5s. increases 
(employers’ offer) 
Shipyard painters 27 Jan. 1920 Hourly wage of 2s. 
(from 5½d.) 
5s. a week increase 
Engineers 27 Jan. 1920 Hourly wage of and a 







27 Feb. 1920  Higher wages Hourly wages of 1s. 
3d. for sawyers and 1s. 
½d. for labourers. 
Coachbuilders 1 Apr. 1920  Higher wages 70s. wage for LLSR 
shopmen 
Shipyard, foundry and 
engineering workers 
7 Apr. 1920 Higher wages Increases of 3s. to 
timeworkers, but not 
for apprentices, and 
7½ per cent to 
pieceworkers from 31 
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March and again from 
31 May. 
Distillery workers 12 May 1920 15s. increase, time-
and-a-half for 
nightshift work and 
double-time for 
Sunday work. 
4s. increase (making 
wages 54s.) and no 
increase in overtime or 
Sunday rates 
Builders’ labourers 15 May 1920 6d. per hour increase 2d. per hour increase 
Dockers 10 May 1920 Wages increases Wage of 16s. a day for 
casual men; weekly 
wage of 86s. for 
permanent men for a 
forty-six hour week  
Bakers 6 July 1920 62s. 6d. wage for 
bakers and 
confectioners; 20s. 
increase for servers; 
60s. minimum for 
labourers and packers. 
75s. wage for table-
hands with doughmen 
and ovenmen to 
receive corresponding 
advances; 2s. 6d. extra 
a day for jobbers; 
increase of 7s. 6d. a 
week for packers and 
labourers; servers’ 
claim rejected; 
Confections be paid 
the same as bakers 
Bakers 6 Dec. 1920 20s. increase for 
bakers and 
confectioners; daily 
wage of 16s. 6d. for 
jobbers; 70s. minimum 
for labourers; 15s. 




Increases of 7s. for 
bakers and 
confections; 5s. for 
packers and labourers; 
6s. for servers; 1s. 6d. 
daily for jobbers; the 
forty-eight-hour week 
unchanged 
Source: Report for 1920 on conciliation and arbitration, being particulars of proceedings under the Industrial 
Courts Act, 1919, the Conciliation Act, 1896, and the Restoration of Pre-War Practices Act, 1919,; Report for 
1919 on conciliation and arbitration. Including particulars of proceedings under the Conciliation Act, 1896, the 
Coal Mines (Minimum Wage) Act, 1912, the Wages (Temporary Regulation) Acts, 1918 and 1919, the Restoration 








Appendix 6: Peak Wages and Hours in Ireland, 1920 
 
Table 6. A: Irish Portside Wages and Hours, 1920 
Port & Occupation Wage Hours 
Cork   
Casual men (cross-channel) 2s. an hour - 
Permanent men (cross-channel) 85s. a week 46 a week 
Casual men (deep sea) 18s. 6d. a day  
Casual men (grain trade) 16s. a day - 
Storemen & weighmen (grain 
trade) 
70s. a week 46 a week 
Casual men (coal trade) 2s. an hour - 
Belfast   
Casual men (cross-channel) 2s. an hour - 
Permanent men (cross-channel) 88s. a week 46 a week 
Foreign-going boats 18s. a day - 
Derry   
Casual men (cross-channel) 2s. an hour - 
Permanent men (cross-channel) 86s. a week 46 a week 
Newry   
Casual men (cross-channel) 2s. an hour - 
Permanent men (cross-channel) 82s. 6d. a week - 
Drogheda   
Casual men (cross-channel) 15s. a day - 
Permanent men (cross-channel) 85s. a week - 
Galway   
In hold (coal trade) 15s. 7d. a day - 
On deck and in yards (coal 
trade) 
14s. 7d. a day - 
Cross-channel, deep-sea & 
grain trade 
14s. a day - 
Casual labourers in stores 13s. 7d. a day - 
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Limerick   
Casual men (deep-sea & grain 
trade) (in hold) 
16s.a day - 
Casual men (deep-sea & grain 
trade) (on quays) 
17s. a day - 
Coal trade (in ship’s hold) 17s. a day - 
Coal trade (other men) 16s. a day - 
Carters, fillers, shedmen 
(permanent) 
69s. a week - 
Waterford   
Casual men (cross-channel) 1s. 10½d. an hour  46 a week 
Permanent men (cross-channel) 85s. a week 46 a week 
Casual men (grain trade) 15s. a day 48 a week 
Source: Standard time rates of wages and hours of labour in the United Kingdom at 31st December, 1920, p. 113. 
 
Table 6. B: Irish Woodworkers’ Wages & Hours, 1920 
Locality Sawyers Woodcutting 
Machinists 
Labourers Hours 
Cork 20 21½-24 16 47 
Belfast 22.86 23.71 15.57 47 
Dublin 21½ 23 15½ 47 
Dundalk 18 - - 47 
Galway 14 14 12 51 
Limerick 18 19½-22 15 47 
Newry 14 & 16 18 - 47 
Waterford 19½ 19½ 15 - 
Source: Standard time rates of wages and hours of labour in the United Kingdom at 31st December, 1920, p. 139. 
 
Table 6. C: Irish Engineering Wages & Hours, 1920 
Locality Turners Fitters Smiths Millwrights Patternmakers Hours 




86s. 3d. 84s. 3d. 84s. 3d. - 87s. 47 & 48 
Newry 85s. 3d. 85s. 3d. 85s. 3d. 85s. 3d. 85s. 3d. 48 
Larne 84s. 3d. 84s. 3d. 84s. 3d. 84s. 3d. - - 
Derry 81s. 6d. 79s. 6d. - - - - 
Drogheda 80s 80s. 80s. - - 48 
Ballymena 72s. 72s. 72s. - - 48 





Table 6. D: Irish Furnishing Tradesmen’s Wages & Hours, 1920 
City Hourly Rate (in pence) Hours 
Belfast 27 47 
Dublin 25½  44 
Cork 24 47 
Source: Standard time rates of wages and hours of labour in the United Kingdom at 31st December, 1920, p. 133. 
 
Table 6. E: Irish Carters’ Wages, 1920 
City Single-Horse Carters Double-Horse Carters 
Cork 62s. 6d. 68s. 6d. 
Belfast 65s. 70s., 72s. (light); 73s., 80s. 
(heavy) 
 

















Appendix 7: Wages & Salaries in Cork, 1916-24 
 
Table: 7. A: Wage Scale at Lyons & Co. for Male and Female Apprentice Assistants, 1919 




Fourth (girls) £78 
Fifth (girls) £90 
Sixth (girls) £108 
Source: Lyons & Co. minutes, 14 Nov. 1919, U354/9, CCCA. 
 
Table 7. B: Wage Scale at Lyons & Co. for Male Assistants, 1919 
Year in Business Annual Salary 
First £104 
Second £134 
Third and Fourth £150 
Fifth and Sixth £162 
Seventh to Ninth £174 
Tenth to Twelfth £186 
Thirteenth and above £212 
Source: Lyons & Co. minutes, 14 Nov. 1919, U354/9, CCCA. 
 
Table 7. C: Wages of Female Drapers’ Assistants and Clerks in Cork, December 1919 

















Table 7. D: Typographical Apprentices’ Wages in Cork, September 1919 
Year Wage 
First 8s. 6d. 
Second 10s. 6d. 
Third 12s. 6d. 
Fourth 14s. 6d. 
Fifth 16s. 6d. 
Sixth 21s. 
Seventh 27s. 6d. 
Source: Typographical Association Cork branch minutes, 13 Sept. 1919, U217/A/4, CCCA. 
 
Table 7. E: Annual Salaries in the Retail Drapery Trade, September 1921 
Position Men Women Office men Office women 
1st year £39 £39 £39 £39 
2nd year £52 £52 £52 £52 
3rd year £72 £72 £78 £78 
4th year £91 £91 £104 £104 
5th year £125 £112 £138 £124 
6th year £142 £128 £155 £140 
7th year £156 £140 £169 £152 
8th year £170 £153 £183 £165 
9th & 10th year £184 £166 £197 £178 
Over 10th year £208 £188 £221 £200 
Charge hands £240 £208 £243 £220 
Source: Drapers’ Assistant, Vol. 19, Sept. 1921. 
 
Table 7. F: Minimum Wages in the Drapery Wholesale Trade, September 1921 
Position Wage 
1st year 22s. 6d. 
2nd year 27s. 6d. 
3rd year 37s. 6d. 
4th year 57s. 6d. 
5th year 67s. 6d. 
6th year 75s. 
7th year 77s. 6d. 
8th year 80s. 
9th year 85s. 
10th year and over 90s. 
Charge hands and ledger clerks 105s. 






Table 7. G: Minimum Wages in the Retail Boot Trade, September 1921 
Years of Service Men Women 
One 15s. 15s. 
Two 20s. 20s. 
Three 25s. 25s. 
Four 37s. 6d. 30s. 
Five 47s. 6d. 40s. 
Six 55s. 47s. 6d. 
Seven 65s. 55s. 
Eight 70s. 60s. 
Nine 80s. 65s. 
Source: Drapers’ Assistant, Vol. 19, Sept. 1921. 
 
Table 7. H: Minimum Wages in the Retail Hardware Trade, September 1921 
Position Wage 
1st Year 20s. 
2nd Year 25s. 
3rd Year 32s. 6d. 
4th Year 45s. 
5th Year 55s. 
6th Year 65s. 
7th Year 77s. 6d. 
8th Year 77s. 6d. 
9th Year 85s. 
10th Year and Above 92s. 6d. 
Charge Hands and Ledger Clerks 105s. 
Source: Drapers’ Assistant, Vol. 19, Sept. 1921. 
 
Table 7. I: Minimum Wages for Shorthand Typists in the Retail Sector, September 1921 
Years of Service Wage 
One 35s. 
Two 40s. 
Three 47s. 6d. 
Four 55s. 
Five 60s. 








Table 7. J: Coachbuilders’ Wages in Cork, 1917-25.6 
Date Wage 
Jan. 1917 36s. 
July 1917 40s. 
Mar. 1918 45s. 
July 1918 50s. 
May 1919 66s. 7d. 
June 1920 94s. 
July 1922 86s. 2d. 
Mar. 1924 82s. 3d. 
Source: CE, 1917-1925; NUVB, quarterly & monthly reports, 1917-24, MSS.126/VB/4/1/1, MRC, UW. 
 
Table: 7. K: Engineers’, Fitters’, Coppersmiths’ & Blacksmiths’ Wages in Cork, 1913-24 
Date Wage 
1913 36s. 
Jan. 1914 38s. 
June 1915 40s. 
Nov. 1916 44s. 
May 1917 49s. 
Aug. 1917 52s. 
Dec. 1917 57s. 
June 1918 62s. 
Sept. 1918 65s. 6d. 
Aug. 1919 80s. 
May 1920 105s. 
Oct. 1921 99s. 
Dec. 1921 94s. 
Nov. 1923 90s. 10d. 
Jan. 1924 88s. 1½d. 
Source: Workmen’s Register, 1913-24, BL/BC/MB/334, Murphy’s brewery collection, UCCA. 
 
Table 7. L: Sawmill Workers’ Wages in Cork, 1917-23.7 
Sawyers 
Date Weekly Wage 
Jan. 1917 34s. 
May 1917 38s. 
Jan. 1919 49s. 
May 1919 59s. 
Feb. 1920 62s. 6d. 
May 1920 78s. 4d. 
Nov. 1923 66s. 7d. 
Labourers 
Date Hourly Rate 
Dec. 1919 8½d.  
Feb. 1920 1s. 1d. 
July 1920 1s. 4d. 
Nov. 1923 1s. 1d. 
Source: CE, 1917-20; LG, 1917-20. 
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Table 7. M: Electricians’ Wages in Cork, 1917-24 
Date Wage 
Mid-1917 36s. 
Dec. 1917 40s. 
Sept. 1918 61s. 6d. 
Apr. 1919 74s. 
Jan. 1920 88s. 7d. 
May 1920 101s. 10d. 
Oct. 1921 95s. 10d. 
Dec. 1921 90s. 10d. 
Jan. 1924 88s. 1½d.  
Source: Workmen’s Register, 1913-24, BL/BC/MB/334, Murphy’s brewery collection, UCCA. 
 
Table 7. N: Maltsters’ Wage in Cork, 1917-26 
Date Wage 
Mar. 1917 28s. 6d. 
Aug. 1917 32s. 6d. 
Oct. 1917 34s. 
Nov. 1917 36s. 
Feb. 1918 43s. 
Aug. 1918 50s. 
Mar. 1919 58s. 
May 1919 63s. 
Mar. 1920 75s. 6d. 
Oct. 1920 83s. 
Oct. 1925 78s. 
Jan. 1926 73s. 
Source: Maltings’ directors’ minutes, 1917-25, BL/BC/MB/218, Murphy’s brewery collection, UCCA. 
 
Table 7. O: Brewery Labourers’ Wages in Cork, 1917-20 
Date Wage 
July 1917 30s. 
Feb. 1918 35s. 
July 1918 40s. 
Feb. 1919 45s. 
May 1919 50s. 
Mar. 1920 62s. 6d. 
Oct. 1920 70s. 
July 1925 65s. 
Jan. 1926 60s. 






Table 7. P: Bakers’ Wages in Cork, 1914-22. 
Date Wage 
July 1914 32s. 
July 1917 40s. 
Apr. 1919 42s. 
May 1919 66s. 
Dec. 1919 71s. 
June 1920 84s. 
Oct. 1922 96s. 






















Appendix 8: Wages agreed by unions and the CEF, October & 
November 1923 
 
Table 8. A: Teenage Labour Wage Scale from 8 November 1923 
Boys Girls 
Age Wage Age Wage 
14-14½ 10s. 15-16 12s. 
14½-15  12s. 16-17 14s. 
15-16 14s. 6d. 17-18 16s. 
16-17 18s. 18-19 20s. 
17-18 22s. 19-20 24s. 
18-19 29s. 20-21 28s. 




Table 8. B: Minimum Wages of Male Assistants and Clerks in the Hardware Trade, 1920-
1924 
Position in Business 1920 (Peak Rate) 12 Nov. 1923 1 Aug. 1924 
1st Year 20s. 18s. 6d. 17s. 6d. 
2nd Year 25s. 23s. 1½d. 21s. 10½d. 
3rd Year 32s. 6d. 31s. ¾d. 28s. 5¼d. 
4th Year 45s. 41s. 7½d. 39s. 4½d. 
5th Year 55s. 50s. 10½d. 48s. 1½d. 
6th Year 65s. 60s. 10½d. 56s. 10½d. 
7th Year 77s. 6d. 71s. 8¼d. 67s. 9¾d. 
8th Year 77s. 6d. 71s. 8¼d. 67s. 9¾d. 
9th Year 85s. 78s. 7½d. 74s. 4½d. 
10th Year and over 92s. 6d. 85s. 6¾d. 80s. 11¼d. 
Charge Hands 105s. 97s. 1½d. 81s. 10½d. 
Ledger Hands with 
Ten Years’ Office 
Experience 
105s. 97s. 1½d. 81s. 10½d. 
 
 
Table 8. C: Wages of Female Assistants in the Hardware Trade 
Years at Business Wage 
1st Year 16s. 6d. 
2nd Year 20s. 
3rd Year 25s. 
4th Year 30s. 
5th Year 37s. 6d. 
6th Year and Over 45s. 
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Table 8. D: Wages of Female Typists and Clerks in the Hardware Trade 
Years at Business Wage 
1st Year 17s. 6d. 
2nd Year 22s. 6d. 
3rd Year 30s. 
4th Year 35s 
5th Year 40s. 
6th Year and Over 47s. 6d. 
 
Table 8. E: Wages of Girl Typists and Clerks 
Years at Business Wage 
1st Year 17s. 6d. 
2nd Year 22s. 6d. 
3rd Year 27s. 6d. 
4th Year 32s. 6d. 
5th Year 37s. 6d. 
6th Year 42s. 6d. 
7th and over 47s. 6d. 
 
Table 8. F: Wages for Male Assistants in the Retail Grocery Trade, 1920-24 
Position in Business Peak Rate in 1920 Rate from 12 Nov. 
1923 
Rate from 1 Aug. 
1924 
1st Year 20s. 18s. 6d. 17s. 6d. 
2nd Year 25s. 23s. 1½d. 21s. 10½d. 
3rd Year 32s. 6d. 30s. ¾d. 28s. 5¼d. 
4th Year 45s. 41s. 7½d. 39s. 4½d. 
5th Year 55s. 50s. 10½d. 48s. 1½d. 
6th Year 65s. 60s. 1½d. 56s. 10½d. 
7th Year 77s. 6d. 71s. 8¼d. 67s. 9¾d. 
8th Year 85s. 78s. 7½d. 74s. 4½d. 
9th Year 92s. 6d. 85s. 6¾d. 80s. 11¼d. 
Charge Hands 110s. 101s. 9d. 96s. 3d. 
 
Table 8. G: Wages for Female Assistants in the Retail Grocery Trade, 1920-24 
Position in Business Peak Rate in 1920 Rate from 12 Nov. 
1923 
Rate from 1 Aug. 
1924 
1st Year 18s. 16s. 7¾d. 15s. 9d. 
2nd Year 22s. 6d. 20s. ¾d. 19s. ¼d. 
3rd Year 27s. 6d. 25s. 5¼d. 24s. ¾d. 
4th Year 32s. 6d. 30s. ¾d. 28s. 5¼d. 
5th Year 37s. 6d. 34s. 8¼d. 32s. 9¾d. 
6th Year 42s. 6d. 39s. 3¾d. 37s. 2¼d. 




Table 8. H: Wages for Warehouse, Office and Counting Housemen in the Wholesale Drapery 
Trade, 1920-24 
Position in Business Peak rate in 1920 Rate from 12 Nov. 
1923 
Rate from 1 Aug. 
1924 
1st Year 22s. 6d. 20s. 9¾d. 19s. 8¼d. 
2nd Year 27s. 6d. 25s. 5¼d.  24s. ¾d.  
3rd Year 37s. 6d. 34s. 8¼d. 32s. 9¾d. 
4th Year 57s. 6d. 53s. 2¼d.  50s. 3¾d.  
5th Year 67s. 6d. 62s. 5¼d. 59s. ¾d.  
6th Year 75s. 69s. 4½d.  65s. 7½d. 
7th Year 77s. 6d. 71s. 8¼d.  67s. 9¾d.  
8th Year 80s. 74s. 70s. 
9th Year 85s. 78s. 7½d.  74s. ½d.  
10th Year and Over 90s. 83s. 3d. 78s. 9d. 
Charge Hands and 
Ledger Clerks 
105s. 97s. 1½d.  91s. 10½d.  
 
Table 8. I: Wages of Lady Shorthand Typists in the Wholesale Drapery Trade, 1920-24 
Position in Business Peak Rate in 1920 Rate from 12 Nov. 
1923 
Rate from 1 Aug. 
1924 
1st Year 35s. 32s. 4½d. 30s. 7½d. 
2nd Year 40s. 37s. 35s. 
3rd Year 47s. 6d. 43s. 11¼d. 28s. 1½d. 
4th Year 55s. 50s. 10½d. 48s. 1½d. 
5th Year 60s. 54s. 6d. 52s. 6d. 
 




12 Nov. 1923 1 Aug. 1924 Years at 
Business 
12 Nov. 1923 1 Aug. 1924 
1st £36. 1s. 6d. £34. 2s. 6d. 1st Year £36. 1s. 6d. £34. 2s. 6d. 
2nd £48. 2s. £45s. 10s. 2nd Year £48. 2s. £45. 10s. 
3rd £66. 12s. £63. 3rd Year £66. 12s. £63s. 
4th £84. 3s. 6d. £79. 12s. 4th Year £84. 3s. 6d. £79. 12s. 6d. 
5th £113. 15s. 6d. £107. 12s. 6d. 5th Year £103. 12s. £98. 
6th £131. 7s. £124. 5s. 6th Year £118. 8s. £112. 
7th £144. 6s. £136. 10s. 7th Year £129. 10s. £122. 10s. 
8th £157. 5s. £148. 15s. 8th Year £141. 10s. 6d. £133. 17s. 6d. 
9th & 10th £170. 4s. £161. 9th & 10th 
Years 
£153. 11s. £145. 5s. 
Over Ten 
Years 
£192. 8s. £182 Over Ten 
Years 
£173. 18s. £164. 10s. 


















From 1 Aug. 
1924 
1st £36. 1s. 6d. £34. 2s. 6d. 1st Year £36. 1s. 6d. £34. 2s. 6d. 
2nd £48. 2s. £45s. 10s. 2nd Year £48. 2s. £45. 10s. 
3rd £72. 3s. £68. 5s. 3rd Year £72. 3s. £68. 5s. 
4th £96. 4s. £91. 4th Year £96. 4s. £91. 
5th £127. 13s. £120. 15s. 5th Year £114. 14s. £108. 10s. 
6th £143. 7s. 6d. £135. 12s. 6d. 6th Year £129. 10s. £122. 10s. 
10d. 
7th £156. 6s. 6d. £147. 17s. 6d. 7th Year £140. 12s. £133. 
8th £169. 5s. 6d. £160. 2s. 6d. 8th Year £152. 12s. 6d. £144. 7s. 6d. 
9th & 10th £182. 4s. 6d. £172. 7s. 6d. 9th & 10th 
Years 
£164. 13s. £155. 15s. 
Over Ten 
Years 
£204. 8s. 6d. £193. 7s. 6d. Over Ten 
Years 
£185. £175. 
Charge Hands £227. 15s. 6d. £212. 12s. 6d. Charge Hands £203. 10s. £192. 10s. 
 
Table 8. L: Wages for Assistants in the Oil and Colour Trade from 23 November 1923 
Position in Business Female Male 
1st Year 15s. 12s. 
2nd Year 18s. 20s. 
3rd Year 21s. 26s. 
4th Year 24s. 33s. 
5th Year 27s. 45s. 
6th Year 30s. 52s. 6d. 
7th Year 32s. 60s. 
8th Year 34s. 62s. 6d. 
9th Year 36s. 65s. 
10th Year 37s. 70s. 
Charge Hands 42s. 6d. 75s. 
 
Table 8. M: Minimum Rates for Clerks and Typists from 23 November 1923 
Position at Business Female Male 
1st Year 16s. 17s. 
2nd Year 20s. 21s. 
3rd Year 25s. 28s. 
4th Year 28s. 36s. 
5th Year 30s. 46s. 
6th Year 35s. 54s. 
7th Year 38s. 62s. 6d. 
8th Year 40s. 65s. 
9th Year 42s. 6d. 70s. 
10th Year 44s. 75s. 




Table 8. N: Wages in the Seed and Manure Trade from 23 November 1923 
Position in Business Female Male 
1st Year 15s. 6d. 17s. 6d. 
2nd Year 20s. 22s. 
3rd Year 25s. 29s. 
4th Year 31s. 39s. 
5th Year 36s. 48s. 
6th Year 40s. 56s. 
7th Year 43s. 64s. 
8th Year 45s. 67s. 
9th Year 47s. 6d. 74s. 
10th Year 47s. 6d. 78s. 
Charge Hands 55s. 87s. 
 
Table 8. O: Wages for Teenagers in Soap and Candle Trade from 23 November 1923 
Boys Girls 
Age Wage Age Wage 
14-15 (first six 
months) 
10s. 15-16 12s. 
14-15 (second six 
months) 
12s. 16-17 14s. 
15-16 14s. 17-18 16s. 
16-17 16s. 18-19 20s. 
17-18 20s. 19-20 22s. 6d. 
18-19 25s. 20-21 25s. 
19-20 30s. Over 21 27s. 6d. 
20-21 35s. 
 

















Table 8. Q: Dockside Wages and Reductions from 25 October 1923 
Coal Section 
Storemen & carters 60s. 
Casual workers 1½d. per hour reduction 
Tonnage workers ½d. per ton reduction 
Cross-channel section 
Single-horse carters 60s. 
Double-horse carters 62s. 
Loaders 58s. 
Storemen 4s. reduction 
Store clerks 4s. reduction 
Checkers 4s. reduction 
Casual workers 1½d. per hour reduction 
Continental & deep-sea section 
Casual workers 1½d. per hour reduction 
Tonnage workers ½d. per ton reduction 
Grain section 
Daily casuals 13s. per day 
Daily weighmen 14s. per day 
Storemen 58s. per week 
Weighmasters 58s. per week 
Filling & portering grain 1s. 10d. per ton 
Timber section 
Casual workers 1s. per day reduction 
 
Source: CEF, Trades Disputes 1923. 
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Appendix 9: Prices in Ireland and the UK, 1890-1930 
 
Table 9. A: UK Wholesale Prices Indices, 1880-1920 (1900=100) 
Year Coals & 
Metals 







1880 64.8 130.0 140.9 124.4 129.0 
1881 61.9 127.6 138.6 123.0 126.6 
1882 62.2 123.4 141.0 123.7 127.7 
1883 60.7 119.1 139.7 121.6 125.9 
1884 57.5 115.2 123.9 114.5 114.1 
1885 54.6 108.9 115.4 111.4 107.0 
1886 52.6 99.9 109.9 101.7 101.0 
1887 53.9 102.7 106.5 95.3 98.8 
1888 56.6 101.2 110.5 98.0 101.8 
1889 62.7 105.1 110.4 103.1 103.4 
1890 74.9 105.4 108.5 99.4 103.3 
1891 70.1 101.4 116.3 95.0 106.9 
1892 65.2 95.6 109.9 92.5 101.1 
1893 59.0 96.4 108.6 89.3 99.4 
1894 60.0 88.6 101.9 84.5 93.5 
1895 56.8 84.3 98.9 84.9 90.7 
1896 55.5 92.9 93.3 86.5 88.2 
1897 56.3 86.8 97.4 86.9 90.1 
1898 61.7 80.0 102.2 89.7 93.2 
1899 72.4 82.9 98.0 91.3 92.2 
1900 100 100 100 100 100 
1901 82.2 93.3 100.1 96.3 96.7 
1902 76.1 92.3 100.6 92.5 96.4 
1903 74.1 101.7 101.2 91.7 96.9 
1904 70.9 112.9 101.2 88.3 98.2 
1905 71.3 106.7 101.0 91.1 97.6 
1906 78.3 121.1 105.5 95.6 100.8 
1907 86.9 127.4 107.0 99.7 106.0 
1908 78.5 109.8 108.7 94.8 103.0 
1909 73.6 112.4 109.2 96.5 104.1 
1910 76.6 136.2 111.6 104.3 108.8 
1911 74.7 128.9 119.9 105.5 109.4 
1912 84.9 119.6 117.7 110.1 114.9 
1913 92.5 135.0 120.9 109.4 116.5 
1914 86.7 128.8 154.1 111.3 117.2 
1915 116.7 119.8 108.7 143.8 143.9 
1916 165.8 180.1 189.4 204.0 186.5 
1917 182.0 270.4 246.2 256.3 243.0 
1918 204.9 354.4 260.3 268.6 268.1 
1919 180.2 373.3 279.7 317.8 296.5 
1920 419.2 503.7 334.1 336.6 368.8 


























1920 271.8 - 357.8 - 480.2 - - 272.9 307.3 
1921 209.0 242.9 209.9 131.9 192.3 158.3 193.7 195.6 197.2 
1922 165.2 171.7 136.8 116.2 182.2 160.6 173.3 166.0 158.8 
1923 154.5 179.3 147.2 114.1 201.9 179.2 159.7 161.9 158.9 
1924 166.3 172.4 142.9 120.3 227.8 219.0 165.6 157.6 166.2 
1925 166.5 146.0 126.0 121.6 209.8 196.9 171.9 157.4 159.1 
1926 154.8 184.6 123.5 120.1 158.3 169.5 147.5 145.0 148.1 
1927 152.0 133.6 119.9 111.9 154.7 170.2 138.5 142.5 141.6 
1928 152.3 117.9 112.3 107.1 164.2 185.9 137.8 142.3 140.3 
1929 145.3 124.5 114.2 116.0 154.4 165.6 131.6 135.5 136.5 
1930 126.6 121.4 112.7 95.0 121.2 122.4 101.7 123.8 119.5 
Source: Mitchell, British Historical Statistics, p. 729. 
 
Table 9. C: UK Retail Price Index, 1892-1914 (1900=100) 
Year Food Coal Clothing 
1892 103.9 74.4 101.0 
1893 99.3 83.4 100.3 
1894 94.9 70.5 99.1 
1895 92.1 68.8 97.8 
1896 91.7 68.2 98.6 
1897 95.5 70.2 98.2 
1898 99.5 72.1 97.0 
1899 95.4 79.3 96.2 
1900 100.0 100.0 100.0 
1901 100.4 89.0 100.6 
1902 101.0 84.6 99.9 
1903 102.8 80.9 99.7 
1904 102.4 79.4 102.3 
1905 102.8 78.4 103.0 
1906 102.8 78.4 104.5 
1907 105.0 88.9 106.2 
1908 107.5 85.6 107.1 
1909 107.6 84.1 108.4 
1910 109.4 83.8 110.7 
1911 109.4 85.1 113.4 
1912 114.5 87.0 115.5 
1913 114.8 90.7 115.9 
1914 (Jan.-July) 111.6 92.5 117.4 







Table 9. D: UK Retail Price Index, 1915-30 (July 1914=100) 
Year Food All Items 
1915 131 123 
1916 160 146 
1917 198½  176 
1918 215 203 
1919 219 215 
1920 256 249 
1921 229½ 226 
1922 176 183 
1923 169 174 
1924 170 175 
1925 171 176 
1926 164 172 
1927 160 167½  
1928 157 166 
1929 154 164 
1930 145 158 






















Table 9. E: UK Cost of Living Index, 1889-1930 (July 1914=100) 
Year Food Rent Clothing Fuel Sundries Overall 
1880 115 91 86 86 95 105 
1881 112 91 86 90 91 103 
1882 111 91 85 85 91 102 
1883 112 92 83 88 87 102 
1884 104 92 82 87 83 97 
1885 94 93 81 87 80 91 
1886 91 93 81 85 76 89 
1887 88 93 80 84 76 88 
1888 89 93 79 86 78 88 
1889 91 93 79 86 80 89 
1890 90 93 81 93 81 89 
1891 92 94 81 91 77 89 
1892 93 95 80 91 74 90 
1893 88 96 79 85 68 89 
1894 85 96 79 85 68 85 
1895 82 97 78 83 68 83 
1896 82 98 79 84 68 83 
1897 85 98 78 85 68 85 
1898 88 99 77 85 67 88 
1899 85 99 76 92 69 86 
1900 89 100 79 116 91 86 
1901 89 100 79 116 91 91 
1902 90 100 73 99 81 90 
1903 92 100 79 94 82 91 
1904 91 100 79 94 82 91 
1905 92 100 87 91 85 92 
1906 91 100 96 92 95 93 
1907 94 100 93 103 97 95 
1908 96 100 75 100 82 93 
1909 96 100 77 98 85 94 
1910 97 100 88 98 92 96 
1911 97 100 94 99 95 97 
1912 102 100 94 101 100 100 
1913 103 100 101 100 104 102 
1914 (Jan.-
July) 
100 100 100 100 100 100 
Source: A.L Bowley, Wages and Income in the United Kingdom since 1860 (Cambridge: Cambridge University 








Table 9. F: Free State Cost of Living Index, 1922-32 (July 1914=100) 
Year
12
 Food Rent Clothing Fuel & Light Cost of Living 
1922 (Apr.) 191 127 194 216 191 
1923 198 128 183 202 190 
1924 196 127 174 201 188 
1925 203 127 190 205 195 
1926 187 127 206 197 188 
1927 178 127 197 218 182 
1928 175 127 196 172 177 
1929 173 127 206 176 177 
1930 172 128 212 183 179 
1931 154 130 207 174 166 
1932 (Feb.) 151 - - - 162 























Appendix 10: Wages in the Cork & Derry Building Trades, 
1872-1930 
 
Table 10. A: Building Trade Wages in Cork, 1916-24 
Workers Wage Date 
Tradesmen (except plumbers & 
painters) 
37s. 6d. Sept. 1916 
Painters 36s. 1½d.  Sept. 1916 
Plumbers & gasfitters 38s. 3d. Oct. 1916 
Plumbers & gasfitters 41s. 5¼d.  Nov. 1916 
Tradesmen (except carpenters 
& joiners, plumbers & 
painters) 
42s. 6d. Apr. 1917 
Carpenters & joiners 41s. 6s. Apr. 1917 
Carpenters & joiners 43s. 9d. May 1917 
Plumbers 46s. 9d. Jan. 1918 
Masons & bricklayers 44s. 7½d.  Jan. 1918 
Plumbers 47s. 11d. Apr. 1918 
Carpenters & joiners 58s. 4d. Apr. 1918 
Plasterers 54s. 2d. Apr. 1918 
Painters 39s. 7d. Apr. 1918 
Painters 50s. May 1918 
Painters, plasterers, masons & 
bricklayers 
66s. 8d. Apr. 1919 
Plumbers 75s.  May 1919 
Building tradesmen (except 
Plumbers, carpenters & 
joiners) 
70s. 10d. Nov. 1919 
Carpenters & joiners 78s. 4d. Jan. 1920 
Building tradesmen (except 
plumbers) 
78s. 4d. Jan. 1920 
Plumbers 83s. 4d. Jan. 1920 
Building tradesmen (except 
plumbers) 
94s. May 1920 
plumbers 100s. May 1920 
Building tradesmen (except 
plumbers) 
82s. 3d. Nov. 1923 
plumbers 87s. 6d. Nov. 1923 













C&J M&B Stncttrs Sltrs Plstrrs Plmbrs Pntrs 
1870 30s. - - - - 34s. 30s. 
1871 - - - - - - 30s. 
1872 33s. - - - - 7¼d. hrly 30s. 
1873 33s. - - - - 7¼d. hrly 30s. 
1874 33s. - - - - 7¼d. hrly 30s. 
1875 33s. - - - - 7¼d. hrly 30s. 
1876 33s. - - - - 7¼d. hrly 30s. 
1877 33s. - - - - 7¼d. hrly 30s. 
1878 33s. - - - - 7¼d. hrly 30s. 
1879 33s. - - - - 7¼d. hrly 30s. 
1880 33s. 30s. - - - 7¼d. hrly 30s. 
1881 33s. - - - - 7¼d. hrly - 
1882 33s. - - - - 7¼d. hrly - 
1883 33s. - - - - 7¼d. hrly - 
1884 33s. - - - - 7¼d. hrly - 
1885 33s. - - - - 7¼d. hrly - 
1886 33s. - - - - 7¼d. hrly - 
1887 33s. - - - - 7¼d. hrly - 
1888 33s. - - - - 7¼d. hrly - 
1889 33s. - - - - 7¼d. hrly - 
1890 33s. 33s. - - 33s. 7¼d. hrly 33s. 
1891 33s. 33s. - - 33s. 7¼d. hrly 33s. 
1892 33s. 33s. 33s. - 33s. 7¼d. hrly 33s. 
1893 33s. 33s. 33s. - 33s. 32s. 7½d.   33s. 
1894 33s. 33s. 33s. - 33s. 34s.  33s. 
1895 33s. 33s. 33s. - 33s. 34s. 33s. 
1896 33s. 33s. 33s. - 33s. 34s. 33s. 
1897 34s. 6d. 34s. 6d. 34s. 6d. - 34s. 6d..  34s. 33s. 
1898 34s. 6d. 34s. 6d. 34s. 6d. - 34s. 6d. 34s. - 
1899 34s. 6d. 34s. 6d. 34s. 6d. - 34s. 6d. 34s. - 
1900 34s. 6d. 34s. 6d. 34s. 6d. - 34s. 6d. 34s. 34s. 6d. 
1901 34s. 6d. 34s. 6d. - - 34s. 6d. 34s.  34s. 
1902 34s. 6d. 34s. 6d. - - 34s. 6d. 34s. 34s. 
1903 34s. 6d. 34s. 6d. - - 34s. 6d. 34s. 34s. 
1904 34s. 6d. 36s. - - 34s. 6d. 34s.  34s. 
1905 34s. 6d. 36s. 36s. - 34s. 6d. 34s. 34s. 
1906 34s. 6d. 36s. 36s. - 34s. 6d. 34s. 34s. 
1907 34s. 6d. 36s. 36s. - 34s. 6d. 34s.  34s. 
1908 34s. 6d. 36s. 36s. - 34s. 6d. 34s. 34s. 
1909 34s. 6d. 36s. 36s. - 34s. 6d. 34s. 34s. 
1910 34s. 6d. 36s. 36s. - 34s. 6d. 34s.  34s. 
1911 34s. 6d. 36s. 36s. - 34s. 6d. 34s. 34s. 
1912 34s. 6d. 36s. 36s. - 34s. 6d. 34s. 34s. 
1913 34s. 6d. 36s. - 34s. 6d. 34s. 6d. 34s. 34s. 
1914 37s. 6d. 36s. - - 37s. 6d. - 36s. 2d. 
1915 37s. 6d. - - - 38s. 3d. - 36s. 2d. 
1916 37s. 6d. 37s. 6d. - 37s. 6d. 41s. 5d. 41s. 5¼d. 38s. 3d. 
1917 41s. 8d. 44s. 7½d. - 41s. 8d. 41s. 8d. 45s. 39s. 7d. 
1918 58s. 4d. 54s. 2d. - - 54s. 2d. 62s. 4d. 50s. 
1919 78s. 4d. 78s. 4d. 78s. 4d 78s. 4d. 78s. 4d. 83s. 4d. 78s. 4d. 
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1920 94s. 94s. 94s. 94s. 94s. 100s. 94s. 
1921 94s. 94s. 94s. 94s. 94s. 100s. 94s. 
1922 94s. 94s. 94s. 94s. 94s. 100s. 94s. 
1923 82s. 3d. 82s. 3d. 82s. 3d. 82s. 3d. 82s. 3d. 87s. 6d. 82s. 3d. 
1924 82s. 3d. 82s. 3d. 82s. 3d. 82s. 3d. 82s. 3d. 87s. 6d. 82s. 3d. 
1925 82s. 3d. 82s. 3d. 82s. 3d. 82s. 3d. 82s. 3d. 87s. 6d. 82s. 3d. 
1926 82s. 3d. 82s. 3d. 82s. 3d. 82s. 3d. 82s. 3d. 87s. 6d. 82s. 3d. 
1927 82s. 3d. 82s. 3d. 82s. 3d. 82s. 3d. 82s. 3d. 87s. 6d. 82s. 3d. 
1928 82s. 3d. 82s. 3d. 82s. 3d. 82s. 3d. 82s. 3d. 87s. 6d. 82s. 3d. 
1929 82s. 3d. 82s. 3d. 82s. 3d. 82s. 3d. 82s. 3d. 87s. 6d. 82s. 3d. 
Source: LG, 1894-1930; Report on Standard Time-Rates of Wages in United Kingdom, 1900, 1900, Cd.317, 
LXXXII, pp. 128-129; Workmen’s Register, 1912-36, BL/BC/MB/334-335, Murphy’s brewery material, UCCA; 


























Table 10. C: Builders’ Labourers’ Wages in Cork, 1892-1930 






































1917 27s. 7½d.  
1918 37s. 6d. 
1919 62s. 8d. 
1920 78s. 4d. 
1921 78s. 4d. 
1922 78s. 4d. 
1923 66s. 7d. 
1924 66s. 7d. 
1925 - 
1926 - 
1927 58s. 9d. 
1928 (Mar.) 54s. 10d. 
1928 52s. 10½d.  
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1929 52s. 10½d. 
Source: LG, 1894-1931; Royal Commission on Labour, Minutes of Evidence, Appendices (Group C) Volume II, 
Textile, Clothing, Chemical, Building and Miscellaneous Trades, 1892, C.6795-VI, p. 240; Cronin, ‘Work and 




























Table 10. D: Building Trade Increases and Wages in Derry, 1917-25 
Date Workers Increase/Decrease Wage 
1 Jan. 1917 Bricklayers, carpenters 
& joiners 
- 36s. 
1 May 1917 Bricklayers, carpenters 
& joiners 
1d. an hour increase 40s. 6d. 
2 July 1917 Painters Increases of ½d. an 
hour and a weekly war 
bonus of 2s. 
42s. 6d. 
1 Jan 1918 Plumbers 1d. an hour increase 45s. 
Sept. 1918 Painters 5s. bonus increase - 
1 Jan. 1919 Painters - 45s. (plus bonus) 
1 Apr. 1919 Painters 5d. an hour increase - 
9 July 1919 Bricklayers, carpenters 
& plasterers 
¾ an hour increase 73s. 5¼d. 
28 Sept. 1919 Plumbers 6s. 6d. a week increase  - 
28 Sept. 1919 Woodworkers 6s. a week increase - 
28 Sept. 1919 Sawyers 7s. a week increase - 
Dec. 1919 Electricians Uniform rates adapted - 
1 Mar. 1920 Painters. 6d. hourly increase (to 




1 June 1920 Bricklayers 3d. an hour increase 94s. 11½d. 
July 1920 Tradesmen 1d. an hour increase 99s. 10½d. 
Sept. 1921 Tradesmen 2½d. an hour decrease 90s. 1d. 
May 1922 Tradesmen 1d. an hour decrease 86s. 2d. 
Nov. 1922 Tradesmen 5d. an hour decrease 66s. 7d. 
June 1924 Tradesmen 1d. an hour increase 70s. 6d. 
















Table 10. E: Building Tradesmen’s Wages in Derry, 1892-1930 
Year C&J M&B Sltrs Plstrrs Plmbrs  Pntrs 
1892 28s. 3d. - - -  - 
1893 28s. 3d. - - - 26 1½d.-
28s.   
- 
1894 33s. - - - - - 
1895  - -  - - 
1896 35s. 4¼d.  28s. 6d. - 27s. 6d. - - 
1897 - 30s. 7¼d.  - 31s. 10½d.  - - 
1898 - - - - - - 
1899 30s. 7¼d. & 
32s. 11½d.   
32s. 11½d.   - - - - 
1900 30s. 7¼d. & 
32s. 11½d.   
32s. 11½d.   30s. 7¼d. 32s. 11½d. -  35s. 3¾d. 
1901 32s. 11½d. 32s. 11½d.   - 32s. 11½d.   - - 
1902 32s. 11½d. 32s. 11½d.   - 32s. 11½d.   - - 
1903 32s. 11½d. 32s. 11½d.   - 32s. 11½d.   - - 
1904 32s. 11½d. 32s. 11½d.   - 32s. 11½d.   - - 
1905 32s. 11½d. 32s. 11½d.   37s. 8d. 32s. 11½d.   29s. 3d. 32s. 11½d.   
1906 32s. 11½d. 32s. 11½d.   37s. 8d. 32s. 11½d.   29s. 3d. 32s. 11½d.   
1907 32s. 11½d. 32s. 11½d.   37s. 8d. 32s. 11½d.   29s. 3d. 32s. 11½d.   
1908 32s. 11½d. 32s. 11½d.   37s. 8d. 32s. 11½d.   29s. 3d. 32s. 11½d.   
1909 32s. 11½d.   32s. 11½d.   37s. 8d. 32s. 11½d.   29s. 3d. 32s. 11½d.   
1910 32s. 11½d.   32s. 11½d.   37s. 8d. 32s. 11½d.   29s. 3d. 32s. 11½d.   
1911 32s. 11½d.   32s. 11½d.   37s. 8d. 32s. 11½d.   29s. 3d. 32s. 11½d.   
1912 32s. 11½d.   32s. 11½d.   37s. 8d. 32s. 11½d.   29s. 3d. 32s. 11½d.   
1913 32s. 11½d.   32s. 11½d.   37s. 8d. 32s. 11½d.   29s. 3d. 32s. 11½d.   
1914 - - - - - - 
1915 - - - - - - 
1916 39s. 39s.    - 
1917 43s. 6d. 43s. 6d. - - - 45s. 
1918 - - - - - 45s. (plus 
bonus) 
1919 79s. 5¼d. 84s. 2½d.  - - - 62s. 6d. 
1920 99s. 10½d. 99s. 10½d. 99s. 10½d. 99s. 10½d. 99s. 10½d. 99s. 10½d. 
1921 90s. 1d. 90s. 1d. 90s. 1d. 90s. 1d. 90s. 1d. 90s. 1d. 
1922 66s. 7d. 66s. 7d. 66s. 7d. 66s. 7d. 70s. 6d. 66s. 7d. 
1923 66s. 7d. 66s. 7d. 66s. 7d. 66s. 7d. 70s. 6d. 66s. 7d. 
1924 70s. 6d. 70s. 6d. 70s. 6d. 70s. 6d. 70s. 6d. 70s. 6d. 
1925 70s. 6d. 70s. 6d. 70s. 6d. 70s. 6d. 70s. 6d. 70s. 6d. 
1926 70s. 6d. 70s. 6d. 70s. 6d. 70s. 6d. 70s. 6d. 70s. 6d. 
1927 70s. 6d. 76s. 4½d.  70s. 6d. 70s. 6d. 70s. 6d. 70s. 6d. 
1928 70s. 6d. 76s. 4½d.  70s. 6d. 70s. 6d. 70s. 6d. 70s. 6d. 
1929 70s. 6d. 76s. 4½d.  70s. 6d. 70s. 6d. 70s. 6d. 70s. 6d. 
1930 70s. 6d. 76s. 4½d.  70s. 6d. 70s. 6d. 70s. 6d. 70s. 6d. 
Source: LG, 1893-1930; Royal Commission on Labour, Minutes of Evidence, Appendices (Group C) Volume II, 







Appendix 11: Wages set by Irish Trade Boards13 
 












June 1914   - 3½d.   4½d.  
June 1915   - 3¼d.   4¼d.  
Sept. 1917   - 3¾-4½d.    4¾-5½d.   
Dec. 1917   - 4½d.   5½d.  
Jan. 1919   - 5½d.   6½d.  
Aug. 1919   - 7½d.   8½d.  
Sept. 1919 1s. 5d. 1s. ½d.  - 7½d.  1s. 5d. 8½d.  
May 1920 1s. 6½d.  1s. 3d. - 8d. 1s. 6½d.  9d. 
Dec. 1920 1s. 8d. 1s. 6d - 8d. 1s. 6d. 9d. 
Nov. 1921 1s. 6d. 1s. 4d. 47s. 
weekly 
7d. 1s. 6d. 8d. 
2 Apr. 1923 1s. 6d. 1s. 4d. - 6d. 1s. 6d. 7d. 
 
 
Table 11. B: Hourly time-rates set by the Tailoring Trade Board (Ireland), 1913-20 













1913    3d. 
14 July 1917 6-7d. 6-7d. 6-7d. 3¼ -4¼d.  
21 Dec. 1917 8d. 8d. 8d. 4½d.  
 8d. 8d. 8d. 4½d.  
12 Mar. 1920 1s. 4d. 1s. 2d. 1s. ¾d.   8d. 
 
 
Table 11.C: Hourly piece-rates set by the Tailoring Trade Board (Ireland), 1920 



















Table 11. D: Hourly Male Time-rates set by Ready-Made and Wholesale Bespoke Tailoring 
Trade Board (Ireland), 1920-21 
Date 
Operative 











1s. 8½d.  1s. 6d.½  1s. 2½d.  1s. 4½d.   
18 Oct. 1920 1s. 8½d.  1s. 6d.½  1s. 2½d.  1s. 4½d.  
14 Oct. 1921 1s. 8½d. 1s. 6½d.  1s. 2½d.  1s. 1½d. 
 
 
Table 11. E: Hourly Male Piece-rates set by the Ready-Made and Wholesale Bespoke 






















1s. 10d.  1s. 8d.  1s. 8d.  1s. 4d.  1s. 6d. 
18 Oct. 
1920 
1s. 10d.  1s. 8d.  1s. 8d.  1s. 4d.  - 
14 Oct. 
1921 
1s. 10d.  1s. 8d.  1s. 8d.  1s. 4d.  1s. 3d.  
 
Table 11. F: Hourly female wages set by the Ready-Made and Wholesale Bespoke Tailoring 
Trade Board (Ireland), 1920 
Date Operative Cutters, trimmers, 
fitters-up 
Other workers Piecework 
Sept. 1920 9¾d.   8¾d.  9¾d.  
 
 
Table 11. G: Hourly male rates set by the Retail Bespoke Tailoring Trade Board (Ireland), 
1920-22 








22 July 1920 1s. 7d. 1s. 8½d.    
6 Jan. 1921 - - 1s. 1s. 1d. 
14 Mar. 1921 1s. 2d. - 10½d.  11½d.  
3 May 1921 1s. 6½d.  1s. 8d. - - 
18 Aug. 1921 1s. 8½d. & 1s. 9d.  1s. 10d. & 1s. 
10½d.  
- - 
2 Jan. 1922 1s. 7d. 1s. 8½d.  1s. - 
10 Mar. 1923 1s. 5d.  1s. 6¼d.  10¾d.   11¾d.  
19 May 1924 - - 9¾d.14  10½d.15  
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Table 11. H: Hourly Male Time-rates fixed by Ready-Made and Wholesale Bespoke 













1 Apr. 1922 1s. 6¼d.  1s. 4½d.  - - 
15 Feb. 
1923 
1s. 4¼d.  1s. 4d. 11½d.  1s. ¾d., 1s, 10¼d. 
(respectively) .  
 
 
Table 11. I: Hourly Female rates set by the Ready-Made and Wholesale Bespoke Tailoring 
Trade Board (Northern Ireland), 1922-23 
Date Operative Time-rates Piece-rates 
1 Apr. 1922 7d. 8d. 
15 Feb. 1923 5¾d.  6¾d.  
 
 
Table 11. J: Hourly Male Piece-rates fixed by the Ready-Made and Wholesale Bespoke 
Tailoring Trade Board (Northern Ireland), 1922-23 
Date 
Operative 









1 Apr. 1922 1s. 7½d.  1s. 5¾d.    
15 Feb. 
1923 
1s. 5½d.  1s. 3½d. 1s. ½d.  1s. 2d., 1s. ½d.  
11¾d. 
(respectively) .  
 
 














16 Aug. 1920 1s. 6½d.  1s. 3d.  8d.   
10 Jan. 1921    9d. 10d.  
6 May 1921 1s. 8d. 1s. 6d. 1s. ½d.  8d. 9d. 1s. 8d. 
19 Aug. 1921 1s. 8d.   8d. 9d.  





Table 11. L: Hourly time-rates set by the Dressmaking & Women’s Light Clothing Trade 





Other men Women (factory) 
22 Dec. 1921    9½d.  
22 Apr. 1922 1s. 4d. 1s. 4d.  11½d.  6½d.  
18 July 1922 1s. 4d.  11½d.  6½d.  
19 Mar. 1923    7-8½d.   
 
 
Table 11. M: Hourly piece-rates set by the Dressmaking & Women’s Light Clothing Trade 





Other men Women (factory) 
22 Apr. 1922 1s. 5½d. 1s. 5½d.  1s. 1½d.  7½d.  
18 July 1922 1s. 5½d. 1s. 5½d.  1s. 1½d.  7½d.  
19 Mar. 1923 1s. 6½d.  1s. 6½d.  8-9½d.   
 
 
Table: 11. N: Hourly Rates set by the Hat, Cap and Millinery Trade Boards (Ireland and 
Northern Ireland), 1920-24 








26 May 1920 1s. 2d. 1s. 3½d.    
1 Mar. 1921   9½d.  10½d.  
3 Aug. 1923 1s. ½d.   8¼d.   
19 May 1924   6¾d.,7¾d.   
 
 
Table 11. O: Rates set by the Wholesale Mantle and Costume Trade Board (Northern 
Ireland), 1923 
 




7 Apr. 1923 1s. ¼d.   6d. 7d. 
 
 
Table 11. P: Rates set by the Laundry Trade Board (Northern Ireland), 1924 
Date Operative Time-rate Piece-rate 





Appendix 12: Wage Alterations in Cork & Derry, 1917-25 
 
Table 12. A: Wage Increases in Cork, 1917-25 
Workers Increase Date 
Gasworkers 4s. 8d. First quarter of 1917 
Iron moulders 5s. Apr. 1917 
Drapers’ assistants New wage of 25s. July 1917 
Boot & shoe operatives 5-8s. July 1917 
Boot & shoe operatives 10s. Aug. 1917 
Drapers’ assistants 33½ per cent bonus Aug. 1917 
Breadvan drivers16 5s.  Aug. 1917 
Gasworkers 3d. 6d. & 1s. 9d. (for boys) Oct. 1917 
Tailors 20 per cent Dec. 1917 
Tramwaymen - Dec. 1917 
Journeymen butchers 40 per cent (old wage was 25s.) Jan. 1918 
Grocers’ assistants at Madden’s 25 per cent Feb. 1918 
Grocers’ assistants at Lipton’s 2-20s. Feb. 1918 
Clerks at Guy’s printing works 20 per cent Feb. 1918 
Motor-makers 4s. First quarter of 1918 
National Shell Factory checkers, 
guagers, examiner and assistant 
superintendents 
Hourly wage advanced to 6½d. 
and a 6s. a week increase 
May 1918 
National Shell Factory 
messengers, charwomen, canteen 
attendants and cloakroom women 
Hourly wage advanced to 5½d. 
and a 6s. a week increase 
May 1918 
Drapers’ assistants 4s. a week for porters and 2d. 
in the shilling for girls in the 
draperies. 
May 1918 
Drapery porters 5s. July 1918 
Flourmill workers 5s. Oct. 1918 
Flourmill workers 7s. 6d. to men and 5s. to boys 
and women 
Jan. 1919 
Flourmill workers 7s. 6d. for men and 3s. 9d. for 
women and boys 
Mar. 1920 
Upholstery sewing workers and 
female polishers 
1d. an hour, making hourly 
wages 9½d. 
Apr. 1919 
Furnishing tradesmen 3d. an hour, making hourly 1s. 
4d. wages 
Apr. 1919 
Printing house machinists  12s. 6d. for night men, 11s. for 
day men, 5s. for boys and a 
fortnight’s annual holiday. 
May 1920 
Wholesale and retail porters and 
packers 
3s. 11d. May 1920 
Tramwaymen 10s. May 1920 
Egg and butter workers 15s. May 1920 
Soap workers 15 per cent rise and a forty-
seven-hour week 
May 1920 
Gristmill workers 6s. May 1920 
Timeworkers handling coal 3s. 4d. a day May 1920 
Gristmill workers 4s. Aug. 1920 
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Flourmill workers 10s. for men and 5s. for women 
and boys. 
Oct. 1920 
Assistants at Egan’s, McKenzie’s 
& the Central Boot Stores 
Wage increase Nov. 1922 
Assistants Dwyer’s, Bailey’s & 
McNay’s 
Wage increase May 1923 
Assistants at Gill’s Wage increases and reduced 
hours 
May 1923 
Source: DJ, 1917-25. 
 
Table 12. B: Alterations at the City of Cork Steam Packet Company, 1917-23 
Workers Alteration Date 
Quayside labourers Increase of 2d. an hour Oct. 1917 
Quay labourers and carmen Increase of 1½d. an hour for 
men and ½d. for boys 
Nov. 1917 
Office Staff Monthly increases of 40s. for 
married male office staff, and 
20s. and 10s. for single men 
and women 
Nov. 1917 
Seafarers Increase of 17s. 6d. (making 
wages 77s.) 
Dec. 1917 
Carters & loaders Increase of 7s. 6d.17 June 1918 
Coal carmen  Increase 4s. 6d. June 1918 
Teenage quayside labourers Increase of 7s. 6d. June 1918 
Labourers 45s. wage and a forty-seven-
hour week (from sixty) 
Sept. 1918 
Labourers Increases of 5s. for men and 3. 
for boys 
Oct. 1919 
Labourers Increase of 5s. Nov. 1919 
Labourers Increase of 20s. a week, 
making wages 14s. a day 
May 1920 
Labourers Incorporation of war bonuses 
into rates, making wages 70-
80s.18 
Nov. 1920 
Store clerks & checkers 4s. a week cut Sept. 1921 
Store clerks & checkers 4s. a week cut Feb. 1923 
Store clerks, checkers & 
watchmen 
4s. a week cut Oct. 1923 
Salaried staff 8s. 4d. a month cut Oct. 1923 






Table 12. C: Wage Advances in Derry, 1917-21 
Workers Advance(s) Date 
LLSR drivers & firemen Higher wage scale June 1917 
Dockers 1d. per hour for casual men & 
3s. a week for permanent men 
Aug. 1917 
Coal porters 1d. per ton Aug. 1917 
ASE 3s. Aug. 1917 
Gasworkers 3s. 1d. Jan. 1918 
Fitters 1d. an hour Jan. 1918 
Gas Company office staff Annual salaries of £52, £70, 
£110, £115 and £200. 
Jan. 1918 
Shirt cutters & apprentices 5s. & 2s. respectively19 Feb. 1918 
Distillery workers 3s. for adults and 1s. for boys First quarter of 1918 
Bleachers 4s. First quarter of 1918 
Shirt factory mechanics and 
firemen 
5s. and 2s. 6d. for apprentices First quarter of 1918 
Munition workers at Mackie & 
Co. 
7½ per cent bonus First quarter of 1918 
Railway workers 25s. to men, 12s. 6d. to boys 
and women, and 6s. 3d. to girls 
May 1918 
bottling and aerated water 
workers 
5s. and less hours Mid-1918 
distillery and yeast workers 4s. for men and 2s. 6d. for boys Mid-1918 
Pork curers Improved wages Mid-1918 
Gas company carters Wage of 1s. an hour June 1918 
Engineers 3s. 6d. Aug. 1918 
Railway workers 5s. to men and 2s. 6s. to boys Sept. 1918 
Gas company firemen & 
labourers 
4s. 8d. & 2s. 4d. respectively Oct. 1918 
Box factory women 25 per cent wage Dec. 1918 
Gaslight company firemen & 
labourers 
4s. 8d. & 7s. respectively Jan. 1919 
Boot & shoe operatives 45 per cent increase Feb. 1919 
Gas workers Eight-hour day Mar. 1919 
Irish Boot & Shoe Operatives New weekly wage scale: 13s. 
to 56s. for men and 12s. to 30s. 
for women 
Mar. 1919 
Irish Boot & Shoe Operatives Forty-Seven-Hour Week June 1919 
Electricians Belfast rates May 1919 
Carters 4s., making wages 48s. for a 
forty-eight-hour week.20 
May 1919 
Pork curers 4s. a week Aug. 1919 
Plumbers 6s. a week Sept. 1919 
Carpenters & joiners 6s. 6d. a week Sept. 1919 
Sawyers 7s. Sept. 1919 
Gaslight company yardmen 
and firemen 
Hourly increase of 1d. for 
yardmen and 1½d. for firemen 
Sept. 1919 
Gaslight company yardmen, 
firemen and enginemen. 
Wage increases Dec. 1919 
Gaslight company labourers & 
firemen 
5s. Apr. 1920  
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Tailors Wage of 11d. per log hour Sept. 1920 
Flourmill labourers Increases of 5-6s. for men and 
2s. 6d. to 3s. for boys and 
women 
Oct. 1920 
Railway workers Increases of 2s. for trafficmen, 
1s. for boy engine, and 4s. for 
the rest. 
Nov. 1920 
Tillie’s warehouse staff 10 per cent raise Dec. 1920 
Source: LG, 1917-25; undated memorandum of agreement between the NUBSO and the Irish Manufacturers 
Association, LAB 83/1591, Min. of Labour records, UKNA; NUBSO, Monthly Reports for May 1919, 



























Table 12. D: Wage Alterations in Derry, 1921-25 
Workers/union Alteration Date 
Engineers 3s. a week cut May 1921 
Masons & bricklayers 3½d. an hour cut June 1921 
Masons & bricklayers 1d. an hour raise July 1921 
Dockers 1s. a day cut Sept. 1921 
Engineers 3s. a week cut Sept. 1921 
LLSR workshop apprentices Wages lessened to 100 per cent 
above 1914 levels 
Sept. 1921 
Flour & gristmill workers 5s. a week reduction Dec. 1921 
Gaslight company labourers 
and firemen. 
½d. per hour cuts Jan. & Mar. 1922 
Coopers Cuts of 1d. per hour for 
timeworkers and of 5 per cent 
for pieceworkers. 
Feb. 1922 
Seamen Cuts of 25s. for ordinary 
seamen and 30s. for able 
seamen and firemen on 
monthly vessels; cuts of 8s. 
and 10s. 6d. on weekly vessels 
Mar. 1922 
Shipyard engineers Cuts of 7s. 6d. & 10s. 6d. May 1922 
Railway shopmen Weekly bonus cuts of 16s. 6s. 





bookbinders and machine 
rulers 
5s. decrease, giving 
bookbinders and jobbing 
compositors a 76s. 6d. 
minimum 
Jan. 1923 
Seamen On monthly vessels, cuts of 
15s. for ordinary seamen, 20s. 
for those in the engine room 
and catering departments, and 
of 30s. for boilermakers and 
electricians; on weekly vessels, 
cuts of 5s. for ordinary seamen 
and of 5-6s. for trimmers. 
Apr. 1923 
Seagoing wireless telephonists Cuts of 22s. 6d. to 27s. 6d. a 
month. 
May 1923 
AEU 4s. 9d. increase for shed fitters 
and turners obtain an hourly 
rate 1d. higher than fitters. 
Sept. 1923 
Shipyard engineers 10s. cut Oct. 1923 
Merchant ship engineers 2s. 6d. cut Oct. 1923 
AEU Increases of 1s. for shed fitters, 
2s. for turners and 5s. for 
machinists 
Dec. 1923 
Shipyard engineers 5s. increase May 1924 
Railway engineers 5s. increase Sept. 1924 
Sawyers & labourers 2d. hourly increase (rates now 
1s. 7d. & 1s.) 
Sept. 1924 




Appendix 13: Affiliates of Derry Trades Council, 1893 & 
1920-1923 
Unions/Workers 1893 1920 1921 1922 1923 
Asylum attendants (Derry)  X X X X 
Asylum attendants (Letterkenny)  X X X X 
IADAMU  X X X X 
Irish Federated Bakers X     
Irish Amalgamated Bakers’ & Confections’ Union   X X X 
Boilermakers  X X X X 
NUBSO X     
Boxmakers  X X X X 
Ancient Guild of Incorporated Brick & Stonelayers X     
Butchers  X X X X 
Cabinetmakers X     
Carpenters & Joiners X X X X X 
National Union of Clerks  X X X X 
Coachbuilders X     
Coopers  X X X X 
ETU  X X X X 
ASE/AEU  X X X X 
National Union of Gasworkers & General Labourers X     
Insurance Agents  X X X X 
Knights of Labour X     
NAUL  X X X X 
NUDL  X X X X 
ASLEF  X X X X 
Masons & Bricklayers X X X X X 
MEA  X X X X 
Musicians’ Union  X X X X 
Painters & Decorators  X X X X 
Plasterers’ Union  X X X X 
Operative Plumbers  X X X X 
Postmen’s Federation  X X X X 
RCA  X    
ASRS X     
Sailors & Firemen X X X X X 
Associated Scottish Iron Shipbuilders’ Helpers 
Association 
X     
Shipping Clerks  X X   
Shipwrights’ Association X     
Shirtcutters  X X X X 
Operative Stonemasons X     
Tailors  X X X X 
ASTT X X X   
Londonderry Teachers’ Association  X X X X 
INTO (Donegal)  X X X X 
INTO (Gweedore & Rosses)  X X X X 
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Woodcutters  X X X X 
Source: O’Connor, 2: Larkinism and syndicalism, pp. 61-62. 
 
Notes and References
1 Wages were now 48s., an increase of 12s. since 1914. 
2 Before the strike, floormen earned 35s. and firemen 37s. 6d. 
3 Specifically, the butchers wanted wages of 49s. for first class men and 40s. for second; piecework rates of 4s. 
for skinning cattle and 1s. for skinning sheep and fat dressing 
4 These clerks were members of the ICWU and not the ITGWU. 
5 This scale was operative after recent increases of 12s. 6d. to 19s. for female assistants and clerks. 
6 Included in this category are coachbuilders, smiths, trimmers, wheelwrights, vicemen and coachpainters. They 
were organised by the United Kingdom Society of Coachmakers until 1919, when this union became the National 
Union of Vehicle Builders. 
7 Sawyers were organised by the Amalgamated Society of Woodcutting Machinists, a British union. Their working 
hours were fifty in May 1917. 
8 Included in this are the wholesale prices for corn; animal products; sugar, tea and tobacco; and wine and foreign 
spirits. See Mitchell, British Historical Statistics, p. 728 for individual indices for these items. 
9 This includes wholesale prices for cereals, metal and fish, and other foods. See ibid, p. 729 for individual indices 
for these items. 
10 This includes wholesale prices for silk and artificial silk, linen, jute and hemp. 
11 This includes wholesale prices for paper, leather, rubber, timber, bricks, stone and slate, glass, china, etc. 
12 Refers to January of the year unless otherwise stated. 
13 LG, 1913-25 
14 Hourly time-rates of 8½d. for buttonholers and machinists, and 6½d. for other female workers. 
15 Hourly piece-rates of  9¼d. for buttonholers and machinists, and 6½d. for other female workers. 
16 The breadvan drivers had threatened strike if their demands were not met. 
17 After this increase, most Steam Packet Co. labourers earned over 40s. Single-horse carters now earned 39s. 6d. 
and double-horse carters now earned 41s. 6d. 
18 Wages were  
19 When the cutters sought another improvement from the SMF in August, they were threatened with a lockout. 
The dispute was referred to arbitration. See letters of correspondence between the SMF, Belfast and District 
Amalgamated Society of Cutters and the Ministry of Labour, 7 Mar., 3 Aug., 17, 30 Sept. 1918, 
LAB/2/435/IC6298/2/1918, Min. of Labour records, UKNA 
20 The carters had threatened strike unless the master carriers made concessions. 
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